THE EUROPEAN SATELLITE POWER COMPLEX

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A000900030001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 200
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 28, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 15, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

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UP WO
CENTRAL EITMLIGETICE AGENCY
? 5
/c/AiE
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND REPORTS
CIAAIR Project 6-513 elontribution to Nm-33
TRE EUROPDN SA22BILITE POWER COMPLEX
FART I
INDIVIDUAL sena= COUNIRIES8
Mame sritENCUS AND ImixtrasEs
5112U4111/211
15 Auguet 1951
aramameogromonrstraraparuverumn
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
El DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO::LS
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
DATE:
AU REVIEWER: Aatut
TH: HR 70-2
? This roport has been prspered at the request of the Office of Nations1
Estimates as a contribution to NT.E-31, The mxkiria1 Zor Section III -las
coutTibuted ty 0111, Departrterot of ;3 tate; for SootIon VI ells tor 049
Departnerrt, of the Irmo
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S,E441,T
aCzCJ rae, Irowi
C IA/RR
Projest Ge51
Evaoms annum POTTER ouLpt
(Contributien to NIE.43)
PART I
INDIVIDUAL SATML/TE COUNTRIE31
MONODIC STRENGTHS ASDWEAKNESSM
EAST MALI
Ecenomic plannine in East Gr* is carried on =oh fte it is in the
usaa. Plane aro eantralar formslated and approved in their fiaal form by
tattletale of the Soviet Union. Supervision of plan fulfillment and In-
oraaaingli ceetralised administrative control are exeouted by Party (SED)**
ereanisatione end funotionaries. Private enterprise is diedniehinge nation-
alised and Sovieteexproprieted plants together accounting for approximeesler
teeethirds of industrial output. Usasures preliminary to the oolleotivisation
Of agriculture have been taken, Gontrole are eafficiently toreprehensive to
privent majer deviations from pursuit of the goals of the current Five Year
Plan (1951.55), which. heeever6 'meta be too high to NI aohieeed in their
entirety()
The plan to inerease fteelayntent from 709 million in 1951 to SA minion
in 1953 nay well fall short of fulfillment, particularly if the *Ismael reto
of defections to the Neat continues at oteevarter ze a nillion and if
shertages of msterialso stich prevent fUll amp1oynse6. are rot allevieted?
FUrthernoree lack of technical and skilled personnel are reatTictine in,
creases ineworkar productivity.
Living standerds in. East Germany are eetimeted to be at ebeut tavethirde
of the 1936 /evel but are expected to rise slightly in 1951-.. Foodstuffe roe
main rationed* and the prices of nonrationed goods are exorbitante Etforte
are being nada to allicriate hausing shortages?
East German foreign trade is eharaoterised by importo of rav materials
and exports of finished goods:, although some comoditisa, sued' so ammtan ?
eeeores and concentrates, provide exeeptions to this pattank Train with the
Bloc conprisee about three-fourths of tete/ trade. *In 1950 thm USSR took
' about 44 percent of East GOICTE1n exports and supplied about 35 eorowet of
7?"M"-rNioanyeeer-Tilteeeonaored government of whio4 le celled the
Deutsche Denokratisohe Republik--the Gormaa Dommoratic Ropublio (CDR).-0
inoledee the Seviet Zone or Germany and the Soviet Sector of Borlin.
** Sotialisti 31uhaitspertel Oetetschlands (Sooialist Unity 'art7)0
- ? ".
..... .???
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A114.
we ap,` .f.116 es,af
imparte0 The comeosition of exporte *is t 'USSR is not expected to chaage
=tea:Away by 1962 but probably.eUl be altsrea when heavy industrial plan
swath the production levels echeduled for 1954,450 Trot& vith the Satellite?
is increasing both absolutely and aclat1ve3y, us East Ge Povideft mueh
of theaindastrial equipment end =Movie:Is required in al-snits dew, opment
plummet, A decline in, the export aurplue ia Soviet trade and a rise in tho
import surplue in Satellite trade bwteeen 1949 and 1950 sugaett that direct
Bloc exploitation of the East Germea econeay peased its peak in 19484
Official trade althWeet Gormtaa WIR4 16 percent af total trade in 1950'
and was valued at $75 nillioua while clandeetiae interzonal trade is eetimated
to be es high as from $250 rdllion ea :;3G0 zillion ayear. This trade enables
East Germaay to obtaia Industrie/ reqa.ireaents essential to the fulfillmaat of
production quotas,
Dhcompensated deliveries of materials; and equipment to the In.,'SR have
averaged mare thAn $2 Millen year, or about ee. estimated 30 to 65 perceat
of industrial production and 30 pernoat oEt Germany's national product0
flectricals railroads naming. matallurgietI. motalworking. and n.rine equip.-.
Aunita leaven. as shipe are the chief items delivered under the reparatione
'program, These deliveries have aggravatee East Germany's *concede difficulties
by contributing to shortageo of meteriels and of foreiga exchange needed to
obtain Wester-- industria/ equipmeut, bat alanned increases in industrial
empacity indicate that East Germany proba:cly will continue to make reparation*
shipments at the rate of from $1,7 hilliol to billion a year through 19520
East Germaay haa regaited selfaauffietency in grain produotiona it egaiu
exports% rugars and neat produttien %A expected to roach prewar levels by 19530
East Germany also raeeives eensiderabie quantities of graiu and meat froie other
Moo countriep, These inperte and n. low level ef domestic consumption here
allowi d. the building of stotkpiles estimated at l'million metric tone of grain
and 45e000 metric tona of calmed meats. 2ast Germany preduees no cotton,
abich has been imported in increaving amounts from the USSR9 and little woo1.
which also is obtained from foreign 00111704U* Although the lose of plants and
-technicians te the USSR temperarily retarded tho postwar development of the
mynthetio fiber industry its rehabaliation is being accelerated to offset
the shortage of natural fibers0
IduntraltAasati=aka further advanced in East Germeny than nagy of the
other Seto 1ite but industry is heavily dependent on the rest of the Bloo
and West Germeny fbr raw materia1e0 The iron and steel indu 9 which pro-
vide* approximately half of domeetio requirement!). di on i Dor
All necezeary raw materiels extept ailiCon and fluxing ahs, Output of
nonferrous metals in far short of roquiremente, Copper produotion its only
.thirds of domestic needs, No prinary eine is prodaced, and nearly one-
thire of the leaf! required naa+ '?e .araaarted, Feet Germary is the world's
riaraest producer of brown coal, of ahich reserves are extensive,
but bag experiencedeat=ficuity in saaanAiiag produation to the levpie
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requirsd bf tic grcrsing demands of the ger:mow, The dorltifir_oy 5..n output, 'and
I 2. esor ire s of btt n
L nion s Goal al to c v. ns tit-ute a a fi.,tudair.1-..t al 17613.1= St a a of tt
460, .2.PIV ci
Theze are no, known deposits of crude oil in Emit Gorries34,, Eaet Germany
is dependent on it vell-deirel utajarAtt,04.p....ii44141-4,;444444-j (thq
iargett inthe emrldr?ran ii-re-s-sverel small rofiX1611.6 ft ithiCh refine 4rade i-a-
_po4ed. from Aulrbric, /u additi
probably will continue to do so. o The number of Vest Berlin residenta
employed in, the Soviet Seetor hes n greatly reemeed.
An actual deoline in employtent took pluce in East Germany after 19469
and a peak ueemploynent of about 72590000 of whom over 3009000 were not seek,.
leg uerke ens reached in 1949.E0( In Deoember 1980, 510000 persons were
receivieg-unemployment corpensation9 and an additional 3430000 vcra receiving
welfare-benefite beoauso they were previously employed but were net eligible
for oompetiation?W
Withal estimate! 390,000 persons. leaving school in 19519 of whore 2659000
were te become apprentiees0 there would appear to be, a suffioient number of
workers to neet the 1951 employmentgoel?11( naterial difficulties and
limitatioea on the eoonomrs capacity to sorb the increased employment will
make aohievement of tbe goal leas oertaine In June 19510 unemployment gas
reperted to be increasing as a result of material ahortagcao .2.91
2. Level of Tecauliealealti.Blffie Skill, and Ettioieu
-
In 1946 there mere tear/y 100,000 engineers and technically trained
pereonnel in Emat Germaey? This number ham eieeo teen reduped by defections
but inoreeeehy the iddition of newly trained per:Jenne:to 41/ It, is raaered
that ttteripU have been made to recruit engineers eromWes Germany. I
shortage of Weilleareorkers is to be it by the training of persons having
lower lualifictations than wore formerly required. 97 1955, 1229000 engl
and teehnoieans and 9649200 appronticee in trade schools are to be trained.E/
Ottawas, .the-follawing numbers are to be trained for industry? oonstruction,
and tranaportatien:
deals of Training Progranei Salectad Sectors
1955
ter
Industvy
Construction
Transportation
5729000
929300
50,900
Engineers and
Teohnieiats
339500
10,000
109000
Productivity was aaid to have regained prewar levels by tbe end of 1949
in lightindustvy01.K but not in heavy industry? By the end of 1950. 1939
levels were to be ao eved threughout the economy? It In 19519 productivity
it, to rise by 14?7 percent and it to be 60 percent a. ve 1950 levels by the
end of 19550 Unterial supply conditions and shortcomings in training programa,
however' may restrict productivi'W gains?
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3.
The additional labor input derivable fran the present labor farce is
limited by conditions of equipment and material imply. The removal of
these obstacles would perlat increased production per worker through the
adoption of overtime and through increases in productivity.
The live Tear Plan is predicated on an increase in the warldng age
population of 400,000 persons by 1953. Such an increase would occur if there
were no migration, /f, however, flight to Western Ger maay continues at the
1950 rate of 250,000 refugees a year, the expected increase would be replaced
by a decrease, Under these circumstances the expansion of the ?comely would
depend an the resources of a population serenely-depleted in the working ages
and overbalanced with vamen, and mobilization requirements would even more
stringently =tail labor's contribution to the Five Year Plan.
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bum=
The social structure of East Germany hen changed significantly since the
end of World War II. The former upper class has practically disappeared, and
members of the former lower class have ?Jacinto leadidg positions in the pro-
fessiona? government, and industry.
Per capita consumption in 1950 is estimated at about twceethirds of 3.936
consumption (expreased in stable purchaning power). Estimates for 1951
indicate that per capita consumption will nee& 71 peancent of the 1936 level.
With the exception of bread and potatoes, most foodstuffs and important con..
sumer goods remain severely rationed. It is enlilrely that the prewar quali-
tative composition of the diet will be negained before 1955. In 1950, loather
shows were available at the rats of about 40 percent of 1936 levels. Additional
quantities of rationed goods are available in the Handels-Orgenieationen (HO
stores), where purahases may be made without ration coupons. at amoral times
the rationed price level.
General workIng conditions are regalated by the Labor Law or April /950.
Control over labor is exercised by the various ministries, and trade unions
are responsible for labor discipline and the fulfillment of work quotas.
AnrimoksialWIAMOrroarvliviOVINWEIMaroswalMailogromoommearommommeasswes
2waggamts1ullagatja.
Economic and political developments have altered the social structure to
conform with the Communist plan for political domination and econemio expansion.
The professional and industrial entrepreneurs have been replaced by members of
the lower acumen considered politically reliable ad by those willing to
accept the Communist regime.
2. Itteleg_Condit4aAa.
On the basin of national accounts, 2/ the total availability for private
consumption per capita in 1950 was estimated at about two.ethirde of the 1936
level (expressed in stable purchasing power). Soviet appropriation of goods
and services without compensation mud an increaee in population are among the
reasons for this decline. Estimates for 1951 indicate that East Germany my
reach a per capita consumption of about 7/ percept of the 19:36 level.
Rationing of potatoes wan abolinhed in September 1950, and bread and grain
rationing was removed in jannary 1951. All other major foodstuffe and all
Important manufactured consumer goads, including ?lathing, footwear, and soap,
remain severely rationed. Prefereace in food rationing is given to heavy
workers, party members, and government officiala. Heat and fat rations on
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the average *re only about 50 percent of prewar consumption levels, and not
before 1956 is the diet expected to rest& its presser qualitative oomposition.3
Supplementary quantities of fOode au d other goods can be bought in the HO
stores without ration coupons, but their prices are several time* the prices
of the rationed goods* In 1950 the average availability of textile materials
per capita me eetimeted at one-third of the 1938 level., that of leather shoes
at abautiteo-tifths, and that of soap at about one.l'ourth. Maw consumer
geode will retrain in short supply because of the coutinued emphasis on heavy
industrial produetion,
3* Working Conditions*
The Labor Law ef April 1950 is the basic bra regulating working ooeditions
in Esat-Germegre This lite delegates the authority for doterniming the wage
structure to the Ministry of Planning, which coordinates with the Ministries
of Fiume* and Labor in this tatk0 The Ylnistry of Eeonoudos has the responsi-
bility for drawing up wags norms within each 'loomed? sector* Prod,Aetioa norms,
on ithioh?wezms are, based, are determined by the Ministries of Economioi and
labor and by the .trade unions*
The organisation of trade unions (FDGB) is completely dominated by the
3' ?arty and la legally recognisolo, Tne main fUnetions of the FMB
are to maintain discipline and to prod workers toward fUlfillment of nor*
In 19500 about 80 percent of East Gerwma labor was organised under the FDG,
which camprieed 18 member unions* The Soviet Stakhanovite movement haablosa
adopted with some modifications by the trade unions*
Because of labor scarcity, women are being drawn inereesiagly into all
industries*. Three-fourths of the increase in total employment scheduled dur-
ing the Five Year Plea (/951-55) is to be achieved by Cul enployment of women*
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1V0 i TradeatrAitin_ance.
2.mm,
East Germany makes a substantial contribution to the economies of the USSR
and the Satellites not only through its exports of heavy industrial machinery,
precision instruments, and chemicals but also through uncompensated deliveries
to the USSR. The value of these uncompensated deliveries exceeda the value of
exports to the USSR. East Germany, one of the most industrialized areas in
the Soviet Bloc is heavily dependent upon imports of raw materials, and this
weaLness has been aggravated by burden imposed by of the Bloc.
A slower rate of increase in East exports to the Soviet Bloc contrasted
'with a sharper rise in imparts from the Bloc in 1950, suggests that therate of
Soviet exploitation of East Germany has passed its peak. The net Soviet gain
of? imports over experts to East Germany dropped from 0177 rillion in 1949 to
057 million in 1950. The other Satellites also were forced to contribute
more resources to the East German econaea in 1950 than they in 1949. Credits
meee extended by Czechoslovakia and Poland, and the East German deficit in
Satellite trade rose from $20 million in 1949 to $72 million in 1950.
Official trade with West Germany, although amountbag to less than 18 percent
of total trade in 1950, is necessary to fulfillmat of East German commitments to
the Bloc. Far more important, however, is illegal trade between East and West
Germany, which has been estimated to be as high as from $250 million to $300
million in 1950 as contrasted with legal imports of $75 million. East Germany
also serves as a channel through which other members of the Bloc receive vital
supplies .from West Germany.
Trade eith the rest of the -world, although accounting for only 9 percent of
total trade in 1950, is nevertheless strateeically important. A substantial
proportion of imports from these countries represents commodities which But
Germany cannot secure from the Bloc.
The continued development of East Germny as a major source of manufactured
goods for the Soviet Bloc is to be expected, unless vital imports are cut off
free the rest. It is probable, however, that further expansion will proceed at
a slower pace than prevailed in 1950 and that increased East German exports
mill ecquire a still greater increase in total imports. Lioreover? as the
effects of Western eileort controls became more restrictive, a greater proportion
of total imports must be supplied by the Bloc.
Uncompensated East German delivertes mill continue to contribute significant17
to the Soviet economic and military poUntial through 1952. The total uncompensated
deliveries to the USSR in the form of reparations, requisitions, financing of
Soviet-owned companies, and occupation costs fram 19l to 1950 inclusive are
estimated to be between 11 billion and 12 billion current US dollen, or over
32 billion a years These operatione for exceed East Germanys total commercial
trade.
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Soviet uncompensated tskings from restGermaw up to 1950 are estimated
t? be from about 25 to 30 percent of the area's national income .and from about
60 to 65 percent of net industrial production, Reparation removals affected
practically all industries of the East German economy and, together with the
effects of war damage, reduced the industrial capacity to about 50 percent or
the peak 1943 level. Available estimates seem to indicate that the Soviet Union
has been taking between 50 and 65 percent of the total production of finished
industrial and consumer goods.
Despite various industrial and financial difficulties, reparation deliveries
have been subetantiallymet by the East German econom6:partlyhecause Western
export controls have not halted extra-Bloc trade, Planned inerea.ses in industrial
capacity indicate that East Germany is likely to continue uncompensated deliveries
to the Soviet Union or on its account at the rate of from $1,7 billion to 02
billion a year through 1952.
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The following table shows value in millions of dollars of trade by principal
..;ountries and areas, ratio of trade with each country or area to total trade,
and percentage change of trade with each country or area.
East German Imports. Exports, and Total Trade
1948-50
Million Dollars
1948 V
1949 2
1950 a
Percentage
Percent-
Percentage
Percent-
Source or
of Total
age Change
of Total
age Change
Destination
Value
Value
Trade
from 1948
Value
Trade
from 1949
0.?.4???????.?
.1.....*?d??i????=0.?
Imports
USSR
51
91
31.5
4.7804
156
33.3
4 72.5
Satellites
40
79
27.3
49705
,200
42.6
4158.2
West Germany
72
74
25.6
4. 2.8
75
16.0
? 1.4
Other
28
45
15.6
460.7
38
8.1
-.15.6
Total
191
289
100.0
4.51.3
469
100.0
*62.3
Exports
USSR
68
208
54.5
4117.6
213
43.9
4- 2.4
Satellites
34
59
25.4
44.1
128
26.3
4117.0
West Germany
67
68
17.8
4 1.5
96
19.8
4 4102
Other
23
47
12.3
4104.3
49
10.0
4 -2.1
Total
192
382
100.0
4. 98.9
486
100.0
4. 27.0
Total Trade
USSR
119
299
44.6
+15103
369
38.7
4. 23.4
Satellites
74
138
20.5
4 86.5
328
34.4
4137.7
West Germany
139
1142
21.2
4 2.2
171
17.9
4 20.4
Other
51
92
13.7
4 80.4
87
9.0
- 6.5
Grand Total
383
671
100.0
4. 75.2
955
100.0
+ 142.2
a/ Estimated. 2/
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1. Trade Agreements.
The East Germ* econaey is being rapidly integrated into that of the Soviet
Orbit through a aries of trade agreements with the ussn and the Satellitee?
The most striking feature of these agreements is the large percentage inceiease
in total trade conducted. On the other hand, no formal trade agreement was
signed with, any non-Bloc country in 19500 and the law level of trade with the
nest that did oontinue waa handled on an ad hoc basis. Eeisting agreements
with Western countries were allowed to 1ae1hile agreements concluded with
Bloc countries called for impressive increases in trade.
A trade agreement 'with the USSR, signed in April 1950, provided for an
incresze of "more then 35 percent in trade.* An agreemeatNrith Poland called
for a 60-percent increase in trade during 1950, involving exchange of German
nanufactured goods for Polish raw materials. East Germanyle 1950 treaty with
Czechoslovakia provided for a trade increase of "more then 50 percent" over
1949 levels, with East Germarge to receive foundry coke rollingemill products,
l
food, and textiles in return for ehemicas, precision coke,
fertilizer,
etc. _V Both Poland and Czechoslovakia, according to these treaties, were to
provide goods on credit-ea tacit admiesion of the strain placed on the East
German econme by the proposed expansion of trade. The long-term treaties to
be concluded in 1950 with Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, based on the
Year Plans of these countries are another indication of the increasing inte
tion of the Bloc economy. Puf.ther proeress toward integration ems achieved in
a series of agreements calling for scientific technological, and cultural
cooperation among the Satellites.
Treaties for 1950 with the lesser Satellites followed the usual pattern of
providing for the eechange of German industrial products for foodstuffs aad
rar materials. The moat striking feature of these agreements was the large
percentage ieerease envisaged in East Germ:Bawls trade eith these countries)
ehich had heretofore been almoat negligible. The orie3ral trade agreement
with Euneary, thic,h was valid from October 2949 through December 1950? provided
for an eechange of goods valued at 422,3 ndlliene 5/ A srpplementaxy agreement
concluded in !larch 1950 provided for aa increase of-40 percent over the level
originerly planned, **We a second supplement, signed 31 thAy 1950, oalled
for a 70 percent increase over the original Ilan totals. 6/ The 1950 agreement
with Bulgaria called for a "fivefold inerease" over total Trade in 1949, which
amounted to only about $3 minden. Trade agreements for 19510 which apparently
follow the same patterns and trends evident in the 1950 agreements, had already
been concluded with Bulgaria, 3.0i Rumania, 2/ and Hungary 2/ by the end of 1950.
There is evidence of Soviet control of East German trade agreements and contracts.
2. Trade *filth NoneSoviet Bloc Countries.
Official trade with the rest, -while d5eiviehed? remained important in 1950.
Pentern Europe could not supply all the raw and semifinished products required
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by East Germany's expanded industrial program, particularly in the field of
metals. The bulk of East German imports from normBloc sources comes from West
Garmany. Other Western countries furnish a small but strategic-ally important
volume of supplies. Clandestine trade is considerably larger than overt trade
and is extremely-vital to the Eaoc economy. Exports to the 'gest, although
at a law levell were important as a source of foreign exchange with -which to
buy-needed imports from the non-Bloc coontries. East German trade with non-
Bloc nations is as follows mv:
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East German Te with !bp-Soviet Bloc Countries
/948-50
Dollars
Source or Destination
1948 1949
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1950
Smada
West Germany 67 68 96
Other
Austria il 2 3
Belgium, 7 4 2
Denmark 1 6 7
Fimlancl .V, 1 1
Vai ilia/
k
France
Italy
--a7
Netherlands
Norway 2
Sweden 1
Switzerland 3
United Kingdom 1
United States
k
Yugoslavia.
Total 23 47 49
Grami Total 90 115 111S
F-1:--ess than t5009000.
1 6 7
Fimlancl .V, 1 1
Vai ilia/
k
France
16
11
4
5
4
9
5
3
1
5
1
2
3
W
16 11
4 5
4 9
5 3
1 5
1 2
3 W
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Italy
--a7
Netherlands
Norway 2
Sweden 1
Switzerland 3
United Kingdom 1
United States
k
Yugoslavia.
Total 23 47 49
Grami Total 90 115 111S
F-1:--ess than t5009000.
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Avrts?
Western countries publishing detailed trade statistics reported ex.
ports to East Germany valued at $108 million in 1950,, In addition* East
Gen= reports indicate imports of another :;5 million from other non.131ao
countries* ahiefl,y the US* the UK* Franot, and Italy* Nearly $33
worth* about 30 percent of the total of detailed imports, represented metals
and metal products* of which West Gemeny delivered $27 million xcirth. The
second largest import os.tegory was chemioals and pharneuzeuticals? valued at
$1.7 miUion, of *doh 014 millionvo:>-th came from West Germany* Food ins.
ports ranked third* aocounting for 015 million* and nonelectrical machinery
import** virtually all of which came from West Germany* came fourth and were
valued at $11 million? Importo from selected 110n-B1oo countries are as
gbncrara
26
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%to% le A
1? N
tIA 1c4
*
?
qttl Al k R g
rt 1,1"
1 4. 1 1 ls
1
el 1 ri. ; gl 1 111 PI ' i i 141
N e .rimftV m 542 ltelmimH m i
1 i :i rail 1111411?1 toliklim61
121 agnagijsloliallINIP
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t4
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cy?
r-t
13:441111+)
281.011 A
RI tug
rx4i
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? Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP79R01012A000900030001-7
be Eautse
East Germanygs pritaipal exports to the Wost in 1950 1~0 food and
other agricultural product*. valued at 020 milliou; te=tile fibers and febries,
valued at 419 million; nonelectrical machinery ami octuipment? valued at 014
million; petroleum, valued at 011 million.; and chnmicsia and pharmaceutioals,
valued at 410 mi11ion4 The largest Share of total exports to the West, whioh
totalled 4146 million Werth in 1950, was taken byilevt Germany, Which accounted
for 49C minion worth, followed by ths Netherlands, Suodeng and Denmark* In
addition to East German exports to ths West on its account, exports worth at
least 016 minima were msde an Soviet account in 19500 with the USSR pocketing
the profits and the foreign exchange*
Exports to seleeted norktBloc countries aro as follows 2.0
? 29
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East German Exports to Selected Non-Soviet Bloc Countries
I> 1950 I>
73
73
73 73
3 Th
< CD
CD
CL ....==.2amaggkta_.===, Rgst 9ermans. Nethenardt Prim,' 4/ kulauk ?1212R WWI S4tpe4and Belgium .22.14
-11
g
x Food and Agricultural
mProducts
6 Textile Fibers
m
u) and Fabrics
CD Chemicals
_.%
a, and Pharmaceuticals
Fertilizers
25 Iron and Steel
a, and Products
1"3 Nunferrous gettis
.4
Use Metal Products
C) Nonmetallic Minerals
..
5; Mineral Fuels
33 and Electricity
ID Coal, Lignite,
-0 and Briquettes
.4
CD Rltroleum
?g Electric Power, Gag,
-I
CD and Water
_.% Lumber, Timber;
K3 and Products
CD Pulp, Paper,
I>
CD and Products
UD Stone, Glass, Clay,
a
a
a and Products
ca
a
a
aca
16,787
782
1,097
1
18729
11,571
1,787
1,153
3,134
788
108
5,584
389
220
2;637
1,077
4,423
1,609
325
198
176
45
175
101
222
92
473
678
4,168
398
89
11,058
3,529
2,413
6
170
310
2,247
11
49
4,006
680
1, 500
792
377
9,
X
20931i
m
18,54
9,9(g
6,71
A
49
7
4-
av
-0
4,6U
11s016
CD
3p52$
K3
2,81
2 3
a
7,3
a
a
a
a -30- _%
_%
2.4
-:,
A1-2-11-11
A-41-11-1
East German Exports to Selected NonSoviet Bloc Countries
1950
(Continued)
West
Germany
122111041 Norway A/ ROMA
?ggis Agana Switzerland
-n
Lfix J.,24.,
pa
m Other Stones and Earths
(7) Cutlery, Tools,
PA and Ironware
CD Scientific
(I; and Precision
CD Instruments
AUchinery and Equipment
aiElectrical Machinery
Is3 and Applianaes
Tran3POrtation
0 Equipment
;Processing and Repair
. Other
Pp
960
705
1,141
8,206
1,033
387
20,530
1,946
344
2,176
135
726
183
115
310
4.84
756
934
1,366
200
337
427
55
193
442
342
591
200
571
77
1,259
20
191
13
43
92
1
ET
CD
_&
CD
2,681R
13,613
? CD
1,711
90
20,53P
61,16
0
Totsa
CD
27 Eleven months.
04
2,1
AmiesMII?
Aajlg 194gAr 'Asaiti sia.47 9A2s.6.2 1.1M Jag
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Seises
ONO Saes MOO .1???
co Clandestine Trade.
Estimates of illegal trade between East ellUeat Germagy vary. but
figures of from 0260 million to MO million are frequently quoted by
authoritative sources, This =oust is about equal to the totaleeede of East
Germany with the Bloc, Shipeents of steel predominete in this trade,'
Thai importance of GOVIIEU intersonal trade to the USSR le .7eslicated
by an estimate that from 60 to 70 pereent of West Gorr= deliveries to East
Germagy are destined for the Soviet Union. ;2/ East Germany also sterns as
O. obwanol through which other Satellites obLstrategic supplies fronCrlost
Germagy, The East Berlin office of the Polish Trade Eimistry reportedly has
the job of obtaining metals and naohinery unavailable in East Germany from
Uest Germmeyelt,
S0 Trade with Soviet Blob Countries
In the years preceding each of the World Wars Germany was an important
trading partner first of Russia and then of the USSR9 serving as a major
spume of industrial imports, FellowingWerld War II. a substantial portion
of the East German industrial plant wars dismantled and removed to the USSR?
The Soviet Union soon discovered, however* that it was more profitable to
leave factories intact in East Germany and to man then with the more ex.
perienoed and skillful Gernenworloares with production:financed through the
Germ= Democratio Republic (GDR) budget, The USSR therefore set about build.
tug up East GaMOW as one of the Orbitts major industrial areas', Ra w materials
were furnished by the other Satellites. *swell av by the USSR9 in order to
expand and exploit East German production askpaoitio
The effeetiveness of Soviet policy is clearly denenstrated lea the inoroase
of the Orbit's share in total East German Zereiga trade9 which roes from
approximately one.half in 1948 to nearly two.thii-ds in 1949 and to almost threui.
fourths in 19500 Another indication of Soviet success in integrating East
Geneuerts foreign trade into the Moo eponegy is the impressive 138epercent
increase in 1960 over 1949 East Gamma trade with the Satellites, Spectacular
increases in this trade occurred in the last quarter of 1950, in which period
were recorded over 82 percent of the year's Soviet deliveries to East Germany
and 75 percent of the yearns East German exports to the other Satellites? The
magnitade of the increase in imports from the USSR in the last 2 nonths of
1950 is reflected in the drastic change in the balance el-I:lithe Soviet Union.,
which dropped from& favorable balance of nearly 40 million to a. deficit of
049 million, Tho following table shoes East Gorman trade balances in late
195010
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East German Trade Balances
1950
TbousaMl Dollars, .
Area ..
31 Ootobar 1950
31 Deoether 1950
Soviet Bled)
USSR
.19,936
- 400316
.690252
Satellites
.620962
70,833
. 79871
Total Bloc
.430026
44201149
.770123
VOn.6oviet Bloo
4. 30185
4. 5.103
A; 10918
Grand Totaliil.
*59841
sona.??????????1?110
,5 046
..!7.50206
4.1=1010M?PI
East Geri= trade with the Soviet Blots in ea follows 10
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6.43.0-R43-T
East German Trade wita Soviet Bloo Countries
1943.60
trillion Dollars
Source or Destinat1on
1943
1949
1950 a/
USSR
Satellites
61
91
156
Bulgaria
China
Czechoslovakia
Hungary
Poland
Rumania
Total Satellites
Total Bloc
USSR ,
Satellitei
Bulgaria
China
Czechoslovakia.
Hungary
Paland
Rumania.
Total S atellites
Total Bloc
1
2
laj
kJ
10
15
2/
6
29
66
e
1
40
79
91
170
68
208
il
4
1
27
24
140
4
ZOO
356
..........
213
2
31/
2
7
26
41.
105
sit
2
69
128
10Z
267
341
j China was rat oonsidered a Soviet Satellite in 1948. Figures for 1949
are not available* but trade with China probably WKS 12eigligib1eo
.54( Lese than 050000000
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S.E.O.RZ.T
a.0 Imports?
East German imports from the Orbit amounted to $118 million during
the first 9 months of 1950. Poland supplied 074 million aorth0 principally
coal and ooal produots; the USSR0 029 million; Osechos1ove1da0 $7 million;
and Hungary0 06 million. The prineipal item was 071 million worth of coai.
apparently aovired to meet the needs of the expanding Eest German indua.
trial plant. Seooni oame iron and stee10 various meta1s0 and letal products,
which at:counted for 019 million. Food and transportation equipment each
accounted for another 08 million.
Imports from the USSR consisted ohiefly of raw materials to be proqg,
sensed and returned to the Soviet Union as finished products. Soviet exports
of 016 million worth of metals and metal produete represented 55 percent of
total import* from the USSR received during the 9.month period and 83 percent
of total metals and metal products received from the Orbit during the period.
The USSR also supplied most or the 06 minion worth of transportation equipv
ment reoeived from, ths Orbit. Soviet eommitmonts for deliveries of crude
iron snd produets had been more than fulfilled by the end of
August 19500 2.31 and commitments to deliver industrial diamonds and copper
to Rest Germany had been also to 2.43/
Imports from **looted Soviet Sloe countries are shown in the following
table 194
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A-g-i-A424
East German Imports from Selected Soviet Bloc Countries
JannarrSeptember 1950
(.1) 4561?11111.1?2?01?01?11.1.014101.1111???10001116211t.
Mad
Quipsi
lfunge.ry? pulearia famja
a
-nFood and Agricultural Products
-1 Meat, Poultry, Butter, etco
7J Fruits and Vegetables
Wines
ET
m Tobacco
cf) Rubber
Cotton
CAD Hides for Tanniag
CAD
CAD Lumber and Products
a
CAD
zOinerals and Products
Pig Iron
" Steel and Products
Wire, Cables, and Bars
5; Nonferrous Metals
i3 Various Metals and Products
ID
ip Manganese, Chrome, and Ores
-.4 Apatitm Ores and Concentrates
CAD Uica
7J
CD Coal Products
_.% Abestos Goods
CD
_.% Pyrites
K3
>
?Cement
a
a
gChemicals and Dyes
a
a
a
a
a
579
531
1,552
222
1,167
1,243
4,609
8,623
630
1,140
208
244
499
199
450
70,888
270
557
495
1,980
622
715
3,130
1,080
298
213
360
- 36
=121
70
261
4,217
282
54
1,911
184
298
19075
(7)
a)
cf)
531
1,552
CID
222
CID
860
CID
Z3
CID
rs3
430
? ?
3,147
1,243
49609
9,245
630
19140
CID
203
7J
70,888
,244
304
304
K)
270
CD
60
1,274
ki-i7h7N71
East German Imports from Selected Soviet Bloc Countries
January-September 1950
I>
73
73 (Continued)
1
-0
<
a m
-n_._._?,.....Q,E_sdjv_z_on t _ USS8 Baal ketas.W.232_41 &BUZZ- Dulizaria BlEada ..-12ta 9,
9, X
x Machinery, Parts, and -Apparatus m
IL Industrial Diamonds and Dust
2 Ball and Roller Bearings
w Machine Tools
CD
CD
tot? Textiles and Products
Machinery and Equipment
fg Traneportation Equipment
N3 Automotive Spare 'Parte
.4
.Trucks
C) Antomobiles and Accessories
33 Other
0
-4 TOW
-0
to
a
a
?%
K.1
699
357
667
143
182
347
787
169
303
2,609
2,830
483
800
10190.
10316
109
255
23
Ltaak
730827
Lila
6101
1.22/2
22
699 f)
357
810 m
1,485 CI
CD
CD
303 ?a
CD
ti
29609
2,830 C)
483
3693
2.17a587 c-A
a
a
a
a aa
CD
a
a
a
a
a
a
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S-E-C-R-E-T
Prior to the yen d spurt0 East Germany exported approximately 0145
minion worth of products to the Bloo countriese The three largest recipients
Imre the 0S%* Which accounted for 0113 million, neariy 79 percent; Poland
021 million; and Czachoslovakia. 08 million. The leading exports0 in order of
their itiportance0 were machinery0 043 million; ferti11zer0 052 million;
ohamica1s0 017 million; eleotrical appliances and apparatus. 015 million;
transportation egzipthent. $13 million; mad nonmetallic minera1s0 05 mi11ion4
East Germany is also an important souree of uranium ore? A Vest
German broadcast of 11 May 19510 citing the East German rail administration
at Cottbus as its authority? slated that an average of 80 boxcars of uranium
ore nan leave daily for the USSR02.01
Exports to seleoted Soviet Blocs countries are than in the follaning
table aVa
East Gera= Exports to Selected Soviet Bloo Countries
January.September 1950
Thousand,Dollars
USSR
Poland
Czeohoslovakia
Rumania
.....13u21w.La
Total
Fertilizer
190830
80045
40038
510933
Metals and
Latal Products
30280
156
381
$0817
Nonmetallic
Ltinerals
50458
18
5,476
Lumber and
Produots
30628
509
40137
Chemicals
90982
2,168
30177
321
623
363
16.634
Photographic
Equipment
10272
338
488
47
147
20292
Textiles and
Glelhing
10582
10582
Llaohinery
36,510
50127
972
21
420630
Electrical
Machinery and
Appliances
13,748
918
140666
Tranaportation
Equipment
12092
489
120551
Llismellansous
Industrial Goods
40372
40372
Other
2,620
1.341
254
177
10
40402
Total
112k 792
20.644
80330
1029_3
??????=4????
865
541
1.440472
M
OANOMOMINIMM
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s-E,c-n-E-T
MN. f a. 404111.
Uncomeensated Deliveries.
a. Introduction.
The evaluation of the reany different catesori-s of seeds and
servicea accuired by the Joviet Union as reparations is a difficult
probleu, noviet uncoelpensated takings in thio report are expressed in
the basic valuation of 193C or 19,V4 (price-stop) :.eichannri; (11). Con-
uersion into dollar equivalent of 153C purcheeins power is at a rate of
neichaearh 1 to UJ O3O. Takinss fro current production aro uoetly
expreeoed in terns of 1944 Geruan price:3; which are estivated at frael
10 to 15 percent above the 1938 prices.
Tho adjuetelent of dollars of 1;3,:.: purchaoins power to current
dollars proseen.re an additional proble.e. -s an over-all factor, the UJ
wholesale price index for nanufactured oode has boon utilized as a
nduittedly? this index dace not neceesarily apply to all
the irice e of nuropcan nanufactured product. ::owever? in ordor to provide
soew.: idea in tens of dollar values, nest Genial uncoevensated deliveries
in torus ef Deutsche ar1 tt (Dn) or neichsuari: (ii)- are calculated at
current US ?0.60 to a: or LI because of the reduction in the purchasins
power of the US dollar.
At the Yalta Conference in 1945 the USel'? our:Lasted that Gernany
ehould pay the alias e20 billion in reparations in seeds and services,
includins surplus industrial equipreent, external accts, current produc-
tion, and servicco of war prisoners. The 3oviet dolosation also susseoted
that ,;10 billion of this auount shoeld be paid to the neviet Union and .1.0
billion to the ',:estern ;uropean countries. Jubseeuent conoiderations by
the US and UK delosates led to the uonclueion that billion worth of
reparatione via o too hich and that no reparationo should be denanded free'
current Gernan pneduction. These conclusions nem, diocuseed at the Potodau
Conference and nnre incorporated in the asroor,ent sienea by the US, the I",
and the UJJ1Z. Tho asreed uethods of meetins reparation elaies were United
to expropriation of Gernan external assets ana ree:ovel of industrial equip-
nent from war and rar-potential plants.
b. 122paations rarleents to the 1.=.
The Soviet Union hi refuocd to furnish any inforuation resardinG
reparation neuovalc frcle Jast Ger...any. Conoccuently, no exact official
infoneation lee avnilable on the extent of these reelovalo, but various
reportu ineicate that plant reuovals have been larse and have extended to
industriee nith little or no war petential.
The pro-1948 Goruan unit of currency.
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Dismantling of East Gorman industries begen in the middle of 1945
and continued aporadically trash 1946. Ettimatee on the extent of diee
mantling indicate a loss of indnstrial capacity equal to about 30 percent
of the 1943 level. Dismantling and war damage combined left the East
German induetrial capacity balm/ 50 percent of the 1943 wartire peak.
By the middle of 1946 tale USSR realized that dismantling of East
Gerran rectories was detrimental to the fell utilization of the plant
capacity. It vas therefere announced in 1946 that planta earmarked for
reparations would be trarsferred to Soviet ovnership but would be left
it East Germaay to be operated with German labor and raw materials under
Soviet ovnerehip. SevenWour of these plants were returned to the
German Democratic Republic (GDR) in, Nardh 1947.
Subsequent inforration indicates that the Sovietesowned companies
control about one-third of East Germanyts total brown coal production,
two-thirds of the pots& prcducrtion oae-half of the metallurgical capacity,
oneabelf of the =last capacity, and between 90 end 100 percent of other
buildingamaterial cepacity.a/ By the end of 1949, reports estimate that
the Soviet-owned (SAG) plants had an absolute monopeke in the basic chemical
industriee and also exercised control over 3,000 state-owned enterprises
and approxirately 24,0CC privately owned enterprises through their control
of coal and power proituction. The total cumber of German employees working
for SAG plants ia estimated at about 300,000 not including 70,000 deployed
In uranium ntininz. 32/ The GDR has no influence Od the SAO plants but is
obliged to deliver rem eaterials and machines to them on a priority basis and
at prices fixed below production costs. 2.41 Prices for reparations deliveries
are based on the value of the 1944 P. It is estimated that the value of SAG
production in 1950 wee about Dn 3.6 billion at thoae prices. SAG production
is delivered to the USSR et. exported on Soviet account...IV
In addition to the SAG enterprises, the USSR has assumed a Trustee
Administration control over 309 industries with 34,000 employees in Perlin,
which in 1947 produced RH 439 million vorth of manafactured goods, of whieh
38.5 percent vent to Soviet account. 2?/
The following table Shove reparations deliveries by East Germany
to the USSR from 1945 to the end of 1948.F The value of labor performed
by Cerm a prisoners of war and the value o the former German areas annexed
by Poland and the USSR east of the Oder-Name line Are not included.
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East German Reparations Deliveries to the UM
194548
Confiscated War Materials and War Booty 500
Industrial Machinery and Installations Removed to the USSR 2,000
Payments from Currant Production (including Feod? Mhchine
Products? Optical Instrumento, Wood Products, Textiles,
leather, and Other Itams),
Industrial Plante Transferred to Soviet Ownership
(SAG Firms)
Transport, Business Interests, and Other Property (ron.
SAG Firms)
Capital Holdings Geld, Jewell71, AnClues, and Art Works
Total
Deliveries Scheduled by the End of 1948
Total Reparations by the EDI of 1948
axternal Assets
3,500
800
500
1,600
200
24122
500
2 6 Lo Dif
500
si Controlled through the central Soviet-ouned bank, the Guarantee and
Credit Bank.
12/ This estimate corresponds approximately to State Department /M.3A4,
29 November 1948.
Planned SAG production for reparations from October 1947 to June 1948
is as follows ag)%
SC-RF.E.1
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? Approved For Release 1999/0.9127:;..gitVRDP79R01012A000900030001-7
Planned SAG Prod-ction on Reparations Account
1 October 1947 to 30 June 1948
odi
Ileavy Industry
Steel
ITonforroUs Metals
Half-finished Products of
Copper, Zinc, and Alloys
Lead and Parts for Storage
Batteries
Li ht Industry
0111?6111?11.V.1?101?IMAMIII 41.1110?
Deliveries
./.1111?1?111.0111/.1?11.1??????????????0
atria Tons G00,0002/
Motric Tons 400,000
Eetric Tons 2 0 000
Metric Tons 110,000
Heavy 77orkship Oach nes Metric Tons 240,000
Ship Construction Metric Tons 180,000
Shipyards I:etric Tons 1600000
Mines Metric Tons 60,000
Rubber Manufactures Metric Tons 120,000
Light Machines and Tools Metric Tons 260,000
Agricultural Machines Metric Tons 80,000
Automobile Industry-
Passenger Cars Units 12,000
Trucks Units 8,000
Trailers Units 10,000
Tractors Units 16,000
Chemicals
Basic Chemicals :anion DL: 8 110
%Lnaaia Lillian Dlls 17
inorganic Chemicals Million DEs BO
Explosives Million DES 540
Lyos Million DLLs 30
Tar Products Million Its 40
Precision Instruments ;anion DT's 75
:lectric Equipment Million DMs GO
Construction Materials
Canent
Timber .
Thousand Metric Tons
Cubic Motors
20
120,000
117"-TETaTrIned de ivories or etre mnounted to 1467boo rys,t'iTC-7760ns?
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-
In 1949, production on reperations account was planned at DM 1.02 billion
Lint reached DM 1.07 billion. 29/ Approximately 75 perceat of this value of
production was accounted for by mac:Awry. SAG plants pxodwed c;bout 43
cent of reparations output, with nationalized and private Fast German plags
producing the remainder,
0. E'2112A2Ey2,22:ue of Uncompensatod Deliveries.
The financing of Soviet takings frau Zast Gorzolnyto ourront pro-
duotion has been accomplished through the following moans:
(1) Curroncy expropriated from financial institutions at the
ond of host1l1tios0 ostimateC at about RII 3 billion;
(2) Issuance of Allied Filitary eetimated a betwoen
RI:1 8 'billion and RD: 12 billion;
(3)
Levios on 1;asi German covornment budgots; and
(4) Profits made by Soviot trading and industrial corporations?
transactions in the blanL7 raarket,, and other commercial activities. 'Jo
ostimate of the ragnitudo of such profits is nossif)100
Dy the middle a 1950 the Soviot Union claimed toat East Germany
had paid only about ,)5,7 billion of the 010 billion reparations bill..
Of tho remainder? aoprodmately j63 billion the USSR forgave 50 percont0
and orderod that the remaining 50 percent be paid 1933 dollar over
a period of 16 yoorsr In current dollar value this Can roprosents an
annual burdon of fros 0500 to 4.00 million.. To this total must be added
about 0900 million ;enually accruing to the USSR from stlx oporations and
profits? Plus the oviet military occupation costsond maintonanco of
S00,000 Soviet arm3d. forces (probably ropresonting Irmo 2 o rillion to
130 million)0 Tla total due in uncamnensated de1rcie s -hu s bstwoon
106 billion and :107 billion a yearo
The lovioq on the German Laender budgets ha -e oo,otlto.%-,d tho
largest sore s cf funds since 19M-71.31avo orobloa *:lo Soviet authorities
to stop the issumoe of military marks. In 1946-47 the Soviet lovios an
the budgote roprosonted about 70 percent of total public rovonuos0 In
1543-49 the oocupation chargos 1.ere nlanned at over 50 percent of total
publio revenuos and were to be spent for: (1) paymont of troops; (2) main-
tenance of ocrunation forces; (3) acquisition of nonreparation industrial
proporty; and (4) pay eats for current production including SAG output for
reparations.
Estimir:da balod on available information indicate that s from the
middle of 1945 to tho end of 19430 total Soviet levios on the East Gorman
publio budgets amounind to DI.: 1608 billion a year*.
? 43
iert. Wm.. WOO. ?????? ????.0
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.00 4111??? 1141.4 Yam 460.11,
Soviet menotary takings frau East Germany indicate that the USSR
was at all times suppliod vith amplo local funds for exploitation of the
East Germany economy through financial meauso aiil
de, neoarations Plan for 1950.
?????IMPIP-411.
In 19500 I;ast Gormanyvs actual reparation deliveries annulated to
ovor DII1 billion in 1944 values* or about c,600 million 0_321 Those repara-
tions do not include some of the groatost Last German uncompensated contri-
butions to the Soviet Union* such as services* pay to the occupation troops*
freicht chx:.ges* subsidies for SAG nlants. and the supply of DM. taken from
the rational End Laender bdgetso L3_21
Production in the SAG plants in 1950 was schoduled to amount to
DI: 306 billion in 1944 prices. This production includes D/1 468 million
worth of manufactured Goods au reparations account* leawlng about DU 302
billion north of goods which are shippod to the Soviot Union* sold to othor
countries on Soviet account* or sold to East German industries at double
their cost to the SAG plants., Of the total 1)11 306 billion SAG production
in 1950* the following are the main categories at 1944 prices:
Production of SAG Plants
1950
(19,11_111.2911
Proeriction
17in1ng Products
250
Chemical Products (including DLI 506 million
in Synthotio Fuels)
12491
Precision Tools and Optios
102
nachinery
764
Electrical Products
4M1
East Gormany*s production plan also oallod for DLI 362 million
Tmrth of export goods to be delivered to tho Soviot Control Commission
by Gorman-awned industrios at 1944 prices?
In addition* the SAG plant and equipmont expansion progrmn called
for an oxponditure of DI1 317 million* probably in current values* Itich
vas to be met by the East German economy* El
Tho Aeparations Deparbient-Plan cilia for the follawisig?de-Thieekeii-in
1950.2il:
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OM MO ONO MO OP
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asam, otwa? sues ow." %maw
I.a.st German Planned Reparations Delivorics
1950
Thousand Mu (1944 Value)
aagownemo..........111016.1.411..enas
COMMOCI
Railroad Equipmanb
/13,334
76,399
Parrot- and Electrotechnical
7quipment
126,499
77085
General Metallurgical Equipment
15,941
12,644
Rolling lull Equipmont
35,068
35,068
Mining Equipment
34,800
29,000
.:Iiro-drauing Equipment
6,000
0
Cable-verkingrachinory
1,894
1,504
Cranes and Movable Lifting Equipment
36,319
A)
Pumps and Campressor Equipment
10,050
4,259
1:etaluork1ng Equignont
13,486
11,554
Gement Plant Equipment
17,120
179120
Construction and Roadu,building
Equipment
7,435
53245
Installations for ChomicaI and
Rubber Plants
30,210
210587
Installations for rood Industry
73,280
25,300
Foundry. Equipment
installations and Equipment for
3,155
Refrigeration Plants
22,550
53000
Various Industrial Installations
8,610
2,300.
Other installations
200470
183845
Marine Equipment
40,000
16,720
Ship Repairs and Salvaging
480000
11,000
Ship 1/v47,11:1iation
2,000
1,250
COmounioationa-Eq4imant
10,000
8,000
Laboratory and Testing Equipment
100000
70600
Prefahricatod Houses
Ilth Sanitary and Heating
Equipment
22,400
0
Without Sanitary and Heating
Equipment
45,000
0
Building I:aterials
5,000
0
Printing Plants
80,000
0
Industrial Installations and Goods
for Polish Reparations Account
102,500
45,800
Total
941,121
432,078
Plans for East Gorman production on Polish reparations account in
1950 are az folloun
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S-E-C-R-E-T
Last German. Planned Reparations Deliveries to Poland
1950
Thou and DMs 1944 Value
Como 1*./ P
Transportation Equipment
1,000
1,000
Pumps and Compressors
500
0
3leetric Trolleys
2,000
1,000
Boilers and Armatures
2,000
1,000
:Tilling Equipment
2,000
0
Pel:Traohic Equipment
4,000
0
Bakery Lquiument
1,500
0
Verkb,mches for Textile Industry
800
0
Radio Equipmont
2,700
1,350
Special ;?,-----roc-;c1 Jeluipae:d,
1,000
1,000
Labcratory Equipment
5,000
5,000
Selenium Rectifier
1,500
0
Dairy and Oil nill Equipment
2,500
2,500
Compressors
1,000
0
Loading EATuipment
1,000
1,000
Various Workbenches
2,000
2,000
Cutting Tools
2,000
20000
flachinist Tools
1,500
1,500
fleasuring Instrumonts
3,000
1,500
Typewriters and Calculating
Machines
7,500
0
Radio Receiving and Sending
Sets
1,000
1,000
Photo Apparatus
49000
0
1:edical Supelies and
Eq:ipment
2,000
0
Various Chamicals
1,000
10000
Fluid Fuel
7,500
7,500
Typographic Equipment
10,000
0
Other
320500
13,450
Total
1020500
43,800
S -13 -0 -R -E -T
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5. Trends--IncludinLIndications of I:obilization for Ylar.
0.IIWIMO?sa.M1?1
Th? eamparative amphaeis on various commodities in East Germany
foreign trede in 1951-52 will follow the pattern already established. Imort
appropriations for the various branches of East German industry during the
fiscal year 1951-52 will total 0887 million* uith the principal items az
follows: food* ;504 million; metals* 0222 million; textiles* 0101 million;
mining* c, million: and chemicals* 075 million* Export appropriations are
sot at million* of uhich maohinory and electrical ongineering will
account for ;)318 million; chamicals* 0120 million; precision instruments,
08 million; and minin 77 million, 29./ Thereforer, the indicated goal of
to tradn for the 1951 fisoal year is approximately 01,6 billion* an
increase of more than 60 percent over the 19E0 total trade* It seems un-
likely* hawever* that overt trade* at least* uill amount to much more than
J2 billion in 1951 or about 0105 billion in 19520
The forced redirection of East German trade to the Soviet Bloc
and the large expansions planeed for 1951-52 are eatpected to produce strains
in both East Germany and ita trading partner For example* the USSR '
probably r.11 be unable to provide East Germany with aluminum in 1951-520 az
it has iu he paste because of heavy demands from China., It is likerine
unlikely that the USSR will be able to deliver bauxite before 1952* and the
609000 meteic tons nramised by Hungary will not meet Eest German needs...L/7
The 3i ate? will have difficulty in filling East Gorman steel requirements.
The increasing integration of East Germanys foreia trade into the
Bloc ecoaaly uill continue. East Germany role as purchaser for the Orbit
ia the Vest dill become increasingly important, particularly in West
Germamr. ODD indication of teis trend is the plan for East Germany to
assume reeponsibility for all machinery purchases in the tient fer the entire
Oatellite area, Ono of the principal reasons for this maneuver is to
prevent the Vest fraa knowing the ultimate destination of the imports0
Taespite the Blocls goal of maximum independence frau the nest, it
seems unlikely that trade with non-Bloc countries can be out appreciably
belaa prleent levels, eapecially in view of 2ant German obligations to the
Blee and the apparent progrom of East German, purchasing inthe Vest for other
Bloc members? On the contrary, it SOMB pro-eable that the achievement of
pla end expansion of East German foreign trade become increasingly
c7cpxadont u2L.a enceeze ia =curing strategic, lea:aerials fram the West* Trade
rrithTlos;.; Germany will remain vital to East Gormanyes industrial plans,
and there Is evidence that the volume and value of East aermany's overt and
covert inparts froa the West will increase in 1951 unless effective measures
are taken 4o tighten Western export controls, espec1a4y in West Germany.
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dial,WIstra.
..?4-941-21
Ana=
The territories now oomprising East Germany were characterized before
the war by a system of diversified farming in which livestock, grain, and
industrial crops, particularly sugar beets, were the chief commodities
produced. Srain output was sufficient to fill human consumption needo,
meet still larger livestock requirements, and provide a small surplus.
Sugar was exported in important quantities, but meat products were
imported. Shortages of cotton, mhich man not produced domestically,
and of wool, of Which domestic output provided only 5 percent of require-
ments, led to the growth of an important synthetic fiber industry.
? The postwar recovery of this eystem of diversified farming has enabled
East Germany to regain its position Of self-eufficienvy in grain and to
resum sugar exports, although prewar production totale have not been
reached. Meet output 110 expected to reach prewar levels by 1953. The
textile industry Ms imported increasing amounts of cotton from the USSR
and is using nore waste than formerly in manufacturing woolens. Although
the loss of plants and technicians to the USSR temporarily retarded the
postwar development of the synthetio fiber industry, its rehabilitation
ie being accelerated to offeet the shortages of natural fibers. A few
cooperatives have been formed, but no attempts have been made to collectivize
agriculture.
A food base is being built up in East Germamv. One million metric tone
of grain reportedly were stockpiled in 1950 from Soviet Bloc Imports?
Large additional ehipments in excess of domestic requirements are pIntrld
for the next few year. A 1950 stockpile of 45,000 mztric tole of canned
meat, which could have been obtained from the 1950-61 Indigenous production,
is also reported, and considerable amounts of meat, proceosse, roZrigorated,
and on the hoof, are being imported. Further increases in moat production
are planned during the next fewyears? and considerable additional quantities
could be stockpiled if domestic consumption were kept at a lad level. East
German sugar production makes an important contribution to Bloc food supplies.
The capacity of East German textile plants and the technical skill of their
operators could be a considerable asset to the economy of the Bloc if raw
materials mere forthcoming from the USSR and the Satellitee.
-
4ga.
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1. glain.
a. &Option.
Prewar grain production in East Germany averaged about 6.8 million
metric tons a year Output declined seriously during the war and by 1948
had risen to only 70 percent of the prewaraverages or about 4.8 million
tone. An 18-percent increase over 1948 level:: was achieved in 1949, when
production totalled approximately 5.6 million tonss but the 1950 output of
5.7 million tons was only slightly above the preview yearge production,
Production is estimated as fellows:
Latest Annual Estimatesof Grain Production
1948-50
. t
Probable Range of
Xigat =IBM BiC2A1M-91...TCLUDILtit
1948
4,758
4,282 to 4,996
3949
5,616
5,054 to 5,897
1950
5,667
5,100 to 5,950
&sesLite
There Is no evidence that East Germany plans an immediate change in
grain acreage, and, therefore, the 1950 grain acreage has been carried over
Into 1951 and 1952. Applying the prewar average yield to the 1950 acreage,
the, production estimates for 1951 and 1952, as shown in the following table,
are nearly 58 million metric tons, or 2.3 percent greater than the 1950
estimated production:
Estimated Grain Production
1951-52
Probable Range of
MailE Ad2aa,12 Iadmilm.eLbatinta
1951 5,798 .5,218 to 6,088
1952 5,798 59218 to 6,088
* Grain unless otherwise specified includes wheat, ryes barley.? oats,
corn (maize), and such minor grains as meslin and buckwheat.
49 -
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2+24.114
ammktilJa4Vaumda.
Before the warH grain production- In East Germany filled domestic
requirements tmd provLed a surplus equal to about 10 percent of total
output. Forty percent of the total output of rye eats barley, and'
neslin vas fed to live:A** together with cora rye, oats,
tar the
purpose. Other domeeio requirements, in addition to human consumption,
inolude need and 1ndur4ria1-demand.
Domestic svarAtaity of grain, computed from East German production
and foreign trade, is 4e,imated as follovet
Esti-la-ad Domestic Availability of Grain
190-53
Onie...VMANftilkwei IMWSMAIRPOIDINIkifONMWAMJ3321412.112gE
igitszte
Probable Range of
bigatio-siallastit
190-4 r
4,725
4,249 to 4,963
1949:.6
5,607
5,045 to 5,8t3e
1950.
5,667
5,100 to 5,950
1951,:U
5,977
5,379 to 6,276
2952..63
5,977
5,379 to 6,276
Before World idar II, East German grain consumption averaged about
143 kilograms per cs?ita per year. Per capita availability, computed fran
data on population A.'oduction, importa and erTorta? and fluctuating live-
stock and industriL requirements, is estimated at 139 kilograms in 190-49,
149 kilograms in 1949-50, 139 kilograms in 1950-51, 147 kilograms in 1951-52,
and 146 kilograms LA952.63. Livestock requirements rose in 1949, were
26 percent above 1949-50 levels in 195041, and are expected to rise 309
percent over the previous year's levels in 1951-52 and 2.5 percent over
1951-52 levels in 1952-53.
d. Otookol3.e4.
Although the statistical grain balance for the consumption year
1 August 1949 through 31 July 1950 indicates that the availability of
grain for human consumption was equivalent to 149 kilograms per capita,
or 6 kilograms* more than the prewar average, the US 62 reporteay exported
* In 1949-50 a per capita supply of 6 kilograms was evival?mt to 112?CCO
metric tens,- This quantity of grain, if not consumed before / Atk:ust /9509
may be considered ac a carr7-ovor at the and of the clonannption;inar and
does not necessarily indicate stockpiling?
tr4 50
?71gra!*4JZ
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to East Germany 1259000 metric tons of grains Widely heat, which wee
immediately shipped to processing plants. Thus it is lvaely that a
significant quantity of flour was available for stockpiling. The
statistical grain balance for the consumption year ending 31 July. 29519
however, indicates a grain residuum available for human coneumption equivalent
to only lea kilograms per capita. If the prewar per capita consumption
of 143 kilograms WA maintained during 1950e510 the difference of '741000
metric torn couId have been covered by the possible carry-over from the
1949 production land stockpiles weld be reduced by this amount.
As of 28 March 1951, it was reported that the USSR planned to
ship 7501000 metric tone of grain to East Germane from 15 February to
15 July 19510 Such a quantity of grain in excess of civilian require.
meats iedicates aotual stockpiling or utilizations not previously
considered. Plans call for similar shipments of 945,000 metrics tons of
grain in 1952. If the 1952 plan is fulfilled, the bulk of this 945,000
metric tons of grain will be available for stockpiling or utilizations
other than previously considered.
e. geramaeraaaeLt?
Surpluses of 33,000 metric tons in 1948.49 and MOO metric tons
in 1949-50 were eaported. In 1950-51, East Gannanywas neatly self-
eufficient in grainy and it probably will remain so through /9520
f.
Expansion of the food and agriculture program is expected to continue
through 1952. The high production goals set for 1955 pins the increasing
imports of grain from the USSR indicate Soviet intentions to promote agri-
cultural self-trufficiency and to establish in East Germany a food base in
excess of civilian requirements. The Five Year Plan Galls for a Wiliam
by 1955 of the meat potential of the melee, industry to a point higher than
the prewar level.
Soviet plans are likely to be formelated on the basis of maximum
norms rather than on the basis of actual averages, a method which increases
the possibility of underfulfinaenta Deppite this, it is probable that the
grain program seeks not only to increase East German production to the point
of selfevafficiency but also to import enough grain to accumelate large
stockpiles Vhich have an obvious military application and possibly indicate
direct mobilization for war.
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2. Eat.
a. Degbdign.
During the period 1935-3a, East Germany produced an average of
680,000 metric tons of meat a year and imported 80,000 tons, bringing
the total availability to 760,000 metric tons, which was equivalent to
47.5 kilograme of meat per capita per year.* Livestock numbers were so
depleted in the war that by 1948-49 the quantity of meat produced indigenously
had dropped from 680,000 to 413,000 metric tons. As shown in the following
table, production estimates for subsequent years, based upon increases in
livestock and on the availability of livestock feed, indicate that output
was about 450,000 tons in 2949-50 and approximately 566,000 tons in 1950,-51.
Latest Annual Estimates of Meat Production
3.948-51
ThguaaLMetric Tons
Probable Range of
.1EL. IdttPak ItUdattiviALEfilliaddi
294849
2949-30
1950-51
413
450
566
372 to 425
405 to 464
509 to 583
110 1102112-ftelglia*
In projecting the 1951.52 production of meat, the planned numbers
of livestock have been adjusted to the availability of feed. As Shown in
the following table, the 1951-52 meat production is estimated at 637,000
metric tons, while the 1952.53 estimated production is 663,000 metric tons,
slightly below average prewar production.
Estimated Meat Production
1951.-53
??'"8".--*AMP2k"WrobaeeRssIgor
stimate vosillistgLLIkda
1951-52 637 573 to 656
2952-53 663 597 to 683
* Meat is defined as the cameos weight of the slaughtered animals as
trimmed for market, together with offals, liver, kidneys, sweetbreads, etc.
It includes beef and veal, pork (excluding fat outs and lard), mutton and
goat meat, horse meat, poultry, and rabbit.
alect-1
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ksmealluguE61,e ?
The quantity of meat available for human consumption is the quantity
consumed by the faxmers themselves, together with the quantity allocated to
the nonfarm population, plus imports less exports. The following table of
domeatic requirements indicates indigenous availability of meat estimated
and prolected for 1949 through 19531
Estimated Domestic Availability of Meat
2948,53
littiNatta
Probable Range of
194849
388
347 to 400
1949-50
450
405 to 464
1950-51
366 ad/
509 to 583
1951..52
637
573 to 656
1952..53
663
597 to 683
g/ If as has been reported, 63,000 metric tons were
stockpiled in the farm of 45,000 metric tons of canned
meat, these data would read as follow-az estimate-.
503,000 metric tone; range-449,000 to 520,000 metric
tons.
Per capita availability of neat was about 2006 kilograms in 194849,
or 57 percent below the prewar average of 47.5 kilograms. Per capita
availability in the years following 1948-49, computed without consideration
of the inadequate import and export data =band, is estimated at 24
kilograms in 1949-50? 30.6 kilograms in 1950-51, 35 kilograms in 1951.52o
and 37 kilograms in 1952-53.
d. Stookalep.
The USSR is developing a. food base in East Germany at a rapid rate.
It is reported that 45,000 metric tons of canned meat, equivalent to 63,000
metric tans of carcass meat, were stockpiled in 1950. If the camps meat
required for this stockpile originated in East Germany, the availability of
meat to the civilian population would have been 503,000 metric tons equivalent
to 27.2 kilograms per capita. If the government restricts meat availability
to 27 kilograms per capita, or to 503,000 metric tots, the estimated 1951..52
production of 07,000 tons woad provide 134,000 tons for stockpiling.
frferrfrismi.
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Similarly, the 1952-53 estimated production of 663,000 tans of meat would
provide an additional quantity for stockpiling of 160,000 tons.
e. 211221124-2E.kadio
The 1951-52 meat availability of 35 kilograms per capita indicates
a 1951-52 surplus of 231,000 metric tone. It is probable that the per
capita availability of meat will be kept at a level appreciably below the
prewar level of .47.5 kilograms per capita to enable the USSR to draw mpon
East Germany for a considerable part of the meat required for stockpiling
in the area.
fe 231101=balablilailaillailWaidaragglet.27.itEe
Meat production has increased from 1948 throaah 1951, and this
trend prObablywill continue through 1952. If the assumptions which under.
Us the 1952-53 production *ultimate of 663,000 metric tons are valid, the
availability of indigenous meat will be 97.5 percent of the prewar productica.
It is improbable that the USSR would permit the importatiom of sufficient
meat to raise the per capita allowance to the prewar level of 4705 kilo-
gram a year. .It is probable, however, that this increased production could
be utilized in the Soviet program of mobilization for war.
3. bor.
a. hai&AUgi.
The sugar beet is one of the major agricultural crops in East
Germagy? and the country is self-eufficient in raw sugar production. Sugar
beet production averaged 822,000 metric tons, produced fram 219,500 hectares,
In 1938-39. Postwar production has not regained this level, partly homage
of poor weather and deficiencies of seed and fertilizers, but chiefly because
of the breakup of large enterprises into smaller plots. Production is
estimated as followss
Iatest.Annual Estimates of Sugar Production (Raw Value)
1948.-51
...11We _Teaa
Proa ble Range of
imaidagaa-d-Ataalia
194849
680,000
612,000 to 714,000
2949-50
555,000
500,000 to 581,000
1950661
800,000
720,000 to 840,000
tszt 54 4.
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b. Probable Productiop.
Although prewar yields are not expected to be attained in 1951 and
1952, expanded acreage will enable East Germany to regain prewar production
levels. Further expansion probably be in proportion to increased
conemner needs and probable continued export demands by the USSR.
Estimated Sugar Production (Raw Value)
1951..53
arptlaffium/ramiatwa.MIASOSSA
WIONINsonammor
Probable Range of
rearPatitagtei'adtatanALEfiltaak
1951-52 822,000 740,000 to 860,000
1952.53 840,000 760,000 to 880,000
c. Pomestio Reouirementri.
Rationing of sugar has been in force since the end of the war. The
amount available on a per capita basis ranged from 15.8 kilograms in 1948
to 19.8 kilograms in 1950. In addition to human consumption requirements,
from 60,000 to 75,000 metric tons are needed for the various food-processing
and confectionery industries. Total domestic consumption ia estimated as
follows
Estimated Domestic Requirements of Sugar (Raw Value)
1948-53
=AMU
Probable Range of
lAiriat40k9f ERnmalso
1948-49
361,800
325,000 to 379,000
1949-'50
390,700
351,000 to 4C9,000
2950..51
427,000
385,000 to 446,000
1951-52
431,000
388,000 to 450,000
1952..53
435,000
392,000 to 455,000
These results significantly attest to Soviet control over the sugar stooks
of major Sate/lite producers. Rationing programs in the main producing
countries provide a surplus wbich can be used in the Soviet stockpiling
or export program.
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d. Zdskpligg.
Estimates of East German augar stocks are based on the assumption
that rationing will continue to regulate conaumer supplies. Further
ateumulations beyond 1952 are expected and should increase at a mirdzona
rate of 1 mantilla supply a year. Stockpiles are estimated as follows:
Estimated Stockpiles of Sugar (Raw. Value)
1950.62
veameensiers:amgmenimeallibilakattaiLITStna
Probable Range of
searIiittztat, bitidatilLatatiataft
1950.61 75,000 65,000 to 909000
195142 105,000 93,000 to 1209000
e. ?urplilp or Derici.
The net sugar surplus provided by rationing in East Germany permits
a considerable volume of raw sugar to be exported to the USSR. Surplusea
are estimated as follows:
Eatimated Surplus of Sugar (Domestic Production?Raw Value)
1950..53
vimegamgmeroglialinirnisimal01,04alilltiElasiiii$3112
Probable Range of
....zisat. Estimate Xamtattofrate
1950.-51 30,000 324,000 to 382,000
1952-53 375,000 357,000 to 410,000
f.Iceid ..g....aalmartaraissittemst jigairektealstakt.
In the postwar period, sugar proauotion bas been promoted by the
economic planners of the GDR, and production in 1951..52 may exceed prewar
levels. It Le proteblet however, that on:kr a small portion of this
increase will be allocated for consmner consumption and that the balance
will be exported to the USSR.
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4. 2clattej&Mata.
a. Production.
Synthetic fiber production makes the largest contribution of raw
materials to the East German textile industry* B408118,9 of cotton and
wool deficiencies, requirements for textile materials can be met only
through imports or by expanding synthetic production* The latter solution
was adopted in 19470 and since that year imports of natural fiber's have
been negligible*
In the prewar period the territories now comprising East Germany
produced approximately 60 percent of the total German Output of synthetic
fibers, or an estimated 135,000 metric tons in the peak year 1943,
Estimated production for 190.60 indioates a considerable drop from the
prewar level, much of which was due to equipment losses through reparations
and shortages of materials, particularly chemicals and cellulose, necessary
for continuous -production* Production is estimated as follows*
Estimated Production of Synthetic Fibers
190-50
1.010WINIIMPIPM11110?0111...11.1011111012111/11.111,1.111170?212ga
Probable Rends of
Xi=
fallnak
ItzikelsaLaLleilate.
3948
47,368
42,300 to 49,500
1949
74700
64,000 to 75,000
1950
82,200
73,800 to 86,000
b0bbze_ig2patiettgeo.
Although planned goals anticipate a higher rate of production, it is
estimated that output of synthetic fibers viii increase only about 10 percent
a year in 1951 and 1952. Information on the present rate of new plant construe..
tion and operational levels indicates that Plan alms are too optimistic.
Production is estimated as follows:
Estimated Production of Synthetic Fibers
1951-52
Probable Range of
Variation of Es?grate
ibt=
2951 90,500 81,000 to 96,000
2952 99,000 000 to 103,000
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C. peaspIteasteutualati.
Estimated per capita consumption of synthetic fiber:: in East Germany
was 3.6 Wlograms in 1938,-a figure equivalent to the coehined total for
wool and Cotton. During the war years the synthetic fiber share of tote
text:111e supplies probably increased because of the Shortage of natural
fibers. The 1938 level of per capita consumption was regained in 1950.
A higher level probably will he attained in 1951-52 because of expected
increaees in production. Consumption is estimated as fellows:
Estimated Requirements of Synthetic Fibers
1948-52
Nallesimionalmbeleg.m .M110
kgwareak????????164???10,..a?V?M?M????????NONNO.,.........12112
ProS ble Range of
Teetimate 'Yeeleasee.setidaesta
2948 37,844 33,000 to 390000
1949 57,360 51,300 to 60,000
1950 65,760 59,000 to 68,000
1951 72,400 65,000 to 76,000
1952 780000 68,000 to 82,000
asaW3geLege2glekes lesellenekt.
There probably are no stockpiles of uynthetic fibers in East Germany,
since it is believed that ell peedaction is consumed domestically or is ?
exported to the USSR. Surpluses are estimated at 16,440 metric tons in 1950
and 21,000 to in 1952e
V11
The postwar increase in production of epithetic fibers began in
1949. Prior to this time, reparations of equipment and materiels and
confiscation of plants by the USSR had considerably reduced the capacity
of the industry. These Soviet acquisitions of teohnical personnel, plant
facilities, and equipment ware the industry's most outetending contribution
to the economic potential of the USSR. If the rapid rehabilitation of the
induotry enableo it to reach the high Plan goes, the Beet German contri-
bution to the Seviet esr potential will be measurably increased, since
synthetic fibers can be used in the manufacture of heavy denier tire cord,
tow lines, and parachutes and can help to relieve the Bloc of dependence
upon Western fiber sources.
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5. at_tm.
a0 ,dic1jou.
East Germany grove no cotton and is completely dependent upon
external sources for supplies of ginned cotton. Almost all current
Imports come from the USSR, and sine* 1947 there has been only minor
evidence of cotton shipments from other sources. Prewar importe of cotton
are estimated at approximately 1000000 metric tons a year. The highest
volume of imports since 1947 vas 22,400 metric tons, received from the USSR
in 1950.
kmaillgasimmatil.
The low domestic availability for 1948 and 1949, as indicated in the
table below, resulted from a negligible amount of importo. For the prewar
years (1934.-36) average annual per capita consumption of this area vas
estimated to be 2.6 kilograms, equivalent to the average for other Eastern
European countries. This was supplemented by the utilization of eynthetic
fibers. Per capita consumption dropped drastically after the war but nay
be raised to 2 kilograms by 1952, so that East Germany can make an effort
to compete with 'lest Germaey in attaining a ralativaly high standard of
living. Domestic requirements for 1948-52 are estimated as follows*
Eetimated Domestic Requirements for Ginned Cotton
1948-52
Cali?MINIFIMMMOW 41?111MMOMIONOWRIMIPONIMMillaillIMMIRIMMENatt"
LIM
timate
Probable Range of
DidEV-2?-2L2112211111
1948
1948
14,000
12,600 to 15,400
2949
24,000
12,600 to 15,400
2950
22,400
20,200 to 24,600
2.951
30,000
27,000 to 33,000
1952
34,500
31,000 to 38,000
Textile production is not limited by the capacity of textile prooessing equip-
ment. Present facilities are adequate far processing projected consumer needs,
and higher output could be achieved by reactivating unused capacity.
59
2*21117kri,
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Go asbile_g_W8021us Ef.....s.....1t
lt r
There probably are no stockpiles of ginned cotton in East Germany,
and the extent of cotton deficits viii depend upon the utilization and
production of synthetic yarns and fabrics. Because of large synthetic
production* liming standards are lose vulnerable to reductions of cotton
supplies in East Germany than In Poland, Czedhoalovakia, and Huegary.
a.
Throughout the postwar years a oonsiderable percentage of total
textile production has been sent to the USSR under reparation agreements.
East Germany's present dependence on cotton Imports from the USSR compels
it to continue this trade. There have been= indications of an expansion
of cotton textile facilities, because of the existence of large amounts of
idle capacity, which could be activated in response to the mobilization
plans of the USSR.
6. gal.
a. Production.
Domestic wool production presently suppliea 27 percent of the rau
wool processed by the East German textile industry. This high percentage,
however, is indicative of a decline in consumption and imports rather than
of a marked increase in wool production. In the /936..!38 period, far example,
wool production averaged 30 percent above the 1950 level but supplied only
5 percent of total requirements.
Losses of sheep during the last part of World Var II and during the
Emily postwar period reduced raw wool production by. 55 peroent as compared
with the 2936-38 period. Even if a normal rate of increase is applied in
production estimates for 1948-50, the output of o/ipped wool is still
considerably leas than prewar output. These estimatea are as fellows:
Latest Annual Ettlmatea of Wbel Production (Glean Basis)
1948*-50
. te. ?
Probable Range of
1St
=Mg&
1948
976
825 to 1,125
1949
1,222
1,000 to 1,400
1950
1,468
1,200 to 1,700
? 60 ...
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b. Lte,,?...qp,...bmsbaMen.
Production of wool is expected to reach a postwar peak of 1,645
Aetric tms (probable range 1,400 to 1,900 tons) in both 1951 and 1952
but will. still be lower than annual output in 1936...38.
agrazillgulkaside
Only through the utilization of the large production of synthetic
fibere and large quantities of cotton and wool waste has a minimum quantity
of textile fabrics been made available to the East German population. The
pr6sent rate of domestic wool consumption in East Germany is considerably
lower than the prewar rate. Even if consumption reaches the 6,600 metric
tons estimated for 19520 the per capita availability would be equivalent
o only one-third of the bstimated prewar level. This availability,
however, would he comparable to the standards of other Satellite countries.
The estimated requirements of:mai:LW-52) are as fellows:
Estimated Domestic Requirements of Wool
1948-52
ea. VIVAIMIIINIMMINNOMMILOW 14h)trie TCP41
Probable Range Pq '
XIME - ilastknattl bdiaililat E...2.QatSa
1948
2,976
2,500 to 3,400
1949
4,100
3,500 to 4,700
1950
5,200
4,500 to 5,900
1951
60000
5,500 to 6,600
1952
6,600
6,100 to 7,200
d,Zoasegag.i.,_exeland S uLsa.glic. D
It is unlikely that aey stocks of wool have accumulated in East
Germany, and the present deficit can be covered ?ay by imports. Because
of this dependency, only a minimum amount of wool is estimated to be
available for domestic consumption.
0,
Operations of the wool textile industry have been restricted by the
size of available supply. There hes been no evidence of efforts to regain
the prewar textile production peak, although surplus equipment is available.
Emphasia has been placed on synthetic production, uttich can be used for
2-?4.41-2-1
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blenmng with small quantities of wool and cotton snd thus enable East Gemany
to maintain a per capita supply- of textile fabrics comparable to the per
capita supply in the other Satellites,
7. Collectation6?
The GDR has not yet taken firm steps to implement it plans for the
ultimate collectivisation of agriculture. The land reform of 1945 was greeted
with considerable enthusiasm, but, 6 years later, many East Germans consider
the results disappointing. Small farms, which still provide the bulk of the
national food supply, have not been collectivised. Machine renting etations
have been established, and fertilizer and seed are distributed by the state.
High compulsory deliveries to the state for independent farmers discriminate
against the large landowners.
62 ?
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S-E-C-R-E-T
VI. Industrial Capacity and Levels of Production.
A. Ferrous Metals.
Summary
Production of iron and steel in East Germany meets approximately 50
percent of domestic requirements. It is estimated that domestic output will
supply a larger share of requirements in the next 5 years, but the extent of
improvement will depend upon the assistance given by the Soviet Bloc. Help
from these sources through 1950 has been inadequate.
East Germany is dependent upon imports for almost all of the raw
materials upon which to build an iron and steel industry, with the excep-
tion of silicon and fluxing agents. A shortage in scrap probably will be
severely felt because facilities of the industry require a high percentage
of scrap in the production of raw steel. Plans have been formulated and
are underway to expand greatly production facilities, particularly of pig
iron, to alleviate the scrap deficiency.
This expansion program is intended to relieve East Garmagy of
dependence upon iron and steel deliveries from West Germany and at the same
time to integrate East Germany industry more closely with the industries of
the other Bloc countries. For example, the planned production of pig iron
will be based on iron ore deliveries from the USSR; coke imports from the
USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia; and manganese imports from Hungary.
In view of the limited assistance given by Bloc sources in the
past, however, it is difficult to see how the industry can expand to the
extent now planned.
1. Production.
Production estimates for the iron and steel industry in East. Germany in-
dicate that considerable increases were achieved from 1948 to 1950, in which
period output of iron ore rose 50 percent; of pig iron, 65 percent; of raw
steel, 217 percent; and of rolled steel, 292 percent, Production of these
commodities in i9149 and 1950 equaled or closely approached target goals.
Scrap production in 1950, however, was only 48 percent of the 1948 output.
Production is estimated as follows:
63 -
5...3.041P.Fr?T
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1-1-2.441
Estimated Production of Ferrous Metale
1948-50
Comoditv
OVEIalaMi Wild a VIM Zatt =di law. WAWA
Pig Iron
N.A.
3.82
200
249
360
300.0
Raw Steel.
3334400
276
650
585
875
675.0
Rolled Products
174
153
356
343
650
600.0
Iron Ore
250
267
355
380
400
400.0
Metallurgical
Coke s/
Strap
1,600
4760
910
1,000
3.03C0
85000
Ferroalloys
Manganese
N. A.
LA.
LA.
LA0
2.5f
Chrome
N. A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
305 IV
Silicon
N. A.
N. A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.;
19.0 ge
Insignificant amounts.
,b/ Processed from Imported ores.
a/ Processed fran &mastic ores.
eamsismastswaramormesiewaserie
2. jialindesUggailatansizak ni imaik.
Intimates of increases in both production and capacity are based an
extensive plans to erect new plants and to expand existing facilities in
all branches of the industry. While no target figures are available, it
is estimated that capacity and production will not have increased by
great amounts by 19520 The expeoted.yearlr increases in output are pig
iron, 100,000 metric tone; raw steel, approtbnately 300,000 tons; rolled
products, 150,000 tons; iron ore and scrap, 50,000 tons. It Is estimated
that production of ferromanganese will increase appreciably because con-
struction of a blast furnace to process domestic ore is under vay.. Out-
put of ferrochrome will increase only slicbtly., although plans have been
formulated to double the 2950 ore-processing capacity. Output of ferro-
silicon can be increased in accordance with requirements. Production and
capacir are est.taated as folIowes
64
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1+9.-Erfel
Estimated Production and Capacity of Ferrous Metals
1951'52
Commoditr
2.2.51
agslustsign
Thousand Metric TOWS
ONMUMIMMINNISVIN11952
1?11MINI
=MUM gala=
Pig Iron
400.0
500
550d
Ray Steel
Rolled Products
1,20060
750.0
1,500
900
1,600,000
1
Iron Ore
00.0
500
600 jai
Metallurgical Coke 2/
Scrap
900.0
950
FerroalloYs
Manganese
5.0
a
8W
Chrome
305
4
4d
Silicon
20.0
22
22
7.---wma"."--Basoartialcompletionofnewplantwhichsplenued
to have a 500,000.metric ton capacity by 1955.
12/ Based on expansion program of current Five Sear Plan.
if Insignificant.
Based =plans to build blast fernace for converting
domestio ore to manganese.
,il Based on plans to double 1950 processing capacity by 1955.
36 Domestic Recuirepents.
Little or no information is available regarding requirements of various
ram, materials by the East German ferrous metals imbmstry. The following
estimates of dcmestio requirements, therefore, are based on the most
probable proportions of raw materials used in ferrous metals production. It
is not possible to estimate requtremente of any of the ferroalloys except
manganese and chromium. Requirements are estimated as follows:
1+24-71-1.
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?.11-grEfet.
Betimated Domestic Requirements of Ferrous Metals
1949..52
Pig Irons/
Raw StegeXot
Rolled eV
Iron Ore a/
Metallurgical Coke 4/
Scrap
350 450
1,300 1,750
1,100 1,900
500 600
300 370
475 goo
Manganese 5 a
chrpme ? 3
500
550.0
10875
2,000,0
1,400
1,50000
700
800.0
420
480,0
900
975.0
13.
34.0
3
3.5
af Based on industry utilisation of 80% scrap plus 20% pig
iron in 1949-50, use of 65% scrap plus 35% pig in 1951-62.
jai Balled on statements that Bast Germany produced in 1949
and 1950 only 50% of requirements, but that this situation
should improve in next few years.
9/ Based on 50% ore.
51/ Based on 1.2 metric tone of coke needed to produce 3. ton
of pig iron.
4. arbalan.
Bast German stockpiles of ferrous metals are negligible because of the
deficiency of all materials except silicon, which ie believed to be pleabi.,
fu10 since same is exported. Scrap wan tormerly in abundant supply and
probably was stodkpiled until the current shortage occurred.
5. purr1lu3 or Deficit.
Bast Germany is faced with a defioit in all ferrous metals and products
except silicon. /n 1950 there las a scrap surplus of 50,000 metric tons,
some of which vas shipped to the USSR as reparations and exported to Poland
and Czechoslovakia. Deficits Inman,. cases were met by imports from the
Soviet Bloc, but the exact amounts of !nab Imports are not known. Scrap
and coke will undoubtedly be in critically short supply in the next several
years. Although ferroalloy supplies are adequate, the ores mut be imported.
Deficits are estimated as folloves
1-Ergra-ref.
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Estimated Deficit, or Ferrous Metals
1950, 1952
Thousand Jetric Tone
Ocamodity
Pig Iron
150,0
.1
So
Raw Steel
873.0
50o
Rolled Products
700,0
boo
Iron Ore
200,0
300
Metallurgical Coke
350.0
450
Scrap
25
Ferroalloys
Manganese
10.5
12
Chrpme
3.5
4
a/ Surplus of 50,000 metric tons.
6. Internal Limitations.
East Germany possesses little of the raw materials needed to establish
a steel industry. There is a deficiency of all essential raw materials
except silicon and fluxing agents. Because of domestic Shortages of iron
ore and coke, the industry has been established an a scrap utilization basis.
Immediately after the wars scrap was in abundant supply, but in 1951 scraps
especially high-quality grade, is in short supply as a result of excessive
reparations deliveries and exports, and procurement on the world market is
becoming increasingly difficult. High-grade refractories needed to line
smelting and melting furnaces, are in severely EiOrt suppiy.
In order to augment steel production without increasing ecrap require-
ments, it vas planned to increase pig iron output by enlarging present
facilities and by building a new plant with a capacity of approximately
5000000 metric tons annually. Raw materials for this paantl chiefly iron
ore and coke, are to be furnished by the Soviet Bloc.
Since domestic production of iron and steel is only enough to supply
approximately 50 percent of requirements, the embargo on steel deliveries
from West Germany has been a severe blow to East Germany. Illegal trade has
supplied an estimated 225,000 metric tons of steel since mid-1949, and 0
ollion worth of steel reportedly was smuggled across the interzonal border
in the first 6 months of 1950. Nevertheless, export restrictions have
seriously .hampered the East Cerman expansion program.
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S.E.C...RF4/4
7. Itend3--includinglall2-"1.2--ELL2EIMIPAEL4M-inEaS.
It is evident that an expansion of the iron and steel industry in East
Germany is entirely dependent upon the aid given by the USSR and the
Satellites in furnishing ram materials and finished steel mill products? In
new of the limited assistance obtained from these sources in the past, it
is unlikely that the industry can expand to any appreciable extent within
the next few years,
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B. Nonferrous Metals.
SuninarY
The output of nonferrous metals in East Germany is insufficient to
meet domestic requirements, and deficits must be met by imports, which are
received from both Bloc and non-Bloc sources. These deficits indicate that,
in the field of nonferrous metals, East Germany is an economic liability to
the Bloc.
Copper output in 1950 is estimated at about 35,000 metric toes and
is empected to increase to 38,000 tons in 1952. 'Planned imports of copper
for 1950 are estimated at 18,000 tons, which, together with the production
of 35,000 tons, indicate total domestic requirements of 53,000 tons,
Lead production has been estimated at 19,000 metric tons in 1950
and 20,000 tons in 1951 and 1952. No primary zinc is produced, but the
remelting of scrap provided an estimated 3,000 tons in 1950. Planned im?
ports of lead and zinc in 1951 are believed to be 140000 and 7,500 tons
respectively, indicating total requirements of about 34,000 tons of lead
and 10,500 tons of zinc.
In 1950 the output of primary aluminum was 1,200 metric tons, pro-
duced from imported bauxite, while 10,000 tons of secondary almenum were
recovered from scrap. Production in 1951 is estimated at 12,000 tons and
in 1952 at 15,000 tons. The output of tin and antimony is small, and
domestic needs are net largely by imports.
Plant capacities for nonferrous metals are believed to be adequate.
The supply of raw materials apparently is adequate in the case of copper,
but the ore deposits are not adapted to large-scale mining. The produc-
tion of other nonferrous metals is limited chiefly by shortages of raw
materials. Other limiting factors are the lack of skilled miners and possi-
ble shortages of repair parts, which formerly were obtained from the Ruhr.
1. Copper.
a. Production.
Refined copper is produced in three plants in East Germany and comes
from domestic ores and scrap. The Mensfeld installation, the largest copper
mining, smelting, and refining operation in East Germaey, in 1950 produced
79 percent of the total output of copper. Production is estimated as follows:
io?
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Estimated Production of Copper.
- 1948-50
Metric Tons
ear 141.----sTatal
1948
1949
1950 y
20,400 1/
21,737 V
27,786
25,826 il
27,519 V
35,166
2/ Calculated as 126.6 percent of Mansfeld production.
b. Estimated Possible Production and Capacity.
In the spring of 1951 a new deposit of copper ore in the Sangerhausen
district is reported to have come into production at the rate of 4,000 metric
tons of copper a year, which ultimately is to be increased to 6,000 tons a
year. Lif
Estimated Production of Copper
1951-52
Metric Tons
I951 19
NMnsfeld Plants
Other Plants
Total
28,000
7,500
2.5j500
30,000
8,000
38,000
......_
The smelting and refining facilities of the aansfeld district were
subjected to little bombing or dismantling and therefore probab4 have about
the same capacity as in prewar years, when annual capacity was 55,000 metric
tons. .,5./ Equipment may have suffered, however, from lack of materials for
maintenance and repairs. Information on the capacity of East Cermany's
other smelting and refining plants is lacking.
c. Domestic Bevirements.
Information is lacking on copper requirements for the period 2948-52.
One source indicates a demand of between 40,000 and 45,000 metric tons in
2955, but this range appears 3av, ince production in 1950 vas 35.166 tons
and planned imports were 18,000 tons, indicating requirements in 1950 of
roughly 53,200 tons.
d. Stockpiles.
Information is lacking on copper stockpiles in East Germany.
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e. Sup1us or Deficit.
It is believed that East Germany faces a considerable deficit in
copper. A contract signed on 1 January 1950 with the USSR called for the
delivery of 6,000 metric tons, which was reported as delivered. 31 Other
planned imports in 1950 were 8,000 tons from West Germany and 4,000 tone
from other sources,naking a total of 18,000 tons. ?./
f, Internal Limitations.
The Mansfeld and Sangerhausen deposits are the two major copper
sources in Sant Germany, Ths Mansfeld reeervee are said to contain about
150,000 metric tone of copper, which will be exhausted in 15 years at the
planned production rate of 10,000 tons a year. 2/ This planned rate of
output is only 37 percent of the 1950 rate because of the exhaustion of the
richer ores. The Liansfeld district is an old producer, and its remaining
ore is estimated to contain from 1.15 to 1.35 percent recoverable copper.
The Sangerhausen deposit le estimated to contain 340?000 .metric tone of
copper and will eventually replace the Uansfeld operations. The planned
output of the Sangerhauzen is to be 10,000 metric tons a year, 10/probab3,y
by 1955.
East Germany's copper ore deposits are not adaptable to large-scale
mining as practiced in the United States. The Mansfeld mires are fast be-
coming depleted and more difficult to operate. The Sangerhausen mine,
although new, may have a water problem, and time will be required to open
up the ore body for a greater production than that which is planned.
The copper industry also apparently is hampered by A lack of tec1ni-
ca14 trained men and Skilled mdners and by a shortage of repair parts and
materials, which formerly were obtained from the Ituhr. 1.2./ Plant capacities
are believed to be adequate for planned production.
go Trance; .-Includin Indications of Mobilization for ter,
East Germany is a valuable asset to the USSR as a supplier of such
manufactured products such as copper and copper-base alloy plates, sheets,
rods, and tubes but must import primary copper. An intensive effort to in-
crease copper production from all sources is being made it ie planned to
increase ore production to 1.5 million metric tons a year by 1955,1v which
would result in an estimated production of about 20p000 tons
of copper a
year from mines.
2. Lead and Zinc.
a. Production.
Since the end of World War II, when the Garman lead-zinc mines in
the Upper Silesian area were ceded to Poland, East Germany has produced no
zinc from ores. .1/ What zinc and zinc alloys are produced come from the re-
smelting of scrap. The production of lead from domestic ores meets over
half of domestic lead requirements. Production is estimated az follows:
ail 7j.
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3-s-o-5-Er4
Estimated Production of Lead and Zinc
1948-50
Metric Tone
lead 3/ 11s966 12,888 19038
Zino y 1,298 2/ N.A. 3;000 h/
FZ'Om scrap.
b. Estimated Possible Production and Capacity.
Possible production of lead and zinc in 1951-52 in estimated as follows:
Estimated Possible Production of Lead and Zinc
295142
Lead
Zinc y
20,000
3,000
Metric Tons
1952
20,000
3,000
?'
scrap.
The three lead smelters in East Germany have a combined rated capa-
city of 13,000 metric tons a year. g/ In addition, one plant near Berlin
produces electrolytic lead, but its capacity and source of raw materials are
not known. pi The capacity of secondary zinc smelters, East Germany's sole
domestic source of zinc, is not known. Anew zinc smeltiEg plant, to be
built at Freiberg, Saxony, is listed under "Priority Plants" in the 1951
Plan for industrial development.
c. Domestic Requirements.
Since lead and zinc are not exported, domestic requirements, measured
by production plus imports, may be estimated as follows:
72'u.
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ktin"fri
Estimated Domestics Requiz.ments of Lead and Zinc
194S-52
listen Ton
.2211.. ?NAL .2211.951.242.
Prods.ction 12,000 2/ 13,000 2/ 19,000 24
Planned Imports, 15,000 pi 15,000 34,0002/
Reqttirenents Min 3212Q2
Production
Flannel Imports
Requirements
Planned itaports
20,000
20,000
3.4,000
3.49 000
143222
As=
1,300 2f N.A.
3,000
3,000
3,000
10,000 LA.
71,500
71500
7,500
NAM LA. laa224 ZS* 19.4212
in 3.950 were as follows 12/2
Planned Imports of Lead and Zino
1950
1ic
Tc
/SELO
LIMP
NIFftatigiEgiL=MI
Mai
2,500
55400
West Germany
9,000
300
Other
2,500
1,800
Total
Um=
2:221
d. soda:neg.
Information is lacking on stockpiles.
e. Surplus oK.Dgiloit.
A212321?41. deficits are estimated at 34,000 metric tons of lead old
79500 tens of sine in 1950, 1951, and 1952.
f. paternal Idmitations.
.at Getman production of lead and zinc i Limit sd chiefly by shortages
of raw materials, but teohnically truined personnel end skilled minurs also nay
be in short supply. .Although the total capacities of tha lead and sine smelters
are not known, it is believed that arty illaretagte in produotion would requlie
either the construction of new pleats or the empanaLon of existing plants.
g. Ztcg1g=Tafaaastug.jngtgataisazLsf,,jfgjjjjjgi,t12tasg,lgx.
East Gemsany is attempting to increase its output of lead and sine
from both mine production and the collection a sorap for remelting. A
as 73
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SupE.O.R-E-T
project submitted in February 1950 to increase oro production at the Beihilfe
mine from 100 to 300 metric tons a day would, if-realizee, provide an addi-
tional 2,000 tons a year, 2h/ but its present status is tnknomn.
3. Aluminum.
a. Production and Capacity.
East Germany in 1950 produced about 1,200 metric tons of high-grade
aluminum from Imported bauxite at the Bittorfeld plant 2/ and about 10,000
tons of secondary aluminum from scrap. g/ There is some evidence that pri-
mary aluminum production will be about 12,000 tons in 1951 and 15,000 tons
In 1952, with bauxite imports increasing proportionately. y Data on which
to base estimates of capacity and of secondary production In 1951-52 are
unavailable.
b. Domestic Requirements.
It is estimated that domestic requirements account for the entire East
Cerman production of aluminum.
It is believed that only working inventory stocks of aluminum are held
in East Germany.
d, Surplus or Deficit.
East Gumany's aluminum production fell Short of domestic requirements
in WO, and the deficit probablyvi11 pereist through 1951.
e, Internal Limitatione.
Cast German bauxite reserves are of negligible value, and all suppliee
must be imported. Another major limitation upon the production of aluminum
In East Germany is a shortage of equipment, most of which vas shipped to the
USSR following World War II.
f. Trends.-Including Indications of Mobilization for War.
The expected expansion in the output of aluminum in the 1951-52 period
rspresente only a smeil percentage of the total aluminanneeds of the Soviet
Bloc and probably does not indicate mobilization for mar.
4. Other Nonferrous Metals.
Ore reserves of both tin and antimony are limited, production is unimportant,
and at Germany must depend upon imports to meet domestie requirements, Tin
output: estimated at about 100 metric tons .a year, 2/ may be increased in 1951
and 1952. Capacity for the production of antimony is less than 100 metric tons
a year* Fran 1 January 1949 to 31 garch 1950, 200 tens of antimony were
imported ITOM Czechoslovakia and 350 tons were to ba isported from the USSR,
but receipt of Soviet deliveries has not been confirmed*
f sr 74, us
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C.
Ssaal.
S-E-C ea-FA
asswag
East Germany has extensive reserves of brown coal* and is the
largest producer of this type of fuel in the world, but the small size of
reserves and output of bituminous coal constitutea a furdamental weakness
of the economy.
The production of bituminous coal was about 2,8 million metrics
tons in 1950, nearly 500,000 tone less than the target. Brown coal output
reached 137.5 million tons, exceeding the Plan goal by 5.5 million tons.
Since the brown coal contains from 40 to 60 percent water and has a low
heating efficiency, over 70 percent of the output is processed into
briquettes and all except a small part of the balance is consumed in
taking electric power. Briquette production VAS approximately 38.2
million tont, in 1950, or almost 600,000 tons over the Plan target.
In 1951 the production of brown coal is to be increased by 5.7
percent and of broxm coal briquettes by 5.2 percent as compared with 1950v
indicating that the objectives are 145 rilvi5on metric tons and 40 million
tons, respectively. These outputs probabl4y can be achieved, and further
increases to 152 million tons of brown coal and 42 m4111on tons of briquettes
are possible,in 19520
With the exception of minor production from one mine in Samere
Anhalt? all of the output of bitumiuous coal comes from the LuganeOclanitz
and Zwinkau coal basin A:II& are located 40 and 60 miles, respectivale,
southwest of Dresden. Significant increases in production are unlikely?
A new bituminous mine Is under development in the Ddberluge-Kirchhain area
but production probably v.111 not be significant until after 1952. Moreover,
the coal in this particular deposit is not of coking quality? It is estimated
that bituminous production will be only 3 million metric tons in 1951 aud
302 million tons in 1952. The targets for 1951 and 1955 are reported to be
4.m4ll4on tone?
In prewar years East Germmey consumed fran 14. million to 17
million metric tons of bituminous coal a, year, of whieh only fram 3 mIllgon
to 3.6 milllon tons were domestically produced. The balance was obtained
fran Silesia and the Ruhr. The loss of the Silesian mines to Poland and
severance of direct access to Ruhr supplies has left East Germany critically
short of bituminous coal and has forced greater dependence on on coal
Which has also 'been in_shcirtsepply bee:apse of largeseadtWdiamantline at t1
brown coal strip operations by the USSR.
* last German brown coal ia generally of lower rank than lignite
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sa?fra-arkz
Lack of adequate supplies of bituminous coal and coke is hindering
industrial expansion and possibly an additional 5 million metric .tons of
bituminous coal annuLly would have to be imported to alleviate the fuel
shortages? There have been many difficultiee connected with conversion
- to brawn coal briquettee, which are not efficient far lse in equipment
that Is not adapted for them. Nov equipment to facilitate such eastita.
tion has been hard to obtain
Two small coke plants produce about 240,000 metric tons of melting
coke annually and conaume about 325,000 tons of bituminous coal. There are
228 gas plants in existence whiCh.vse bituminous coal, but only 177 were in
operation in 1949, and many of these received much les? coal than required
for capacity production.
Brown coal ia the basis for East Germagyes large synthetic fuel
industry? Production and processing of brawn coal for this purpose and
related usea is concentrated in about 12 Soviet-owned corporations which
control about a third of the brown coal output and close to 40 percent
of the briquette production?
East German imports frostiest Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia
in 2950 are estimated to have ccosisted of approximately 3 million metric
tons of bituminous coal, 4.mi1lion tons of brown coal, and close to 105
million tons of coke, which were offset by exports of as much as 205 01110n
tons of brown coal briquettes? The actual deficiency in domestic supplies,
however, is much more than is indicated in. the import figures? Briquette
shipments are not an indication of a surplue of that Mel, since briquette?
are exported to pay for badly needed imports?
Labor shortages have retarded the production of both bituminous
coal and brown coal, and it haa been necessary to use forced labor, wane%
and disabled persons, !ening maohinery and equipment have been overstrained
during the past decade and are in need of replacement? There are ahortagce
of spare parts, tools and all types of nonferrous metals, while great problems
exist in the constraddm of the massive esnavators, Widge ?mess and
auxiliary equipment used for atripping brown coal? The ability to fulfill
higher goals each year for brown coal production depends in large measure on
acquisition of sufficient quantities of new equipment for replacement and
expansion needs.
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1. ptehatirmi,
. Bast Germany is the worldas largest producer of brown coal and has
extensive brown coal reserves, but reserves and cutput of bituminous coal
are limited. Production of bituminous coal mam about 2.8 million metric
tons in 1950, less than the output in 1948 and 3.969 and nearly 500,000 tons
below the Plan goal. Brown coal output in 1950 roadhei 3.375 million tones,
exceeding the Plan target by about 595 million tuan9 Since brown cool
contains from 40 to 60 percent water, it has little direct use except in
the prodUction of electric power. The bulk of the output is maratfactured
into briquette?, Which have about three times the heat value of the
equivalent weight of brown coal. The predectien of bituminous coal, brown
coel, and brown coal briquettes is estimated as folloast
Estimated Production of Bitumincue lea, Brown Cool,
and Brown Coal Brlquettso
2948-50
allottearebalMilKOMMINIMMta^1141.01MINOMMIIMIJaglaMattiaLITM
Brown Cool
21:210.q921 has2114a211,
linsdaggeSela
1942
298
11009
3090
1949
390
12495
3409
1950
208
13705
38.2
1950 (P2.an)
393
13200
3796
The bun of bituminous coal production COMC3 from two email coal basins
in Sexcey, the Lugan-Calsnitz and Zwickau dintricts, Nihieh are 40 and 60
miles, reepeatively? southwest of Dresden, but these zeserves are nearing
eXhaustion. A miner producer, the Ploets mine in the Halle diatriet of Sammy,-
Anhalt? =paled 51,600 metric tons in 1949, tat the 1950 Plan called for
only 35,000 tons,
Thick deposits of brown coal underlie large areas of Sar, Semmaro
Anhalt, Thuringia, and Southern Brandenburg ard are etploited mainly in
open-cut operations, which employ massive exnavators and auxilimq eqpia
ment. About two.thirds of the brown opal produiltion names from state.owned
mines (v7B mines), of which there are probably 00 or nore, divided into
8 diotriats. The remaining production canes frm abont /2 large mines under
Soviet control (SAC mineo). Approximately 90quet;.le plenty are operated
in conjunction with the mines, Seventeen or these, wIth over 40 percent of
the capacity, are Soviet-ovneC
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Ar?DirEritlE
Production of brown coals brown coal briquettes, and brown coal (Wee
in 1949 and Plan figures for 1950 and 1951 lave boon reported as fellows*
Production of Brown Coal
3949-61
??Inn,MOI.I.INNIM.M.I.IP.M???=MMMNIMIMIUMMNMM.IONOMIMIMY.MMPMOINWMIMINMINIiI?OMNMMIMMPOMAW.JkEMaaigaddSagga
MAWR .121k2.
Diotriet
Barna (Barna and Adjacent Thuringia) 60299
Nauselwits (Altenburg/. Mbuse1wits0
and Baits) 9,050
Merseburg Male and Mierseturg) 250653
Bitterfeld 12,407
Magdeburg and Stassfurt 2,500
Mucikenburg (Eastern SaxonywAnhalt) 8,445
Senftenburg (Most of Brandenburg) 9,836
Ileum (Southeastern Brandenburg
and East Salmm) 90087
Subtotal ALUZ
AWIma 419203
Total iii ill 1,/
717 Increased to 145 million tons since these figures mere reported*
=Ma&
6,920
2.91112e
7,950
9,013
90700
26,562
28,120
12,697
12,1450
2,626
2,750
9,026
9,500
100789
120700
10,667
11,400
416102
2A322Q
43,700
470530
-
A-FrirEnTri
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- Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP79R01012A000900030001-7
1MB Plants
District
HrCxarfrl,
Production of Brown Coal Briquettes
194951
illanalatUaid2.122ft
=Zan =Zan
Borns
2,466
2,540
2,750
Meuselvits
39398
3343.0
3,450
Meraeburg
4,776
4,840
5,080
13itterfeld
1,129
1,230
1,285
Magdeburg
369
390
400
Muokenburg
2,235
2,390
2,460
Senftenburg
4,062
4,320
4,565
Welemr
2,263
2,880
3,M0
Subtotal Mal EMI MA=
?Amagatti 14,087 15,600 16,000
Total ikatil Zia RAU SI
reaser-W=Tra----------"0 on..--a?milli tons since these figures were
reported.
Production of Brom Coal Coke
1949..353.
W3 Plants
District
Bitterfeld
42.6
40
42
Meuselvitz
6305
62
60
Waspy
23600
233
234
Subtotal
Zaal
211
.231k
.?0-23egata 41,360.0 si N?Aa N.A,
Total 412,2,21
p Estimated.
- 'T9 ?.
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2?friaikfri
2. ?diagasUgajat&gaggralaugalmagne.
According to the Five Tear Plan* the production objeatives far 1955
are 205 million metric tons of brown coal, 56 minion tons of brown coal
briquettes and 4m4l11on tons of bituminous coil. In 19519 production
of brown coal is to increase 5.7 percent and output of brown coal briquettes
is to increase 5.2 percent as compared with 1950* which would ?stall&
the targets at about 145 million tans and 40 million tons* respectively.
These outputs probably can be achieved, and further Inernases to 152 million
tons of brown coal and 42 million tone of brown coal 'briquettes are possible
In 1952.
While the goal for bituminous mining in both 1951 and 1955 has been
reported to be 4nallion metric tons, prospects for attaining this level
are very unfavorable unless a mild= under construction at Daberlug-
Elrchhain Is able to supply about 1 million tons, vial& seems unlikely.
This mine is soheduled to begin production in 1951, but considerable
difficulties have been encountered, and it is probable that tonnage will
not be significant, until after 1952. Output of bituminous coal la there,-
fore estimated at 3 million tons in 1951 and 3.2 million tons In 19520
3. gpmestio Beouiremente.
The (tool consumption pattern in East Germany has undergone toneiderable
change as aresult of the war. The area used from 14 gallon to 17 million
metric tons of bituminous coal in prewar years and produced only from 3
million to 3.6 nill4on tons. Total postwar availabilitles of this type of
coal, however,. have been reduced to about 5.6 million tons a, year, of whit*
about 45 percent has been Imported, Dainty from Polanlo This severe shortage
of bituminous coal has famed the substitution of brown coal* which* with
the exception of that used t7 power plants, and, laminar quantities, for
other purposes is utilized in the farm of triquettes. Brown coal is =-
economical to burn in facilities that are not adapted for it, and conversion
has been hampered by inability to obtain the proper equipment.
Bituminous coal is essential for the production of ntetallargical coke
and for other purposes. The two metallurgical coke plants now In operation
produce about 240,000 metric tons annually and consume about 325,000 tons
of bituminous coal.
East Germaoy has 228 gas plants which UBS bitumincrum coal, but only 177
of these were operating in 1949, These plants produce coke as well as gas
and are estimated to have consumed about 1 4 million tons of coal in 1949
and probably more in 1950, The shortage of bituminous coal is to a large
extent responsible for the shutdowns of sone of the plants, and those that
are operating do not have sufficient supplies to meet their requirements?
80
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If all the plants in existence were operated at capacitor, coal requirements
would probably increase by at least 1 millionmetrio tons &year.
Bituminous coal provbies the railroads and power industry with only a
fraction of their energy requirements, The eleetrio power Industry has
reduced consumption of bituminous coal through oonversion of some of Its
faeilities to brown coal, but conversion difficulties necessitate the
continued use of bituminous coal at aezy industrial plants. Little, if
any, bituminous coal is allocated for domestiouse.
It is estimated that available supplies of bituminous coal were distributed
as follows in 1950i railroads, 5.5 percent; power stations, 14.5 percent;
gas uotks, 25.3 percent; smelting coke, 5.4.percent; and other industry,
49.3 percent. The total quantity consumed is estimated at between 5.9 million
and 6 v41' Ion tons, but this vas considerably less than needed*
Out of approximately 141.5 million metric tons of brown coal available
in 1990, including 4m4llion torts of imports, it is estimated that approxi-
mately 70 percent we processed into briquettes, 26 percent was umed in
making electric power, and the balance went mainly to industry. New rail-
road locomotives have been designed to burn brown coal dust, tut as yet the
quantities used are negligible. East Germany bas consumed about 95 percent
of its briquetts output in recent years and bas exported the balance to pay
For necessary imports,
The bituminoua coal deficiencies are part3,y responsible for shortages
of brown coal briquettes. Current briquette requirementa are not known,
but they considerably exceed available supplies* Since at least an additional
5 70115on metric tons of tituminone coal are believed necessary to meet
current fuel demands, it is certain that a, mudh greater quantity of briquettes
would be needed to alleviate dhortages. The fuel requirements of railroad
locomotives are met almost entirely by thous' of brown coal briquettes, but
remits are not very satisfactory, because considerable coal drops through
the grates before it is completely burnsd, and its high sulphur content has
a corrosive effect on the equipment.
It is estimated that 3506 million metric tons of brown coal briquettes
were consumed in 1950 as follows: railroads, 18.9 percent; distillation
coke (including use for synthetic fuel)* 22.4 percent; power stations, 9.6
percent; other industry, 4343 percent; and domestic use, 9,8 percent.
Brown coal Is the basis for East Germanre large synthetic fuel industry.
Production and processing of brown coal for this purpose is concentrated in
about 12 Soviet-contrelled combines, Which in 1950 used About 14 million
metric tone of brown coal in the production of electric power and produced
about 16 million tons of brown coal briquettes, of which up to 90 peroent Wan
converted into distillation coke*
81 -
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kiredrairri
The following tables furnish estimates of the availability and require-
ments of solid fuels for the period 19042, but it must be emphasised that
the figures are based on inomplete data and are to be regarded only ea rough
approximations Aetna needs are definitely mach higher than the allocations
given below, uClich represent estimates of quantities distributed.
Estimated Ea.st German Availability and Requirements of /3:Kumla= Coal
194-52
Production 2,80
Stocks (as of 1 January) N.1.
Imports 2,459
Total SalL
Exports 0 0 0 0 0
Stocks (as of 31 December) LA. N.A. R.A. al a/
3,019
2,807
3,000
3,200
N.A.
N.A.
d
2,606
3,138
3,200
3,400
5?241
6a2111
Tota3. Availability
442 141 WU lag
299113=Billtdk
Railroads
180
300
325
500
600
Power Stations
1,200
1,400
860
900
900
Gas works
1,250
1,350
1,500
1,500
1,600
Smelting Coke
320
320
320
320
320
Other Industry
2,357
2,255
2,940
2,980
3,180
Total Requirementa WM Zan 5.9L12112 la=
IV Very small.
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Estimated East Genoa Avallabilligr and Requirements of 13rovn Coal
194642
.....ilammaLliditiaagia
Ins-rjaxage .41248 ... .1249.. 3211. -MIL- .322.
Production 110?863 124480 177,500 1459000 352,000
Stocks
N.A. Al ii
4,000 4,000 4,000
Ita4M. 142,900 3.56,000
0 0 0
N.A. a,/ ili
Total AvailabiliV alifilia akin alai 111411 ARM
(0-5 of 1 Zanuary)
Imports
N.A.
4,265
N.A.
3,850
Total
lila*
1.23.820
Exports
?
0
0
Stocks
(as of 31 December)
.
N.A.
N.A.
balLUSINIAL
Briquette Plants
'78,100
909450
Power Stations
31,000
33,000
Chemical Plants
1,000
1,100
Other Industry
4,000
2720
Railroads
460
460
Heating
568
600
Total Requirements us=
si/ Very mall.
99,300
104,000
109,200
37,000
39,400
41,000
1,200
1,300
1,300
2,840
3,100
3,200
460
460
500
700
'740
800
21:11422 21i1.202 lit&MQ =kW
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414-Cri
Estimated Fast German Availability and Requirements of Drown Goal Briquettes
1948-52
-44:40 To*
Jiiii. alblak. .1UL .1121L..
Production 30,045 34,785 38,195 40,000 42,000
Stooks (as of 1 January) N.A. N.A. LA. a/ d
L o Laporte 0 0 0 0
Total Saki. 34:211 XXI 4124111 la=
Exports 19778 3,991 2,555 2i100 2,500
Stocks (as of 31 December) N.A. Nd.. LA. if
Total Availability Wag WA Wail Aso 2214111
Easualameita.
Railroads
6,250
6,350
6,725
7,000
. 70300
Distillation Coke
7p200
7,500
7,975
8,500
9,000
Power Stations
Other Industry
2,000
9,703
2,000
13,600
2,000
15,400
2,000
16,300
2,000
17,300
Domestic Das
3,117
3,344
3,540
3,800
30900
Total Requirements
2111641
2?221*
35.4141
Ea=
120521
-
244-Etiet
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1-frestaill
Estimated Fast Gauen Availability of Coke d
1948-52
UAL
1.
Y . "
21SL
. ,
122.
Production
Coke Oven Coke
240
241
240
240
240
Gee Coke
625
700
750
750
800
Lowitempeinture Coke
vs Plante
315
342
335
336
340
SAG Plante
4,2C0
4,360
4,665
4.995
59300
Subtotal lailiM SAO WEI WA is=
Imports 372 1,129 1,430 1,600 1se00
Stocks (as of 1 January) LA. LA. N.A. 12/ ill
Subtotal la72 ba= UM UP. 8.J4
M W 56
Stooks (aa of 31 Deoember) LA, NJ. I. A.,
Total tilai AM &VI Ziagi giatii
Exports
7?Ma on requirements are liot available.
32/ Way walla
4. 42taadi1ate
Chronic shortages of coals particularly of bituminous coal, are sufficient
evidenee that East German stocks are perenially small. The railroad districts
in October 1949 bad accumulated emergency reeervee totaling 400,000 metric
tons of tftuminous and brown coal, sufficient for 20 days' operations. These
reeervee were maintained through the following Decedbers buts ty Petauezy1950,
they had declined to 176,028 tone, enoudh for only from 8 to 9 days operations.
Stocks were built up in the lamer of 1950 and were reported in mid-October
to be adequate for 12 days' operations tut subsequently fell again to about
a veeke a supply.
Another indication of the low level of coal stalks is found in the fact
that the SAG power plants usually have reserves of brown coal 00M:tent oaly
for 1 or 2 days' operations. Since these plants are assured of a 'WNW
flow of coal, however, larger reserves prebably are not necessary. Other
industriee would be expected to carry greater inventories, tut it is doubt.-
ful if they generally average more than 2 weeks' requirements.
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ktrees-k-fri
5o luau or DefAcit.
Postwar coal shortages have resulted from the loss of the Silesian
mines to Poland,' the separation from ;supplies in the Ruhr0 and large.
scale dismantling of braun coal operations by the USSR.
While imports in 1950 are estimated to have consisted of about 3
Million metric tons of bituminous coal, 4. rdrion tons of brown coal, and
close to 1.5 million tons of coke, the total deficit may have been as
high as 11 million tons. Conversion from bituminous to brown coal may
slightly reduce the net deficit.
Approximate import and export figares are given in the following
tables, and in the case of the Soviet Union, the figures are subject to
amide range of error.
Estimated East Gelman Imports of Brown Coal
190-50
--3"E"7"1" ..2a---I91mg"-112,112-11211
Poland 4260,570 3,853,000 41,000,000
Czechoslovakia 4,404 6,000 N.A.
Total ArArafra974 ?.-$5904% itatagQ2
B7---xpsa=a"...ts exportim cauntriea.
lil Estimated.
Estimated East German Imports of Bituminour Coal
190m50
.22iirg-a-71242 )ra-12.V2
Source
Poland
Czechoslovakia
West Germany
Total
1,5620100 2,600,000 3,000,000
6,000 6,000 N.A.
890,875 0 138,000
2,406221 26= 2.a131421
rdfia=portseportedfrormt exporting countries.
Estimated.
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Estimated. Emit German Ymporta of Coke
190-50
297,461 si
74,oco
154
725,000
404,000
9,4
2,/
3)/
900,000.
4.809000t
%ACC
Poland
Czechoslovakia
West Germany
USSR
Total Matt.eln I 1.2"..24t. 22630,...E4
Reported Poland*
12/ Estimated*
At/ Possible Shipments*
Estimated East German Exports of Braun Coa Briquettes
19040
Y)tr10 Tons
Non-Soviot ]loo
.41214.-
194 V
1959
Patria
0
0
2590.00
Denmark
0
198,500
280,090
Sweden
174,852
0
Switzerland
6%914
3,608
0
West Berlin
210,867
223,000
250,000
West Germany
123,198
3,800
450,000
Subtotal
Soviet Bloc
USSR
Subtotal
Total
Mallgs
0
1,200,000
laltaat
24252ank
ciii 87
12-?-2.-Erfel
iSs9222
50,022
3.050E4000
30229a=
lailL2122
50,000
19500?000
24.422MQ
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Awarding to the 1951 Plan, East Germany will export 2,400,000 metric
tone of brown coal briquettes as compared with the estimate of 20555,000
tons for 1950. Brown coal coke exports are reported at 220 metric tons in
1949, divided between Switzerland and Czechoalovakia? and 45,000 tons, all
of which went to West Germany, in 1950.
6. bedgmajdatatUng.
Basic restrictions on the East German coal industry are the limited
resources of bituminous coal in the Zwickau area and of coking coal. The
development of the Deberlugjarehhain deposit probahlyle111 not add to
domestic supplies of coking coal, because the coal in this particular deposit
is reported to be unsatisfactory for coking purposes.
A lack of manpower has retarded the production of beth bituminous and
brown coal. The Shortage of qualified technicians, especially those with
management capabilities, has been especially acute, and attempts to educate'
Party supporters by abort-item courses for responsible ?ositionn have proved
a failure. The number of employees actually employed in coal production is
small in relation to the total number of employees in tee industry, moulting
in high overhead costs which depress miners/ wages.
Youths are reluctant to become miners, bemuse the work is unappealing
and the pay low. The inability to obtain enough voluntary apprentices resulted
in the recruitment of forced laborers and increased employment of women. It
has been reported that approximately 2,500 wean were recruited in October 1950
for the brown coal mining districts of Welzmw end Senfteriburg. In the hard
coal mines at Zwickau, a large number of exam have been employed in, the
cleaning plants, but it was planned also to employ women inside the nines.
Goals have been set for the employment of partially disabled persons, but,
because of the hard work involved, the quota could not be realized.
The coal industry has to depend almost entirely =machinery and equipment
that have been badly overstrained and worn out during the last decade. Great
problems exist in the construction of the weave excavators, bridge cranes,
and auxiliary equipment used for stripping brown coal. Briquetting equipment
is in need of replaitement. Brown coal operations have been hampered by
shortages of such items as links nuts, screws, and bolts. The bituminous
coal mines likewise are struggling along with worn equipment. Spare parts
and tools are in short supply, and miners complain about the inferior quality
of their tools, which are made of soft steel.
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7. 21:1110=TalinaraglattagaUtURIZigatataLtaralig.
Bitisnincus production in the old mining districts has been relatively
stable thmgh inadequate in mount, since the end of the ea and no
significant change is Likely to occur before 1952. The nor bit:ma:Inoue coal
1115.110 at Doberriug-rdrehhala is expeoted to produce about 1 minim tons
annnall7p but several more years of development probably will be required
before the operation can attain that Leval of output.
There has been a steady increase in bra m coal production since 1947,
and this trend should matinee, providing the industry can obtain suffioient
quantities of new equipnent for expension as well as for replacement.
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D. Petroleum.
Summery
East Germany's eynthetic liquid
highly developed in the world, makes an
potential for war of the Soviet Union.
ments and provides a surplus for export
fuel industry, the largest and most
important contribution to the economic
Production meets domestic require-
and for stockpiling.
The gynthetio refineries produce over 95 percent of the country 'i out-
put of liquid fuels, and Boehlen, Leuna, leitz, and Schearzheide, the four
largest refineries, together account for about 90 percent of the production
of gasoline and 62 percent of the production of diesel oil. The total out-
put of liquid fuels in 1950 was almost 1.1 mermen metric tons, including
about 70,000 tons r4: 95/130 aviation gasoline produced at Boehlen but not
including unknown amouuts of jet fuel produced at Boeblen aftd Schnarzheide.
Production goals of 780,000 metric tons of motor gasoline and 475,000 tons
of diesel oil in 1955 probably will. be met.
In 1950 the petroleum industry, in addition to furnishing about
600,000 metric tons of petroleum products for the domestic economy, sepplied
50,000 tons to Soviet authorities in East Gummy and exported nearly 3001000
tons of gasoline, kerosene, and diesel oil to the USSR, Poland, Czechoclovakia?
and West Germany. Abaut twoethirds of the supply of lubricants is proeuced
tram small quantities of credo oil import,od 2:con huatria.
Stockpiling of petroleum products undoubtedly has taken place, but
tbe size of reserves is unknown. In addition to the nearly 150,000 metric
tons of surplus products available in 1950, a portion of the allocations to
the Test Garman economy probabky vas used to build up stocks. Shortages
of gesoline, diesel oil, and lubricants have been reported, and cuts in tha
domestic allotments Of these commodities for the purpose of stockpiling were
reported in the fall of 1950. Gasoline storage depots either have been or
are in the process of being filledond drums have been confiscated by the
government.
Apparently the Soviet Union has realized that the diamantling carried
out In 1946 and 1,947 was shortsighted. Efforts at rehabilitation are evi-
dent, and particular attention is being given to increasing the output of
such specialized products as gelation gasoline, iso-octane, and jet fuel. In
addition to Boehlen, peens and Zeits are to produce aviation gasoline in 1951.
1. Production.
East Germany has no known deposits of crude oil, being entirely dependant
on its well-developed gynthetic liquid fuel industry and on several small re-
fineries which refine crude oil imported from Austria. Bomb damage and
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dismantling by the USSR after the war reduced the eapaoity of the eynthetic
refineries w one-ihalf. Numerous reports indicate that the output of the
remaining plants is increasing. Planned production was 700;000 metric tons
in 1949 and 1.06 million tone in 1950. The plants ate operating almost at
capacity in .1951. SAG plants owned and controlled by the Soviet Unions
account for 96 percent of grethetic fuel production, and Germanmowned (61)
plants produce the remaining 4 percent*
The output of liquid fuels in 1950 in estimated as follows
Estimated East German Production of Synthetic PUels
1950
Itassanilittalalana
Zallatts
Aviation Gasoline
70
Motor Gasoline
395
Kerosene
25
Diesel 011
405
Fuel
55
Lubricants
110
Total liagfia
According to recent reports two of the synthetio refineries, Boehlen
and Solnarzheide earpertnentanyprOduced 2,000 metric tons each of T-1 jet
fuel, 2t/ all of :bleb was ahipped to the USSR* in the last qsarter of 1950.
Aviation gasoline of 95/130 grade is made at the Boehlen refinery, Which also
produces isossoctane. Lubricants are produce both syntheticaThr and from
crude oil Imported from Austria, which totaled 120,0M metric tons In 19500
The 23 operating refineries are listed below, with their 1950 production
of gasoline and diesel oil 3fit
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East COMarl Refinery Production
1950
Metric Tons
Name
-Owner
Process
Gasoline
Dispel Oil
Boehlen
SAG
0111?1??????????????
Bergius
220,000
50,000
Lama
SAG
Bergius
90,000
? 0
Zeitz
SAG
Dergius
80,000
190,000
Schwartheide
SAG
Fischer-Tropsch
35,000
12,000
Coalzau
SAG
Carbonization
10,000
30,000
Webau
SAG
Carbonization
WOO
20,000
Koepsen
SAG
Tar Distillation
6,000
20,000
Rositm
SAG
Carbanizatia4
5,000
60,000
Leutzkendorf
VVB
Crude Oil _ _
climilischer-Tropsob
8,000
20,000
Eddaritz
VVB
Tar Dietilletion
2,000
500
Boesdorf
VVB
Tar Distillation
0
3,000
Klaffenbach
VVB
Crude Oil
2,000
0
Herrmnleite
vvB
Crude Oil
420
0
'
Total
1465 920
405.5oo
2. Estimated Possible Pza_duction and Capacitor.
Although plans for 1951 and 3.952 are not known, there is little doubt
that output, espeoially of such specialized products as aviation gasoline
and jet fuel, Will increase. The production of motor gasoline and diesel
oil is to be 780,000 metric tans and 475,000 tons, respectivel); in 1955. y
The planned production of liquid fuels at Boehlen in 1951 shows an increase
in the amount of aviation gasoline and iso-octane. The scheduled output
is as follows yt aviation gasoline, 90,000 metric tons; motor gasoline,
140,000 tons; iso-octane, 22,000 tone; diesel -oil, 27,000 tons; and kerosene,
10,000 tons.
The lama and Zeitz plants reportedly were being converted to the pro-
duction of aviation gasoline early in 1951.y The Fischer-Tropsdh
tian at Leutzkendorf was to be closed down an 31 March 1951 and transferred
to Schwarzheide for more efficient operation* gi
3. ..2DEPAgElt.25anTelqa-
On the basis of information available civilian and military revirements
cannot be estimated separately, The planned distribution of liquid fuels
in East Germany in 1950 is reported as follows E/:
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Planned Distribution of Liquid Fuels (East Germany)
3950
Thousand Ibtric Tote
Consumer
Gasoline Diesel Oil Esrosene Fuel Oil
Total
Commerce
5
5
0
0
10
Berlin
11
5
0
0
16
Transportation
13
12
3
13
41
Industry ?
77
38
2
113
135
Agriculture
18
55
3
0
76
Central Government
32
le
0
0
50'
States
104
72
2
15
193
Reserves
13
10
1
0 ?
24
Total
273
215
11
g.
In addition to this distribution, about 50,000 metric tons of gasoline and
diesel oil mere allocated to the Soviet civil and Military organizations
in at Germany. The estimated total requirements for lubricants have been
placed at about 145,000 tons, 2/ but the East German share of this total
is not known*
Actual consumption of petroleum products probably dill not equal the
planned allocations* Gasoline allocations mere cut to 35 percent of June
and Ju4 levels in September, October, and November and. to 20 percent in.
December, 10/ and a reduction in gasoline ratians has been reported by other
sources. Considerable cuts in diesel fuel allocations mere reported in
September 1950* av
4. Stockpiles,
The exact extent of at German petroleum stockpiles is undetermined,
but they known to be large. The capacity. of permanent Shortage facilities
exceeds 1 million metric tons. All of the gasoline storage depots either
have been or are in the process of being filled, 1 .and new storage facilities
are under construction* The out in gasoline allotments in the fall of 1950
wan reported to have been the result of stepped-up stockpiling*
Saxony-Anhalt alone, 100,000 drums were confiscated in Novetber 15O, and
similar action was reported in the other Leander. J The storage dep4s
at Walton and Riese each received 35 tanrairrOf tane gasoline a month
in 1950 from Poeblen* ly In addition to gasoline, part of some of the other
products allocated for consumption in 1950 probably mere stockpiled instead.
5. Surplus or Deficit*
asst Germany has a surplus of all petroleum products except lubricants,
which are chronically in short supply, In September 1950 the Soviet authorities
ordered that deliveries of synthetic lubricating oils to East German consumers
be stopped immediately, thus making the shortage more critical, 22/
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In addition to stockpiling sem of its surpluses, gest Germany exports
petroleum products to the USSR, Poland* czechoslovakia, aid West Germany. A
limited interzonal trade agreement reached in early December 1950 provided
for the sale of at least 30,000 metric tons of petroleum products, and
nrObably an additional 20,000 to 30,000 tons, to West Germany. 2...2/
EXports to the Soviet Bloc in 2950 are estimated as follows aft
Estimated Petroleum Expert? to the Soviet Bloc
1950
' Thousand iletric Tens
. Destination
Aviation
.Gasoline
Motor -
Gasoline Kerosene
?Meet)].
,Oil
Total
1009.~IIIIIIm
???????????0???14.1.0????
....a.wm
USSR
35
15
0
73
123
Poland
0
35
5
67
107
Czechoslovakia
0
30
0
20
50
Total
35
8o
5
16o
28o
6. Internal Limitations.'
The chief limitation on the East German petroleum industry is a short-
age of equipment for the production of synthetic fuel, Expansion of facilities,
and even reconstruction of war-damaged plants, has bean seriously hindered by
the effects of the Soviet dismantling policy, which, however, apparently has
been reversed. Supplies of tetraethyl lead, all of which must be imported
from the USSR, are inadequate. Total annual requirements are reported at
400 metric tons, but in 1950 the USSA shipped only about 184 tons and in
1951 planned to deliver 150 tale. 3Sil Tank car shortages seriously restrict
thew imports.
70 Trends?including Indications of Mobilization for War.
The output of liquid fuels in East Germany has increaeed steadily in the
postwar period. Dismantled plants are being rebuilt)and the efficiency of
operation is increasing.
Production efforts are being concentrated particularly on aviation gesoline
and jet fuel. The 1955 production goals of 780,000 metric tons of gasoline
and 475,000 tons of diesel oil probably will be mat. There are indications
that heavy emphasis is being place-a-Oh-increasing production of the larger
synthetic plants at Boehlen, lamas Zeitz? and Schwarzheide.
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Eo Electric Fewer*
Summary,
The elestric power industry in Eest Gummy cautributea sigaificantly
to the eoenomic potential of the Soviet Bloc tlrough the important part that
it plzers in the manufacture of industriai goods itir export to the Soviet Bloc.
The largest consumers of electric poser are the chemical and synthetie fuel
industries* Although power is not ?Sported in appreciable quantities to the
ether Satellites* small amounts are tzbansmitted to Poland in return for Polish
coal.
The 'USSR pliers a direct role in the production and consumption of
eleetric power. SAG plants (Sovi'eteoweed industrial enterprises) control
about 51 percent of the generating 4:rapacity, produces about 45 percent of the
electric) pavera and commas from 35 to 45 percent of total production.
Postwar produetiozi of power has constantly increased and has satisfied
the essential tetquireirnts of the ecoroeye but at no time has output bean
sufficient to meet all" requirements. SAG Me increased its share in the proa.
ductionp and probably in the consumptioniof electric power.
Because of the poor condition of the generating equipment azel the
difficultiet encountered in effecting repairs, replacements, and additions
and in importing Eseessary equipnant from the West, the electric power in..
dustry cannot in the future maintain the postwar rate of increase of production.*
Th1.8 dealing', in the rate of increase will tend to limit the axpezIsion of those
4 nettiltri011 requiring large quantities of electric power* The expanded output
belle the electrical equipment industry nay enable generating oapacity to be
enlarged and more efficiently used by late 1952, 'but planned goals for eleotrie
power production are not likely to be met,
lo atremi_ the IthlatrZ.
The electric peeer industry contributes sivaificantly to East Gernanes
high level of industrialisation. Although almost all industries depend an
eleotrio power to sons =tent, the chemical and synthetic fuel industries are
the largest consumers*
2o Prew......1 PEttart Trends and Develo zits.
Prior to the Soviet dismantling of a large portion of East Germanyes genere
ating ?opacity and transmission equipment in 1945.47 the electric) power system
in It Germany was highly developed in fairly good condition* end closely
geared to war production, Sines World War I when the use of brown coal
for power production booms praotica1. expaasion has been continuous. the
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greatest increases in generating capacity occurring during war and rearmament
periods, 1/ when emphasis was placed on the production of nitrate, cartddes?
aluminum, copper, and other goods requiring large quantities of cheap electric
power for their production. At the end of World War II, brims coal was virtually
the sole feel source for power production. Transmission facilities were widely
developed, not only for reasons of econagy, but also because the large con-
centration of capacity in a few plants, which results from the location of the
generating plants at the site of the brown coal deposits, makes it imperative that
consumers be protected from supply interruptions by access to alternative sources.
Mach of the older equipnent, particularly boilers, suffered durinc the war from
lack of propermeintenance, but enemy action disabled not more than 5 percent of
the generating capacity. V
Dismantling serious4 decreased the efficiency of the electric power system.
Most of the newer generating equipment and considerable quantities of transmission
equipment were removed, and economic distortions were created b7 the removal of
disproportionate quantities from different parts of the country,
Despite these handicaps,. the electric power industry raised production by 45
percent from. 1946 to 1950 2/ by cannibalizing, importing spare parts, balancing
boiler and turbine capacity, strictly regulating consumption, and operating
generating units far beyond the normal safety lielt8. Althellah the increasing
postwar requirements have largely been met, power production has not expanded so
rapidly as requirements, nnd added restrictions are being imposed on less
essential users,
The electric power industry will face difficulties in the next 2 years. The
efficiency of existing capacity can he improved only slightly. The worn condition
equipment, the strain imposed upon all units, part1cu1at4 the bonen, and the
improbability of installation of new capacity Will linit the efforta to increase
production. Although some increase may be expected, the rate of growth will be
slow, and the leek of electric power will tend to limit industrial expansion,
3. 11312121111-====.
a. gpssicars
Bast Germanyve extensive brown coal reserves constitute almost the eno
tire energy base of its electric, power system. Since bituminous coal must be
Imported, it is used only in power-consuming centers such as Berlin, which are
located too far away ieeertrown eoai burning plants to make transmission of power
from these plants economical. tack of adequate supplies and the prior claims of
more essential =era' b.= provaaea ciaa aua oil from being used iror power
generation. .Hydroelectric resources are so limited that only about 1 percent of
present capacity 18-hydroel7etr1cQ
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Bromm coal reservos are sufficient to enable the power industry to
maintain mad expand produetion. The saving from low-oost production eith
this fuel are slightly offset by the necessity of l'oating generating ca-
pacity at the fuel source to avoid aecoesive tranamisaion costs and of
employing special teohniques and equipment. Those limitations have put a
premium on repair faoilities and skilled manpower and have increased the
strategic vulnerability of the industry by forcing a conoenbration of ose.,
pacity at the fuel souroes.
b. Eleatrioity Generating Fleets.
The available figures for annual installed capacity in East Germaey,
including East Berlin, range from 4.4 million kilowatts y to 4.85 million
kilowatts sy and apply to 1947. These capacity estimates appear unrealistio?
since they inolude much equipment that cannot be put into operating con..
dition. Operable oapaoiey in 1950 amounted to only 2.9 million kilomatts a
year. Iff Although this figure shows the broad disorepancy between operable
and installed opacity that now =lets, indioating the poor tondition of
mall of the equipment9 it represents a considerable inprovement over conditions
in 1946. ellen only 2,05 million kilowatts a year were in operating condition.V
Soviet dismantlers took the newest e uipm a
ent and reduced nnual in ll
steed
-2e
Th
oapaeity by 301 million kilowatts. 8 eremaining generating equipment was
obeolescent sad in need of repair, bad condition of the boilers being the
ohief factor that prevented many power plants from operating at capacity.
It is unlikely that the operating capacity of presently installed
equipment will increase beyond 3.2 million kilowatti a year by the end of
1952, being retarded by the age of the equipment, the continued postponement
of repairs, and the lack of sufficient spare parts and materials. Altheugh
the Five Year Plan (1951.55) envisaes an increase of annual operating ca.
pacity of 2.1 million kilawatbs, 9 it is estimated that the total operable
oapacity will not exceed 3.25 million kilowatts a. year by the end of 1952.
Installed capacity in 194722/was alnost equally divided between
industrial and public utility use, and SAG plants controlled 31 percent of
total eapacity. Nearly 68 peroent of the capacity vas in:tailed in Saxony-
Anhalt and Saxony. 'where the largeet brown coal denosite ere located? Siel/ar
informatioe for 1950 is not available, but it is unlikely that the pattern
has changed radically &ince 1947. Nationalisation ?f all power installations
in East Germany centralisation of oontrol for the purpose of aggregate
operation, and a tendency toward closer ties between SAG and German in-
dustries have increased the efficiency of the power system.
The following table lists the 10 largest power plants, which together
account for about half of the present capaeitv. All of these olents burn
brown coal. The table also Meows the extent of SIG control and the geographical
concentration of capeaityu III
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8,4041-11,9B-T
k;spaci17 of Selected EAst German Power Plants
196G
Thousand Kilowatts a To
ma led Operable
Naas of Plant SVacitV Capaeitr
Expinhain
800blen
Klingenburg
Sobkopau
Iti.tterfeld
Zrebornewita
Hirsobtold.
Berbke
ilouna
Laute
Onership,
332
279
Sunny'
SAG
267
191
Saxony
SAG
230.
3.55
Berlin
German
209
136
Sasony.Anhalt
SAG
205
177
Sazony.Anhalt
German
176
152
Saxopy*Anhalt
Gesrman
164
130
110
Saxony
Samony-Anhalt
German
German
1121:
sa
Sazonar.,Anbalt
SAG
179
53
Brandenburg
German
Total 1 918 4.1118?
4? TransmistImattel.
The tranamisaion network ln &et 8ermmay is highly developed and i4
an important faotor/in the power systrm0 With this network it is possible
bo operate tram 85/to 96 percent of tut operable **peaty on an aggregate
boots. Aggregate/ operation permits the ooncentration of capacity at sources
of fuel supply and MAXIMUM utilisativn., and prevents the frequent breakdowns
of the individual generating unite ftomseriously affecting the stability of
the total posir supply*
The transmission netawk vial developed as part of a national network
whIth included regional and loom,' kales built to provide oompleto service
within East Germany? In 1967 the Waiving lengths of different.moltage
:.in existed in East Ger1any-8
Voltage end length of East German Transmission Lines
220
40?8
110
2,225,2
60
65-.6
30
614,4
40
614
30
296..3
Divtl? maim
245.3
1,687.3
413.8
1,620.6
593.1
11,228.1
'98
14*. 4.41-Z0-1
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?Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP79R01012A000900030001-7
8.8.4.R.E4
The 2204d1ovolt lines, which previously had connected the brown *nal
burning plants in East Germseywithgenerating plants in Bavaria. and the Buhr,
are now being dismantled dO that the equipment ney be used to build additional
liass from Dieskau through Bitterfeldto the Aue.Zeunits uranium area. 2.4/
The 110.ki1ovolt lines crisscross the entire area of East Germany and
are the principal means of interregional transeseitln,? a( There are saw
110.111ovolt lines running from the eador brawn coal 'gents in Saxon and Saxon
Anhalt to regional oolleating point., shish, in turn, are eonneotedwith one
another, and others surround and radiate in all directione from Berlin. This
network protects Berlin frmn the offsets of individual generating failures
and provides a MIAMI of tramsmitting power frmn the brown coal paanta in the
soutbmrn third of East Germy to the oentral and northeri regions, Two
220-.kilovolt lines, four 110.ki1ovolt lines, and numerous lomareltage lines
run into West Gerasey. A high.tension cable comsat* the Hirschfeld* power
plant and the Polish aity of Gorlite across the Oder River, and low*tezusion
*abbe connect East Gamey with Poland and Czechoslovakia.
The large SAG power plants have their own netecr14 stioh, althrugh
part of the national network, is operated directly by the Soviet authorities
to supply power to the SAG chemical plants.
Soviet dismantling of transmission equipment was not extensive enough
to affect seriously the distribution of power. Despite shortages of new
equipment and naterials, many Improvements hare been made by cannibalising
existing unused equipment. The benefits of this practice probably have been
exhausted in line construation, however, 4/ and the shortage of high.q
tension cable is now oonsidered serious.._4(
/lost of the DM 100 million allocated under the Five Year Plea 1.4
for expansion and main:tenant:ft of tho networks= be spent an strengthe
the linkage between East Berlin and the brown coal plante in Saxony and Sax.004-
Anbalt and on altering the zietwork to avoid transmission through West
Be:11%14.V Despite the soaroity of new equipment, it is poesible that the
Power ustry can amoomplish =It o: its objeotives by the end of the Five
Year Plan, It is likely, hovever, that important chews will not occur
before the end of 19520
40 Produotion.
Productiofl of electric power has inoreased elate 1946 as follows atilt
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SmE.C.114-T
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?Approved For Release 1999/09L2LatrP79R01012A000900030001-7
Production of Electric Power in Eest Gormany
1946..50
kat
aauoiz
lkarea
Embeilau
1946
11.7
1947
13.7
1948
15.4
1949
17.2
1950
18.5
Two important features of this expansion have been the concentration of pro.
duction in relatively few plants and the increasing proportion of power
produced by SAG plants, which reportedly rose from 37 to 45 percent of total
output between 1947 and 1949.
? Improvements in distribution have greatieeingneuumel utilization of ?
capacity, permitting the rumarkatGePhigh average use of capacity of about
6,500 hours a year, which equals a plant factor of 75 percent. Although this
high rate of equipeent utilization could not have been reached without
multishift operations in other industries to spread consumption evenly over
time, and although further production increases may result from the operation
of additional capacity, it is not expected that hours of operation will in-
crease above 6,500 hours a year. Assuming that the level of imports of
eqpieeent and materials front Wept Germany can be maintained, production in
1952 may be 20.5 billionkilowattehours. An increase in the rate of equipment
breakdowns and the cessation of West German exports, however, could reduce
1952 production to below 1950 levels.
The planned goal of 31.4 billion kilevattehoure for 1955 Wirt considered
unrealistic, although the rate of increaeo of production may . se towards the
end of the live Tear Plan period, when the electrical emArmaat industry
should be able to deliver new generating units.
50 2921100=Ro
The importence of electric power to the East German economy and to the
economic potential of the Soviet Bloc is beet illustrated by the pourer cone
gumption pattern. The le/spit consumers are the chemical, synthetic fuel,
and brown coal industriesewhich together consume about 35 percent of the power
produced. Pu'or plants and teenamission losses aecount for another 15 per-
cent of the ewer, leaving may 50 pervert of total output for other users.
Electree power is partioulmayinecatent to the SAG iedustries? chiefly
because almost all chemical production is SAGecontrolled. Most of the power
consumed by the SAG industries is prodeved by SAG power pleas, which are
?
e 100 e
SeEeneReEei
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---- Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP79R01012A000900030001-7
connected by their own paver grid', an& their present production is comp1ete:1,y
consumed by so industries conneeted to this vide leaving no reserve power
available for emergencies. Additional demand on bo mot only by East German
plant.so which must restrict the distribution of power to the national sector
Of the ecenogy in order to meet SAG donandS032(
The following tablea( gives the oonsuOption pattern for 1947 and
illustrates the importanse of eleotric power to the SAG industries* Sinne
1947, there may have been a slight increase in the proportion consumed by
the chemical industry aid some reduction intim proportionL used in households.
The statiaties exolude East Berlin, where SAG controls no power plants and
oonsumes only a mall &mint of power*
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Consumption of Electric For in East Germany
1947
1112021.0000151101110PRIMMOOD1.41111.,
73
73
3
<
0
a
li
0
-1
Pp
m
ET
m
ce
m
_&
CD
CD
CD
a
CD
is-3
-4
..
C)
>
33
0
-0
-4
CD
P3
CD
_&
CD
_&
K)
>
CD
CD
CD
CD
CD
CD
CD
(A)
CD
CD
CD
-a
--Eramitt.lizsYs_
Braun ? 0me .1mduetry
Other Mining
Consumption
1144- 40n KW
% of Total
PmElandiza
v,o
30k
1005
18.9
4-4
107
001
105
005
1.4
1.3
1.6
4.1
0.8
0.8
2.6
303
W,04
2.0
100
16.0
LAii9
SAG Consumption
IMILLIaLlg_W_
417
168
19140
10840
186
0
0
16
0
58
0
17
0
0
0
34
0
0
0
0
0
JA2?-
% Consumed
by SAG
% of Total
ag-E2MPumnt5'n
10.7
403
29.5
47,3
409
0
^
ti
0.4
0
1.5
0
0.5
0
Q
0
0.9
0
o
0
0
0
LW
1,423.05
353094
2903
4900
98.0
880
3800
0
0
1000
0
36.4
0
9.5
0
0
0
11.6
0
U
0
0
0
22612
Gasoline IndustrT
C.htmleal Industry
Uetalworking Industry
Twf.tile industry
Lii,6i.ths'z' Zadustgy
FLper Industry
i;oodrorking Industry
Building Materials
ZAdustry
Transportation
Other Induztry
Band T:adea and Small
Induatry
Fot%d, Processing Industry
Suge.7.? Industry
p1y
441,1nuituTm
Ecu?7,1oniim
Oesupyimg Boner
Other Consumers
Holm, service if*
14orter Plants and Loccmi
Total
1,166.81
20089,88
491.08
-192.06
13663
164.84
D9092
158.34
150034
181.20
448.44
204.85
87618
288.56
367.41
1,,::350.16
227.62
115.82
10732.80
llagatll
k;zoludiug Berlin.
IV?
44
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41'
About 2 peroent of total peree predectien i - e,eld t, -To s4 ':;eveaNe
Poland., and eseohoelovekla.15V Lbee el tie p-,7- ,1:e4elei Le neeo oezeeey
Lie', Poland is exported by the Uarbko ancl Hereve. anni- ulanie in return for ceee
mined immediately across the border in tilt Erieeel ,eie ard in Polend. :n-
signifioant quantities are supplied to Cgochoeleee5-e, .S(
The excess of requirements over cupply of eleotiec newer has neeleasieeted
stringent restrictions on use since the aad of ebe eel". The imposition ef
tighter restrictions in April 1951 probably indicoe that industrial ex-
pansion in progressing at a faster tenpo than is reeenrion of ponce- prom
-1(
duction, 24 Although power shortages have boon reeneeeible for a generel
reduction a industrial efficiency* they have not eeusly curtatied pre
-
duction in the important industrial plants. It is eeesible, however* thet
electric power will becore an industrial bottleneek en the next 2 yearca
The predicted decline in the rate of increase of e/cotrie pr productien,
if it ?court's, will widen the gap between requireeeete cad supply. Since
meta-lotions on nonindustrial oonsunptian miracle; ETC: severe, and clime en-
duetrial coneuners already have emononised on the u-e o0 electric peer, it
appears that the rate of industrial expansion ?event be as rapid as beroieNfore,
.The large consumers of power will be nest serioemly elteotei by these sherOenee,
Fer instenco, restoration of the large aluminum ie41-eteee eleich vex dieeentlee
by the USereprobably will be delayed by the inei)ie to inareeee newer pvc-
4uotiont,
6. Input Reqpirements.
Manpower reqpirements for the electric power indeetry probably do not exceed
30,000 persons? al/ A Shortage of teebeically akilled personnel handicaps the
industry, Drown coal for fuel is available in 6u:1:In-lent quantities? It la
estimated that 37 millibnemetric tons of brown coal,, 2 llion tone of browe coaA
briquettes* 1.5 million tons of lamecarbonisablen eo7le? aad 35C,000 teneaZ
bituminous' coal were comanmed by the eleotrio power Industry in 1950 26/
Maintenanoe requiraacnts of equipment are high Iecause of the poor cone
dition of the overeage installations, the high deterioration rate caused by
the burning of brown coal, and the continual postpcnent of overhauls. The
maintenance of boilers, which have broken down at a.7,00t four tines the to .
of turbogenerators, has been a particularly serieue eroblcm. 17/ The plan
to expand operating capacity by 2.1 million kilowatee in the next 5 years will
create large additional equipment reviroments. Thf. industry will need nae'
new boilers, turbines, generators, traneformers, ant:- cables in addition to
new parts for wasting equipment? It has been Gst7Lnted that from DM 700
million to DM 800 million will be required to retell', replace), and expand
generating equipment 20,/ and that I*! 100 million el-:e he needed for improve-
ment to the network, acy
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(-Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP79R01012A000900030001-7
-
VUlnarabilltT.,
Depondroe 00 cat OvmanF prv1 if i,6act)rA :.-oett*Tg 47,-7! rorlin for materia1-9
;sni-)7aconerti, parta, rad nice nflits Lohea the 'tower industry highly
-1Anerable to txLordovrtzfaro, t'hect tqp1: cz.ntia? to the maintonanee
clid expansion of productiono Plo-Yrosl LaA: bit rTeuily in equipping
rcpair plelts and iz rAnufnobarin3 spare .ait Germany, but even
thIn aottqity is dependent upon iaporlw flora Vtt Grj In 1949 it was
est:;,rsted ty off!oimlo of tho indistry tint PM 20 21.-.1Lon would be needed to
mlm' denAnds for 1.r)E0,,, 3q/ Easetal irports to 1.90 included condenser
i'ubcor copper cableD bX_er !albeel awlerheater ii:q1)35g steel, special
olsotrio motor a end rep1c4meat parts, replacew:It parte for turbines.
galvanized steal cable.) Ugh-grade atieleD heavy c,Ar-ent cablop, and special
ioelitog.sen331
Imprammants of facilities ham boon slight and have been aohieved in a
few oatogovies of materiels and eluipz:ento Officialo, of the industry ha3e
enatad tl7st tl?.-e task of replacng cmd, repairing puur Etations now in
lopz. aordition meting tho Additional olostricit !,,-cmiremente: of the
nea7lt A: -'-j' require Da 1 i11 en of which .r &C to GO poent .4111
be required in the for4 of foraigi currency? Si
-
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,?-Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP79R01012A000900030001-7
6.4?mioit;
Ptlax4rY.
The proivation of caustic soda in Et whiCh is estimated
at 145,000 metric tons in 1950, ia inadequatr= to =et domeatia requirements?
The Industry is plagued with many limiting facterci emug them electric
power shertageso shortages of spare parts; and al07,icivated equipment, Which
or7itrihated to the failare to meet the 1950 proction quota, Despite
domestic sllertagesi East Goroauy Is bllv c be ocatiniling reparations
shirlents of ca7.13t.te soJa to the USSR..
To better itc caustic soda position, East ,7s47many muat increase
impore from tbo We since the entire Soviet Bl*t. is ')-7aced with a general
shortage; of caustic coda. The largest iiDporto r:=1 suiyiod by Sweden end
Cho rist1ards., Deficiencies in the caustic a,n)jA uu:pp77 aro patially
rcposibl, for the failure of naLly id trios enuatis sodas imong
)611 7:re Irayo4 colllaorio, soap, tl.;;;'-S3Lterr, latom?,diatess and other
11.evy inustriess to exparld pv)driotion
ThG eutimaed 1955 output gcal of 250s.00i) .m)ta4o tons of caustic
GOdA 5.3 likoly to ho met ruless asoassaryas aro obtained,
pacticula-.y from the West; the industry fases nositiou and even deteriore-
,--
t'ton
So pure s7.14hu1' is mined in East Gorm3.n7k-; %,ut large quantities are
r000vere4 from notneeircus smelters; Pram coo ovos, .rom synthetic ftel -
mauafacti2:re and froln other sources. Proauctif; these and from new
30'1110 iQ being continually inoressd, CrotJ. to send sulphur and products
reqvirin7 sdlnbur to the USSR as reparatio1721 E71z Isma:Iy has bsen obliged
to curtail amstically domestic production of rubber goodap nertlin
chmioals ani other products ,Xcloh requepr xLm The -world sulphur
shortag cald ;;rostern oxpor controls rnaks thz, p-Tnt of inports frca
t1.3 ihf vol.:,trles which prodl.:ze moit cutptIts diffirnalt
If no
lormeny depends principally on ;Trites for the sArin-
tv3ture of sulphuric acf_d? sulphite puip,) and )72...7 D.tAr ohemica1c0 Most
or the ld Gupply of pyrites comes fl7va mrL-Bio 3e-illtiz?ies ',.11d is in great
dannn6 as a substitute for milphurs :421oh Tx!pply throughout the
world, A3 a ..serit of this increase in world coupled with Western
tradle eozIrolo, p:irltes e;4prts from Western ot'llneA to Bast Germany may
ceese altogether in 195? Because of earlier p-f,;-)nt difficaltiesp
stocks on band fell so lou that tho rato ,)17 cr..tf,17; rAllphwio acid works
UW, roam& after 1949 plmi to reaA
I-E-Sr-r-kl
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(Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP79Rd1,012A000900030001-7
(.7 7-.? ) ;13
1,elf-tsefIclene; i!Z:2 sulphv.yie 1ci ttiraJgh the use of
,Jeze egponsive TWV'TAS ba,;lod on ups= and tb.,.--)2g7- f.....,nreaced
Lion of sylrhate bi-fsorodicts from the po.L-sli Ullustries.
So long as Ft tlar,:lar7 an procare .;10 -.1:,%'::z,ary quantities of
pyrites from non-Crbit a-eae, it gill ont1i t atrib.Ate important/7
the, wqr potential of ';he USSR by supplying stiat.:gic vods requiring
-,yritoiJ. If the pyrites is n,:t forther..mir,- irom tna 1.)est, however, this
ad J?L1 1-e serlouoly impai132 91U-oucht lessanLig lovve as alternative
sources of raw natriels are eoveloped.
East Germa/y ia only signAficn:fit prdur!,.=e of synthetic rubber in
th.) Soviet Dlot, The Pnawveke. plant In e47hkc-ptu, '1,?rianyla largest gynthetic
pl9nt? prod.:zed 692000 metric!..,ons vier 50 percent of the
oi Gan outpu?, of syntLe-ti rubb 4g 2 II, The effects
Lnd the shortage of raw mrl rhcx1 catgut considerably
yeara, hut pioductiom in noJ..-.4 40,000 metric
is expo%tae to reach out 47000 tolx 1,951, The Five Tear
e!?D ,-,nvisaces production at pr-c-%-a:u Ic r. 1.955,
loora than half of the nyntbetic .)roilr,c64 in East
believed to b@ retained fcz. use by d',-to rubber fabricating
plar_ts moot of the recralnder going to the IMP, ('2--ch)L11evakia, and Poland.
afortti hare boon rade to build np a -.caber f-br:tatimg Industry in
EAV, .7.y; which bore the war vas sul)pli!:d yYea:. Garman plant&
Fou, aoto,e0bile tire plests produced an s9tim,Itod P200f100 units in 1950
,rd prlucties iu axpel-Akti to double betuan 195) L955,. This planned
hosever: is dcpondent on the niztpieliZz.c:- of upccial equipment and
Mc avIllaf)iiii7 of eavrzsteriale, Domestic prc:1-1!:i .01 or autaraabile tiros
r,ot c-eacleat for rec,uirements? at half co' c11-.Let be met from
1..,T.p0:-t1:, mainly f,I.cal Woe+ Germal/y;, roland, thoI L1dE Gzschoslovakia2
zt J.:4-,aly, in the tnes and sizes prodeJ bY?Tot Garman plants are
cavealylLmited iports 011 still be reqsiaei! ftE rl-iAecaments for maw
velvf.cles? ocn if production gains arc! achieve;1. Yre cold and rubber
s.re exporl..erl to the US al and the Satellito% 7nd the atm or rubber
cseeia nnd of sypthstio rubbcr as ropmaticils cAd a' ,:mports to the Soviet
E'er- i o7reeted +-o coat:Irmo to handfxsp the ,E.J01on of the at German
Stocks of synthetic rubber and -?eubber goo6n, ircluding tires, are
rqported to mist in East Germany, but aach uopp1n are not believed to
y'st reacod large Imoportious
io6 -
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(-Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP79R01012A000900030001-7
SnErnaRnEnT
Nast of the channal products used for t7re produaton of synthetic
robber are available do7e3tiea11y9 an additiowl ran rntorials are obtained
fnon the other Satellites, patioularly PoIand, PrnaICnton of the ehemloals
used in synthetic rubber .?roduction and in the rubben fabrication processes
44S begun eft or the Western cornterblookade out off nuplies from West
G.Drnnny la 1948 Carbon 'black production also hes :en inereasedo Additional
slpp1ic5 are now being obtained from Poland and Vnst Genman7y and by clandestine
tads Western countries
The high level of German technical personnel and the advanced nature
of the processes used are considered capable of gqppnrting a large expansion
of the rubber industry,, This technical leadership in East Germany is also
boing used in training of.Ekmletand Satellite personnel to overcome the lack
of skilled rubber workers elseuhere in the Soviet Bloc.
131,....eask..t....NVOY.... ,,,IZAZ/CILS66,.......a.m.VIMMISIIMI.
1 - gaViltalartc'
ti
Ezetzetlge
&Ant Germanyrs production of caustic soda is estimated at 1109190
motvic tons in 1948, 138,000 tons in 19499 and 140,000 'sons in 1950; Planned'
nntnnt i-11 1950 as 1459000 tons. Caustic /noda is produnod at the present
tne alnost entirely by the electrolytic =the& Br; and. during the warp
'6nn cod ch plants also produced cauctic soda by tho cauctification processo
7nth of thcne plants ware largely dismantled by the US.S.ho
b- 76:t2.19.,i&U.19.2.2tVgfnaaaqUal 02??,g3LESINT,
. caustic soda ylants at Radebeul and Volfcn are expected to
npenatina by 19520 Rough estimates of production aril capacity in 1951
1952 are as fellowsz
Estimatsd Production and Capacity of Canst;;_c Sada
1951-52
acm4uPwr Iftwaa m 4.4m.ewmcantaMMECUtOat,9weanaS
girAg11z
1951 150 190
1952 170 21C
s
C., LAW *rat Olin 670
balm
and
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(?Approved For Release 1999/09/27 : CIA-RDP79R01012A000900030001-7
P.?211,g-gST.41-1-VPI*A-
Tho mininum vartitias of catstic soda a..Nared to permit mlight
pro-lmtion incroases for the cousmArg induntrs are esi-,ated as follows
Estimated Domestic Regtirerents of Custic Soda
194g-52
.11.3.
...VV.", PT .C.C.Valt? ...1111Mantice qt. 1504 aff21201
719911:1213FAI
1948
115
1949
145
1950
165
1951
185
1952
210
.741 rc2or indicates that the total demand for 1950 would bo in excess of
30,0CC tons,
The rayon industry, producin6 artificiel silk and staple fiber, is
th lry.Lit single consumer of caustic soda and in 1950 wad approximately
or ths caustic soda output, Otter caustic soda users are the
papsr (bloachad sulphite prap and sniphate pulp), map* dyestuffs
.:(-termsdlates, fins thamicals, heavy stamicals, and toztiles industries,
-IctAilod analysis of consumption la possible.; sires soda ab also may be
the gulp and pap3r0 soaps, dyestuffs, and Ileavy chemical industries()
There is no diet indication that caustic soda in presently being
rtod in East Gamely.. Ono 1949 report stated that p of the planned
proctiou cf 118p200 metric tons, about 6?3C0 tors were allocated to the
ro;,(si:,7e0.
S;$;14,723,_as or_p_ells,Lto
Gmstic soda defl^i esttmateld
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-E-C
Eat:tlYk-.7d
1950, 1952
!ItglIsaal-Nqt.i
1.91-Q
-Tem
122
Requirtments
165
210
Availaillity
Prodtction
140
170
Imports
22
20
Total Availability ,gg ag
Net Deficit 2
East Germany faces a serious supply situation for caustic soda0
-J1sd ana1 proauction quotas have had to be revised downward for
Li yeara, The produartion quotas for the oellulose artificial fiber,
soap industries also have had to be lowered, partly as a resat of
the allatie shoitage. Although soda ash may. b6 ussd as a 11-Jib3t1tute for
cAmic sorla in the pulp and paper, soap, and other Jndustriss; its produe-
0.1 also is inadaquatep :)artly because the soda esA plants were extensively
d:4_8-p.lAntied by ths USSRg aid it is a question -allethel? coda aah or caustic
is In sborr supply,
The Shortage of custics is fur:ther aggravaad by reparations deliveries
to USSR, In 1949, alanit 2000 metric tons of caustic soda were sent to
the TJSSII, and. 300 tons of soda lye Item scheduled to be shipped to the Soviet
Ukkion in llexch 1951. Although its production is llu East Cormany has been
aApplying Balgar1a9 Czechoslovakia, Poland the USSR, and China with caustic
potas .4hicb can be used as a partial sOostituto for or,Lustic soda?
Many at-;:sn,pts hxvc, been and stal aro teing nac:o to import caustic
seda fro2.1. tha West,. In bcth 1949 and 7.950, about 24,,500 metric tons were
supplied by the Hetherlo&s,, While nearly 4,000 tons wre fernished by
West Gemany in 19500 in August 1950 a trade contract vas signed with Sweden
for caustic soda deliveriEs amounting to e038v287, ,5nCi it is believed that
this contract carries ?vex into 19510
other Europa& SatelJites can fftrnish little assistance to
t:as shortaga in East Gerlaany as the cauatio shortage is general
lAcc, Poland9 however. suppliea 3,070 mstr?c tons in 149,,
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Salt; the leasie ray material needed1 sda production; is
In plentiful sup-Ily in East Germany, Tho r2.'lLgor)...;-,r,Utiens on preuction
A.1--e shortages of electric pewE?r, equipaent 'a-:cp8zl, and nerf.ruryo
I' ,L7/00A'1? P..9.Y1K0
Eant Garnany is believed to to o:c,,nr.:1 at fermi capacity
-Atla no soctric per r4iservo, Failures alld b:=.3.if.vrio. have occurred,
:21.1-11 not for cottended periods. In orde to continuear opera-
iA.ea; the electric 'Dever 'rd for th(,. ohcmieni ?ecslyes first
-pri.or!ity :tn cupply vainnanas dnanda,
Maoh of the austic soda vAuipai)nt inefficionto The
-5S311 1:3 reported to have rood the annual !:oda capacity by about
58,000 metric tole through diamantlirg, Rnd 17,11-77: the equipment tan 1ms
Al! a modern typs. Noy equipment and parts fc' ,:x.c.trolytic installations
ra in short. supAT, and little of tlis typs of,7:-.-_-s),Aant is pro&aced
YAinterance work formcrlyvas dow:, .T7J.5 firms new in West
eruy and there is believed to be little capac'Jity to build and 'repair
41ectrolytic cello in East Germany at thin time, sangy of suitable
Dleatrelen also has been a limiting fceter, end ,Tiatraetory aexstos
lAt3.ohrgirls.J7er the cells have been laoklzg,
AM:SM.
This metal i6 necessary in the Operilicil of mercury-type electro.,
lytie cells, Several seurces have reported a s'Aoge er7mermyy in East
X.I.V-A=..L991141-#E-4149.1.t.-12a.S.L.S2UOM;1471-1-9.01AS:,
Thera has been no indication ofnebiliz.501-.1 for war in the caustic
weia industry, in fact, the industry has bac(.ima zoaaingly dopendent upon
the ',Jest and apparently desires to keep trade C7:q.L.IV OpYll. to permit
sufficient importso
Several electrolytic caustic plants o,:c r;c1Av1uled for empannion in
191.51 ',md later, The increase in elettric pos17 pply which is essential
to thane plans; however unquestionably will sn,7:;:nt,.) great difficulties.,
Another problem is mainienance of the antiquated 1.1.71.t inetallations with
inadequate toole and eqvipmeDt, The East industry cannot
ottain adequate suantitfan Tranhiaary?, onzr ovipment
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from the Soviet Bloc countriee? Even ftedhoelavakia can only slightly
replace the former deliveries froalplest Germany, Preeision reehanIcal
instrumento of high quality cannot be oupplied at all fram Elm eourcesp
which produce only lov-quality instruments
,-
It has been reported that apprentices are not properly indoctrinated?
Young workers of proved efficiency Who have the necessary talent for uni-
versity etudies are being retained in the plants, 14hile other, lase efficient
workers are proposed for university training because of their social backr.
ground., These limitatione indicate that the estimated production goal of
250,000 metric tons of caustic soda in 1955 is not likely to be attained,
2 293ararAEL=21.
ao &gbalguo
(1) masa.
Ni pure sulphur is mined in East Germany,, Large quantities of
by-product sulphur are recovered from the smelting of nonferrous metals,
from -the waste gages of coke menet from proces3 gavea produced im the
manufacture of synthetic liquid fuels, and from uport oxidea produced in
the purifidation Of city gas. 2/ Planned productiot of by-product sulphur
in 1949 was 32,200 metric tons, but attainment of thin target is unconfirmedc
The 1950 Plan oalled for an output of 53,550 ton s0 and, in the first 7
months of 1950, production was 25,000 tons0 equal to an annual rate of
42,900 tons? 3,/
(2) DIAJAW
The only pyrites deposits in East Germary axe located at
Eibingerode in the Earz?MOuntains and at Himmelfahrt near Earibruqckso
Production is estimated as follows:
Estimated Production of Pyrites
1949-60
2949
10,000 il
700000 ki
60,000 ki
195O./
7'4000
13t,000
9OOOO
d11Estimated from monthly output ratss in
9 and total planned output?
jai Estimated from output of 520052 metric
the first 7 menthe of 1950 and the pla4rod
of 90,000 tons. if
November
tons in
1950 output
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gatiTATITANWAILZugastIn_04
(1) .fing111E0
Plana for the production of by-produzt stlPhur in 1952 have
not been reported. On the basis of planned production of 60?000 metric
tons in 1951, 2/ it Is fistimatod that tho 1952 output will approach
709000 tons
(2)
Planned proeuction of pyrites in 1951 is 1100000 metric tons
of which 960000 tong is to be produced at Elbingorodei, 2/ From these and
earlior data, it Is astivated that total production of pyrites in 1952
will ba about 1300000 tone
0. Nimostiglielag;makk,
(1) AM12bm
Sulphur requirements include not only reparations dhipments of
sUinhtr as sudh but also the amounts needed in the manufacture of repara-
tIons products? nearly two.thirds of total requirements are for the manu-
facture of carbon bisulphide for rayon, and one-tbard ie for reparations
and for exports to 'jest 0ermanyo 249/ Small quantities of sulphur are
required for rubber vulcanization, mine flotation agents certain rubber
chrzmicaiss,, and a variety of other chemicals
Since planned requirements of sulptair wars 603000 metric tons in
.1951,2 J.1/.it is estimated that 1950 requirements wo7..8 about 503000 tons and
that requirements in 1952 including reparations anA other export/4 will be
about 70,000 tons.
(2) SIXa2AL.
The principal requirements of mites- aro for sulphuric adid0
sulphite pulp, and a large number of chemicals,, %lphuric acid in turn,
Is essential in varying degrees in the production of suplosives, rubber
chemicals, riakr metal products? rayons, nylon, blohromates? and other
stratePic products Planned imports of 165.,,000 metric teas 2.2/ and an
estimated production of 70,000 tong in 1949 indica U that requirements for
pyrites in that year uera 235,000 tons. Requirements In 1950 were 2e0,000
tons for consumptions, pile 60,000 tons for stockpile, of 10.6h 250,000 tens
?ware to be impor'z,ed and ?0000 tong 'were to te dcmaAlcal347 produced? IV
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Requirements *n 1951 arid952 are estimated at 2809000 metric
tons on tte ausuMptiot that same prodilotion of anlphorio acid from gypsum
and from sulphate by-products of the Petaoh and rgyan lodastries will have
begun. 14
tIG Zokate.
Shortages of both sulphur and pyrites have prevented extensive stock-
piling of either of those materials. As of 31 July 1950, stocks of sulphur
and pyrites -were only 577 and 382 metric tons, respectively. IV Although
it is planned to import 60,000 tons of pyrites in 0=03f7 of requiremente in
1951 as a precaution against a recurrence of 1949-50 doortagee, 2k,/ it is
doubtful hether this extra supply can be obtained.
e. VA to
(1) bilia=?
Eaet Germany is (mope/led to send sulphur and products depending
or solphur as reparations to the USSR, while at the BAMO time its own
irdustries9 particularly the viscose royon industry, have been operating at
low rates since 1949 becarso of sulphur shortages. Ignother the country
would he self-sufficient in sulphur if reparations requJrements wore
eliminated cannot be estimated, since it is not known at what rate the
sulphuroconsuming industries would have to operate in order to satisfy
domestic requirements.
In 1949, exports of sulphur amounted to 11n.500 metric tons, of
which 6,442 tons went to the USSR. as reparations and the remainder went
principally to Czechoslovakia? with small quantities going to Rumania,
Pcland9 and Yugoslavia.. 22/. Reparations ehipmsats to the USER of 8,359
tons of sulphur had been rade as of 30 Septembcr 1950 uVr under an agreement
of 12 April 1950 providing for deliveries of 129000 tont. ai There were
no known imports of sulphur in 1949, but 2,000 tons ware pnrehaeed In Italy
in 1950, 32/ although delivery has not been Confirmed. Same carbon bisulphide
is believed to have been imported from West Germany in 1950 for the rayon
industry. gd The surplus-deficit sitration in 1952 wnll depend largely
upon Soviet reparations requirements and the achievement of the production
target for that year.
(2) ?en
Planned imports of pyrites in 1949 were 165,000 metric tomb, 22,/
but, so far as can be ascertained, only 142,000 tons were actually received.*
LUC..
* Ociapliod from official statistics of non-Blcc ryrocoes wad from reports
or Bloc prod:leers.
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The oevarity of the pyritas deficiency is illuotratcsi by the plan to
import 10s000 tons of sulphuric acid IA 194924j6w-ivalont to about
79500 tons of 45 percentssorlphur contest pyrites), by the cessation of
sulphuric acid exports to West Germany in 1950, gfil And by a 30-cercent
rection in the output e acid plants in the last quarter of 1950 and
the firot cosoter of 1951 until a supply of pysites saa assured. av
In 1950, lassoed pyrites Imports wore 2502000 metric tansy&
but in -Mie first 7 months only 450164 tons hed bean received, Zai and it
is doubtful Whether 60,000 tens contracted for in Oroaco? Cyprus, and Poland 22/
and 509000 tons pi chased in Italy 2.0j were filially obtained. Attempts
sore bade to procure stopiies from Spain and Portogal? using Brit/Shp Frenshp
and 31,4n13 firms as covers 1? /V and a special mission want to Bulgaria in an
attempt to preburo additional supplies Planned Importe in 1951 also total
250,000 tons, of shich 220,000 tons are to be from non?Orbit countries.
Plana for pyrites imports have been included in trade agreements 'with Norsay?
Suedon, Finland, YUgoslavia? and
fs AkTo
(1) Aglithon.
Inability to procure necessary extraetion equipment, Whidh
comes
mainly from West Germany f and WhiCh differs for the several types
of extraction processes, ha a been a principal factor in retarding the
expansion of bysproduct sulphur recovery* Imports of equipment from the
USSR cannot be relied upon, and Czechoslovakia ha teen unable to replace
deliveries from West Germany,'
(2) Dat:va.
In 19499 US occupation forces reported that the old deposits at
Fabingerode woad be exhausted in fram 18 to 24 mouths but that new deposits
had been discovered which would last 10 or more yearsf, IV The orierol
Elbingorode deposits were reported in 1950 to be largOly exhausted yielding
ore of only 30sparcent sulphur content, shish receosite:,ed admixWre of riches.
ores (probably imported) Wort roasting0 f Theanel,at of the regarres at
Bimmelfehrt is unknowau
g. ke_r_ DraatutssmspgistUsis
Insysss,
East Germasy faces increasing difficulties In proouring sulphur and
pyrites from nonsBlet countries, Which are alseady coofronted with a critical
shortage or sulphur and are expected to be short in pyrites in 1952. /il
Coasequeatay, East Germany is setting ovary effort to Ix:crease domestic copplies
of sulphur in one form or another. These efforts 1710-1s/111 t.1) increased
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produetion of pyrites anE eleveeal sUlphur frem 1.eete geese; (2) rehandling
of the eulphurie acid (upsum bace) pant at Volfen;. ece-4,1etion of which
-ie expooted by mid-19512 27/Whieh will have ea initia1 eel& capacity
equivalent to 59,000 metric to-n.3;111/1 and (3) prodrztion of sulphuric acid
from magneSium eelphatep a by-product of the royal Selinetry
Tho Viva Year Plan (1951-55) calla for tho pro6laction of 438,000
metric tone of sulphuric acid (equivalent to 312,CC0 tons of 45 percent
sulphur content pyrites) from gypsum alone by the eri of 1955 at the
former IG 'Arbon plant at Wolfen. a It ls eetremay doubtfal, however,
Whether this conversion will be completely nohlevcle by -nen. Fbrthermorep
the Plan does not mention acid production frem the vacte sulphur dioxide
gas of nonferroue smelters. Nemertheless? in a oells Puat Germany la
oelL-suffloient9 on a restricted basis? in elemental eulphurp deppite Soviet
teparationa requirements.
Increased pyrites demands are being pertly it by larger domegtic
production, while the Increasing import requirements, filled principally from
eon-Orbit countriebp are beginning to level off? 1%wr strategic producte.
requiring sulphuric acid or sulphur dioxide in thclr e]anufaeture are exported
0 the USSR and Satellites East Germanys ability -40 famish these goods
eonetitutee an important contribution to the Soviet v.al potential but will
eontioae only as long as adequate supplies of pyritel san bs obtnined from
eee-Blec areas. NO haeie exists for believing that Albania, Bulgaria p and
RUMAla can supply East Germany with sufficient pyritee, even if these
ecuntrics cease exporting to CzeChoslevakia, Hnngary aal Felon& Even the
availability of Yugoslav pyrites would not farV 7cet Satollite requirements
in the event that supplies from Norway, Sweden ici3 nd Cyprue were
cat off
3. aUttMe
Predpet:ice,
Or two.thirda of the synthetic rubber induotr7 in prewar Germany-
Wie 100~ In vht iP Of Itiont (ler?7-0 rIteee?t i'le "^"":". eleet et
Schkopau in Eaet Germemgruss Germany-vs largeet syntl-ictio rabher plant,
cj.1
producing ammna7 %/about 60,000 metric tons, or over 50 percent of a total
Garman output. -4 Since the end of the war, Soviet dianeatling of a sdb.
otaatial portion of such Alcilities has considerably reqreed output.
Aided by replacement of semauouipnent and imptc-cA,ancalt., a tcohnologice
pooas3aa5, however prodnuticn has graqually inorne
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9C0 WM* Ven RI., OW.
Estimated PredectioL of Synneac Pelbee
1918-50
Le-Eric Tone
Year
Eatimete
1948
30psoo
1949
27,000
1950
40,00
Duna S (equivalent to the GBS rubber produced in the US) is the major
type of synthetic rubber producedp.but Duna 33, Duna 33.1, Dunes 32 and 85,
Perbunan (Duna N? equivalent to GRA in the US), and other variations of buna.
type rubber also are produced,
So mn research work on behalf of the USSR reperteAy has been conducted
on low.temperature polymerisation of rubber and on tho deyolopment of rubber
capable of withstanding IOs temperatures. h/ Formelae end facilities for the
production of PurzeIl, a type of celluler or sponge rUbber were acquired by
the Soviet Union in 1945. This sponge rubber may be the type reported to be
useful in antiradar coating on submarine hulls. SI
Almost all of the preme tire manufacturing facilitiea are located in
Vost Cermcmc,. and the industry in East Cermaw had to start from. the bottom in
bnildi'glg up suth production after the 'mere pi Until the imposition of the
restere counterblockade in 1948, considerable qualtitiee of tires made from
synthetic rubber supplied by Eest Grarinavy were reecived five plants in :gest
Germany. The counterblookade -stimulated vigorous affeets-te increase East
German tire production.
There are nos- four plants producing autorobile ti-ca in Eezt Germany,
the major producer being the Deka plant in Ketscheedev.re. F-eoductien of tires and
tubes is estimated as folloes,
Estimated Predue'eion of Automabile Tiree and Tubea
1911&750
porzeodi.
Unite
1948 3:-?149 22g2
Automobile tires
10.000
267000
45Ty000
Autombile Tebes
220,000
41M00
467,000
14
325
4.00 NEW 411.69
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SeLeleneEeT
W. .M O. ..
b. Estimated Poseible Production lad Ovacitz.
An increase in synthetic rubbee production ie scheduled in the Five
Year Plan (195145), with output to reach 60,000 notric tons, or 50 percent more
than 1950 production, by 1955. 2/ nth the ad"titiolt of polymerization equipment
aM dequate quantities of raw materialss the Deneyeeke plant at Schkopau could
rapidly reach its prewar peak of production. Senthetic rubber production is
eetleated at 470000 metric tons in 1951 and 50,000 tenn in 19520 .1.2/
Production of automobile tiree in scheduled ta double in the next 5 years,
reaching 900,000 mita by 19550 XL/ Thie earmesion of productions like the
increase in synthetic rubber outpas -dill depend on the addition of special
eauipment and the aveilability of raw materials, Sore machinery for tire
production reportedly hes been nade in Enst Germanys 12/ but whether or not
new facilitiee eill be sufficient to meet product:len gods is not known. In
order to attain such output by 1955, production nrotelae would have to be
540:000 units in 1951 and 630000 unite in 1952, 4/
c. Domestic Requirenents.
Most of the cheelical conponenta 'which go into production of synthetic
rtibber are derived from calciun carbide the induetry's basic raw materials)
One retric ton of limes 600 kilograms ol cokes and about 3:500 klloratts of
electric parlor are reqeired to produce a ton of caleine carbide. It was reported
in 1948 that 4.3 tons of carbide were required to preduco 1 ton of Buna Gs but
this ratio probably has been lowerede
Of the 47$000 metric tone of synthetic rubber to be produced in 1951,
little more than half probably wilt be retained for the donestic production of
goods:, the remainder being allocated to the USSR and the other Satellite
countries as reparations end es exports. Data en the xebber supplies available
to plants in East Geroaay ia postwar yaars are not aeerables but preliminary
estimates are as follcws
rAbero
Estimated Domestic Availability of EUbber
1948,50
Metric Tons
194?. 1949 3.950
Synthetic Rubber 100000.123000 1 000.18000 20,000
Nataral Rubber 928 21,000 3,000
Total 19121?1-208 .a2P9:1221_92? 222E2.
No information is available on suppliee oy prourement of reclaimed
Supplies cf syathetic rubber allocated uzl by East Garnet plants are
expeeted to increase. In the next 2 yeare it icstimated that about 25,000
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mel 1c tons ofsynthetic rubber a year Yill be avafleble :'or East German
con meption? and inport3 of natural rubber also are expected to inerease.
Domestic production of automobre tiree? a leege reantity of which goes
to the USSR, is not sufficient for requirements. Since tie total number of
vehiclen is approximately 1700000, requirements are estimated to be about
850,000 tires a year, of which over half unst be ioported. About 600,000
rotor vehicle tires, of which 440,000 were to be irported, reported3y were
required in 1948. 1.6/ Since the range of types End 61173.3 produced by East
German plants is severely limited, rany motor vehicles depend entirely on
importe for replacement tires. 1_7/ The reportedly poor ouality of domestic
tires necessitates a high rate oT-replacement.
d. Stockpiles.
A stockpile of 6,000 uetric tons of synthetic rubber existed at the end
of 1946v 18/ and part of 1948 production VW scheduled to go into reserve stocks.
Plans for-1949 provided for the allocation of only 6.6 tone to reserves, .12/
and present stocks probably are still mall,
In 1950 a seell reserve of used rUbber0 svotd not to exceed 1,200 metric
tens0 ees reported, and the SAG edninistration reported/7 notified the rur
Innere Reservan Office, which controls feadustrial stockpiles, that in 1951 the
ITAr-pWw-rali. the remaining stock. 20,/ Stocks of natural rubber
existing at the end of the war were appropriated-Ey the WS% but some of these
reserees reportedly were allocated for use by Gera 121;mtao 21/
Fabricated rubber goods also are reported to to going iato reserves,
but these accumulationn may be only tenporary stocks, to be maintained pending
the inauguration of a strict syntem of distrilexUale It is also possible that
these reserves are intended for reparateons or bartering exchanges with the
USSR and the other Satellite countries. 2/ Soca cf approximate:14-6030GO
tires at a depot in Berlin reportedly wore heavily depleted when supplies from
7:est Garmany were cut off in 1948. _2_1/ About 24,300 automobile tires and
11003GO tubes Imre included in the 2949 plan for reserve stocks. Other major
itees included for reserves in 1949 were 241,500 pairs of rubber footwear,
48$10(' pairs of rubber boots, 321,100 squire meter of conveyor belts, and
446,4co ueters of rubber Vebeltsr L4./
Go SEplus or Deficit.
East Germaey suffers from deficAs of both natural and synthetic rubber.
Becauce of the excessive allocation of eynthetic rrtbsT to the USSR and the
other Satellites, the quantities avrilable for dony...stin consumption are not
eufficient to neet requirements. w Diversiona ef senteetic rubber to
reparations and/Or exports to Soviet Bloc oountriecl espeniall7 to the USSR,
Ceecheelovekta? and Poland, and to reseeee stock re estInated at 20,000 vetric
tonn 3n 1950, 220000 tons in 195:1 and f-250000 ton in
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*me
Deoause of the laCt of sufficient capacit; for t%o manufacture of
rune:4 goo3A and the lovsge allocations of such goods io the USSR and the other
Sats)lites, there is also a deficit of fabricated goes, especially tires. 27
At present, it is estimated that from one-bAlt to tse-thtrds of damestic re e.
ments of tires rumb cone fromfigports. Conveyor belts were fes such short supply
in 1948 that industrial plants were faced with a EhritC,ams, but imperts from the
West enabled rinimum operations to continue, and domestic production has been
increased. 2.81 The export.plan for 1951 providee for the sir:wont of 275,000
pairs of rubber boots and /400,000 rixbIemrth of rubber tubing and other rubber
products to the USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.
East Cermauy produces a surplus of dipped rubber goods, of 'which it
wan once the major and almost sole producer. Although some factories were
dismantled atter the Isar, it is reported that productive capacity is still
higher than current demand, and some factories hare hind to close down from time
to tile. Increasing quantities of these goods, particularly prophylactic rubber
goods and surgeons' gloves, 30 have been illegally smt to Vest GermaRy snd
3dumpodu at prices that wo-ila ,ansay cover the cot o p-odunirg them in Lest
Gt.,,rmatay.
Tnteraal Limitations.
(1) Availability of.RawEaterials.
Natural rubber is obtained by transshipment from the USSR and the
Netherlands. 2...V Some stocks of natural rubber, taken by the Soviet Union
after the war, may have beln made available to Gorman plants, 2.2/1 but future
supplies must be imported. Synthetic rubber will be supplied from domestic
nroduLtion. Carbon black and rubber chemicals are nos' produced in Bast Germany,
and additional supplies are procurel from other Orbit countries aril fran
'Western sources. 3t:West Gera ;as the main source of those supplies until
these exports were 'Marry. the imposition of the Weston' counterblockade in
1948. The shortage became so acute as a result of this action that some rubber
chomicals reportedly Imre borrowed froz j)utch firLc in order to bridge the
til orclem placed in the U.S through a Dutch inttrmetlia:cy could be filled
BY /ate 19h9., production or the !7ajor rubber cmicals had 17;c= staxted iPast
G(3rai1y2 ilaustratfmg the sapidity 'xitt, eahich f:),vah matt:rift:1s can be put into
ix,>-'odustion in response to econoric warfsrc,, 351 P!ss7rs1-;Seta-naphthylamine, domesV1
produotion ofihicstari.,-ed in 1949 the. Cn i:tt, 3.,?it i inported frerl
Polala,12 and somep obab1yis still obtained by c1zry.37,c-till'o moans in Ticstmm
aaroplo
Carbon black Fooduction also has bean inofeuied2 yy and additional
srfonleg aro imported from West Germany, Producfla if gas carbon black ia
*tit tted at 12200 netric .%.ene ia 19500
Tire cord is produced in Ea:3i., Crerrwm.r2 ar4 tLc Fivs Year Plan provides
for foreassl production in the nsze:, 5 years, ::49" Qup7Yj.ties Vil3COSO rayon
td Pcrlon (Aylen) cord for ths productLon of corl are supplied to tha
W.3SP. Lnd the other SatelWes; particultay= CsefSho;317;wkcis,
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, ? 1, (7 ) 17,
ShortaLes of :/ar atxLaz chainal rersonnel? letuipeent Container-
reErnhee-i7MITECTFE-c7e:
The shortage of nattera rubber 'Nee laseeed he quality of rubber
product-ss ond plans provide for increa.sed imports cf natural- rubber from the
Netherlands to servlement the meager quentitiso suep71.1 by the USSR, 1101
retie most of the chenieel products need for the production of
synthetic rubber are dorsentically available, some of the basic raw materials
!mist be irported. Lime civics from Rekelend/Harss bat Woe must be imported
from Poland. Benzol has been irsported from Austria, but it is reported thats
since the end of 1.:ay 1950, approsielatel,y 25 eel-cent of r equiromnts has come
from Poland md the reminder from the USSR, Pheaylebeta?naphtleflamines
required in the f5ree3 stages of i'le.s,rieriezation, forrorlz- was procured mainly
from 7est Germarws but production TiaS initiated at the Velf.en plant after
TT-Plies were tont off dur:ing the comterblocleade n 1921,.1. Some 597 metric
toriS reporty were imported in 19)48 frost Itestria Czetelealcesekis.2 Poland, and
ii Prcduction of pherwlebeta.nephtbylaretne probably !e til]. insufficient
sAnee 90 toas reportedly 're imported frou. Poland irt e first 3 mouths of 1950,
P:eesent requirements are estimated to be abodt a sear,
Soviet dismantling at the Schkoprus syntItetie relber p".Lant eeriously
decreased East Germany's synthetic rubber capacite? Theee removdeLa affected
main:4 Dolynerization and styrene prodection facilities,. It was reported that,.
es a conseauenee of the leek of bonzol for styr,--ene prodeetiens on3,7 8 percent
styrene is included in the synthetic rebber mixtures ratt,:er then the plasned
32 percent. US producers corAr.011.1y use about 23 lroveent etyrenes but experimenta.
tier has been made with lower ratios. Altisoegh it is report4.-?d: that the rubber
pereleced is suitable for en. arctic 1.1:338 and ezeeld rcr edelitary specifications
down to--70 degrees Fs it 18 believed to be inferior in other respects, With
the eddition of pelymerisation eertelpmit and with asses...a:Ice of adequate quentities
of raw .eateArels, the Schicopau plant ceuld rapidly reach its presar peak of
prodection,
The increased sgarthetic rubber rz'oduction echeduled in the Five
Year Plan illy permit additional quantities to be alloeatod to the German economy?
In former :sears, more then half of East Germany's sroduction of synthetic rubber
reportedly has gene to the USSR and to Satellite count:rice, ca-asing asewer?
domestic shortage of fabricated rubber gocds? Vele, t'Sxeel'age of rubber goods
eleo results in paets hosesser. fres tre: -lack of rsansfar.;treine capacity which
resulted. free]. the postwar livieion of Cermeny and Erosf iet disniantling.
Auto tire production has received the iireatest, in the postwar expansion
s'eogrem. isting installations have teen cossolfieleted eeel equipment pieced
tege.ther to Provide increaeed capacityr. but ti-17?.F5-3 ?1:27.1r-rt-1,-ns have resulted in
breakevens els old equixent, The ludirstry- also 'eao ;self esed frm a, lack of electric
power,
The high technical level of Enet Germ: ; pf2:4Tionnal and the
reteareed nature of the presses 1113d are considered oterolata of supporting a great
? 320 .
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expansion of the rubber industry. East German persolindi and i-Pthods are now
being used to train rubber workers of the USSR a)._YL the other Satellites in an
attemvt to overcome the lack of skilled labor in those countries.
Trends.?InCluding Indications of Mobilization for 'Oar.
Aa a contribution to the Soviet plan t? increase automobile tire
production, East German tire productiot is expected to double in the next 5
yearsc. This increased production, however, would only equal present East
German tire requirements, there= requirements by 1955 probably will have
incweesed.
S?E?G
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aa.
R4incering
Suvr,a5.7
Th anemeering inaustry accounts for -,:pout 25 -r.,:rcertt of the value of
East German industrial geoduction. The industr7tms 61eriant7ed by the Soviet
Union after 'World War II, reduning its capacity o about 28 percent of the
prevar level, but, by the end of 1950, ca:_lacity had 'Dcz-n reconstructed to the
1936 level snd comprised shoat 700 major plants5 EsTiving aboui7. 700,000 workers,
or 25 percvnt of tZe induexial labor force. farti prs!!mt production capacity,
about 30 pelcent is Soviet-owred. The rolue of 1950 p7mOuotion of the i/xlustry
was about Fr 5.2 billion.
Unecr the Vivo !ear Plane production in 1955 is ix) reach a value of DE
11,28 billion. Tho Plan provides for supplying equipnea% for the expansion of
tha rining? metallurgy-, and electric power industries; for production of rawly
iimen of equipment formerly iworted from the West; sn6,-!or -(..raditional surpluses
to export ih exchP:ige for rrw matertql imports. The '1T1 is ambitious and
probnly :514ossible to achicvz in its entirety.
Germagy is delivering huge quantities or th) products of its
enL-eerirg industries to the USSR as i-eparatdar; ani in watiliereial transactions*
Reparation; deliveries in 1950 wore about DM:1 billionv Meat of the production
oT titA $oli-f.ct.ovinad firms villa in 1950 had a plI,nnxi 11,1matulti.,n r_,f II! :1_1
Uo ao goes to the UESR, Thus the USSR gets.g.,x7a-, 45 percent, by value,
o cm or the industx7s aside fro,n r3go1cr zo-ffazaLal invorts
na. Five 7ear Plan Lims at a omplete integratiol of tha East German
that 9,1* the SoNdet Bloc. Productioa npc,ital goods in 1955
vI17 be- fron 250 to 260 pc.rcent of the 1!./36 lova and will be vary siwilar to
tta output adhicved in 1944r tnaas ifl.w key goals of 1,(i c'lcia are ecommio
Zabyealiono of We Gerzew and conversion of the :11117.5tria1 1,1otential
to direct ,Imd indirent production*
GOMICay lacks zwrir basic mteriple rci.d o-LT3aents for the production.
,oS h-raohin.o,/ -Ali& formerly tiara freely obtainsi from liost Cr3reauy. To eliminate
these hottlroacim? many noir industrial aotivitios b3 inittatod.
Ceneral.
a, Production.
. In '437 the area 1.41.t.ch is nor East Gerz2vi:Toduccd 29 percent of the
total Gervqn output of machine tools, 54 peroeLt of taAlle md other light
machilleryr 34 parcet of fittings and .valves, und 35 poT31nt o precision and
optiT-.A1 eo7,-6,pfsient. The eneneeririg inerztries of -1:17-1 p:-..-Aen.b Fast aid West
OcTi7117.,'ae7:7 7aighly interdepeadant before t7le Tar, Gerixarty woducod
3v:fp:irises seriiljntypea Cf ti3xtile Tachins, e,,v,iverittt grootsica
instozsuctimt.1%, :.saehine d itt it Yme dependent on
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West Germenyfar trucks ;a; ,heavy electrical oquipnent; most types vf
egaipmenti and hetvy v?th onstruction,
the Soviet Union dismantled about 72 percent of
ction capacity' geld later converted to Soviet
1005 percent of the prewar capacity, including
installations. y Of the balance left in German
igO portion bad suffered uericue war damage. The Soviet-owed
SAG plants aCOOlitit tar ttut 25 to 30 percent br value cf engineering Production"
and met of their et** is shined i4 the Irat as Soviet-owned property 2 in
addition to reparations. The SAO 1ering plants had a planned
value in 1950 of DU 1.33 billion, fsted actual production probably. exceeded the
planned figures.
-
T)* Soviet anthcrities haw demanded preferential treatment for the
-SAG Ornate in the procurement of workers, materials, and components, and plante
under ,the eoutrol of the Illnistry et liachinery Building have been forced to
tec materials as Vixstired by the SAG firms on a priority
primes Allah are lowr than present prices. Algorst a13. of the
the SAO plants la deLvered to the USSR, and the ?J ? ? .is
SovIhet account.
wad matey* under the Ilinistry of itaehinery Building and
are sheen in he following table Vs
Oanerehip and Daployment in Selected
gest German &tneering Industries
Decinber
?
Workers Workers
(Thousencle) Plante (Thovsaads)
106
96Z 21 37.0
EquiPient12930.0
- .
PrOC114011 eld
NarisissigA4 54.3 8 22.0
Rail. and llotor Traria. -
.
65 58.7 10 2160
.18 37,2 6 11.0
Total :122, 432.5 60 124.0
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additian to the SAO plants and the nationalized plants (VVS's),
there are a large number of small privately and commona113r mined firms in
East Gersten which la 1950 had a planned production equal to about 22 percent
of planned produotion of the entire engineering Indust:7.Jc Assuming that
these fires also =ploy 22 percent of the workers, the to number of workers
is about 700,000. Workers in the engineering industries, therefore, constitute
about 25 percent of the 2.8 mrmon industrial workers employed in the manufactur-
ing and extractive industries.
Production of Selected at German Sectors
of the Engineering industry
. 1949.50
Ousgoditsr
1"14121221"1142Aa
4
Machinery, including
land and Water
46
49
28
Transport !karma
liectroteahnical
kuipment
46
47
39
37
Precision and Optical
lkicipsent
48
48
23
Total
47
49
30
29
mei i No wi ..;...21122
1:12te Plante
122Q
24
23
15
16
29
31
23
la 1946 the Soviet alon began a policy of demanding and assisting 111
the expansiam of the engineering industry. 1/ Older the Two Year Plan 4949404
monstruction of metallurgical and machinery plants was started, and dismantled
machinery *us returned from the USSR for some of this reconstruction. 2/ The
Plan provided far *spending capsaity by 50 percent in the 190-50 period, with
speoial emphasis on metallurgical, locomotive, freight earl, amtomottve, machine
tool, instruments and optical equipment, agridultural machinery, and bicycle
plants. The Two Tear Plan, in most respects, appeared to be &normal plan
far rebuilding cenaciti, to prewar levels, and, te,the end of 1950t average
production capacity of the industry had reached the 1936 level. 9/
b. ratimated Possible_Preductina aad Cateattro
Production goals established by the Pive Year Plan (1951.55) far exceed
normal domestic requirements for engineering products. Output and planned output
areas follow:
124
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z
PrOthIcAi07:-. ti7 ;11Irirei :1, tiv
EaIt CrzTL avineoring
1949-511 1955
ol.......r.e?Snaer
-4t.rav4r..tx-,Or
2:2119
Yachinery, including 20350
Land and Vator Trans-
port Equipment
Electroteohnical
Equipment
Precision and .Optical
Equiluent
Total
ittlatou Iti
1955 af
4258 iJ 8,71
700
.1,1473
'1 1
2,250
278
38?
Ar
930
2432q
5 202
7,300 Va3 230
ThG fzes mvare with a total indut4-,-.1e1 1-)r.othtyt:lon in 1.950 vztiva-1
LA 23 tillion 9.r4 aschodulut output in 1955 of MI 3,6 billione 2,11/1 Thus
th outlIft of the enOneering Lalustries IL 195) represtntel 2'41 igrzecnt of
ir,dtstrial pz tiot t va1ue3 zInd ti 3,2.i5 ;:te "t1 amount for 254
emt, 1.11Autitry as 'a whole is sehlAuled tfi,-; TM-1h 190 percent of 1950
levels in 1955, tho coal of the 0.114',2. TAUStri08 iS 23.7 perceato
irdicate that the Fiir? Year Plan iv ticcsAnetytbiearried apt
in Jtc cuidrety, but that the My projects cin t ,---mpleted v41'. tIr
$Vmdpvd of livingu
e, Dometic Requirements,
Prewar Germany waa a large pro-drew end Triaohiner7, and East
Gryehrtred i tIv300 er.Torts, In Fier:a prewar yr;ars4? Genially aupplied as rach
a3 cri---thi:ret of the machinery offered irtcoLd i:r1zcth, 15! Oyer.e11 engineer=
J; capaciV ia adequate to met dowetic recpir,c213-ztv bIgrestera export
o'lltrols or at materiala and components haw hax.,17por." ?;,70dnction end ha''e
cl'oted sl*rtage3,,
Th pril%oipal donostio requiromntN ma,:711:iory .or (1) r000nstxuo-
Us, of p7...ants eithey destrc,ycil durilg the war Dr (V the Ofyrt,:k,
(2) Increu5ing e1,3ctr1.c p/iTez- gonerating coa1 n-ad
7.a---r-er-7; (4) It2.11(3.ing a vetallart5..eal 7.1. ( 5 ) PrCZTV: tjr.Y!'a
?;;ach.ini.ly foiraii?rke? iaap,,,-)ri:44 :Crag the 7:- t,
125
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In addition to the demands of the domestic economy, the East German
engineering industry also faces hem' requirements in the fora of Soviet
reparations charges. The value of planned reparations of engineering products
in 1949 was DU 1.02 billion, but actual deliveries fore 11.1 1.07 billion. lag
Shipments in 1950 totaled about D11 1031 billion, aleunuth planned reparations
were valued at only DU 969 rill ion, broken down as follawo
Flamed Reparationa of East German
IkEgineertg0Pnducta
411111mgammilisereltallawriembrateftesawnsuillammumalBILIZEILAN
Ccon...L.Ardi Reparations
Railroad Rolling Stook 313
Power and Electrical Equipment 127
Mining, Metallurgical, and 12/4
Metalworking Equipment
Cranes Derricks, Cement, and 61
Construction Equipment
Food-Processing and Refrigeration 96
Equipment
Ships, Ship Services, and Marine 116
Equipmeat
Precut Houses and Building 72
Materials
Printing Equipment 00
Laboratory and Ccumumications 140
Equipment
Chemical, Rubber, and Other 38
Equipment
Equipment for Polish Account 102
Total 969
It will be noted that the intastrial products delivered as reparations
are largely products of the machineryroducdng industries. These deliveries in
1948 were about one-third of engineering production. In later years, as a result
of the reduced value of deliveries and the increased value of production, this
percentage has decreased, amounting in 1950 to about 25 percent.
Of 1950 reparations, DM 468 mullion were to be supplied by the SAG
plantain rtitireil for which the plants of tha Iliastry of tlachinen Building were
to svIZ3y products of an equal value to the SAG factories at 1944 prices. 29,/ It
bats-Ted tat almost the entire production cf the SAG 47Cee to
the USSR or, if supplied to the East Gorman economy, mast be paid for in equal
value by gof3ds. Thus it appears that, in 1950, tho USSR removed from East
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12-Frailrirt
Germany machinery end equipment of a total value of about DM 2?3 Mt1on, of
whieh SAG Production was DM 1?3 telllion and reparations about ttf 3. billion?
These removals =gusted to about 44 percent of the valve of engineering
production in 1950,
The total value of reparations for 1951. is not knoym, but it
probably is about the same as in 1950. Some important items to be delivered
are steel rolling, vireo drawing, and tube mills; equipment for cement and
peat briquette factories; 400 mobile* steam, electricity generating sets,
valued at TM 3.6 million; 2013 fiiihingInggers and Gainers, valued at ?
DM 57 millica; 307 various types of metal shears, valued at DM 3,8 million;
55 various types of crank and I:ere:alio presses 'valued at Dm 5.8 million;
several types of Universal mil14ng machines; 4;00 refrigerated railroad
cars; high...tension electrical equipment; 100 a33...metal railroad coaches;
25 750.4mMlmartergsage industrial locomotives; end numerous machine parts. ja
d. .822kB:UAl?
Other than normal working 5nventor3.es, there are no known stockpiles
of engineering products in East Germany?
e, jpm.olua mg. Deirj.911,
Before the war, East Germany produced acme engineering products,
notably light mat:shiner; and intstrumente, in excess of local requirements and
made up its deficits, which were largest in bearings, automotive equipment,
and heavy machinery, ut.th imports, chiefly from West Germany? These surpluses
and deficits did not extend over entire categories of machinery but rather
existed in various individual trpes of machinee and components, Tor example,
watches and instruments were exported by /kat Germany, but their production
was dependent upce imports of such components as screws, springs, and
bearings from West Germany or foreign enurtries?
War damage, Soviet dimmantatig, and the curtailment of free trade
with non-Blom areas have aggravated the effects of East German deficits,
While posher plans for reconstruction and expansion of the engineering
industry aim at the elimination of these deficits and the achievement of
self-sufficiency, these goals cannot be realized without help in the form
of raw materials, components, and muthinery from the West,
t. Wernil Livittcat4QBE.
East Gamow lacks adequate supplies of raw basic materials and
components far machinery building, *which formerly were freely procurable
- from West Germany, These items include all kinds of metals, espeeiall,y
high-grade alloy steel for bearings and machine parts, tool steel, tungsten,
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:Quad= foil, cadmium, amd bismuth; madhine compenents of many kinds; and
even simple tools, such ae saws, files, and gear cutters. To cope with
these bottleneckswmany industrial activities, particularly mining and
metallurgy, =mit be expanded or initiated, Nevrtotpes and sixes of machines
must be developed and produced, and more Imports of heavy machinery are needed.
go. alNial=klaaltjaillirditetULAraithWAVZSILAILISZ.
The Five Tear Plan aims at a complete integration of the But German
economy with those of the Soviet Bloc countries. Production in 1955 will be
more or less the same in composition and quantity as that achieved in 1944.
Production of capital goods in 1955 will be from 250 to 260 percent of the
1936 level, or slightly above the 1944 level.
&Oasis will be on increased prodaction in 24 key engineering plants.
Quotas for these indicate that the indust z7 is to seek economic independence
of West Germany through domestic production of machinery previously imported
and is to convert its industrial potential to armaments production, both
direct and indirect, au
In 1950 the area mug able to produce 21 percent of the types and
sizes of machines formerly imported, and an additional 20 percent is to
be produced in the near future under present plans. Nevertheless, despite
the fact that self-sufficiency is to be sought, East Germany must oontinuo
to lean heavily on West Germany for imports if Paan -goals are to be achieftd,
Among the key projects scheduled for earliest completion are new
plants and plant expansions for producing mining end metallurgical
men.t, boilers,turbines generators, transformers, motors, electrical switchgear and other s
t apparatus, briquette presses for brown coal, dredges, cremes,
conveyors, heavy gears, pumps, compressors machine tools, and bearings.
Nenly of these items were previously produced only in snail quantities and
sixes, The Plan provides for producing =oh larger machines and machines
never before produced.
The emphasis on heavy industry is clearly sham in the distribution
of.the re4 25o minion to be invested in 195L by the Niniertry of Machine
Building, The following table shows the percentage of employment in ea&
branch of the industry and the corresponding percentage of, Investments
128
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Alrisfrirrit
Planned Employment and Investment in the East German Engineering Industries
3.951
=SEim."1-wea---..."------a221
Heavy Machinery if
22
42
General Machinez725
e
Electrotechnical Equipment
20
14
Precision and Optical SPIPsent
12
6
Rail and Motor Transport Equipment
12
5
Shipbuilding
9
25
Total gQ
a/ Includes the machine tool, and bearing plants, which are to
employ 4.5 percent of the workers and share in 17 percent of the
investment.
The central plea far research and development for 1951 includes 196
outlined research tanks for machinery construction and 612 additional develop-
ment projects, which are to be accompliched at a cost of over DK 50 million. 23/
2, Mans Tgda.
In 3042 there were 1.9 million 'machine tools in an of Germany, of which
700,000 were In Eaet Germany. The major part of the largest and most efficient
of these machine tools was removal ty the teat, and machine tool plants store
reduced to fran 20 to 30 percent of their tomer capaalty.
The 1951 Plan provides for the production of 114 3.87 million worth
of machine tools and metalworking maohines. g Production in 1949 Vag
valued at amly DM ZS million and In 1950 at 104 minion, The Principal
Products in the 1952. Plan, which calls far an output 180 percent above
1950 levels, 2/ we as fo.Uovss
Planned Production of Principal Machine Toole (East (Jermaxer)
1951
4.365
45.7
Lathes
Boring Mills
190
6.9
Multispindlo Automatics
134
1.7
Milling Machines
2,000
174
Geer;.outting Machines
350
5.3
Small Planers
320
10.0
Shagezneand Other
Tools
1,900
16.0
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244.11-fr
The list also includes a Urge number of an33. drilling, grinding,
fl/Ing, and sawing machine tools and light metalworking presses, forging
machines, and shears. Asir heavy tools are to be built in 1951, In -
addition, the 1953. Plan also provides for the production of rim 136.6
million worth of accessary tooling, snob as cutting tools, drills,
millers, saver and files.
Because the live Year Plan lye heavy emphasis on expanding the means
of production, the machine tool Industry receives the highest priority in
investment funds allottedto the Ministry of Machine Building. The nen
provides for expanding machine tool production in 1955 to 347 percent of
the 1950 level ani for attaining a production capacity of 30,000 units. 3/
Of the 24 key plants producing machinery which are to be enlarged in
the early years of the Five Tear Plan, 6 are machine tool plants. Plans .
provide for achieving self.sufficsiency In all kinds of machine tools, many
of which fonnerly were imported from West Germany. Heavy emphasie is placed
on the production of large planing, milling, boring, and gear-cutting maohineik
By 1955, producticat is planned to include 135 planers of up to 12 meters in
length; 1,000 lathes of over 300 minima tare in worb.diameter; and 165 bor-
ing mills of 4 meters and over in diameter. A new activity viii. be the
production of portal 70114ng machines of 3.00 adllineters and over in spindle
diszneter. Heavy gear production is to increase fran 320 unite in 1951 to
11,500 units in 1955, and the value of production of gear...cutting machines
will increase fran Dtt 503 million in 1953. to DM 27 million in 1955.
The plan for machine tool production mast provide for a .inst amount of
engineering design and develop:ant wit because the Soviet Union not only
dismantled the chief plants but also took Important drawings, specifications,
patterns, ani other items essential for reaming production* Furthermore,
Industry before the war relied heavily on West German imports for many Vine
of machines, components and Parts, which now must be produced internally.
If the plan of the Ministry of Machine Banding is to meet with may success,
the machine tool industry must reach a large percentage of the 1955 goal bY
1952 and 1953.
3. Staler WiehiPer?
a. &Oak&
The heavy machinery Plants are among the most Important in East
Germany. At the end of 1950 their status was about as follows:
-11-1-1144
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Ownership and Employment in the at German Heavy Machinery Industry
1950
..."84.44,1
kmri
Maid Infrelilindav DAM abgiandll
Ifstallurgica3. and
Mining Machinery,
Cranes, Derricks* etc. 35 20.7
Boilers, Tontines,
Dimas, Pumps,
Oceopresaorai and
Heavy Industrial
Machinery
?
Total
37 2.3.3 a 16.6
.22
4ta4 lia Sag
The 16 SAO plants are among the largest In the industry* 1
mer.G.oying about 6,000 workers and together they employ about 47 per-
cent of 0-1 heavy m& 1)' a
b. Sptizatted Possibl, ,proOpc)ion api, Capacity.
Ten of the 24 machinery pleats scheduled for priority. .treatment
under the rim Tear Ilan produce helm machinery* and 21 percent of the
1951 Investment In the engineering Industry is allocated to these plants. hi
The quotas assigned to thew 10 priority plants clearly Tece13.3. that East
Carew alms to bootee self..sufficient In the types of heavy machinery.
formerly imported.
These plemits are expected to supply the atrotng and metallurgical
equipment required to double steel production between 1950 and 1952 cmd
to triple it between 1950 and 1955. 51 Production capacity is not yet
sufficient to meet the ?erg; requirements for expanded steel production.
Some equipment le being supplied, however* by the SAG plants* and several
rolling mills tube mins, and itreacea are being provided by Czechoslovakia..fri
At the same time, East Gelman, has been furniabing large quantities of
meta3.1urgica3. eqtzipment to the USSR. 71
The live Tear Plan also provides for the expansion of diesel engine
production and for the production of diesel engines of laver sizes and
for new uses. Nine hundred .and fifty diesel aeggregates, vhich probably
arv) units of more than 100 horsepower designed for other than satkestive
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and tractor use, are to be produced in 1955. The use of diesels in
tree:tore, motor vehicles, power units locamotives, and ships vill be
increased. Roth two-oyole and four.o;ole unite are to be twit. While
diesels of up to 500 horsepower are now being produced, prototypes of smite
ranging up to 2,000 horsepower are being tested, 2/ and a 3,500.horsepower
gas turbine for use in locomotives is being developed for the USSR. 2,9/
kiditional key plants scheduled for expansion include those
producing boilers, turbines, pampa, compressors, dredges, cranes, and
mechanical transport equipment. Us/
a.? annitiltiallb
Those key plants which formerly produced mediutweigirb =einem are
to be converted to the production of heavy machinery. For OZEtinples a former
locomotive ?plant is to construct mining and metallurgical machinery. A
sewing machine plant is to convert to the construction of medium-sised foundry
machinery, and a gear plant is to undertake production of the largest-size
gears. These new plants and plant expansionts are all scheduled to be in
full operation by 1953. la/
/4. ItEdrattiltigiNgaSSZIRBSIt*
a? &SWAM,
Postwar dismantling reduced the output of eleotroteolmioal plants
to fran 25 to 30 percent of their 3938 level, and a large part of the
plant capacity. remaining was taken over by the SAG pleats, tad& famished
about 38 percent of the 1950 production. Rebuilding was spurred by the
Soviet reparations demands, 2,/ and by 1949 the total production value of
electrotechnical equipment had risen to DX 700Br4114on The 1930 Plan
called for production valued at TM 1,150 million. 3/ ieployment in the
Industry in 1950 was about as follows stsh
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Ownership and Itaployment in the Bast German
El.ectrcrteohnical Equipment Industry
1950
Gerven.ovned Plants
Woriers
Mitt Akamassial
Kimetrica3. Iftchinery
29
32
ItLectrical Apparatus and
Cables
56
28
Ocesamleations Equipaent
46
28
Subtotal 133, Di
SAG Plants 15 30
Total a am
b. aptimated Possilxle Produetion cipd Opacity.
The Five Tear Plan provides for emending production of electrom.
technical equipment to a value of DM 2.25 tdllion in 1955, or 197 percent
of 1950 output. 5/ Heavy emphasis will be placed on expansicur of *opacity
for 'building large electrical machinery. Four of the largest plants in
this industry are designated smug the 24 key engineering plants to be
expanded. These plants mast supply the large =its far expanding electric
power generating capasity by 245 million kilowatts ty 1955 and far
expediting the rehabilitation of existing plants of which 60 percent are
from 20 to 40 yearn old. Generator s at capacities up to from 25,000 to
30,000 kilowatts vin be produced. I/
The Five Tear Plan provides for investment expenditures in the
eleotrotechnical equitment industav of DM 80 million in 5 Tows, of
vbiob DM 54 million will be applied to the four plants building heavy
machinery. 2/ About 50 percent of this investment expenditure is scheduled
for 1951.
C. bunattameadasaarta.
The electrical mv.chinery plants furnish a large part of East German
reparations and commercial exports to the USSR as ve33. as of exports to
other countries. 2/ &ports include rectifier stations transformers,
and Earitchgeara in large quantities. Reparations to the USSR in 1951
included 116,000 radio tubes of 8 Undo. ja/ Bulgaria is to reoeive
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priority shipment of IN 110 million worth of heavy machinery ant electrical
equipment in 1951. 1,1/
5.
Tractors were not produced in Bast Germany in prewar years, If The -
Industry is rapidly being built up, however and by 1955 production is
expected to reach 12,000 wheel and track-14Ln tractors of sloes ranging
from 22 to 601 hors ?al The tractor industry has three final
assembly plants, but parte and components are supplied by the automotive
and other machinery plants. The 1950 Plan provided for the production of
5,400 units, but in the first 6 months only 1,466 units were produced, and
production far the year hardly exceeded 3,000 units, 3/
6, Arriepltmal Mgtkiperv.
Agricultural maohinery is produced in 30 plants, employing 6,500
workers 21'whidh also produce other related machinery items. The largest
plant
workers,
1,600 workers, but employment in the others ranges mainly
from 120 to 280 workers. The Five /ear Plan provides for the value of
production to reach DM 162 million in 1955, or 202 percent of planned
production in 1950. The inventory of farm equipment is scheduled to increase
as follows lob
Inventory en= Equipment in Use in East Germany
2950, 2955
Unite
Commodijm
1955
112AROMNIL
Tractors
21,950
37,500
Tractor Plows
14,090
38,500
Tractor Cultivators
1,112
8,500
Tractor Drilla
9'75
7,000
Tractor Binders and Mower's
4%2
9,000
Tractor Threshers
4,100
6,000
7. AgfulaasUgglana.
a. bzbellano -
The railroad equipment plants after the war suffered heavy dismantling
which left few installations aside from three plants taken over by the USSR
and the repair shops. Many of the plants have been rebuilt, but some have
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been converted to the production of mining and metallurgical equipment
and other heavy machinery. At the end of 1950, SAO films controlled
four oar plants and one wheel and =le plat. Total employmemb in these
Installations is estimated at about 2/13,000 workers. 2,/ At the same time,
the East GOMM operated 1'7 plants, inoluding 1 locomotive plant. (small
steam and diesel locomotives), 6 car planbs 9 accessory plants, and 1 plant
being rebuilt mainly for the production of 'heavy machinery other than
transportation equipment. Among these are six repair plants which are
remodeling locomotives to burn coal dust and are making other improvements
to rolling stock. In addition, one electrical machinery plant has started
building electric locomotives. Total employment in these 17 plants in 1950
was 21,690 workers. a/
The railroad equipment plants are being expanded for increased
car production. The value of output in the VIM plants, which was DM e3
million in 1949, j/ is to be DM 192 million in 3.954 broken them as
follows ill
? Planned Production of Railroad Equipment (East Germany)
1951
NW&
Small Steam Locomotives
392
31,360
Diesel Locomotives up to 50
Norsepower It
510
25,500
Tenders
3
80
Open Freight Cars
220
2,728
Closed Freight Cars
3,350
41,540
Refrigeration Cars
300
6,000
Dump Cara
220
6,600
Special Cars
875
26,255
Passenger Cars
254
27,178
know-gauge Cars
17,000
10,200
Commuter Care for Berlin Elevated
Railroad
24
4,320
Street Gars
200
10,000
Total Mal
b. Estimated Possible Production and c,anactity.
The 1955 Plan provides for the production of 13,000 freight and
passenger cars, a goal which represents increases over 1950 output of 250
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and 273 percent, respectively. No plan has been made available on the
production of main-line locomotives 39 of which were to be produced in
1949. V One plant is working on electric locomotives of Soviet design. W_
and 40 electric locomotives are Scheduled for production as soon as posolble. W
? Investment expenditure in the railroad equipment plants in 1951 is
Planned to be 24 5,130,000 a small total as compared with the else of the
industry and with invest:me:4s in other engineering industries. It comprises
only 1.9 percent of the total investment of the V.Inietry of Lachine Balding. IQ/
o. Renarstions 4p; 4Ignocbt.
About 70 percent of the total railroad equipment production of East
Germany is being used to meet reparations charges. 2V Production targets
of the TM plants for 1950 and for 1951-52 for freight ears are 3,480 units,*
of which about 500 are to be exported to Poland, 500 are to be allocated to
the Red AMOY in tact Germany, and 2,480 are destined for domeatio use. ad
Reparations, of which about 67 percent came from SAG plants in 1950,
are as follows
Reparations of East German Railroad Equipment a/
1950-31
..-------------......"------"=".2 InftWEIS Ijait49. 4122. 2.fif
Locomotives, 750.00114*aster Gauge 250 ) 25
ramotris Locomotives,150?04114roatar Gauge 21 )
Steel Passenger Coaces, 1,524.02111imeter Gauge 350 .. 100
Refrigerator Oars 1,100 1,500
Freight Gars . 1,050
Closed Cars, 750wmi1l3meter Gauge 1,500
Other Special Gars 3.6o 250
Mobile Steam Electricity Generator Stations 400
si/ This list is grobe.bly itusomplete.
Reparations deliveries include many specially equipped care, such
as 3.60 repair shop cars Complete with machine tools, 24/ supplied in 1950; _
254on car chassis for cranes, which might also be mounts for gunslith
special slag trucks; and dump trucks.
Redur-----lemed from the original goal of 3,570 units.
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S. Motive _Bauiplegt.
All but two automotive plants 'which the USSR took over, were either
destroyed during the war or dismantled. The two SAG plants have an annu.al
capaottiv of 3,000 automobiles and 7,200 motorcycles and employ frau 3,500
to 4,500 workers. 1,/ About 70 percent of this production has been going to
the USSR. ai Dy the end of 1950 the VVB automotive and tractor industries
combined had 47 plants In operation, employed 25,400 workers', 3/ and in 1950
produced 10,000 automobiles and 2,400 trunks of 0.7540n, 1.54ont sal
3?40n eartetils The 1953. Flan provided for an output of 9,000 motorcycles
and 150,000 bicycles, while the 1955 Flan provides for the
of 24,000 trucks, (1/ which is 947 percent of production in 1936. Only a
few of the 3i'4on trucks now have diesel motors, but the Plan provides for
expanding production of diesel motors. The 1951 production is reported to
be falling short of planned levels because of shortages of special steels,
oranksbafts and most modal components, many of which must be Imported
from West downy. VVB production is of poor quality, and even the SAG
plants are operating considerably below cap/mitre 2/
Antitriottion pwinga.
War destruction and 'dismantling reduced Bast German bearing production
to a amen fraction of farmer levels. The USSR took over three plants which
had an ammal capacity of. 2 minion bearings and. 420 metric tons of bearing
balls. Five plants left to the Bust Germans were put back into service
and in 1949 produced 3.7 minion bearings. Combined production of an
plants in 1949 totaled 4.6 minion bearings, but requirements in 1949 were
8.5 million, of lad& 5 million were required by SAG plants and 3.5 minion
by Bast German plants. In 1950, requirements rose to about 12 million
bearings, 0411 less than prewar requirements of 15 minion units, 2/ ani
production remained far below requirements.
The Five Tear Plan provides for a tremendous increase In bearings prodno.
tion frail DM 11 million in 1950 to DM 106 million in 1955. 3/ No figures
are :mailable on the number of bearings to be produced, but from the values
it may be deduced the production is planned to ewer both domestic use and
export. Materials required for bearing production in 1951 amount to 16,570
metric tone, consisting of 1,230 tons of balls, 5,100 tons of steal bars,
7,500 tons of tubing 840 tons of steel sheets, and 2,000 tons of forgings.
On the basis of 2 wields Of materiel required per bearing, this material
would yield 18 ra113.1on bearings. Estimates on a similar basis indicate a
production of 27 minion bearings in 1953 ard of 32 million bearings in 1955.
As in the case of machine togs, most of the production increases con?
templated In the Five Tear Plan are to be achieved by the third year, aid
the bearing plants are included among the key plants selected for priority
treatment. Most of the machine tools required for bearing production are
being built in the nationalized planta. The major production problem in
1951 is procurement of various alloy steel items which the rim plants are not
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yet capable of producing. Curtailment of shipments from West Germany has
made it necessary to use domestic steel of unsuitable quality. Some steel
has been imported from Csechoelovakia, but apparently the Sate].Lttes are
not capable of meeting Nast German requirements.
Although the USSR has taken a considerable part of the production of
the SAG bearing plants, these also have supplied bearing balls to the WB
plants, and Soviet bearings have been imported. In 1950..51 the USSR will
receive 2 million needle bearings from the principal SAG p3.ants.
10. 1111111=11111LIVILSCUINIUSWEInidp
Under the Nast German government are 62 plants producing instruments and
optical equiranext with 54,300 workers. The largest prewar plant vas completely
dismantled but has been rebuilt to its fanner capacity by the addition of
over 3,000 machines, and it now employs almost 17,000 workers. Other di..
mantled plants have gone through the same process of rehabilitation. In
addition to the WB plants there are eight plants, employing 22,000 workers,
which are controlled 'by the USSR. The most important of these produces
watches, clocks, and instruments and employs about 4,000 workers. j,/
The Plan for 1950 provided for a production value of re4 390 minion of
which 21 percent was produced in the aka plants. Production in 1953. was
planned to exceed 1950 production by 56 percent, and production in 1955 is
to Iva& DM no million, or 239 percent of the value of 1950 cutPut0,3/
Instruments and optical equipment are delivered as reparations, end since
the amounts of raw materials needed In production are smalldiglarge quanti-
ties can be produced for exports:. Instrument toq)orts, exel optical
equipment, totaled DM 23 minion in 1949. Production capacity in 1950
exceeded demand, and even the SAG firms needed new orders to keep plants
busy. .5/ As a result of surplus capacity sand Soviet pressure to undertake new
lines of production, the industry is expanding into different fields many of
which are closely related to ornaments needs. fj New production includes
various types of instruments for ships and aircraft. Soviet requests for
other new items, such as torpedo heads, motors and steering mechanisms, and
gun sights' have been turned down by VVB firms on the grounds of lack of
facilities. 2/ These plants also manufacture office machinery, exports of
which are sizable. All Idnds of calculating and bookkeeping machines are
produced, and there are several typewriter plants, Um of which have 5,000"
workers each. The industry has been highly dependent on West Germany,
Switzerland, and Prance for screws springs., jewels, and other small parts
which have been in acutely short snpply. 2/
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122dUaliM00
%Dept for tank maneacturing plants mhich were bombed for 3
menthe in 2944 but mere quickly rehabilitated, the German =Mona industry
was never the Object of systematic( air attadk. As a result the industryemerged from the war with its large productive capacity relatively intact.
The Yalta Agreement and the Potsdam Dedlaration, however, outlawed the
production of =Mow and under the 1946 Plan for Reparations, which was
actually a plan for Industrial disarmament, only from 50 to 55 percent of
Germany's total prewar ammitions.industry was to remain by 1949. The heavy
Industry which had made the steal, ordnance, and tanks for the Nazi war
machine was to be reduced to about one...third of Its formar.capacity.
The East German liquidation was campleted even before the target
date of June 190, but Soviet policy began to Change by 1949, and for the
past 2 years the 'USSR has violated the demilitarisation agreements by
giving East German plants extensive orders for weapons coeponents.
Fulfill-
ment of these orders has been assured by assistance in plant rehabilitation
and by insuring the provision of raw materials.
It Is believed that little or no manufacture of assembled military
weapons has yet taken plass in. East Gomaxy but that ?opponents of Soviet
weapons are being made in substantial quantity and sent to the USSR for
essembly. Among the capponente are parts for both small arms and heavier
weapons, including tanka, railroad guns, submarines, and aircraft. In
addition explosives,ammunition, machinexy for munitions manufacture, and
smell ships are prodcod. NO less than 30 firms are reported to be making
major capponente of the Soviet tank.
The German Type.t42 machine gun, about 1,000 of which are believed
to have been made within the past 2 years, is the only complete weapon
manufactured in East Germamy. Before the maro Germany had a wall-developed
export business in hunting rifles, and some 66,000 were produced in 1950
in East Germaey. The Alert Police are equipped in part with the World War II
96-it rifle, and there are reports of new East German production of this
rifle in 3950 for the police.
In addition to the manufacture of components for Soviet weapons, the
East German Industry regularly engages in repair work on weapons of the Soviet
occupation forces.
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It is estimated that less than me-third, and perhaps leas than one.
fourth, of prewar Germany's total munitions capacity was located in what is
no East Germany. Of the 13 principal wartime manufacturers of heavy weapons.,
only 2 were located in Bast Germany., both in Magdeburg. These are the
Mascdalnenfahrik Buckets R. Wolfe A.G., makers of gun barrels, shells, bombs,
and cartridge csases, and the Friedrich Krupp Grosonwerke A.G., prewar
designer and manufacturer of the Mark IV tank and maker of antiaircraft
guns, tanks and components shells and torpedoes. Two tank assembly
plants, Alkett A.G. and DaIn:ler-Bens A.G., were located in Berlin.
Even the manufacture of small arms and of maall..arms amosmition
cent/wed in the West, but Sabi in Zest Germany remains an Important center
of this production. Of the Relob's total explosives capacity of 29,720
metal? tons monthly in September 1944, only 6,200 tons (21 percent) were
located In East Germany and 1,830 tons (6 percent) in territory occupied
by Poland after the war.
It is expected that few, if any, complete weapons will be produced in
East Germany in 1952, ard the table below therefore is designed to, indicate
production of parts equivalent to the quantities of therefore,
items shwa
therein. Since the USM has been furthering the production of military items
In Fast Germany for the past 2 years, it seems reasonable to assume that with
continued Soviet assistance production In 1952 will be the equivalent of
30 percent of either (1) about half of what all of Germany produced In 1940
or (2) one-fourth of what all of Germany produced in 1941. The application
of these ratios to Imam 1940 or 1941 production eves the following resultss
Estimated Production of Weapons in East Germany
1940, 1941, and 1952
11.11.POOM.MMIMO.M.analliaLIMIIMPOSO'
Geii
East1952
..412AL
Aircraft
10,826
LA.
5,413
1,625
Armored Combat Vehicles
1,643
N.A. .
820
246
Passenger Cars for Armed
Forces
28;52.1.
L A.
14,255
4,275
Motor Trucks for Armed Forces
53,348
N.A.
26,674
8,000
Field Artillery
Ne Ak0
? 2,160
540
162
Antitank Infantry
N.A.
1,800
450
135
Other Light Antiaircraft OMB
LA.
2,400
600
180
Mortars
N.A.
4,200
1,050
315
Light Infantry Weapons
LA.
1,824,000
456,000
136,800
un
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Estimated Production of Ammunition and 8431oeive Dvice
1941 and 1952
n Pest Gatuany
Thousand WU
Et
sormimmourmoupwwwairallaggaiLiemisura.
1z
Small Arms
1,056,000
264,000
79,200
Hand Grenades, Land Mines, etc.
15,600
3,900
1,170
Mortars
1p200
300
90
Light Antiaircraft (20.30 Millimeters)
60000
15,000
4,500
Artillery
8,160
2,040
632
Aerial Bombs
1,776
444
133
Estimated Production of Maploaivea in Fest ?exam,
3941 and 1952
Commoclitsr
*trip Tons
East Germany
;.952
Propellants
112,200
28,050
8,435
High Explosives
228,000
57,000
17,100
do kaligia2diagralledo
Under present coalitions the only East German users of weapons and
ammunition of military type are the Alert Police. These include 42,000
members plus 10,000 in school* Originally the Alert Police were equipped
with World War II German weapons, but more recently they have been largely
reequippel with Soviet weapons of ourrent type, including T-34 tanks. They
have elm received trail:dug in chemical warfare and have been issued GM=
gas masks and tear gas made in eseehoelovekla? The caly drain on poetwar
German military production far domestic requirements, therefore, has been
the gas masks for the Alert Police,
d. Imnortly qpit acoorte.
About half of the 1950 production of sporting rinse vent to the
ITSSR? An components of weapons are writ to the USSR for assembly, tut
no item, Tata, or weight Mares are available on this trade.
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12. iiitUritto
a. Ibibigt?
The Newt German aircraft industry is presently small, and its
potential is not mach greater, because of the large-scale dismantling of
aircraft factories carried out after the var by the USSR. It is probably
true that in 1947 the Soviets stopped dismantling underground manufactarring
installations, maw of whit* were aircraft factories, and investigated
their possible use in the event of var. No Information received, however,
reports the reactivation of the plants to production of aircraft parts.
In any event, the deportation of key German scientists has made it almost
impossible to rebuild the industry. No tactical or transport aircraft,
either Jet or conventional, are made, production being limited to air..
Graft parts and lowahorsepower engines.
(1) Man&
/t is quite probable that NW, at Zieenach, is producing a 200;0
horsepover. aircraft engine designated as the Aa. 410, which Is suitable
for use in training, liaison, reconnaissance, artilleryuepotting aircraft,
and aeap.lanes. Information In 1949 atantioned that this engine also was
produced at the Audi Works in Zwickau: Reports have been received or
receipt of these engines at Rostock.
Radial engine castings for Soviet aircraft are reported to be
made in a foundry at Mega in West Leipzig. It is probable that lime air.
craft engine parts are zaanufactured in plants producing engine ports for
automobiles and tanks. These *cad cane from a piston ring and gasket plant,
from several cylinder-liner plants, and from nine tank and aircraft Maine
aesembly plants.
(2) aylraft Parte ask Acseppor192.
Zeiss at Jena with little previous experience in grro inabra.
meat production, was reported to be completing tooling in August 1950 for
UM production of tartoestic pilots for Soviet bombers. Gyro companies and
gyro horizons also are being made at this plant, with production reported to
be 30,000 =its a year, according to early 1950 information. Zeiss has also
developed a simulated gunnery training set for fighter pilots. Two hundred
sets 'tare originally ordered in 1950# and the order was doubled by July of
the same year.
Orders for 2,400 units of 5 types of turn potentiometers for
aircraft were received by WS Optik at Jena in mix1.1950. An unidentified
factory in Inebrenau is reportedly producing _parachutes for the Soviet
Union, with part of the output to be delivered to the German Peoples' Pollee.
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b. altiaagige?
The teelmology used lathe East German aircraft industry is not
?
so high as it was before and during World War /I. Training of new tAbohnie.
ease has been stopped for about 6 years and the insignificant else of the
present aircraft industry and the deportation of key German scientists to
the USSR have further lowered the level of technical skill. Reports
indicate however, that some German scientists have been repatriated to
East Genianire
The technology of the aircraft industry also is handicapped.*
the destruction of aircraft factories and aeronautical research !mai..
ties and the defeat:1AI of technicians and scientists tothacWest. There
have been no reports of extensive or even partially successful rehabilitap,
tion of reeeardh facilities former3y used by the East German aircraft
industry.
Co amantkamagamommla?
Feet Germany is prehibited by international agreement from producing
or operating aircraft.
do JON2E11,0
It may be assumed that all aircraft engines, parts, and ancessories
are exported to the USSR, although no specific data on quantitative exports
are available.
0. Algskals*
There i.e no major stockpiling of aircraft, aircraft parts, or
components in East Germany. A. Soviet aircraft supply depot at Strausberg
maintains supplies far a ndlitary strength of 750 tactical airplanes, but
it is not bum whether part of its supplies originate in East Germany.
fo blassobattlimA
Most of the plants presently producing aircraft items are vulnerable
to aerial bombing. There are, nevertheless, underground facilities not in
use at the present time which would be extremely difficult to locate or
damage from the air.
g. Internal Wmitplitona.
The aircraft plants were the first to be stripped by the Soviet Union
after the vex., and the equipment has not been widely replaced. Therefore,
large.seale aircraft production cannot take place at this time.
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h. 2rends.Ino1uilinar Indicotions of Npbilimatjoik for Nal>
There wUl be no largeogicala production of aircraft or engines in
Fast Garmsny except in the unlikely event that many key German scientists
are returned firm the UM. It is probable, homer, that production of
component parts of aircraft ad engines will be stepped up.
4.1.thoc0 the contribution of the Nast German aircraft indnelay to
the Soviet lair potential is not great, trends within the Industry indicate
that the USSR could be mobilising Beet Germany for war. These trends are
evident in the following:
(1) Orders to stop the dismantling and blasting of imderground
aircraft factories.
(2) Ewleitation of old, reliable East German firms to produce
aircraft oompenents for Soviet aircraft, especially items of critical.
importanoe to fait, high-altitude, long-range bombere.
13s allftislano
so
Immediateay after the war, the Neptun Rostock was the on3,y East
German. shipyard employing more than 1,000 workers and capable of beading
vessels larger than bargee. Soviet dintlingemd war damage had destroyed
the major Installations. Between 1945 and 1947 all yards were nationalized
or placed under trusteeships, and the industry concentrated its efforts on
the repair of war damage. Employment increased, but the lack of eqaipment,
materials, and skilled labor precanded noteworthy gains in production. In
1947, %den shipbuilding was assigned high priority, employment reached 9,000
workers, are construction of fiehing vesaela vaza reported as six times the
output of 1945.
Ta 1948 the Federation of Nationalised Shipyards was formed. The
labor force rose to 3.3,000, dismantling was curtailed, and some of the
equipment already taken was returned. The constriction program specified
standardized types of vessels, the nombere to be built in each yard, and
the source and quantity of materials required. in output of 124 vessels at
22,800 gross tons averfulfilled the planned goal of 120 vessels of 19,000 tone.
In 1949, inrearbsent for shipyard expansion surpassed DM 60 Dalton,
and employment rose to 17,000. Three new yards were reported under constrac.
tion. Planned production for the year was 39,000 gross tone, consisting of
214 craft, at a total coat of 34 86 raillion, but available information
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indicates that this goal was not attained. It is estimated that, conaidering
the increase in employment and the introduction of ?line tealndque,
production must have anceeded 30,000 gross tons. Cu the basin of tonnage
output per maw of the previous year, the rdnimum production would be 25,500
tons,whereas by cost analysis, a reported value of DM 80 million for the 1949
production initiates that output could have been 35,000 taw.
?
The planned quota for 1950 is ialicative of the progress aid importance
of tie industry. In addition to repairs amounting to 34 45 minion, it we
planned to build 313. fishing Teasels of 65,800 trams tons. Still further
expansion of the shipyards vas planned with an investment in excess of -
DM 100 million. The labor force inoremeed rapidly to a total of 37,000 in
the fourth quarter of the year, at which time it was reported that an even
greater increase in both manpower and faollities was required to meet the
demands. Construction time for the standard types was halved, increasing ?
The rate of delivery at the year's end for the largest class to 13 units a
month, Fran the figares available, it appears that the ehipbuilding quota
was exceeded, and that actual production was 317 vessels totaling 89,000
gross tons. This success can be attributed, in large part, to the flexible
system where*/ manpower can be shifted or the quotas of the individual yards
changed to accommodate total requirements.
b. Sitimfted Possible Prggilystiop and Canacay.
The Five Tear Plan goals are conservative in the light of the
Production figures for 1950. Nmphasis in, the Plan still Le ce3xtered on
fishing craft of the lugger and cutter types, of vhich over 1,500 vi3.1 be
built, although plans also include larger vessels of 1,000, 3,000, 5,000,
and 8,000 gross tons. The total 5.5rear output is to be 369,000 tons varying
in yearay quotas. In 1953. the keels of 250 fishing vessels are to be laid;
in 1952, 280; in 1953, 3501 in 1954, 450; and in 1955, 260. The first two
large ships are to be completed in 1952. The 190-50 average output rate of
2 tons per mma per year is la/ and can be expected to improve, it even with.
out each improvement the pleanned tonnage can be achieved with the present
labca. force, which is estimated at more than 40,000 'workers.
Theme are 59 ;shipyards in East Ciernatay, but only 33 of them, ocaprised
of 3.4 nationalized yards and 1 Soviet joint-stock company yard, are of major
The remainder are boaiyardat limited in capacity to building
aM repairing small craft. Despite the tact that the major yards have an annual
estimated capacity of over 100,000 gross tons, most of them are geared to the
production of fishing craft, and only three have facilities for large ship .
conetruction. A fotarbh, the Vilkswerft at Stralmmd, was reputedly instalLiag
vays for vessels of heavy tonnage, but, in the 1953. balling program, it vas
not assigned a quota of large merchant chips. The estimate of the =peaty of
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the IndeetrY IA based on the 1950 tonnage output per w P
orker vhich is less
than per capita output in other European countries and onlyone.sixth of that
In the US. Therefore, it can be aseumed that capacity will be greatly
increased as more trainees oomplete the trade school courses and as building
facilities are augmented. Another factor *doh will have a decided offset
on new ship construction, eepeolally of large vessels, is the completion,
scheduled in 1952, of repair obligations included in the reparatioes
settlement.
c? pomestie Beauiremeirts.
Ship production In 3.946-50 was for both reparations and the East
German ficthing fleet. In 1948, only a negligible tonnage was slimed the
latter. In 1949, appradmately 33 percent of new ehip construetion remained
in Past 0021114W, while in 1950 domestic allocations, amounted to 45 percent
14 total output.
It is the expressed intention of East German officials to offset the
loss of Polish and West German craft, which before the war conducted almost
the vhole of the East German fishing industry. It is further planned to
build large ocean...going ships and enter the international merchant marine
field. To acmcmplish these plans, East Ciermany must retain the major part
of the output of its shipyards,
allfib.USW
The small percentage of the outptcb of fishing vessels that the Soviet
authorities have permitted the East Germans to retain cannot be considered
stockpiling. Since domande for materials and manutactured parts have far
exceeded the supply, no accumulation of reserves of these items has been
e. SUTD1118 or Dattai?
The output of the East German shipbuilding industry probably will
continue to be deficient In the next 5 years, despite the tremendous expansion
it has undergone. Rovever, as the pseado-dndependence of the country progresses
and reparations dearease, shipyard production will be adequate to provide an
export eurpins.
f. Intarool Limitoticam.
Until the creation of a central purchaeing agenoy for the nationalised
shipyards in 1948, procurement of materials was difficult. Each yard was
responsible for obtaining Its ovn rem awdertale ani was ecmpelled to fabricate
all necessary parts. Concurrently with the centralisation of procurement,
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nmw factories yore established for the mtumfactere of finished component
parts, and oubcontracting was initiated. As a. resat of these imprevmsents,
the abiarda 1y.1949 were obtaining tat...thirds of their entire requirements
from East German industry, uthereas previous3,y they had relied on Otedboi.
slovakia, the VS, Vest Germanys and, to some extent, other Western
countries. There is 4111 sole dependence on Czechoslovakia for diesel
engines and on West Germany for navigation equipment, but even these
deficiencies are being eradicated.
The lack of tools and equipment was, in the early postwar years* a
serious handicap. This disadvantage was overcame with,Soviet imports, Which
continue despite Fest Germany's progress toward self6euffi0ieney. Amost
important limitation In the dhipbuilding induebry is the lack of trained
personnel such as welders, medhanice, carpenters, and shipfitters. Some
reports indicate that elliled labor in the yards is an low as 10 percent
of total employment. Numerous trade wheals have been established in the
*micas OhipbuLlding centers to remedy this defect. Througuast 1950 many
reports indiomted morale in the industry was low because of peer housing
conditions in areas where employment has mushroobal, the low rate atm
OW 4 to DM 6 an hour), and the presence and interference of Soviet
supervisors.
g.Irends..4cludine Indications of Nobiliz4tqn
limphasis continues to be placed on expand= of the shipbuilding
industry. Investment 11=0.951 to 3.955 is scheduled to be Ett.2o9 anion,
In 1951, DM '70 million is planned, representing onewfourth of the total
investment to be made lathe machinery building industry. With such emphasis
on expanding dhipbuilling facilities it is possible that the 2955 Pal 02' a
merchant fleet large enough to elimiLte dependence on foreign versals will
be realised.
Production of marine components implants engaged in other nenufactar.,
Ing has increased. For ample, the Dieeelmotorenvark In Bostock, emit of
the Ocean-going Shipbuilding Department, reportegr delivers its entire
output to the Shipbuilding industry. The diesel engine plant of Woaff.Beelera
has been greatly expended, as has the Finsterwalde generator manufacturing
plant,
Since the East German dhiphuilding industry apparently does not produce
naval vessels', its program cannot be called a direct indication of mobilisation
ter mar. Aside from the rdlitary value of merchant Ships, however, the
industry is of vital importance in an estimate of the Soviet war potential in
four ways. First, its shipyards provide a basin for naval construction.
Second, these yards are employed as advance repair bases for the Red Fleet.
Third, their current production of merchant ships permits the shipyards of the
USSR to concentrate on naval construction. Fourth, the fishing craft being
produced are designed for faito4 ready conversion to minelayers', minesweepers,
and patrol boat*.
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140 alitalailli*
The Soviet Union, after the war, dismantled the largest and at
modern abrasives plants in East Gammany. At the and of 3.950 the industry vas
comprised of one ancient and= cadde plant of a capacity of fram 000
to 12,000 metric tone a year, one new silt= carbide plant producing 3,500
tons a year, and nine abrasives products plants with an mural capacity of
4,600 tons. Present capacity for abrasives and abrasive ithsela is below
requirements but is imoreasing and probably will expand aufficiently during
the Five Year Plan to meet future inaresass in requirements. To meet other
production targets in 1951, East Germany will depend. on West Gamow for a
large part of its abrasive product requirement?. 2/
15. General Maohinqm
truier the administration of the Ministry of Machina Boil/Ling there are
261 general machinery plants, which Employ 106,400 vyorkers. These plants
produce all kinds of ligrt machinery and metal products and supply oceponents
to plants buiMing heavy machinery.Principal items of production incazde
textile, sewing, printing, paper, foodin.ocessing, light chemical., refrigerating,
and other light machines; fittings; plumbing and sanitary equipments fire
extinguishers; and other similar its, A few SAG plants also produce sale
of this light equipment? a/
Dismantling of these light machinery plants was oceq)aratively
and only a small percentage of the invesbasarb funds fox. 1951 Ina allotted to
these plants. Soma of the plants are being converted to the production' of
other types of mach:Ines and components useful in the expansion of heavy
machinery production.
Recent export oontraote branded considerable quantities of the products
of thew plants, among which ware sewing, textiles printing, paperprocessing,
agricultural, and dairy machines and similar items. ji
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H. Uranium.
1. Production and Catecitmr.
Production fraR the uranium deposits in East Germany began in 1945
and increased gradua14 through 1948. There vasasharpupstringinoutput in
1949 and.a smaller but regular increase in 1950. The 1949-50 rate or in. -
crease is expected to continuo through 1952. Ore and concentrates are recovered
and shipped to the USSR for final processing. The East German output represents
45 percent of the total uranium available to the USSR.
2. Domestic Reouiramenti.
As there are no atomic energyplents in East Germany, there are
no domestic requirements for fissionable materials.
3. atesgallm
.No stockpiles of 1121311iUM are maintained in Fast Germany.
4.qurpip or Daflaut.
The total output of uraninm represents a surplus, which is shipped
to the Soviet Union.
5. btergalIdmitations.
The deposits of uranium-bearing minertas in East Gemenware the
largest single source of fissionable material available to the Soviat'Union.
Sufficient supplies of manpower are available because of the large numbers .of
we and political prisoners that can be utilised, Ifficient mining practices,
mine ventilation, and other safety measures are not poketiced, and proper food
and olothing.aresbort in moraines. These limitations are not of great
importance, however, because of the almost limitlesa supply of manpower available.
Transportation requirements and the supply of highly skilled personnel are
believed to be adequate.
6. Trends Includine Indications of MOtdlisation for Ar.
The output of uranium concentrates in the 1948.60 period has nom"
steadily uPeard. Increases since 194C2 however,
are believed to represent
the operation of a larger number of MUMS, as wr-11 as being an indication of
a stapped.up program aimed at isobilisetion for war.
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Transoortatioa.
a-
The Bast German tranaportation system-makes an important contribution
to the Soviet economic potential for war, principally the railroad system
but also, to a lesser extent, the water and highway transport systems. Al..
though the East German airfield network is of great strategic significance,
as are all forms of Neat German transport, no internal air transport
operations are conducted, and international operations are of no economic
consequent*. -
The Min's traffie with East Germany is of greater importance and
volume than its traffic with any other Satellite. The East Germs rail system
carries a large proportion of this traffic, which includes reparations, .military
supgies, products of Soviet-owned industry in East Germany, novae oommerco,
and transit traffic from the West. East German rail traffic destined for the
USSELmoves both across Poland for transloading to the Soviet broad.geuge net.
Work and to East German Baltic ports for transshipment by sea. The total
volume of rail traffic destined for the USSR is probably at least 25,000 metric
tons a day. In addition, the much greater volume of East Dorman internal rail
traffic is essential to the maintenance of industrial production for Soviet
account, The Soviet Unica also receives railroad equipment out of current Bast
German production,
East German inland and maritime water transport facilities, which are
Important, tothe domestic econagy, also participate in the movement of traffic
to and from the USSR. East Germany has no oceangoing fleet,. but its Baltic
ports handle a substantial volume ?t eastbound seaborne traffic which the
rail lines across Poland to the Soviet Union probably could not entirely
accomodate. The highway network of East Germany makes littIo direct contribution
to the Soviet economic potential. Highway traffic plays a significant Part in
the internal economy, however, and its volume and relative importanee are .greater
than in any other Satellite country,
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A. =Mg&
1.
The facilities of the Beet German railroads although iMpaired,
probably are adequate for foreseeable eoonomic and military traffie re.
quirements. Bast German rail traffic, already heavy and increasing,
operates in large measure directly or indirectly for Soviet benefit and
contributes significantly to the economic potential for war of the USSR.
CVer.all capacity is only slightly in excess of traffic requirements and
is being increased yearly at rates 'comparable to the increases in re.
quirements. .Although the system is vulnerable to serious disruptions at
civilian traffic, essential military traffic probably could be maintained.
CemeraLDescrintion,of the netwerko,
Despite extensive postwar dismantling, the Bast German
State Railways (Deuteche Reichsbehn..DR) has by far the densest network in
the entire Soviet Bloc, 12.1 kilometers per 100 square kilometers. Trackage
now totals approximately 13,000 kilometers, 32 percent less than in 2945.
The network comprises 13 major lines radiating from Berlin, still the largest
railroad hub in Europe, which are joined together termirey. lateral line's,
some of which form a north.south route and three east-west routes across the
country, by.passing Berlin. In addition, a double-track railroad encircles
Berlin, providing a route for transit traffic outside the center of the city.
Despite these by.pesseA to high a proportion of postwar through traffic has
passed through Perlin that a second north.south connection has recently been
opened along the Polish frontier, an outer freight ring has been built to
ease the burden on the Berlin "Ringbahn," and a second outer freight ring
has been begun.
ID? 2tstaas
Traffic on the DR approximated 16.74 billion tonaldlameters
in 19500 21 percent heavier than in 1949 And 82 percent heavier than in 1947.
The rail system accounts for roughly 85 percent of total Bast German traffic,
in terms of ton.kiloMeters. Rail traffic includes exports of minerals, cement,
chemicals, petroleum, metals, and-machinery to the Soviet Bice, chiefly to the
USSR, and imports of coal, ores, .and metals for fabrication in East Germany
for Soviet account. The largest part of the total, however, consiste.of ?
internal traffic. Because much of the internal traffic moves directly or in.
directly in the Soviet interest, it is difficult to estimate accurately-what
proportion of the total traffic is of economic importance to the USSR, It Is
certain, however, that a large part of activity is beneficial to the USSR and
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that East German rail traffic is more important to the Soviet economic potential
for war than that of any Satellite.
Military rail traffic in East Germany is heavy and is of
considerable importance to Soviet occupation forces. There are no railroad
facilities in the &rope= Satellites of greater potential importance to the
Bed Amy than those of the DB,
Traffic from East Germany destined for the Soviet Union
crosses Poland via the 1rankflnetder6.01er and Euestrin border stations.
PoliSh-German traffic, on the other hand, enters Roland further south via
the Neisse Rtverborderetatiotts of When, Ibrst, and Horka. It is note.
worthy that industrial production fron the Chemnitz area and uranium ore from
the Ern Gebirge, both located in the South,, are routed circuitously to the
USSR via Berlin and Franktbrt0en-dersOder. rather than directly across Poland
via the Neisse liver stations. German traffic across Poland has nearly roadbed
capacity, with the result that mach additionaltraffic destined for the USSR
now moves north for transshipment at Shot German Baltic porta.
0. bmilimmsdp
The fixed facilities of the DR network are in poor condition.
Maven years of :overloading, inadequate maintenance, and extensive destruction
and dismantling have resulted in severe deterioration of the system. Rails and
ties are old, badly worn, and generally long overdue for replacement. Ballast
is light and poorly drained. One-third of the total network has been dismantled
and removed.
Despite these handicaps, the condition of the fixed facilities
is not now a serious handicap to rail traffic. The present network is handling
about double the amount of prewar traffic, and an additional 60-percent in.:
crease in traffid is planned in 1955. In accordance with the Sovietssponsored
policy of utilizing existing facilities as intensively as pozsible, with
minimmn expenditures for maintenance and replacement, capacity is maintained
only slightly above current requirements, thus permitting the maximum allocatiOn
of materiels to war production. Since the Soviet Orbit is able to produce all
the railroad equipnent necessary to meet probable traffic requirements, the rails
road policy in East Germany, which appears to be one of inefficient overs
exploitatiOn, may be the most efficient way of liquidating a superannuated
investment preparatory to a sweeping modernization,
d. gnaw&
In accordance with the Soviet practice of MaXIMUM exploitation,
it is believed that total DR traffic currently is within 5 percent of total
Capacity. Traffic occasionally may even exceed rated capacity, causing
temporary and .local congestions. The planned expansion of facilities., completion
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of some of which has already been reported, will provide considerable yearly
increases in capacity through 1955. Planned annual increases in traffic,
however, are expected to absorb all of the increased capacity.,
A yearly increase in trarfic of about 2 billion ton.kilometers,
approximately 12 percent of present traffic, is planned through 1955 and is the
best available index of planned increases in capacity. The type of expansion
of facilities now going on in at Germany is not extensive enough to produce an
annual increase in capacity greater than 12 percent of present capacity, The
program to double-track five major east.west linos, which was projected by
Soviet authorities in the summer of 1950, would have provided a greater increase,
but this *plan has not been carried out, Other less effective ways of increasing
capacity, including increasas in the number and length of ;casino sidings and im.
provement of the traffic control system, have been adopted on several key lines.
Only a few short stretches of track are being doubled. Facilities in same yaria
?are being improved, but the yards are not being greatly expanded,
e. Velnerabilitx.
DR facilities are vulnerable to both air action and sabotage,
Themetwork contains few tunnels, but numerous bridges on neatly all the key
lines afford targets which are highly vulnerable to air attack. Although the not.'
work is dense and provides lines parallel to almost every vulnerable route, the
system affords few practical alternative routes, because all lines are operating
close to maximum capacity, Itany,major lines tiara blocked, essential traffic
could be rerouted only at the expense of equal volumes or traffic on parallel.
linos,
Disruption of one or two major lines, while it would not halt
essential Soviet military traffic, would seriously curtail civilian traffic on
the alternative lines over which Military traffic was rerouted. If continued,
such dislocation would have a detrimental effect on industry and would reduce the
economic assistance which Fast Germany supplies to the USSR. Only a long-term,
full.scale program of attrition by air, however, could close the ER network to.
all traffic, and this program would require air =primacy and sustained attacks.
Sabotage can be more effectively employed against workshops
and rolling stocks than bridges. recause the rolling stock inventory is limited
and obsolescent, the high level of traffic now maintained by the DR depends in
large measure upon the productivity or the workshops. Recent slight galas in
inventories have been largely attributable to increased output in the DR heavy
workshops. Sabotage campaigns against these workshops, coupled with direct
attacks on rolling stock, could gradually reduce the inventory of operable rolling
stock.
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2.
1,1 .Y.11pD ?? 11. .0.)
,?4,I1_1J1 .0 e,14.42 ?
rotential tor Nkr of :PALMA.
a? 1A120=21.0
The DR has a total of approximately106,500 freight ears and
5;650 locomotives; of Which about 93;500 and.4;005; respectively, are service-
able at any given time. If special-purpose and reserve equipment is excluded;
the system has about 80;000 cars and WO lax:motives in dailysemvice, This
inventory is adequate for current DR traffic requirements and will gradually be
expanded to meet the planned increases in requirements,
The condition of the DR equipment is poor, Because most of it is
old and worn. and due fey. replacement; it is not expected that any important
quantities of DR equipment will be removed to the USSR; despite the fact that
the East German system has several thousand adjustableineccle cars currently in
service. Nevertheless; the USSR continues to receive new equipment out of current
East German production.
b. 'reduction Nrebilities?
gest German industry has a surplus capacity for the produetion
of railroad equipment; although some of this capacity-is now devoted* to other
purposes. Th. plamead 1950 freight car production of 7,000 units for the U$SR
probably vas achieved; while production for the DR probably was negligible Far
1951 the planned production. of freight cars was reduced from 3;870 to 3,24, of
which 500 were for the DR; 500 for Polish reparations; and the reaataing 2;270
for the USSR, The cutback in freight oar production reflects principally an in.
creased production of weapons, at German industry can produce *stayer rolling
stock the DR can convince the Soviet economic authorities it must have.
0. =eater Transfers to the USSR,
It is believed that the ussa 4111 not remove worn rolling stock
from the DR as long as East Gorman industry is fulfilling Soviet demands for new
equipment. In vim of the fact that the roiling stock now in service on the DR
is asking a substantial contribution to the Soviet military potential; it is
highly unlikely that the USSELlidll withdraw appreciable quantities of this
equipment.
It is extremely unlikely that locomotives would be removed to
the USSR; because moat of the existing inventory would require extensive re.
building for conversion to broadgauge. In the mIlikely event that the USSR were
to make emergency removals of freightvars; the DR system could afford limited
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loeses but thereafter would be affected in proportion to the number of cars with.
drawn, Between 3 and 5 percent of the working park (from 2,500 to .4,000 cars)
mold be removed before all existing surplus traffic capacity were dissipated.
Removals of 10 percent (3,000 oars) would reduce the capacity for handling traffic
of secondary economic importance. Removals of over 15 percent (12,000 cars )
would seriously restrict traffic of primary economic importance,
3. Tildtree/ Contripaticsa.
a, 1j1i'4 in Soviet
(1) Itetwatjeed_Natnre otyraffic yittv_the USSR 4nd the Satellite.
The DR handles four kinds of traffic between Germany and
the um: (a) the output of Soviet-owned industry in East Germany (SAG traffic),
(b) products of Bast German industry delivered to the USSR as reparations,
(0) East German production exchanged with the USSR under trade agreements, and
(3) transit traffic in goods procured outside East Germany for the Soviet Bloc.
The shipment of dismantled equipment such as plant machinery and railroad
installations, remoVed by the USSR as *war booty,* has now came to an end. 'Traffic
to the USSR is reported at about 25,000 metric tons a days, moving via rail both
across Poland and to Baltic ports for transshipment. /t is not certain that
all four categories of traffic are included in this figure, and total traffic may
be half again as large. The principal items shipped to the USSR are fertilisers,
machinery, eleetrical equipment, and transportation equipment. Major iteas im.
ported from the USSR by rail include Steel plates, bars, and vire; other metals;
and replacement parts for transportation equipment.
The considerable adlits4y traffic between East Germany and
the USSR Is not included, in these figures and makes total traffic even heavier than
indicated,
(2) jjmortanee of Traffic to the Soviet Iconamv.?
Of all traffic moving into the USSR across its 1,?.74.1,en
frontiers, that originating in Nast Germany is heaviest and of greatest eccmcale
important,* to the USSR.
b. Role Of Regireadtin TradIalLtIt.--1-?,1111*
(1) *tent and ROUT, of Traffit,
Bieeept for Vienna, Berlin is perhaps the chief focal potht
for traffic between the USSR end the West. East Germany, through quastmlegitimate
agencies, has devised means for carrying on trade with the West which directly or
indirectly serves Soviet interests. FOr example, flrerutra,* the Soviet-German
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forwarding agency, with headquarters in East Berlin, stations representai.
tives in various guises in many commercial centers of Western %rope.
Nearly all the commodities which "Derutraw procures in the West move into
Berlin via rail and are forwarded on via rail to the East. Many scarce
commodities which are important to Soviet industry are proctored, although
not all of them are necessarily destined for the USSR. Satellite countries
also procure, via East Germany, critical items which are in Abort supply
throughout the Orbit. These items include bell bearingsvtungstano.
industrial diamonds, and machine-tool components. The volume of this
traffic is not known, but it is believed to have been reduced since the
application of export controls by Western nations.
(2) Clandestine Traffic.
Much of East Germany's commerce with the West is
clandestine. As export controls reduce legitimate commerce, clandestine
traffic may be expected to increase. The volume of this traffic cannot
be accurately estimated, but it is certain that its importance to. the.
USSR far outweighs its dollar value and is moth greater than its relatively
mall tonnage would indicate.
4.. Inverse Cpntrituti.ou..
a. Equipment aqg Mhterials.
For its cSon needs, the DR requires neither eqpipment nor
materials from the 'USSR. Domestic industry has ample capacity to prOftos
all the locomotives and other rolling stock, rails, ties, and signal equip-
ment which the DR may need. There is also a large surplus capacity available.
to mantfacture equipment for export, but considerable quantities of steel
must be imported yearly from the USSR to maintain this export production.
be th222MSKe
The DR was Short of personnel through 1945, but inoreesed
training and the introduction of more women into railroad work has eased'
the situatioh in many labor categories. The most critical Shortages, those
of skilled mechanics and machinists for the workShops? probably have been
considerably relieved.
c. guaLadelliC
Control of the East German railroads by the USSR is assured
In several lays. The principal direction is supplied by the Getman Economic
Commission (DWK), which regulates the planning and attempts to control the
productivity of every facet of the economy and is, in turn, completely
controlled by the USSR. The Director-General of the DR is a blindly loYal
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Communist. Who has three deputies, including a "Director of Cultural .
Affairs." Each regional railroad directorate has a cultural director,
directly under its president, Who i. responsible for thought control and
political indoctrination of all railroad personnel throughout his directorate.
Soviet military personnel occupy key posts throughout the DB to assure that
Red Army requirements are properly dispatched.
5* bilkitalL2M11221112dg.
The East German railroad system is expected to be able to meet
all military and economic requirogents placed upon it in 1951 and 1952 00d,
by the end of 1952, to show Improvement in virtually every department.
Agrodual strengthening of facilities on selected routes'of the
DR. vill continue thrmeumit 1952. This program will include lengthening- of
sidings, replacement of the most worn rails and ties modernization of some
'signaling equipment, limited expansion of terminal f:ollities in key yards,
and the construction of connecting curves at same junctions. The southern
half of the Berlin cuter freight ring and a north-south connection to by,
pass Berlin to the west will be completed. It is unlikely, however, that
any major program of double?tracking will be completed, or even undertaken,
befOre the end of 1952.
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B. Adam
1.
aff...1E.Ete-gliUne
To date, the direst contribution of East GOMM highways to
the Soviet monad? potential for war has been negligible. Indirectly,
however highway transport is of considerable importance in maintaining
the productivilw of East German industry, mach of which is operating on
Soviet orders.
Extensive use of the highways by the Soviet ocioupation forces
also contributes substantially to the Soviet military potential. In
addition, despite the handicaps staining from war damage and inadequate
lildutenanees the roads in their present condition probably could marry
heavy military traffic in support of large-scale offensive operations
for a period of free 3 to 6 month.. 31/
a,
111121346.2211102dialLatallildiarlit
The densit7 of the Haat German road system is 0.38 kilometer
per square idlometer. 2/ The network is most dense in the area south of an
east.vest line through Berlin, while roads are relatively few in the North
German plain, The highway situation in 1950, as compered with 1947, is
shown in the following tables
Tait German Highways
1947 and 1950
Cktemorr
Reiehsentobehnen
(Supethigbilmrs)
Reiohastrassen
(National or State Roads
Landetrassen
Clace I (Provincial)
Class IX (Local)
Total
Concrete with gloat
Asphalt Seetions
Asphalt, Cobble, or
Waterbouni Macadam
Gravel or Loosely
Bawd Waterbouad
Macadam
Gravel or loosely
Boland Waterbcomd
Macadam
.ronomasivargbaseeras
itUrtill*ba
2 Lanes, 1,378 1,378
30 Each
16-21 9,676 8,646
12-421 2.8,410 17,401
3..048 19,160 34348
48,632 45,773
e In view of the souroe, the 1 figures appear reliable. The 1947 Mures ray not
be accurate although it is possible that 3,000, kilometers of roads have been abandoeed
sines that Lama
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--'? War damage to East Gennroads was heaviest in the arse
east Of Berlin, but total damage generally was not so extensive as that
sustained in Western &Irv,. Bader, to road surfaces was relatively.
light,being Sensed mainly by einessive use and lack of maintenance, while
damage from demolition, abellfire,-And bombing was of little consequence.*
Damage was east extensive and effeetive on the Autobahnen and ReiChastraesen.y
Bridge destruction by retreating Germans was widespread and thorough, and *
1,131 bridges in East Germany were destroyed during the-war.A/ Temporary
repairs Were made immediately after the war, but permanent reconstruction.
was not undertaken On a large scale until the period of the Two Year Plan
(1949450). *at of the present-emphasis is being placed on reconstruction
of thi:Autobanen and Relehestraisen bridgeti, but progress until reeentli
has been oleo toarosolt of steel, cementvand asphalt shortages. 2/
The meet reetint information states that restoration of the Autaihnin bridges.
is now *Will in hand." At The condition of the Elbe, Odor Seale and
Feiss. Biter bridges, Whidh are of great Importance to east-vest traffic,
was as random in 1950 2/1
Condition of East Germaa Major Highway Bridges
1950 ?
Prewar Intact or Destroyed and
Wilk. ititinaBEE liteding a/ JETBEiall...
Elbe 25 20 5
Oder 15 7 a
Setae 61 16 4
Belies 57 5 19
jrniti
Condition
Jams_
41
33
d Net neeessartly permanent restoration.
? Wee the Five Year Plan (1951-55), 660 bridges are to be
rebuilt, 270 by the national government and 990 by the vailouolalk, and
all temporary teidges are to be replaced kr permanent structural-1;40/-63s
hundred kilometers of new roads also are to be built by 1955. 11/
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b. Inak,
The foliating traffic figures have teen reported for East
East German Motor Vehicle Traffics
2947.40
' Traffic
...13161....
-1250.
Passengers Carried (Millions)
58J3
71.0
73.0
78.0
Passenger.kilometers (Millions)
1,122.0
1,047.0
1,121.0
1,15900
Metric Tons Carried (millions)
34.7
3908
44.0
4506
Average Length of Haul
(Kilometers)
30.0 DJ
30.0
3400
34.0
Tonailometera (Billions)
1.0 a/
1.2
1.5
1.6
VThetimated.
No 3.950 traffic figures have yet been issued but it was
announced that the 1950 traffic Plan was 102.7 percent fulfilled by the end
of September; According to the East German press, 38 percent Of all trane.i.
port, by. weight,. is currently carried on the highways. jj/ In terms of ton,
kilometers, however, the highway network handles less than 10 percent of all
East German internal traffic. It is planned that, in 1955, highway traue
port will carry about 35 perCent of total traffic, or .100 million, metric tons.
In comparison, the railroads are scheduled to haul 195 million tons in 1955.
? The average length of haul for track transport is relativeli
high. AlthcOgh the proportion of long-distance traffic. is declining, over
25 percent of all tonnage moved tumotOr vehicle in 1950 traveled 50 kilo-
meters or more, la In 1948, long-distance truck transport accounted for
about 30 perdent of the total tonnage moved by highway? 11/
A large proportion of total highway traffic is carried by
East German vehicles in direct support of Soviet military-forcesin.East
Germany. Soviet military motor transport units also operate extentiveb.
over East German 'highways. Regdlar ecmiercial traffic involves mainly the
collection and distribution of agricultural produce and the movement of..
industrial :rex materials and products between ports, rail terminals,- and
industrial installations.
0. Daggasal.
Little data are available on the amount, condition and use of
road-building machines in East Germany, but it is known that suchegnipment is
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Inadequate and frequently obsolete. 2,71 Required new equipment listed as
of August 1950 by the Directorate General, Motor Traffic and Roads, included
30 trucks, 30 trailers 20 passenger cars, 50 motorcycles, 50 tar sprayers,
10 asphalt boilers, 4;00 tar barrels,. 2,500 meters of tar ppm hose, 75
tar boilers, 75 tar and chips mixing machines, 10 large snowplows, and
1,500 bicycles for road maintenance personnel. IS/
d. %peaty.
The present capacity of the East German highway network is'
well below prewar levels. Many of the in routes still have teSporary
timber bridges, and maintenance and repair of the road surfacee has been
generally inadequate and of inferior quality. since the war. 12/ The .
highways, however, are considered more than adequate in terms of present
economic requirements. a2/ In 1946 the Transportation Corps, of the us
Army eetimated that three east-west highways south of Berlin and ono high-
way from Berlin to NuteMbeig eadh had a capadity of 20,000 short tons adv.
e* ? YSIMILV241t?
Highway transport in East Germany is more vulnerable than
in any-other Satellite, because the volume of highway traffic is greater
than in the other Orbit countries.. Since, however, alternative routes,
either rail or highway, are available in many cages, effective attacks
on the highway net would have to be widespread, persistent, and coordinated
with action against the rail system.
The bridges, particularly those spanning the major rivers and
thode on the AntObahnen, are the most vulnerable-points in the road ystem.
Demolition, rather than air attack, probably would be the most thorough and
effective method of destroying these structures. However, the ease with which
temporary bridges can be built, as was .demonstrated in 194546, greatly
increases the effort required to produce a serious disruption ()thigh/fay
traffic.
Highway traffid also is vulnerableo.particularly to lowlevel
air attack. AutObahnen traffic is easily observable from the air, and
traffic on other roads, although frequently hidden by tree cover, can often
be spotted by dust, particularly on the gravel roads in summer.'
2. jxect Ct ut.o411 ofAlely Transport Eftiument to the
?cio Potential f?r War
East Germanyle directoontributions of motor 'vehicles are signifi-
cant-to the USSRkecadomic potential It is a well-established fact that ems
German vehicles are atill widely used in the USSR, and current trends suggest
that future contributions to the Bloc are to rethain at a high level. In view
of indications pointing toward the curtailment of long-distance highway traffic,
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it seems likely that road transport in East Germany is being reoriented
according to the Soviet pattern, Uhl& emphasises the Use of motor trans..
port for short-haul traffic. Such a transport program would require only
a relatively small nuMber of vehicles, used intensively, and would reduce
the economic significance of the road eystem. The potential strategic
value of the highway network will remain largely unchanged.
Talventories.
The following motor vehicle inventories have been reported
for East Germany, excluding East Berlin and vehicles owned by Soviet
installstionsi2b
East Getman Motor Vehicle InventorY
1948.49
brdagyaballekallillag-2211217nserviceable Total
Ausstasabla
Ploarricoablt.
Trucks
68,742
25,240
93,982
70,790
15,787
86,577
Tractor-T=iler
Combination.'
Tractors
9,465
4,446
13,911
8,461
2,687
11,148
Trailers
360827
18,792
55,619
39,574
12,932
52,506
Special Vehicles
3,946
1,816
5,762
3017'
9c9'
4,226
Buses
1,073
1,267
2,340
1,134
361
1,495
Passenger Cars
46,127
21,153
674280
50,335
12,905
63,240
Total (excluding
Trailers) , lawn
1.81-47i 11ika1232 Sian
Although the total motor vehicle park declined between
November 1948 and October 1949, serviftable vehicles* increased in that
period from 129,353 to 134,0378 or tram 71 to 80 percent of the tote
inventory. A high rate of retirement and cannibalisation Of older vehicles
in order to Secure replacement parts probably was responsible for the net
decline in inventory. A Soviet Yilitary Administration -(SMA) order in
3.949 stated that fthe stripping of motor vehicles withdrawn from traffic
is to be organised, and :pare parts required for repair shops are to be
gathered systematically." Salvage of 9,800 metric tabs of spare parti was
anticipated as a result of this program. Zjj It is probable that the shortage'
of .spare parts and truck tires has continued, since a farther reduction in total
vehicle strength was expected in 1950, although the percentage of serviceable
* Serviceable vehicles should not be taken as the nodber.actuaI4 in use.
-
Prod 10 to 15 percent of the serviceable vehicles usually are undergoing
normal operational maintenance, repair, and.servicing.22/
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vehicles probably continued to Increase elightly.2il
The nneber of motor vehicles registered in East Berlin
is not known. In the entire Greater Berlin area, there mere 17,199
licensed motor vehicles in March 1950. a/
b. Effect of_Transfers to thc VSSB0
Available evidence indidates that reparation deliveries of
production facilities and finiehed vehicles, together with deliveries made
underloviets.East German trade agreements, have reduced the number of
serviceable vehicle. in East Gernem to the absolute minimum required to
meet planned traffic commitments. It seems likely that the total inventory
will decline further as the serviceability of the motor vehicle park
increases and the utilisation of the serviceable vehicles is intensified.
There are indications that domestic vehicle production facilities are to.
be rebuilt and expanded, At with, the possible aim of making East Germany .
a major source of vehicles for the entire Bloc, comparable to Csechosloliakia.
To date, however, East German vehicle exports from current production have
not been great. The USSR has received chiefly passenger oars obtaining
1,697 in'1949,:the last year for which complete data are available. rll
Automobile engines and parts also have been exported, both to the Bloc and
to the last. 301 Although these exports have not had much effect on the
domestic economy, other than possibly to prevent use of productive capacity
for alternative purposes East Germany has been left with an overage1. badly
deteriorated stock of motor vehicles which is barely able to meet the
traffic requirements placed upon it.
3. jndiragt Gontribut4gpiR
a. Rolle of HiShwar Transport ip Soviet Trek. .
Although precise data are not available, it is unlikely that
any through traffic of economic importance is carried by highway between
Bast Germapy and the USSR: There mey be some military traffic in support
of Soviet units in Germany, but it is more prObable that elmoat.all these
ehipments are made by rail and water.
'hi Role of Highway Transmit in Trade with the Weeto.
It is not known whether commercial highway operations are
conducted between East Germany and the Fest on a scheduled basis, it it
is certain that a large velmne of traffic is carried. The commodities hauled
are of real importance to East Germany and, indirectly, to the USSR. Most
of this traffic is believed to be in commodities subject to Western export
controls and is, therefore, clandestine in nature. Highway transport is
better suited to this type of operation than rail transport because of its
greater fleiibility. In addition to East German traffic with the West,
?3.63.
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-Csechollovak and possibly a few P011ah tali*** also ?Orate on East German
highways in both Intra?Blec and East-West trade.
ImwerseGentrihntiqpi.
The Soviet Bloc has contributed little, other than supervision,
to the restoration of highway transport in East Germany.- The only known
Shipments of vehielee iiipplied by the Sloe amounted to 46 automobiles and
$S1 trucks delivered in 1949. 22/ These imports originated in the 'USSR
and Czedhoslovakia In about equal numbers, and most, if not all, of the
vehicles were assigned to East GermanParamilitarynnits. As the East
German vehicle industry expands, such shipmenta? presumably curtailed in
1950, probably' viii cease altogether.
Soviet supervision and control of East German bighway transport
appears likely .to continue indefinitely. Although control is nominally
vested in the East German General Directorate for Transport, the Transport
Adtainisthition of the MA actually holds ultimate authority, Allah it
exercises at all levels of highway transport activity. 22( Nagy of the
Soviet supervisors reportedly are poorly qualified, and their authority
is retented, particularly by the German teen:Leans serving under them. XV
5.Atbspiltibutslzsgati.
Little important change in the East German highway system :is
indidated through 1952, and present trends are expected to continue. The
tonnage of traffic handled by the highveys viii increase slightly, While
the reduction in long-haul Motor freight viii reset in a stationary or
declining tonAllometer total. The number of motor vehidles probably will
continue to decline, despite increasing domestic production. Most.orthis.
production will be for export purposes and will -increase East Germany's
direct contribution to the Soviet potential for var. The role of highway
.transport as a supplementary transport service Will be accentuated, thus
reducing its economic significance. Further development of the highway
wets* probably will be pointed more toward its potential strategic value
to the Soviet Bloc than tward its role in the East German ecOncey.
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o Neteragenszia.
1. Itirect Contributions mf itater Transport to tha Enos:ale Ationtjal
by
Wq4 the VSSR.
a. . genga.grisidejagALgastymaistk.
East German .water transport facilities are of considerable
importance to the Soviet economic potential for war. The waterways form
the last link in the east.vest water route from the USSR to the western
boundary of the Soviet Bloc. They comprise the greater part of the Eibe
River, the Oder, the Mark Brandenburg system connecting the labs and the
(der, the Meckl:nburg waterway gystem in the north, and the eastern portion
, of the Mittelland Canal system, which =as across Germany ,from the Rhine
River.
The Elbe rises in Czechoslovakia and flowe.throUgh Samen7
and Prussia. It is navigable throughout East Germany. The Oder is the
main water route from Upper Silesia to the Baltic: but at present is of
greater value to Poland than to East Germany. The Viark.Brandenburg,gystem,
with Berlin at its center, links the Oder with the Elbe and is one'of thi
most important routes in the entire East Gorman network. J Details on .
ImOrtant segments of the principal waterways in Eaet Germany are as follows jod's
Principal East German Waterway
WaterwAT
Length
(Kilometers)
11:::.
3.5
Barge Capacity
Proms Tonig
Elbe River
Berlinuppandauer Canal
Brits-Kann* Branch Canal
1,0004,350
- 1,000.
1,000
CharlottenburgaVerbindungs Canal.
3.2
1,000
Klbeqlavel Canal
57,6.
1,000
Bavel4der A terway
102.7
1,000
LoverJavel Waterway
170.2
1,000
Prins Priederidh-Leepold Canal
3.8
.
7504,000
Spree4i0der Waterway
132.6
7504,000
Tatou Canal
37.8
7504,000
fthensattbewjriedrichstal Waterway
67.0
750
tiukoelleer Ship canal
1.8
750
Oder River191.0

750
Seale River
174.7
450
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Eta% Germany has a mbaber of important ports. The prinelpal
maritime ports are Rostock, Wernemninde, Wismar, and Stralsund. In addition
to therimalor seaports, there are numerous small ports of importance to the
fieht4 trade and, to local traffic. The major inland port la Berlin, nog
belimed to handle more traffic than any other Erie, German inland port.
Drodell ltagdebtirg, Koenigesilusterhauten, Riese, Genthin, and Belle are
coer important inland ports.
Traffie.
The water transport facilities have largaltregained their
prewar importance as carriers of bulk, slownoving traffic, and they play
a significant supporting role in peacetime traffic movements to and from
the West, as well as within the Soviet Blau In.addition they provide
alternative routea for wartime use. Inland waterway:traffIci'moreover, i&
of considerable significanoe in maintaining the productivity-atlas% German
industry, which is proddoing largely under Soviet direction and for Soviet
account. Although East German ocean trade is carried by vessels of other
nations the traffic passing through the country's Baltio ports ie, of
importalm to the USSR and relieves the rail lines Geroge Poland of a burden
which probably would exceed their capacity.
The total volisne of ocean traffic to and from East German
ports is not knave, but it is apparent that there has been a steady inorease
since the end of the war and that the traffic of the Baltio-ports is now of
econcmic,importance. In 1050 the twin ports of Rostock-aarnerasends handled
1.5 million metric tons of cargo, and traffic in the port of Stralsund totaled
1 million tonne a/ In addition to normal East German-Soviet commerce the
movement of reparations goods of Tarim* types to the USSR constitrite: afl
important part of East German ooean ahipments and a substantial portion of
the traffic of domestic ports. Vhile there is still a considerable volume
of traffic between East Germapy and the West, this traffic is being reduced
by the tightening of Western export controls.'
Inland water traffic has steadily increased since the end
of the war but is still well below the 1938 level of 20.2 million metric
tons. 4/ According to official figures publiehed in the East German press,
waterway traffic in 1948. totaled 8.5 million tons, 5/ while the 1950 Plan
'figure of 14.7 million tons was fhlfilled by 104 percent on 21 Decenber 1950,
making the 3.950 traffic level slightly more than 15.3 million tons. Although -
Inland water traffic accounts for only about 7 percent of the ton4ildmeter
traffic of the entire inland transport system, the tonnage hauled on,the
inland waterways represents about 20 percent of the total tonnage. Inland
-
water transport is important for the dameetic movement of a wide range of
commodities, but fran 50 to 75 percent of the total tonnage hauled an the
system is accounted for V five categories of bulk cargo: coal, mike,
building materials grain, and lumber.' The nature of the inland export and
Import traffic is Lbstantially the same as that moved by ocean transport.
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a.
The ports and waterways of .East Gomm are in fairly
good condition in spite of vast war destruction. Substantial appropriations
for their rehabilitation and expansion have been made, and this work is
proceeding as rapidly as possible. Ports have been cleared of much debris,
cranes haVe been installed or are scheduled for installation, and navigem
tion facilities have been restored Over most of the routes. IMprovement
.in maritime port facilities also is progressing, and BostoasUarnemnende ?
can now accommodate all but the largest ships. Continued emphasis On
vater transport is indicated:by the fact that the planned investment for
"Inland water transport and ocean traffic" has been fixed at DM 220
million ($55 mill(on) for the 1951.55 period. if
d.. Canacity.
The capacities of the East German waterweys decrease from
vest to east, being ;areal)- concentrated in the Elbe system, the Berlin
network, and the route S leading coat and west out of that city. The
Oder, which forms the -present eastern border Of the county, contributes ltttLe
to the performance of East German water transport.
Although there is little information available as to the
total capacity of the system, it is possible to make reasonable estimates
based upon available figures for plans and performance. Since the wates...-
way system is still being rehabilitated ind expanded, and traffic is
increasing, it is likely that planned traffic figures are established at
levels not far below. full capacity. If this assumption is correct, the
fact that performance since 2946 has consistently been slightly above the
target figures indicates that the spites is operating at nearly full
capacity.. Therefore, the present capacity of the ayetem probably does not
exceed ty tore:than 15 percent at beatthe 1950 traffic total of about 15.3
million metric tons, .and the annual oapacity might be estimated at not
more than 17.5 million toes, a figure still below the 20.2 -million tons
carried in 3938.
Waterway capacity is seasonally restricted sometimes
severely.,by.ice, lovvater? and floods on long segments of the inland
vater route's: Por example, a 400-mile eector of the be above Hamburg
is restricted by lad water to about 220 days of full-scale operation. 'with
operations at 75 percent of .capacity for about 80 more days. los also Is a
handicap on virtually all routes for varying lengths of time.
Cargo..handling capacity for ocean shipments is concentrated
largely in the ports of Roetock, Warnemuende, Wismar and Stralaund. At
present these ports are estimated to have the following. mama capacities:
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Bostockwarnemnende 3,900,000, metric tons; Wismar, 3,400,000 tans; and
Stralsund, 1,000,006 tads. 3/
In term of strategic capabilities, the potential of the
East German fleet cannot be oonsidered an important factor, since it
consists of only one merchant ship of over 1,000 gross registered tone.
Surveys of the traffic between Beat German and other ports reveal that
East Germany's ocean traffic is carried prelom4nant4 in ships owned or
Chartered by the USSR or %land.
0.
The inland water network and maritime ports of East Gemnany
are extremely vulnerable to military action and, to elation. degree, to
economic integre measures by the 'Jest. During the war, port inetallations,
dikes dams, sluices, and looks throughout East Germany were the object
of aiie and ground attacks which were quite successfe. In the important
area around Berlin (Land Brandenburg), for example, 59 percent of all
locks and 9? percent of all bridges were destroyed. In addition about
1,000 vessels were sunk along the inland routes 9/ Virtually all routes
have locks at frequent intervals, and some rout:s depend heavily upon the
maintenance of elaborate facilities for their continued operation. The
disruption of such realities, although probably difficult because of their
massive sise and the protection given them would constitute a seVere and
probably vital blow to continuous water transport operation. jj,/
Western control of Hamburg and the lower readhes of Ito Elbe,
East Germany's principal waterwiy, is a malor factor in the economic vulner.
ability of the inland water transport sistem? althoagh there has beetT
interference thus far with East German traffic. The continued increase of
inland water transport capacity despite the tightening of Western siport
controls indicates that inland water transport is not affected by this type
of economic warfare. Domestic and Satellite sources can supply the barges
and powered vessels required, while port equipment probably can be provided
in aufficient quantities to meet essential requiremente. Although the
construction of oceangoing craft in East Germany depends to sane extent upon
supplies from the West (about one..third of all materials used in. East German
shipbuilding comes from West Germany 21/), deepisea transport requirements
are being met largely by Soviet and Pali& ships. As long as Bloc tonnage
is available, therefore dependence an the West for shipbuilding supplies
will not constitute a major factor of vulnerability.
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2. Xrect Contributions of Water Transport Emiument lo the
Economic Potential foriier of the USSR.
a. Zmutaziga.
East Germany has no merchant ahips of over 1,000 gross
registered tons, with the exception of one vessel of 1,200 tons. The ocean..
going fleet is oomposed of email cargo ships and fishing vessels. This
inventory totals several hundred ships, but the exact number of vessels is
unknown.
The inland fleet is still below its prewar tonnage but. is
nevertheless of considerable size. Although the total size of the fleet'
is not known, it includes the following vessele'dontrolled by the German
East Zone Navigation Administration: 350 tugs, 2,312 dumb bargee totaling
10015,100 gross tons displacement, and 262 self-propelled barges totaling
103,200 tons displacement. 1,21/ In addition, the Soviet Oder Navigation
Company -owns the fdLlowing vessels: 7 tugs, alio barges totaling 293,040
tons displacement, 70 steam launches totaling 50,000 borespower, and 34
actor boats totaling 14,650 horsepower. IV It is uncertain whether the
latter group of vessels can be eonsidered to be in the East German inventory,
since the Oder is chiefly a Polish-Ozechoslovak waterway, at present.
b. grtild..421:1211021..temaLREB.
There is little likelihood that the USSR will withdraw ALA
German transport equipment. The vowels would be of negligible value to.
the Soviet Unice and they serve Soviet interests far more effectively in
their present em:iloyment in East Germany than the?, could elseWhere in the
Orbit.
It is probable that the East German econmy could itand moderate
losses of vessels and later transport equipment without a major offset won
operations or effective potential. There is, however, very little surplus
capacity in the inventory. Transfer of the fishing fleet, moreover, Would
cut off the country from a major food source.
3. "Olivet Contriputiopp.
a. Sole ot Water Transport in Soviet Trade.
The Soviet Union's trade with East Germany is of greater
significance than that with any other Satellite. While East German ocean-
going ships play an unimportant role in Soviet trade, a considerable volume
of ocean traffic carried by vessels of other Bloc nations passes through
East German ports to and from the USE. Eastbound traffic consists of
reparations goods, ccamercial trade, and the production of Soviet-ewned
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induAry ionEast Germany. The principal items of ocean traffic to the
USSR are machinery, fertiliser, chemloals :cement and a variety of
industrialTroets. Importe by sea frmAhe USSR consist primarily of
grain and raw. materials .for domestic fabrieation for Soviet account.
Inland water traffic also is of consequence in Soviet..
East German trade and consists mainly of the gime products as are
transported by sea. Cargoes of certain ray materials and industrial
products, indluding lumber, cement, and other building materials, move
across East Germagy and Poland to the USSR by inland waterways, while
grain tram the Ukraine and bulk raw materials as well as coal from Poland,
movestO East Germany by this means. German inland water craft, moreaver,
participataln the movement of transit traffic from the Vest destined for
the USSR and elsewhere in the Orbit.
The potential value of the East German water transport
system to the Soviet military position also is believed, to be considerable.
Fast-Vest ocean transport routes using East Germany's Baltic porta wad
be valuable in logistic support operations, although they would be subject
to attack from Western teses. Both the Baltio and the inland routes would
provide alternatives for. damaged or overloaded rail lines- and, if rail
transport were interrupted Inver would oonstitute an important segment
of total Soviet military transport capabilities.
1) 1.212..stliatiff-lissiimtanars44ILValink?
Although East Caftan oceaniveing ships are of little leportanoe
In trade with the West, traffic between the West and East German ports continues,
despite expOrt controls. This traffie ie carried mostly in Soviet and Polish
vessele. Goode exported firm East Germany 'by sea include potache salt,
lumber, and machinery, vhiCh go principally to Western Europe. Imports by
sea from the West include iron goods.textiles madhinery? and chemicals
and Most of these imports either directly or indirectly serve Soviet interests.
Inland water traffic to and frock the West is important to
the USSR as well as to the Satellites. The bulk of East Germany's Weetern
ieports comae from West Germany, and e considerable part of this traffic
moves by waterwaY. It is known, for example, that East German barges
move through the Western Sectors of Berlin under reciprocal agreeMents at
the rate of at least 300,000 tons emelt, 3il although thiti figure undoubtedly
includes muell domestic traffic. The goods carried include machinery and
Other industrial goods legally Obtained from the West, as well as a large
volume of clandestine imports.
The volume of clandestines water traffic is not knosn, but
audh cargoes, which eover a wide range Of itema in short supply in the East,
are believed to exceed in volume and importance those carried in legal trade.
Water transport is believed, however, to play a secondary role to truck and
rail transport in the movement of clendestine traffic. Cargoes reportedly
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move by train or truck &erase 'lost Germany to the West Berlin area and
are sent On by bergs via. the Spree Rivera Clandestine ocean cargoes
go from Hamburg to Rostock, from which they are transshipped by barge,
train, or truck.
44 Zwerse Contributiqui.
a4 Wow* epa Heterials.
In order to regain their prewar value to the German
econaMii East Oermages ocean fleet, inland latter craft inventory, and
port faellities must be considerably improved. The ocean fleet is still
confined to the planning stage, while the. barge fleet remains.below pro.
war levels. It is extremely nalikely, however, that East Germany
-receive Any of its water transport equipment requirements from. the USSR,
although some( vessels may be received from the Satellites. The USSR
produces few oceanusoing cargo or passenger ships, and what tonnage is
constructed is kept in the Soviet fleet. East Germany is u04
bargee, fishing boats, and small cargo craft, but from 90 to 95 percent of
the ships built are delivered to the USSR under reparations and commercial
agreemente. East. German requirements. for port facilities and waterway
aids will probably be met, if at all, from either the gest or the other
Satellites, rather than from the USSR. .
b. anima.
, East Germany makes no manpower requirements upon the Soviet
Union. On the contrary, East German water transport would be greatly aided
by the return of the large nuMber of shipping and shipbuilding technicians
who have been sent to the USSR.
0. brale..ggildiralo
?
Soviet control over East German water transport has been
established for political reasons and sometimes operates at the expanse of
efficiency.
5. ftcasge palsagnmaste.
It is likely that there will be a cont4nollwg improvement in Eget
German water transport through 1952. The ocean-going fleet may come into being
with a fey small ships of the coaster 1ype4 _The inland barge and tug fleet
will be increased slightly, as viii the total ton-kilometer performance of
the inland fleet. The cargowbandling facilities probably will be appreciably
improved, and cargo;handling capacity might be expanded by /tomb" to 15
percent. or even more, if cUrrent expansion plans are fully carried out.
One obstaele to development of the system will be shortages of materials,
particularly with respect to items ordinarily obtained from the West.
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D. jilajranamstt.
L. !Won't Contribitions of Air Transnort to the ICcolicinioPatenUa
atiliELAUIVLIM
Although present air transport operations into Bait %magi are
of no economie consequence, existing airfields could provide iMmediete and
adequate facilities far large-scale transport operations.
general Deacention otlbe Networlc.
East Germany has no organised coMmercial air transport
service's. All its 51 airfields are controlled by the Soviet Air Force, Whieh
maintains air transport bases at Aaltehburg and Staaken. The only airfield
available for civil transport aircraft is Schoenefeld, in East Berlin.
As part of an extensive Soviet. program of reconstructien and
improvement at farmer German air installations, which has been underway for
several years, runways at ads:Major airfields are currently being extended.
The liteit.eurvey of Beet German airfiabisli lists seven as having rum-s
ways of 7,000 feet or over, capable ot handling large transport and bomber
aircraft.; Zetbst, with a :trip of 10,200 feet, islocbibly the important
air base in the European Satellites. Thirteen other airfields have runways
of approximately 6,000 feet, and 25 smaller fields are in the 2,0004Oot olass.
b. ZMittaa.
Nonmilitary air transportation into East Germany 2/ is
limited to aircraft of the USSR's Aeroflot, Poland's LOT, and Oseohoilovakiale
OSA. The extent of this traffic is not great.
Foreign Air Routes In .at Germany
Air
Route
Aeroflot Nesoolpatnak4darsaw-Ber11n
Noscoi.Minelo-Betlin
Mosoow.Ealiningrad.BerlIn
CSA Prague-Betlin
WZ Wareawmaer1iii.Brusse1s4aris
Warsaw.Berlin.Paris
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Daily except Sunday
Weekly
Daily including Sunday
Weeklx
Twice Weekly -
Weekly j
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C.ligskandr
The Nast German airfield network is the best equipped in
the Satellites and provides the most extensive and up-toodate facilities
for night.-flying and Allwweather operations. Eighteen airfields have
equipment of this. nature ranging from adequate to superior. In addition,
15 airfields have equipment permitting limited operations at night and In
poor weather. Improvements already tmderwey or projected at five of these
fields, when completed, will fUrniah.adeqeste runways beundarn and obstrue
tion lighting. Navigational aids at 21 airfields provide adequate service,
while 8 additional fields have minimum facilities. A continuing program of
improvements will increase the number of airfields in both of these categories.
Repair facilities are well-dispersed, with 28 instillations
providing field maintenanee and 3 bases equipped for depot repair. No
major repairs to civil aircraft, however, are undertaken at East German
airfields, such work being perforthed in the country owning the aircraft.
?
Extensive facilities for storage and stockpiling of aviation
fuels are available at the seven meet important bases. Some prOdsion ii
Made for fuel 'storage at Almost all East German airfields. At six lordlier/
airfields, however, no fuel supplies are available.
a. Ranacily.
East Germany has the largest number of good airfields in
the Satellite countries. These are generally Characterised by high-quality
construction and equipment permitting utilisation on a 24-hour basis. The
capacity of the East German airfield network has been greatly increased
since 1945 through a coordinated program of building and runway construction
which has raised trim 9 to 20 the number of airfields with runway's of 6,000
feet pram's. The airfield system, therefore, could at any time be readily
adapted to large...scale transport operations.
et, Vulnerability.
East German airfields are so distributed as to provide great
flexibility for the Soviet Air Force. In the event of sabotage or air attack
on certain fields, alternative facilities would be available for temporal:ruse.
2. pireot ContiOutione of Air Transnort Eouinment to the Eciagage
Poten,ial for vgr of the USSR.
Nast Germany has no air transport fleet and makes no direct
contribution of air transport equipment to the Soviet economic potential for war.
3. liebable Deyelpqments.
It is wilikely that the USSR will permit East Germany to organise
air transport services.
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1?PArtefet
rm.. Our -.rent Allocation of ponasic Resources.
Invelskant and Props:Aim
The Satellite pattern of emphasis on industrial development is apparent
in plans for Nast Germany. the Five Yearn= (1951.45) contemplates an
average annual investment in industry of DM 3.6 billion an increase of
38 percent over 1936 levels: The planned level of inve:tment is more
significant in view of the fact that East Germany already is highly
industrialised.
Investment and production are largest in the engineering industry,
particularly in heavy machinery. Deconstruction of 24 machinery manu-
facturing plants cruoial to the success of the Plan is scheduled to take
place by 1953.
In 1950, Soviet takings arcuated to about 30 percent of the East German
national product.
2. Agdagassajszalgasa.
Agricultural development has emu& lower priority than does industry
in the East German scheme of economic planning. Altatouit agrioultural
production is scheduled to rise, the main economic effort is to Increase
Industrial production.
30 21ti14uadammiddas
Civilian consumption In /kat Germany is still below the 1936 level
despite postwar increases in living standards. The allocation of textiles,
food, and other consumer items, however, demonstrates that civilian consunpo
tion is given a relatively:low priority. Plans for the production of
consumer goods do not envision basic increases in living levels before the
end of 1952.
40
do
.loodoi-?7o
? t .;
? 41^V.
The Soviet Soviet Union receives directly from East Germany approximately
billiortworth of uncompensated goods and service a year. Uncompensated
deliveries include direct support of a Soviet military occupation force of
approximately 300,000 troops. More important, hove'-3r, are the shipments of
industrial goods to the USSR. SAG plants account far 44percent of these
shipments; publiosiowned factories939 percent; and privately owned firms,
the remaining 17 percent.
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The chief items Ohipped under the reparatians program indlude
equipment for electrical installations and railroads; mining, metallurgical,
and metalworking equipment; and ships and marine equipment. Industrial
ray materials do not bulk large in East German deliveries to the Soviet
Union. Urania!' is the one ray material of importance obtained by the
USSR, East Geresq, 64PPIYing 45 peroent of the total available to the
Soviet Bloc.
East Germany's commercial exports to the USSR ware waned at an
estimated $369 million In 1950 and were composed of the same types of
commodities as those delivered as reparations.
te. Bribable Shimmed! of Manufactures amitiaterials in 1954.
It is probable that experts from .at Germany to the .Soviet Union
will remain about the same in quantity end copposition tbroudh 1952. The
at German ecenoilo program is primarily designed to reduce dependence
won noneBlac countries by inoreasing the volume and range of industrial
,olitput. By the end of the Five Year Flan period, it ie probable that
the compositiOn of exports to the SovietUnionvill have dhanged because
healiy industryiwill have achieved fullsscale production. An important
current detelopment lathe manufacture by East German industry of aUbstantial
quantitiee or armament components for shipment to the USSR, including parts
for tanks, submarines, and aircraft.
a. Other GontrIbiatiggn.
East Germany, along with Czechoslovakia,. Is assuming an important
position in the development of the Satellite area as an industrial complex.
It is providizig industrial equipaent and materials required for development
of the other Satellites and will proVide more in the future. This relation..
ship is reflected in the recent large $110288438 in trade between East Germany
wad the other SatelLttei.
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U. yarkimeted Became of Vulnerability to Western Econoutp Wartime
1. ihdas-impockso
Thirtywthree percent of rest Oman imports by value, in 1950 were
from the USSR; 43 percent from the other Satellites; 16 percent, from
West Germany; and 8 perce4, from other Western European ecuntries and
the rest of the weld. Although important items are Imported from
Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland, and the Netherlands, it is estimated that
they are not absolutely essential to the East German economy.
East Germany's legal imports ftan Ueert Germany ware valued at about
$75 million in both 1949 and 2950, but, as &proportion of total imports,
they declined from 26 to 16 percent. Clandestine imports from the same
area aeount to possibly three times the legal imports? These clandeetine
imports are believed tote composed largely of iron and steel products,
bearings and machine tools. Attainment of planned goals will continue
to requIle Imports from Weft Germany of commoditione which Eaet Germany
either cannob:ret manufacture or cannot attain in sufficient quantity from
within the Bloc.
2. Decree of Vulnerability of Na.i9r Seatore of pa poonaarrf,
East Germany is vulnerable to Western economic warfare in two ways.
First, the maintenance present production levels depends upon obtaining
metalworking maohinery and replacement parts from the West. Second, the
achievement of increases in output, as outlined In the Five Tear Plano
likewise depends upon the proourement of imports from the West.
Heavy industry in East Germany is directly vulnerable to Western 000UOMIO
warfare because of its reliance on Went Gamow for imports ofeomponent
parts, particular types of specialised machine tools, bade steel products,
and high-grade alloys. The chemical Industries are still highly dependent
upon Western sources for caustics, sulphur, and pyrites. East Germany must
import caustics from the West because of the shortage in the entire Soviet
Bloc. Nowt of these imparts cone from Sweden and the Netherlands. An
inadequate supply of caustic soda would affect such industries as rayon
and cellulose, soap, dyestuffs and Intermediates, and other heavy chemical
industries. East Germany possibly would be selNeufficient in sulphur
and pyrites if reparations dhipments to the Soviet Union were discontinued,
Shortages caused by continuing reparations Shipments, however, have famed
many plants to curtail operations, and the Soviet Bloc has not been able to
supply the sulphur and pyrites necessary to make up the difference?
The expansion of production in accordance with the Five Tear Plan is
vulnerable to measures of economic warfare affecting electric power, coal,
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and manpower? Eleetric power is short despite the existence of a highly
integrated and efficient network. Roundwtheoelock and multishift opera..
time have been instituted fair Maxima utilisation of present capacitr*
Without impOrts of parts and new equipment Pram Western countries, however,
it will be difficult for East Germany to increase either total operating
capacity or actual power production.
Dizeetay related to the electric power problem is that of coal, which'
is virtnaLly the sole energy eource used in power generation, East -
Germagy faces a bituminous coal shortage, whit:hit is attempting to offset
by extenolve use of 'brown coal, No sector of the economy has mm's 'than a
2 weeks, oupgy of coal on hand, and inmost inetanceo reserves, are
sufficient far less than 1 week, The machinery and equipment nownsed ape
old and are in constant need of repair, and considerable effort is being
expended on the development of a mining equipment industry. 'Efforts to
increase production through use of more labor are not effective in, brown
coal mining operations, which utilize heavy excavating equipment. Additional
labor is not mach more effective in stepping up the output of hitominOngs coal,
because the narrow, steep Shafts will not permit dimultanedus employment of
nem miners. Fhrtgermore? some of the tools and equipment are made of ooft
steels and in some cases are hardly useful even for hand mininge
Manpower in East Germany presents a, unique problem. On the, one hand, "
population transfers and materials Ohortageo have created an unemployment
problem. On the other hand* given sufficient materials and facilities,
there probably will be a manpower shortage as the Five Year Plan gains -
momentum became of the excess of deaths and defections Over births, In
addition, there is a specific shortage of technical and skilled, personnel,
Although efforts have been made to overcome this lack through training
programs, defections to West Gomm., if they continue at the current rate,
possibly viii offset agr gains. Time there are two vulnerabilities 1z the
manpower situations (1) the discontent and unrest whiCh arise frOm =employ.-
ment; Which can be enhenced by a. l!estern economie warfare program designed to
perpetuate present dhortageo of equipment and msterialo, and (2) Continued amd
possibly increased defection to the West, parttmularly of teehnical and'skillei
peroonnet,
Transportation le not critically venerable to Western measures of
economic warfare. 'lost Shortages of transport equipment ani oupp1il6s vlieh
now exist reoult from the heavy reparations burden on the transportation
equipment industry and mot from limited domestio produotion,
Agriculture does not represent a, vulnerability), because the Soviet Bloc
is able to make up any East German agricultural deficit,
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3* 9?llatina 14easualisattig& etern BOonomic warfare.
The possibility that the offsets efWestern export restrictions could
be offset *rot& an increase of intra4lec trade is not great* In. 3.950 a
mijor effort as made to reduce all trade with nonZloo souroes to an
rbsolute minims, thus limiting Anther adjustment through this medinew
ire, of 00t11`130. some steps which could be taken, such as the alleviaw
tion of a coal shortage by the diversion of Polish ?cal now sent to Western
Europe* Such adjustments, however, probably would not solve all the problems
created Itr large-scale Western economic warfare*
The most important adjusitment possible would be a reduotion by the Soviet
Union of its unturapensated taldnge from East Germany* Such action would
.release to domestic induatry machinery and materials necessary to achieve
the Five Year .an goals* There also is rocs for internal adjustient in
the East German econcar. lafficulties of suoh adjustment, however, are
evidenced by the continuing unemployment problem, which further shortages
of equipment and supplies timid accentuate*
Operations in the most critical segtore Of the soonour? however, probahlr
could be maintained despite Western etionctoic warfare measures* The consumer
goods industries have some capacity which could he diverted to heavy indtuotry*
Production in less important industries could be out back to make more Implies
available* Ex:oept for those items imported from West Germany, the WM of
substitutes cannot be developed mach further, since the entire inanctrial
doveloPment of Clormanr in the 193010 and during the war vas dlr.:Asa toward
self-eufficienay*
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I.adiluationa of Preparttions far War.
The basic emphasis on heavy indwitry in the current Five Tsar Plan in
East Gsrmazar involves an expanzion of those industries capable of contributing
directly or indireotly to arms produotion. The types and quantities of
produeerst goods called for by the Plan are similar to those of 1944, the year
of peak production during the ware
There are, hovever, few indioations of immediate preparations for var.
There is no evidence of a mobilization of manpower or transport facilities
on a wartime basis or of &dispersal of induetriese Same indioations do
exist, homer, which point to a preparation for war, sudh as the stockpiling
of foods, including grain awl neat. These stockpiles are sdheduled for
further expansion. Stockpiles of petroleum products almost completely fill
the available storage space of about 1 minion metric tons. A stookpile of
rubber also is being ammailated.? The USSR is preserving the underground
factories built by. the Germans. The production of war materiel has increased.
Although no completed weapons are believed to be produced, component parts
for small arms and heavy weapons, including tanks, railroad guns, submarines,
and aircraft, as well as exploaivee and ammunition, are made. Part and
shipping facilities and the airfield network, which is under complete Soviet
military control, are being expanded.
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APPENDIX A
RECAPITULATION OF LIMITATIONS, DEFICIENCIES,
AND REQUIREMENTS OF INTELLIGENCE
Sections /II, VIII, IX, and X do not have material
to be included in this Appendix.
I. Trends in the Structure of the Economy.
Information gaps uncovered in this study include the following:
1. Up-to-date organizational details of the planning bodies (especially
on interlediate levels), together with detailei descriptions of their func..
tions and methods.
2. Information on the intricacies of East German statistical systems.
US RICOG reported some information on this subject, but it was incomplete,
while CIA/080 reports have contained little if anything on the subject.
3. Informatton on the chin of command in the various economic ministries.
Changes in these ministries occur frequently, and timely reporting would be
helpful. Poor reporting is most noticeable in the coverage of intermediate-
level agencies.
4. Information on the attempts to create artisan and handicraft cooper-
atives. Vague reports of such action, have been hinted at for soma time, but
specific details are lacking.
5. Information on the "Center of Industrial Requirements," located at
Rostock. Detailel descriptions of this center's function the manner
of implementing its program, its relation to the State Punning Commission,
its methods of operation, and its operating personnel would be helpful in
assessing its importance.
6. Information on Berlin' n unique status in East Germany. It appears
that special plans are drawn up for Berlin industry and that Berlin is regarded
as distinct from East Germany by the USSR. Information bearing on this dia.
Unction would be helpful.
II. Capacity of RumanBesources for Economic Development,.
The East German censuses in 1946 and 1950 and other vital statistics provide
population estimates. Future information concerning vital statistics and
migration will be necessary to keep population estimates up-to-date and to per-
mit estimates of possible changes in the labor force. The employment statistics
available do not provide sufficient details of industrial distribution. Ibre
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information will be necessary for the study of the recruitment. and training of
young people and women. The uncertainty of the part allotted the Soviet Sector
of Berlin in the Five Year Plan is a major gap in information. Further infortp
ation concerning productivity and the progress and content of training Programs
also would, be desirable.
IV. FOreii Trade and Finance
Additional information which would shed further light on the commodity
composition of trade as compassed vith specific goals for various commodities
is fragmentary, and much of these ,fragments are in German. The tasks of
translation, tabulation, and comparison alone would require 3 or 4 additional
weeks of full-time work. This information 'would, be valuable, but it is not
believed that it would change. the basic picture presented in this report.
Over-all information on-Ehst.German foreian trade is becoming increasingly
scarce. In 1949, SO pablished.detailed reports on East Germany's foreign trade
by ommrtry and commodity for 6 months, 10 months, and the complete year. No
such reports have been available for 1950. Monthly reports summarizing imports
and exports (contract* in the flase.of the USSR) are available for the months
of january through September 1950. No such report for any later date is
available. Since then, reports. have been received showing the debits and
credits in trade balauce.aocountS, with the status of each account as of the
end of the month. Such reverte ate available for the months from November
1950 thrmighjanuary 1951, and, although these give no informations* to the
commodity composition of trade, they at least indicate the level of imports
and exports and the balance in Nast German trade accounts with various countries.
No comparable report has been received covering any month since January 1951,
however, and it is not known whether or not such information will be available..
Since such information is essential for an accurate picture of East German
foreign trade. every effort should be made to obtain data, of the type formerly
received, on actual imports and exports, by commodity as well as by country.
Attempts should also be made in West Germany to Obtain further details on German
interzonal trade, both overt and covert. Other Western countries should mate
available data concerning their trade with East Germany. While some countries
began publishing midis statistics In 1951, France and the US still do not follow
this practice. The UK atarbelipUblishing the total volume of trade with East
Germany in January 1951 but without breakdowns by commodities. ln particular,
details are needed concerning strategic commodities which are known to be going
to &18t Germany.
Niels remains to be done in exploiting all the available information on
uncompensated deliveries. There exists a large amount of information relating
to East German uncompensated deliveries in the form of reparations, to SAG
production, and. to the investment plan. Much of that material is in German
end has not been translated. time limitations did not permit full analyses
of the investment part, and only the categories connected with reparations
and SAG operations were examined. Further study on this subject should be
made, and all the available information should be assembled.
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, The probable error in the estimate of the value of East German uncompensated
deliveriee.from 1948 to 1952 may be between 25 and 35 percent because of.diffi-
culties in determining, current production costs in East Germany and the price
structure of the products delivered to the USSR.
V. Agriculture.
Abundant prewar German itatistics and other published sources of information
on East Germany are available in Washington, but much work remains to be done
to clarify details. Knowledge Of this material is essential as a background for
=analysis of the relationships among production, domestic requirements, and
surpluses or deficits and for an appraisal of their effects on the economic
potential of the country and of the Soviet Bloc.
The chief gaps of current information are in the fields of import, export,
and regional trade. Captured German documents, SO reports; defector reports, and
foreign news itemal although indispensable sources of information, usually pro-
vide only incomplete information. The appraisals: Blade by the Office of Foreign
Agricultural Relations of the State Department and by the Department of Commerce
sr" useful but sometimes inadequate.
VI. Industrial Capacity and Levels of Production.
A. Ferrous Metals.
information from East Germany was quite comprehensive until 1950 but
has been inadequate since that time. Material is needed on the following:
1. Output of pig iron, raw steel, and-rolled products in 1950.
2. Estimated. production in 1951-52L', ?
3. Progress of expansion of individual existing plants and of
new plants under conatruction.
I. Requirements for raw materials.
5. Consumption of raw materials.
o. Import and export trade in raw materials and rolled products.
B. Nonferrous Metals.
le 2022E.
Inibrmation is lacking on the following:
a. Domestic requirements.
b. Stockpiles.
c. Imports planned in 1951 and imports in 1950, with countries
of origin.
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d. Annual production, grade of ore, and mining methods and
conditions at the Sangerhausen mine.
e. Recent plant expansion.
f. Production capacities.
2. Lead and Zinc.
Information is lacking on the following:
of origin
*. Domestic requirements.
b. Stockpiles.
C. Imports planned in 1951 and imports:in 1950; with. countries
d. Rated capacity of the new zinc Smelters at Freiberg.
e. Zinc mines and production.
f. Recent plant expansion.
g. Production capacities.
#. Ore reserves of lead and zinc.
3. kluMinum.
Information isleektngon the following:
a. Requirements and consumption pattern.
b. Availability of technical personnel.
c. Plant capacities.
d. Plans for rehabilitation of aluminum plants other than
Bitterfeld.
C. Coal.
The following information is requested:
1. Total production and output of individual nines in 1950 and plans
for 1951.
2. Data on the distribution of bituminous coal, brown coal briquettes,
dna brown coal coke to the major categories of consumers in 1950 end Tia r
1951.
3. Data on imports and exports, by countries, of coal and coke
during 1949 and 1950 and the 1951 trade plan.
4. Information on machinery and. equipment requirements in the coal
industry.
D. Petroleum.
Further information is needed on the following:
1. Stockpiles by location, product, and quantity.
2. Quantity, type, and destination of exports.
1a3
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4.
in planned
5-
6.
7.
8.
9.
materials.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Shifts in production schedules.
Consumption by consumer, quantity, and product, including changes
allocations.
Expansion of refineries.
Pismantling or shifting of equipment.
Plant security measures.
Construction and expansion of storage depots.
Indications and causes of shortages of petroleum producti and raw
E. Electric Power.
Information on the electric power industry. of Eastliermany has been
plentiful as compared with the reporting on other Satellites. The absence of
the usual vide gaps in data concerning the condition of the equipment, consump-
tion of electric power, and input requirements permits a fairly accurate
measure of the net contribution of the industry to the economic potential of
the Soviet Bloc.
SO reporting has been skillful and concise. Official German documents
translated by FDD have given considerable accurate information. The lack of
time to exploit all the information available to CIA has been the most important
factor limiting the completeness of research.
F. Chemical.a.
1? -1COILEJletir
Although intelligence coverage of chemical plants in East Germany
was good up to m14-1950, inforMation available to this office after that time
has been decreasing. Details on plant equipment instaLlations Pad Current'
capacities are desired, as are total production figures for the various heavy
chemicals produced in 1950. Reports of this pature previously were available
from G-2, but little information has been received from this source lately.
2. Sulphur and. Pyrites.
Little reliable inforbation on East German production of and trade
in sulphur and pyrites is availdble. The existing world shortage of sulphur
and the anticipatel shortage in pyrites make procurement of such information
increasingly important, since the Satellites are to large part dependent on
the West for supplies of these materials.
3. Rubber.
The major deficiency in information on the East German rubber in-
dustry is in data on foreign trade, especially on shipments of synthetic
rubber as reparations and as exports to the USSR and the Satellite countries.
184
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eaee on preeuAlon of rubber ehemizals, types end extent of productiee,aed
plare Installations and. loeetien %leo are needed. Additional information on
eeliee?eal rubber faerleating plants, especielly tire installations, is
eeret,
'eeneral.
eeze syallatle for the preparation of this paper was not sufficient
oeroplete eealuatiou of tbe more than 2,200 documeats eovering 700 main
it Utese induStrIes. Ou1t .ocuaenta In the CIA Librare were used. ER
:ottelted, einee overeall rather than Individual plant production
- etre eantet.
eftee eocumonts re 0 to enclosures, vhich generelly were photo-
.I., tepee copies or text in German. The were few FDD translatioas on
thee :_ne.stre, and thcoe ueually eere abstracta from which statistics were
omettee ana tnere:ore of little value.
Moot enceosurea were not in the CIA files and had be rrowed
ee or G-2. Oa one rue* e for en 30 document, there on, eeks'
eettiog eae eoommento
Mane reports relattne to production tallest Germany are ambiguous,
Le that the. do not elearie state what part. oe tbe proauction is included tr.
the report (I) as to eateeories of products and (2) US to administrative mentions
ef the ,..eluisere (eetreie-VVB4, SAG, private).
eeme reports did not show up on the int:el.:terse run, and there vas
teeeing zertain documeate not in the Library,:
12. craft?
?
The reports wed in this paper are not generally reliable, being
eeeje.c to errere ea interpretation awl translation. The tendency for eources
te teel weet Information is most lieely to be in highest demand at the moment
-le another weeeneaa, and repores frem different sources frequently duplicate 25X1X7
esee ether with aniy minor perapbresing. There is a noticeable lack of
leel_ele_ tetheica eoservers, either defectors
4he eraa eota.n the essential information abeut arcetle!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1,11
it is etvieue that lietle 'are is used in interrogations. For
:.he person who wrote one report stated that the defector was stupid,
ereiterne, "had the shakes," etc., and then prepared several pages of inform-
ation which would indicate the opposite. In these Lnterrogations there is
arm, wen. .r.a.
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generally little emphasis on the aircraft industry, and evidence indicates
that the technique of asking leading questions is prevalent among interrogetors
seeking information on aircraft or aircreft parts manufacturing.
13. Shipbuilding.
The material in this paper was attained solely from reports in the
CIA Library, of which no more than 50 percent could. be studied. Because of
lack of time, facilities in individual yards were not analyzed in order to
exploit more completely the general reports on production and capacity. Never-,
tholes* since many of the statistics set forth herein were obtained from
official ministerial documents of the German Democratic Republic, it is believed
that a fairly accurate estimate of East German shipbuilding is presented. A
plant-by-plant study is planned which should confirm the conclusions.
H. Ural:
0.12311.
OSI has a large volume of information on the uranium resources of Bast
Germany, but little of this material is now available in this branch. An
accurate picture of the real shortages in this field will be known only when
a complete surVey of the material in the Special Commodity files and in OBI
has been made.
VII. Transportation.
A. Railroads.
The quality and quantity of information received on Nast Germany's
railroads is far superior to that available for any other Satellite. Coverage
on facilities, equipment, traffic, an& plans is excellent. In same cases the
information is almost as comprehensive as that available to Herr Kreikemeyer
himself, the DR's Director General.
Although information received on traffic is voluminous, it requires some
clarification. It is not always stated whether traffic reported is total Soviet.
Interest traffic, Soviet military traffic only, East German reparations traffic,
Nast German-Polish traffic, or total traffic. Nor is it always clear whether
coverage is on an 8-hour, dwwn-till-dark, or 24-hour basis. In some cases it
is uncertain whether a given report describes scheduled traffic only or traffic
actually observed, including nonscheduled and Soviet military traffic.
B. Highways.
The major deficiency in intelligence information on East German highway
transport is the lack of detailed data concerning all aspects of highway traffic.
Highway transport is employed by numerous segments of the national econoMY,
such as agriculture, industry, the military, commerce, and government. The
total vehicle park, including both motor vehicles and animal.drawn equipment,
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is distributed according to the requirements of these various interests for
road transport service. In order to estimate accurately the over-all capability
and economic vulnerability of East German highway transport, the allocation
pattern of vehicles and the nature and quantity of all types of highwely traffic
movements must be known.
C. Water Transport.
- Intelligente on East German water transport is deficient in several
respects. Detailed information is lacking on +he nature and extent of traffic,
legal and clandestine, vith?theWest,'Es vell as with the Bloc. The capecities
of inland ports, water routes, and tho.oeeen fleet are not sufficiently knovi.
Data on equipment inventories are inadequate, and more details on the types snd
tonnages of vessels in each area of operation sire needed.
' D.
Continued reporting on the cobdttimanause ok East German airfields
is desired., togethpr with accurate infOrmation on the types and quality of
airfield eqUipment installed or planned. Evidence of stepped-up 'nonmilitary
air freight operations between. Last Germany and the Soviet Bloc would be signi-
finant. This should be reported promptly, together with the name of the airline
or airlinee congluating this traffic and. the extent and nature of the freight
carried.
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APPENDU B
moons Ali MRCSS*
Sections, Vo =It IX, and 3t do nob have
material to be included in this Appendix.
I. Trends in the Structure of the Economy..
? 1.
2.
3-
5.
b.
7. Mib330G R & A Report 4, op. cit.
25X1A2g 113:CM 3.5 Feb 1951.
10. Encl. I, p.5, 30 Mar 1951 (East Gerson farmer
cultural 1ith1b
State 0Th Rpt. 5330.19, 5 Apr 1951.
=COG, Frankfurt Cable 90501 U Nat 1951.
=COG, Eastern Elesent, Berlin, D..01, 10 Aug 1950.
COVE:COG, & Rpt. 4, 13 Apr 1950.
State Biographic Sketch 10, 6 Dec 1950.
25X1A2g 1.1.?
121 _Army 7707 EC30.,,BerUn, R-E 139-50, 28 Aug 1950.
13. State`Blographic Sketch 10, op. cit.
14. State OIR Rpt. 5230, 24 May 3.950.
15. RICOG, Frankfurt, D.2669, 16 Feb 1951.
16. FBIS, 2 Nay 1951 ("Informationsbuero West; refugee press association).
17. (Amy) 10, EUCCS4, Apt. R-E-29-51, 9 Jan 1951.
18. BICOG, Eastern Element, Berlin, D.301, 13 Nov 1950.
19, RICOG, Eastern Element, Berlin, D.507, 3. Feb 1931.
20. MOOG, Berlin, D.665, xt Her 1951 (based on survey ammeg East Gerson
farmers visiting West Berlin Agricultural Exhibit).
21. ECM, Frankfurt, D.1445, 1 Nov 1950.
22. MOOG, Eastern Element, Berlin, D.343, 5 Dec 1930.
23. State on Rpt. 5230, op. cit.
24. Ibid.
BM
25
25X1A2g 26. .
27. ?ir ID, PVCOM, apt. 114-139-50, 7 Sep 1950.
28. tArnrj ID, =CU, Rpt. R-E-109-51, 1 Feb 1951..)
29. State 03B, Rpt. 5202, 7 AM 1950-
30. OI/NICOG, Frankfurt, D.1157, 21 Zun 1950.
31. MOOG, Eastern Element, Berlin, D.669, 30 Mar 1951.
3.88.
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Capacity of Iknoan Redources for Economic Development.
1.
2.
3.
5.
6.
7.
25X1A2g 8.
9.
25X1A2g 12:
25X1A2g32.
13.
14.
25X1A2g 13:
25X1A2g
19.
20.
2X1A2g
23.
24.
1939 and 1946 Censuses (1951 figures projected by esitimating the
excess of deaths over births and the net migration).
FB1S, 2 Dec 1949.
FD20, 16 liar 1951.
BICOG Berlin 555, 20 Feb 1951. 25X1A2g
Rounded frau the sun of dependent agricultural 10111111111111
27 Jim 195o, and independent agricultural workers, CIA
372539, 5 Oct 1949. 25X1A2g
Ibid.
TOO figure plus increase in FBIS, 18 Aug 1950.
rounded to include independent workers
and artisans.
Prom incre:asp!nl: !Ipa.n:b!.:121C0 Berliti485, CfA: 561108, 23 Jan 1951.
12p. cit.
PB, 20 Ayr 1930.
FMB, 19 Jan 1950. 25X1A2g
COG Berlin 18 CIA 56=8
CU 3161361; ilagIMM among others.
Joint 1,ks, 61 19 Bay 19119.
CU 609621, 30 Kw 1951.
FMB, 29 Nov 1930.
=COG, Berlin 1472, 8 Jim 1951.
COG Berlin555, .
, 1 1 .
EMS, 8 Jun 1949.
III. Living and Working Conditions.
1. OIR..5444 (P7), 22 JIM 1951, "The Economic Situation and Prospects of
Bast Germany," 1951.
IV. Foreign Trade and. Finance.
1.
3.
25X1A2g
25X1A2g
num Berlin 260 24 Jul 1950.
trade report. and contracts for Jan-8
25X1A2g
published by Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
and Switzerland; West Gexman statistics
- 189 -
S
ports for NtmDec 1950 in
trade statistics
the Netheili4ds, NOrway, Sweden,
on interzanaltrade, which
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25X1A2g
4.
5.
25X1A2g 6.
7.
13.
9.
10.
13..
32.
25X1A2g 13.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21,
25X1Aig.
23.
24$
25X1A2g 25,
26.
27.
25X1A2g 2a.
29.
30.
25X1A2g
25X1A2g
25X1A2g
25X1A2g
31.
32.
33.
34.
36.
37.
3a.
provide basis for estimates of East German trade with lrance, Italy,
the US, the UK, and Yugoslavia, which do not publish a breakdown,
between Bast and West German trade.
21 Feb 1950.
16 Dec 1949.
BAB 2 1950lin
Ibid.
urg DPA broadcast, 25 Nov 1950.
See notes 1, 2, and 3.
xbia.
En Berlin Des
. 123, 5 Sep 1950-
1 Sep 1950.
es notes 1, 2, and 3.
Ibid.
14 Maar 1951.
Ar Maformauli ation 23 Jan 1950$
Chicago Dal)j Nava, 2 Nov 194a.
25X1A2
On 4792, 3.5 Nov 1948,
for April through Decembor 1949,
"SoViot Zone Budget
State Deep. 744, Berlin* 20 Ain 19490
Vlb Industrt4 Canacitv and Levels of ProtRitioni,
A. POITOUB
Sources:
25X1A2g
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25X1 A2g
25X1 A2g
25X1 A2g
16.
17,
18-
19.
21.
22.
23u
24,
25,
26,
27,
28.
29.
30,
31.
25X1 A2g
FDB-
U261
....I.. 11
49, lit,
2'
FD130 U-241/49, /42, a-E 277-5c, tiu,
HICOGy D 736, 20 Apr 1951,
NIMMENIM
FDE, 11,-261/49p
Fr, girmtmpL-A,,,
2. tUaL-Aad-EXX1&24,
25X1 A2g
25X1 A2g
25X1 A2g
25X1 A2g
25X1 A2g
1. Numerous Sc) and G-2 :worts,
2.
3, ID EUCOliv !?.E 3(1?-44.0 27 Oct
5.
7.
8.
9.
10.
no
12.
13u
14.
15.)
16.
/7.
18.
19.
20,
1950.
D =Oil RE 369-40, al? At,
ID EUCal4
ID EZCO!.!
ID EUCOU4
529560 20 Sep 1930.
.iE369.40, 2E, all.
RE 369-0, 22: C1t
22. ID EUCOM, RE 260-50, 12,
23. Compiled from official statintics of non-Soviet producing coUntrice
and from rortiorous SO.port on orbit producing countries. -
24, pp EITC0/1.
25X1 A2g 25.
25X1 A2g
193 -
. CIA-RDP79R01012A000900030001-7
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? 2,44-11.11.4.
17. CNC 221448 11 Jun 1948.
25X1A2g'
20.
25X1A2g
ZL. CHOtimaiimaik. Dec
25X1A2g 24.
23. ONO 2230.1
25.
26.
25X1A2g
27.
28.
29.
25X1A2g
25X1A2g
25X1A2g
G.,
30.
31.
State Dept., Berlin 473. 18 Apr 1949; R.T..162-51, 15 Feb 1951.
Estimated on available data on exports end planned exports of
etiVromrdirubber atitral rubber.
25X1A2g
Dept., Berlin 473, =4 al? Ale
teille the basis of export plan for eynthetic rubber
State Dept.. Berlin 17365. 14 Dec 191.8.
going to USSR, Czeohosloveicia, and Poland. MMM, 25X1A2g
8 Mezr 1951.
1950. ' 25X1 A2
32. 0110 2854-49. 1 Dec 1949.25X1A2
33, ;ndia Rubber W04d, . ,gits;
34, State Dept., Berlin 4285, 5 Apr 0
35, State Dept., Berlin 17365 14 Dec 1
13 Sep 1950;
36. 144 RubberItorldp 220
37. State Dept., 1736 14 Dec 1948;
13 Sep 1950; MM.' 20 Feb 1950;
38. Rabbets ilorld, RD* au.
3,0 emit 1 Enainserins Nen, gay AI.,
19
25X1A2
and other mimes.
0110aSi.
1.
25X1A2g
banal.
1.
2. CIA 3782701 Oct 1949 OM 4792. Nov
3.
4.
5,
6.
FDD
Oot 1949.
25X1A2g
FDD
26 Oct 1949,
25X1A2g
25X1A2g
7. =go
8. H1COG 2600
- 195 -
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9. MOOG .84 Aug 1950.
10. .; 11100G 260. 22., az,
3.3.?
12. 25X1A2g
ve,.
13. Eatirited
25X1A2g 140 reent of 1950, HICOG 448b
15. ITA.ro eat 14 Jun 1945.
25X1A2g
16.
17. OIR 5202i Aug 1950. 25)162116..
164 on 5202 1930;
25X1A2g 34.
22.
23.
210 1110 81 IIICOG 448, Jan 1951; IrL000 7014 Apr 1951.
20 212112.09.292111.
25X1A2g
10
2. USSR Radio 13roadcaat Vol. III Uo. 4.
25X1A2g 34.0
25X1A2g
30 limy Megidnem
25X1A2g i.NUMMI.
2.
25X1A2g
25X1A2g
36
4.
5, Section on F=01.13 Metals
6.
25X1A2g
7. MOOG 744 1951.
g.
9.
LOo
110
I ?
25X1A2g
25X1A2g
25X1A2g
4. Donitroteohnical Bouireent.
1.
2.
3. MOOG 260 Oat 1' 9.
25X1A2g ifro
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25X1A2g
25X1A2g. iriC?G
. An 1950
9.
7. H1COG 23, Jul 1949
25X1A2g
10.
U.
2441, my 3.951.
5. Traot(vi.
25)(6...
1.
2 HICOG
25X1A2g 3 . .
6. Arrxieultural litehiaersr.
17. Railroed,_Esmipment.
25X1A2g
1.
25X1A2g .
3. State aram. Dee 19500
4 mumminum
25X1A2g 5. MEM ICF 11303 1950.
25X1X7 fh
6.
25X1A2g a,
9, State A..1711 Dec 1950.
10.
11,
12.
25X1A2g 33.
240
15.
16,,
8. jutcootive Eauinment. ?
1.
2.
3.
25X1A2g 4.
5.
6.
7.
-197..
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grgr2r&-Z-2
25X1A2g
25X1A2g
Aat4fricticmDcar1nn4
le
2.
3.
44 00MNAVFORpER, CIA 520882, Sep 1950.
10. 1ad2,15ttikd Optical Baal:mut.
2. H1COG 260 Oct 1949.
3o 25X1A2g
4.
5.
60
7.
a.
25X1A2g
25X1A2g
Alizasa?
&Juni"'
14, Alssema.
324.344, Ono Mar 1951.
15. General Ilacbinarr,
VII. Trananortatiou,
A. Eigilask.
B.
25X1X7
25X1A2g
198
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144-11-1-1
32. OM 63-51, 17 Fob 3.951 (naval Attache Derlino from verPrue
German nationals).
13, ft,
Gable Series No, 632, 7 War 190.?
D. Air Txt.
le 1,8A1/0/14 "Msfielde and Seaplane Stations of the World.*
1 I 1
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roved For Release 1999/09/27 :.CIA-RDP79R01012A000900030001-7