OIR/DRF CONTRIBUTION TO NIE-32: THE COMMUNIST MILITARY POSITION IN KOREA AND ITS EFFECT ON SINO-SOVIET COURSES OF ACTION IN THE FAR EAST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A000800050023-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 12, 2000
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: March 6, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

a
Approved For Reese 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79R94912A0
Copy Ich ECTZT
25X1A9a
OIR/DPF COBTITIYANION TO NIE..32:
Trz annumsT mum= ma'am IN EDBEA
An ITS Nilji1iffil-SDEZ-Vcdeirreirleff
ICE THE xnel-
V.1., 4..."..=11.,....,..1111,1m312.2.?
March 6s 2951
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
Dr:PAM= OF STATE
OFFICE OF IBTEITIGENCE Emma
Divlolon o2 Pascorch for For East
_ .
Review of this document by CIA has
SITCP317 determined that
ele CIA has no ohlection to declass
Dr
It contains information of CIA
Interest that mutt remain
classified at TS S C
Authority: Hit 70-2
1:1 It contains ne hing of CIA Inter st
Cali Reviewer
Approved For Release 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79R01012A000800050023-2
? Approved For Reese 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79RW12A000800050023-2
S3T,CREE
9-Fe32:- TM C IRIMY7 POSITION IN KOREA AND rrs
EFAM: C S linhtWiET760bBSTS 077A-CriarWMIE FAR FAST
? ? ?
11. TO liaT nand.' EMS 1ZO1EAN CAMPAIGN AFFECTFD COMM=
Iaj )fi dtIV.PAZIWITMS '114-2WW.B EAST=
A. Neve Chimp, ena Koreem lessee to dete been sue that the
4. Nav have strnined or dieelipted the domestic eccnotChina?
The Chinese CemennSete heve to date been able to support their
military effort in Korea elthout seriouelyelderupting the Chinese ecenomy.
Prices have been hold relatively etable and vith few exoeptione supplies
of essential coneteeere cocas atypear to have been adequate to meet reqniree
vents, ApTerently, the Chineeo CcEleuniste have been able to finance the
cents of their Korean TeLture t1non3h the postponement of reconstraction
expendituree and threuf;h n Increace in revenues made possible by the
favorable 1950 crape, the enleeted tax base, and acme increave In tax
rates; Moreover, the troops dispatched to Kora were largely foreee in
being, and it is peobable that the costs of mobilizing, equipping, and
training replace:male Lave net ns yet reached the neceseary levels to
replace military loseee,
In the. bo area of Mezehuria there is evidence that induetrial
output has declined orghtly end that the employment of large numbersof
civiliane in military erapportia3 operations has reduced eMplegment and
output in suoh winter oeoupations as lumtering, marketing, and hmting.
This lots of output,' hueover, is net likely to have eerious effects on
either the military effort or the local econemy.
B. Mould continued Chtneee-Kerean gerations inEcaoa on the =event scale
be likolyto
-------
4, Cause a skenificent drain on Somiet resources?
The continuance of the Kbroan campaign would very likely create an
increasing strain cla the Chino economy, It le probable that vithethe
eventual neceesity foe leegeeecele tempt; replacements military costa weeuld
rise considerably over prom:I-It lavela and that the continued. poetpciment
of reconstruction enonditures would begin to dielocate markets and
production and to reduce the capacity of the Chinese Ccumunists to mobilize
reeouroes.
The extension
szcrizr
Approved For Release 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79R01012A000800050023-2
Approved For Rase 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79R0j12A000800050023-2
ZZILIET 2
The omtennion of acti7o nilitary cperations into the Manchurian
frcat-f:ese seasca of 1K3y th=th. September -would have a serious effect
ea fain cutout in 1951 due to the withdrawal of agricultural labor and
draft animals for Pllita:2,7 nu7lort activities. A redaction of agricultural
cutout to the leveln of 1S?!:-7 and 19118 years of active civil war
fighting in Manchuria voula largely wipe out Manchuria's export surplunes
and would greatly reduce tLe lozourscs available to the Chinese Communiste
in 1952.
Despite theae conraldexations: the =neat) Communists emu probably
maintain the preeent rate of ex]?anditure of military reeources in Korea
for some time at the sacrifice of dmeetic reconstruction and welfare.
With subgtantial military reseirre forces in being which can be concentrated
and ova:ported. In the grain,.euxplus area of Manchuria and supplied with
Soviet materiel: it ie unlikely In the short run that economic pressures ?
will substantially affect the military capadities of the Chinese CoMmunists.
I:EI. MAT HAS MR TM EFFECT CF TEE =MN CAMPAIGN CE COVISMIST I1iTENTION5
SAM
TEEMasoasoca?a?
A, General Conpiderationp
It seems evident from military preparatices now underway in China
that the Cemmunists at this a:nature envisage at leapt continued military
operations in Korea and poseibly also expended military action elsewhere
in the 1# t.
The that fUture mftlitary operatiens might assume can be analyzed
In terms of three possible developments:
1. Continued Com:mist capacity for launching major offensives
In Korea;
2. Lees of capacity to launehMajor offensivee in Korea tut
continued Ccamunist ability to carry oa a war of attrition;
3. Reduction of Comaraniet strength to the point whore comp/ate
defeat in Korea becomes a distinct possibility.
14' InPgqqam)NPITPI-PPI:a1T/441-gmllillgUitioellianIVE WOlglres 1411 ;ram'
At the moment: the Communiete Probably have the capacity to launch
major offensives in Korea for the achievement of limited military objectives.
They probably believe: houovera that their strength in Korea lias lees in
their prospects fordlrect military victories than in their capacity to
absorb
Approved For Release 2001/03/%64-RDP79R01012A000800050023-2
Approved For Reipase 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79RW12A000800050023-2
to.aue 3
fte0110
abcorb ge.'eater loocon than corlai be endured by the UN command. andato
maintain a long d.ran out eee et raining UN colidarity and endurance.
The Soviet Union wou11 prol:o7Dly supply such additicnel materiel as *mad
be requind for an oeeration of athie type.
It is probeble that lc-I-tellies has given thought to offensive MVOS
ag&illat I.ocktna, Teleani. Honetong, and. poesibler other places in the
Far East as a mane of 0.iveztirg UN strength from the Korean fighting.
Et:mover, Chineee Camaaele.e intentiaas with respect to other offensive
ravels in the Far at in any event, pr.Ohably be determineel primarily
in the light of footers other than the needs of the Ccargunist military
oampaign in Korea.
Winery operations against UN forces In Korea weld not preclude
Pei-p?Inee eirealtaneoue reeatiolpation in discussions perhaps c&2'
initiated., of peaceful ecAtlereent. The Chinese Ccoramiet aim in such
negotiaticns would. peotably not be the conclusion of a political settlement,
bnt rather the creation of a:334.112Ch. discord among the UN allies as possible.
Ca 2J !!'(L T?Ce, 0-7 Coyerniert Cepacyll to Launch Ononsive
If Pei-puing -and Ho:3cmi felt that the Chinese Cow:mists Imere no
longer capable of launching -Purther major offensives in Kama it le than
likely that they would. engage in a war of attritiOn in the hope that the
elusiviees of a clear-cut Yiethry over the Chinese and. Korean Canandet
troops would sap the morale 02 the UN troops and gradually Improve Coretztalat
nilitei fortunee In Korea, while sizsultaneciuely the Conesuniste sleight,
by other Mimeo of aoticn, bring about a change in the international
conditicns, especially tleoza in the Far East, that now enable the CS TO
concentrate much of its fighting strength in Korea.
Estimating that the math Korean troops would, be unable by themeolvee
to deny the uq force ccese to the rialiCharien and. Siberian border?) and to
maintain Communist gerecavesaatal authority on Korean 13?110 Communist China,
with Soviet approval, 1..rould probably try to preserve an armed. force of its
own in being in Korea to this end, probably investing additional materiel
and. unofficial perzornel sent to the= by the USSR. The Soviet Union,
however, would. probably not intervene openly.
Communist rativen for creating diversions elsewhere in the Far Eeert,
assuming their col/timed militery ability to do so, would. be equally strong
as in the situation outlined under B.
D. Intentions Ammar Comearelet Re nfe.,11.,......?,_eon of the Possibilitif Defemt
in Korea
Realization of the pocaibility of complete defeat in Korea would lead
the Ccoreanists to give greater reight to ouch factors as the limitatione
an the availability of iSCGsntini heavy Weapons, ammunition, and. equipment
frcm. out of the Soviet arzenal limitations imposed by other &towels upon
Soviet military protection. Both the Chinese Comumnist and Soviet leaders
'would. probably also maize the greater ultimate importance of strengthening
Approved For Release 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79R01012A000800050023-2
China Cr
rMITITNI
Approved ForIR,v..Vase2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79R(4012A000800950023-2
TaefLaUtIgeAl
fb5.m't irri. ienger.Tause atraIng poser,
projects.that noTa Ivava to ccota lAattlao Korean cempaign for
whatever technical au,ISzt:::nco anl materiel tha TESB can bake evailable
to Cemmanist China. rlYo lonz-7:arce consideration Could be buttressed by
pdaGibly 8rowirci fimr.:Iot in PoS-p'ing over the.increaead.efforts
eaeuired to emelt arta re,intair. effeetive control over the Chinese
populace.
The it reactSau of the Communiststo a deterioration ,of their
military position ta nrs,L alE;10; be the broaching of new terms for a
negotieted, settleeres7:e tvilSxWn3 eeehaps same significant conceseions
to the viewpoint of ti o 7;14 cemouflaged by faceesaving gestures..
ThitemoveeTould be clooely aceueeenled by a withdrawal, as forced upon
them, of the.Chirese Cceeeelet treees to a series) of. strongly defeasible
pooltiene Within north Zeros.. Every attekst would be node by Peiepqn3
to make the UN militery'adeemeen costly and to stress its menopoly
an a peaceful.approech to VIII colution of the Vorean problem." The
Soviet role duelngethie poriorl would probably be restricted to a
act:tinning provicion of ceetaSneeapaas, ammunition, and equiPmeut to
the Chimes Cann:111st forces end to the support of PeW1ng?0 peace
=yob in tbelMff. A deepeeete Chime? Cemmunist resort to the lawaohing
of major mil1tar7 opoYatiOno elsewhere In. the Far East would net be ?
likely to occur, since it would jeopardize the attalement of the principal
Chinese, Communist aim -- the- coaeation of a costly conflict that thaeatened
the security of a TItal azea a OhAnn and the attainment of a-eettlonent
In Korea on as fav=able tozma to the Communists as possiblee
g. What ATT222" 129 Pt.RK474&5?714-73:1t.catIcna IlitteEten'ect,t?ctO
e Preeent Soviet intent:Lone In Lowea apparently look towara a complete
defeat of UN forces'atel meeivam ana to involvement of the UN, and
paietioularly the VS, in a loee Incoaciamive Sinewy. operation at a
anurann, goscou my already have accepted the poseibility that the Chinese
Communists will not bo able to cepol the UN frzet Korea and that a lone
?sta1emn`,0 may ersue, Id thSs'eituation and at this stege, the USSR
Beene prepared to offer :morale diplomatic, and a *Detain amount of.
covert military suppoet while evoiding direct intervention.
If it became clearthet the Chireee Communiate faced defeat in Korea,
Moscow, to achieve its orgioel objectives in the alma ati press:Tee both
its own .prestige and Sinee%viet cell.aarity, would-probably inoreaose-
sabstantially its aid to the Chinece and Kers= Ocumunistse Thitemight
iDVOIAM the 1120 of greater mtners of Soviet pian en and_pilots, increteed
numbers of tecbnicaX pomMj and perhaps "volunteers)" if necesmary. At
the Game time, Meseow could le expected to support eel. particleatich on .
Pelep'ingls part in diccuesion of "peaceful" settlement.. If these
efforbs proved insufficient the poscibility carnet be disregaraed that the
VMS would go to the extatra of waging an all out, altheugh perhaps 'still
"Mtofficia1," military camai52lovorKtmea.
F. Recent
Approved For Release 2001/03/62TIA-RDP79R01012A000800050023-2
Approved For Rase 2001/03/09, A-RDP79RQ,1012A000800050023-2
Rocent Chinsse
1.4
,J.:11TrIct Peace novas
. Pei.peim has made 1:7-.n.i.:?ieaut &enmity naves to settas the UMW=
probien, threau3b. neoaLiation. G:7.nce its counter-proyosal to the Utt of .
Zarnary 17. A prmzinit:1-, C121:7.r.sLe Ceramist leader inlicated at the Scale,-
ar2cnoored niowld re ace Cc:Inc:11"1n That .rerlin act February 22 that hie
Goverment a1C aniort in yrinalple a 5.;orver conference to diocuoo a
ueckatien of the e=715.ct tl'e Ear East* w' bet. the 9Council" did. nek
suboccinent1y incmperate this proos33. into it final resolutions.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/03/09 : CIA-RDP79R01012A000800050023-2