REVIEW OF THE CONCLUSIONS OF NIE-29 'PROBABILITY OF AN INVASION OF YUGOLSLAVIA IN 1951'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A000800020031-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 17, 1998
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: May 4, 1951
• Content Type: NIE

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
REVIEW OF THE CONCLUSIONS
OF NIE-29 "PROBABILITY OF AN
INVASION OF YUGOSLAVIA IN 1951"
NIE-29/1
Published 4 May 1951
The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff par-
ticipated in the preparation of this estimate. All members
of the Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this
estimate on 3 May.
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NIE-29/1: REVIEW OF THE CONCLUSIONS OF NIE-29
"PROBABILITY OF AN INVASION OF YUGOSLAVIA
IN 1951"
THE PROBLEM
To review the conclusions of NIE-29, "Probability of an Invasion of Yugoslavia in
1951," in the light of recent developments.
CONCLUSIONS
There has been no new evidence since
the publication of NIE-29 (20 March
1951) enabling us to determine whether
the Kremlin has decided on an attack on
Yugoslavia in 1951. There have been no
major changes in Soviet strength or dis-
positions that bear upon the likelihood of
an attack by Soviet forces in 1951. How-
ever, Satellite capabilities for initiating
an attack on Yugoslavia with little or no
warning have increased, and Satellite
military preparations are continuing.
Although developments to date do not
appear to warrant the conclusion that a
Satellite attack will take place in 1951, or
indicate that such an attack is more likely
this spring than later in the year, they do
give added emphasis to the conclusion of
NIE-29 that "an attack on Yugoslavia in
1951 should be considered a serious
possibility."
DISCUSSION
1. In NIE-29 it was concluded, inter alia, that
"the extent of Satellite military and propa-
ganda preparations indicates that an attack
on Yugoslavia in 1951 should be considered a
serious possibility." A number of develop-
ments since the publication of NIE-29 (20
March 1951) call for a review of this conclu-
sion.
2. Among these developments are the follow-
ing :
a. Heavy Soviet ground force equipment
continues to arrive in Hungary, Bulgaria, and
Rumania, further improving the balance of
these Satellite forces;
b. Certain Bulgarian military units re-
cently have been redeployed in the direction
of the Yugoslav border, and at present at least
one Bulgarian tank division and four infantry
divisions are disposed along the Yugoslav
border;
c. Expansion of the Bulgarian and Hun-
garian armies is continuing;
d. Jet aircraft have recently been observed
in all of the European Satellites except Al-
bania;
e. Satellite airfields continue to be enlarged
and improved;
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f. Early-warning and/or ground-controlled
intercept radar has recently been observed in
the vicinity of both Sofia and Budapest;
g. The number of heavy Soviet AA guns in
both Bulgaria and Hungary appears to be in-
creasing;
h. The apparent food shortages and the ra-
tioning of an increasing number of food prod-
ucts in the southern Satellites suggests that
stockpiling may be under way;
i. Yugoslav-Satellite diplomatic relations
are marked by increasing friction. A num-
ber of protests have been exchanged over re-
curring border incidents; several consulates
have been closed and diplomats expelled; and
the Yugoslavs have arranged for the Swiss
Government to represent Yugoslav interests
in the event that relations are severed between
Belgrade and Budapest;
j. Soviet and Satellite propaganda attacks
on Yugoslavia have been intensified and have
become more specific. Many of the themes
which had previously been directed abroad are
now being disseminated to Soviet and Satel-
lite audiences, and especially to party and
military personnel.
k. The materiel of the Yugoslav Army and
Air Force continues to deteriorate, with the
inevitable concomitant effect upon the opera-
tional efficiency of the Yugoslav forces, and
until Western military aid arrives in substan-
tial quantities, Yugoslavia will become in-
creasingly vulnerable to Satellite attack;
A High Yugoslav officials have private-
ly expressed increased concern over the
possibility of an early Satellite attack. Al-
though the timing of these statements sug-
gests that they may in part have been de-
signed to support the recent formal Yugoslav
requests for arms and equipment from the
US, the fact that Yugoslavia is openly request-
ing such assistance may also be interpreted
as further evidence of genuine fear of Satel-
lite aggression.
3. Some of these developments, such as the
movement of ground forces in Bulgaria, the
border incidents, the Cominform propaganda
campaign, and the deterioration in Yugoslav-
Satellite relations, point toward Yugoslavia as
the target either for a military attack or for
an intensified war of nerves. Others, however,
such as the arrival of jet aircraft, the airfield
construction program, and evidence of stock-
piling appear part of an over-all program of
military preparations throughout the Satel-
lites and the Soviet Zones of Germany and
Austria.
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ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
FOR
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
REVIEW OF THE CONCLUSIONS
OF NIE-29 "PROBABILITY OF AN
INVASION OF YUGOSLAVIA IN 1951"
Published 4 May 1951
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. Ll
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AIJTH: HR 70-2 ... ,:
DATE: % OG, 95 REVIEWER:, 10 3t{ 0
DOCUMENT NO, _
AUT: is I
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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