NIE-29/2: PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN YUGOSLAVIA AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF ATTACK UPON YUGOSLAVIA, THROUGH 1952

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A000800020020-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 2, 2000
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: December 14, 1951
• Content Type: NIE

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SECURITY INFO R! IATI ON
C E N TRAL INTELLIGENCE A G E N C Y
ll,. December 1951
SUBJECT: NIE.?29/2x PROBABLE DEV.ELOP'MITS IN YUGOSLAVIA AflD
THE LIKELIHOOD OF ATTACK UPON YUGOSLAVIA.,
THROUGH 1952
To estimate probable developments in Yugoslavia and the
likelihood.. of attack upon Yugoslavia, through 1952,
la The present regime in Yugoslavia will probably retain
firm control over. the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY), the
armed forces, and the security forces0
20 The CPY will undoubtedly retain its monopoly of power.
Although the regime has refused to modify its goal of an industrialized
and collectivized economy, there will probably be slight and temporary
readjustments within the period of this estimate,
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3, It is unlikely that dissatisfaction among the peasants
and discontent within the middle and lower ranks of the CPY will
reach the point of undermining the stability of the regime,
14 The assassination or death of Tito would weaken the
regime but would be unlikely to break its hold over the country
or to produce fundamental changes in the regime's foreign or
domestic policieso
5. Cominform efforts to penetrate and undermine the regime
will probably fail,
6. The capabilities of the adjacent Satellites to attack
Yugoslavia have further increased since the spring of 1951. If these
Satellites., with Soviet logistic support., should attack before 19539
they could probably overcome organized Yugoslav resistance within
a few months.
70 The growing cooperation between Yugoslavia and the
V:estern Powers has probably convinced the USSR that an attack by
the adjacent Satellites would involve not only serious risk of war
between the US or UN and these Satellites,, but also'the danger that
such a conflict would develop into a general war,
8. An attack upon Yugoslavia by the neighboring Satellites
is possible but is unlikely unless the Kremlin is willing to accept
general war,
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DISCUSSION
INTRODUCTION
9a Since the publication of NIE-29 (20 March 1951) and
NIE..29/1 (t May 1951), the following developments have taken place
affecting the internal and external position of Yugoslavia:
a. Increasing discontent, especially among the peasants.
b. Unrest within the middle and lower ranks of the CPY0
Co Growing disparity between the military capabilities
of Yugoslavia and those of the neighboring Satellites,
d, Increased economic and military aid from the V est.
1. Stability of the Regime
10. From the outset, the regime has placed a heavy strain on
the population, particularly on the peasant majority. Until recently,,
the regime relied upon collectivization of agriculture and upon
forced delivery of foodstuffs to ensure adequate food supplies
for the growing number of industrial workers. It held peasant dis-
content in check by repressive measures.
11o In recent months, the regime has abandoned the forced
delivery of some foodstuffs and has relaxed some of the more apparent
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repressive measures, So far,, this relaxation has encouraged the
peasants to express their grievances more openly, Peasant discontent
increased in the fall of 1951 with the government's announcement that
the peasant's right to withdraw from state agricultural cooperatives
on the expiration of their three year contracts for trial, membership
was to be restricted or denied,, So long as the regime sacrifices the
production of consumer goods to the needs of the program for industri.D
alization,, and so long as the program of collectivization is maintained,
peasant discontent will almost certainly continue and will probably
grow,,
12, Although the regime has refused to modify its goal of
an industrialized and collectivized economy,, there will probably
be some slight and temporary readjustmonts within the period of
this estimate,
a, Additional measures will probably be taken to
decentralize administrative control and to encourage
initiative through increasing the authority and
responsiblity of local management and labor and
through allowing enterprises to retain a portion
of their profits,
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bn It is probable that within the next few
months the rogirae will transfer resources
from its program of heavy industrialization
to the production of consumer goods in order to
induce the peasants to increase food deliveries.
C, Within the period of this estimate, the amount of
land under collectivization will probably be increased
only slightly. Recent evidence indicates that the
least successful collectives will be broken up
and the land returned to peasant owners. Tito has
has made clear, however' that collectivization of
the land remains an objective of the regime.
dp Current and future peasant discontent will be
firmly handled on a local level,, but with such
discretion that relations with the tilest will
probably not be impaired.
13, We believe that discontent among the peasants is not
likely to become a serious threat to the stability of the regime
within the period of this estimate and that the regime will probably
be able to cope effectively with peasant discontent. Tito's control
of the CPY, the armed forces, and the security forces appears to be
firm. On the other hand., anti-Communist elements in Yugoslavia are
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sharply divided and lack effective leadership, Finally., the
nationalism of the peasants leads them to support Tito in his
struggle against the Cominform.
Unrest within the CPY
]J Discontent also exists in the middle and lower ranks
of the CPY. Some pro-Sovict sentiment still exists in these
groups, and they are disturbed by the Vestern orientation of the
regime. Moreover, they have lost prestige and power as a result
of the relaxation of controls and of the regime's attempt to
penalize. officials guilty of misusing their powers.
15. The high officials of the CPY are apparently not troubled
by the current shifts of policy, which they almost certainly regard
as a "temporary retreat." Such adjustments have always been recognized
by Communists as compatible with Communist strategy. Moreover, it
must be apparent to any Yugoslav Communist who has supported the
present regime that the likelihood of his survival in a regime con.
trolled by Moscow is negligible,
16. Those members of the middle and lower ranks of the CPY
who have expressed dissatisfaction with the regimes policy of relaxing
controls are being gradually removed from office, as are those who
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have made themselves excessively unpopular because of their
fanaticism and severity, A quiet purge of the dissatisfied
elements within the CPY will continue at least through the winter
of 1951?1952,. This purge will strengthen the regime's control over
the Party, Although there will probably be some liberalization of
the adrninistratien9 we estimate that control will remain firmly in
the hands of the present Communist leaders,
Probability and Consequences of a Coup
17, Efforts of the Cominform to overthrow the regime by
subversive 'means have thus far failed, The regime's large and
efficient security forces will probably be able to discover and
liquidate any officials over whom the Comnform is able to
acquire influence,
18. A coup d'etat directed against Tito by high members of
the CPY9 the armed forces,, the security forces., or by other
dissatisfied elements is unlikely,. Tito now commands the loyalty
and obedience of the Party and the armed and security forces., and
even opponents of the regime apparently prefer it to the reestablish-
ment of alien control from Moscow,
19, The assassination of Tito remains a possibility, His death,,
whether from assassination or from other causes, would be a serious
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shock to the regime' but it is probable that the CPY, the armed
forces, and the security forces would rally behind his successors.
Through the period of this estimate, the foreign and domestic
policies of the new leaders would almost certainly follow those
established during the past three years by Tito, Discord over
domestic issues might develop within the ruling group after the
first few months,, but fear of the USSR would probably prevent such
discord from developing to the point of open conflict,
II. THE LfILITARY SITUATION
The Yugoslav Armed Forces
20, The Yugoslav army now consists of 3259000 men organized
into 32 divisions, of which 2 are mechanized. The size of these
forces is not expected to increase significantly within the period
of this estimate. Their fighting ability, by Balkan standards, is
high, and they are supplemented by 60,000 members of the Frontier
Guards (KNOJ). Security forces are estimated at 109000, The air
force has 6149 aircraft, of which 1108 are assigned to tactical units,
Most of the aircraft are of German or Soviet World War II design and
construction, and lack of modern equipment would make it difficult
for the Y.AF to accomplish its mission of tactical air support against
a Satellite invasion. The capabilities of the Yugoslav navy will remain
negligible,
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Nfto~
21, The numerical strength of the Yugoslav armed forces has
remained relatively constant throughout the past two or three
yews, though the deterioration-of Yugoslav materiel may have
offset to some extent the improvement in morale, training, and
staff work. The military supplies thus far provided by the West
have consisted almost entirely of light equipment. Current
Yugoslav military capabilities are seriously restricted by the
followings
a. Insufficient quantity and obsolescence of .much
of the equipment,
b0 Heterogeneity of present equipment, mostly of
Soviet and German Z7orld Vdar II stocks,
co Lack of spare parts and of proper ammunition,
d. Severe shortage of heavy weapons, particularly
of antitank artillery, antiaircraft artillery,
and armor.
e. Lack of adequate general staff tactics and techniques,
particularly in planning and coordinating the movements
of large forces,
220 US military equipment scheduled for delivery under the
military aid agreement will replace some of the materiel now used-
by the Yugoslav armed forces and will supply newly organized supporting
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units? YAF capabilities will be appreciably increased by
the delivery of US and-UK equipment by iiareh 1952, but little
army equipment will be delivered. before nid-19520 No real
increase of Yugoslav army capabilities can be expected before
the end of 1952, because the new equipment must be delivered to
the units, the troops must be trained in its operation and
maintenance,, and staff work must be improved,
The Satellite Armed Forces
23, Yugoslaviats military capabilities, in relation to those
of the neighboring Satellites, 'have declined steadily during the
past two years, The armies of Albania, Hungary, Rumania, and
Bulgaria are now estimated at 590,000 men,, organized into 38
divisions, of which 4 are armored and 2 mechanized, These forces
have grown in size from
in January 1950, and it is
believed they will continue to increase throughout the period of
this estimate, The Kremlin is reorganizing the Satellite ground
forces so that they will conform to the Soviet pattern, The
Bulgarian army is apparently the most loyal and formidable. Its
12 divisions are almost fully equipped with Sovict materiel,, reserve
stockpiles are available, and morale is goodo
h gure to be supplied by +G-2,
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24, The around forces of the Satellites adjacent to
Yugoslavia are supported by air forces which together possess
more than 1,100 aircraft, of which 25 are jet fighters, These
air forces have more than doubled in size since play 19519 and
particular emphasis bas been placed upon ground support aircraft.
It is estimated that the capability of these air forces will be
further increased by the replacement of many older aircraft by
later-type piston-engine aircraft and by an increase in the number
of jet fighters 0
III, LIKELIHOOD OF ATTACK UPON YUGOSLAVIA
25, The ultimate Soviet objectives in Yugoslavia remain the
elimination of the Tito regime, the replacement of this regime by
a government subservient to Moscow, and the political, economic,
and military reintegration of Yugoslavia into the Soviet sphere,
There is no evidence to indicate clearly when or how the USSR
intends to attain these objectives,
26, The following factors might indicate a Soviet intention
to precipitate an attack by Albania, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria
upon Yugoslavia during 1952:
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a. The increase in the capabilities of the armed
forces of these Satellites, It is estimated that
in an attack before 1953 the air forces of the
adjacent Satellites could defeat the Yugoslav
air force; their ground forces., with Soviet
logistic support., could overcome organized
Yugoslav resistance and reduce Yugoslav forces
to guerrilla warfare in the mountain redoubt area,*
b, The Satellites adjacent to Yugoslavia have evacuated
the majority of the civilians from key border areas.
Soviet and Satellite propaganda has attempted to
erase the ideological difficulty connected with
an attack on Tito by identifying him with Fascism
and denying that he had even an early affiliation
with Communism, Tito is also charged with participating
in Vlestern preparations for future aggression,
27, On the other hand$ the increase in the armed strength of
the adjacent Satellites during the last two years does not necessarily
reflect a Soviet intention to launch an attack upon Yugoslavia during
1952. Satellite military strength would almost certainly have in-
creased substantially during this period as part of the Sovict program
* G. ., at the ecember meeting., reserved agreement on this
clause until it had studied the Collins report more thoroughly,
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of preparedness.., even if Yugoslavia had not defected, There
has been no apparent sense of urgency in the preparation of these
Satellite armed forces for offensive action, or for the coordination
of their military activities, It is estimated that the Bulgarian.,
Rumanian, and Hungarian armed forces will not complete their re-
organization and reach maximum effectiveness until the end of 1953
and the Albanian not until mid-1954.
28, The economic program of the adjacent Satellites., designed
to advance simultaneously the industrial base and the immediate
military capabilities of the Satellite area., has placed their
economies in an advanced state of war-readiness. There is, however,,
no indication that the long-term aims of the economic program are
being sacrificed to achieve greater immediate war-readiness,
29, Current Soviet and Satellite propaganda provides little
evidence concerning the likelihood of an armed attack upon Yugoslavia
within the period of this estimate. The volume of propaganda directed
at Yugoslavia has remained constant. Recent propaganda is almost
identical in its hostility with that of mid-1948, The mid-1951
declarations that the Yugoslav people "would find a way to freedom"
disappeared by September and were apparently only a phase-in the
general war of nerves against Yugoslavia,
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30, The Kremlin may believe that the existence of Tito now
poses a less serious problem for the USSR than it has in the
past and that the elimination of the Tito reg;me is not an
immediate necessity, The USSR has effectively prevented the
Titoist heresy from undermining its control over the Satellites.,
and Titoism has made little headway in the international Communist
movement, Moreover, the Kremlin undoubtedly recognizes that
Yugoslavia cannot become a serious military threat to the Satellites
within the period of this estimate,
31o Past Soviet actions suggest that the Kremlin does not
consider Yugoslavia as an isolated problem,,, but views it as one
of several factors affecting the general position of the USSR,
Consequently, there is little likelihood that the USSR will launch
a %atellite attack upon Yugoslavia without carefully assessing the
effect of such an attack upon the general Soviet political and
strategic position,
32. The growing cooperation between Yugoslavia and the
Western Powers and the concrete indications of that cooperation
in the last six months have probably convinced the USSR that an
attack by the adjacent, Satellites would involve not only serious
risk of war between the US or UN and these Satellites, but also the
danger that such a conflict would develop into a general war,
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330 Therefore: although the military, econo:..ic, and propa^anda
preparations of the adjacent Satellites indicate that an attack upon
Yugoslavia in 1952 is possible, we believe that such an attack is unlikely
unless the USSR is willing to accept general war,
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