POSSIBLE NIE ON INDIA'S POSITION IN THE WORLD BALANCE OF POWER
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79R01012A000500040040-0
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
3
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
October 4, 2012
Sequence Number:
40
Case Number:
Publication Date:
January 5, 1950
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP79R01012A000500040040-0.pdf | 245.82 KB |
Body:
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/04: CIA-RDP79R01012A000500040040-0
Office Manor ,,idum
ED STATES GOVERNMENT
( )
TO : Dr. Langer
FROM :
SUBJECT: Possible NIE on India's Position in the World Balance of Power
DATE: 5 January 1950
nr
Wt--25X1
1. It is suggested that serious consideration be given to the desirability
of producing a National Intelligence Estimate on India's Position in the World
Balance of Power in order to assess India's will, as well as its capability, to
resist further Chinese (or Soviet) aggression in Asia. Although a number of
India's leaders appear increasingly disturbed by the implications of Chinese
Communist aggression in Korea and Tibet and have unofficially indicated a desire
to establish closer ties with the US, the Government of India, under the power-
ful influence of Prime Minister Nehru, continues to pursue a "middle course" in
the East-West struggle. The Indian Government considers Chinese Communist aggres-
sion less of a threat than Western Imperialism to Asiatic nationalism and, conse-
quently, is extremely reluctant to join with the West in collective security
measures against such aggression. Even if India's will to resist Communist
aggression were to increase significantly, there is considerable doubt as to its
ability effectively to resist such aggression, because of a number of potentially
critical developments both within India and on its borders.
2. The advance of Chinese Communist troops into Tibet is expected to result in
the rapid subjection of all Tibet to Chinese Communist rule. Tibet's southern
frontier is in places less than 250 miles from New Delhi and less than 350 miles
from Calcutta. Chinese Communist troops in their drive into Tibet have been re-
ported not only to have approached the Assam frontier but to have crossed the
frontier on certain occasions.
3. If the French are driven from Indo-China and a Communist regime is established
in that country, it is generally expected that Siam and possibly even Burma will
not long be able to resist Communist pressures and will also become Communist
states. Chinese Communist troops are reported near the borders of both countries.
4. China has long maintained claims to certain territory in northeastern India,
and the Chinese Communist regime can be expected to take advantage of these claims
at an appropriate time in order to bring pressure on India.
5. India is disturbed by the possibility of Chinese Communist aggression from
Tibet against the border principalities of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan and has
attempted by various means to'increase Indian influence over these states. It
has been successful in establishing protectorate rights over Sikkim and Bhutan,
but its attempts to bring Nepal to heel are meeting with considerable resistance
from the hereditary ruling clique in Nepal, the Rana family. India's chief instru-
ment in undermining the authority of the Rana family is the Nepalese Congress
Party. The danger exists that the struggle between the Nepalese Congress Party
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and the Rana clique will result in chaotic conditions within Nepal and thus render
that kingdom an easy prey to exploitation whether by a hostile government in
Tibet or by Communist and other disloyal elements in India. The Nepalese Congress
Party is itself suspected of harboring Communist elements, and the 'ommunist
Party of India is reportedly planning activities to take advantage of the Nepalese
situation. Nepalese Government troops, who are currently having considerable
difficulty in suppressing insurgent forces of the Nepalese Congress Party, could
probably put up only token resistance to a Chinese Communist invasion from Tibet.
6.* India is reported to have strengthened its garrisons along the northern and east-
ern frontiers and to have built more airfields in the north-eastern part of the
country.
7. Although the Government of India continues to pursue a "middle course" in the
East-West struggle, its faith in the concepts of an Asian accord and an Asiatic
Third Force appears to be weakening. It recently turned to the US with a request
for 2,000,000 tons of wheat, although admitting that it was in no position to pay
for it. (At the same time, however, it has concluded a modest barter deal with
Communist China for 50,000 tons of rice in exchange for jute.) A leading Indian
industrialist recently proposed to the US Ambassador that India be assisted to
participate in the production of military equipment for the Western Powers. Although
the Government apparently desires to appear, neutral, a number of officials have
discussed the problem informally. Various officials have also responded enthus-
iastically to a US suggestion that the two countries informally discuss the South-
east Asian situation.
8. The Kashmir issue continues to embitter India's relations with Pakistan, which
might well resort to arms to prevent the establishment of an Indian-aligned Con-
stituent Assembly by the present pro-Indian Kashmir Government. Preparations are
already in progress for the election of an Assembly which is tentatively scheduled
to meet either in May or September 1951. The disinclination of the UN to take any
action which would have the effect of interrupting or delaying these developments
in Kashmir has induced in Pakistan a feeling that the great powers are willing to
sacrifice Pakistan interests rather than antagonize India. Consequently, publ$c
pressure to pursue extreme methods in Kashmir is growing, and Prime Minister
Liaquat has refused to go to the London Commonwealth Conference until he obtains
an assurance that the Kashmir issue will be formally discussed collectively by the
Commonwealth Nations.
9, Although the Communist Party of India has been weakened during the past year
by factionalism, there is considerable evidence that a determined effort is being
made to heal the breaches in the party. Preparations are now in progress to hold
a Party Congress in mid-January 1951, when an attampt will be made to establish
a politburo and to devise a unified program. If this should occur and if more
energetic direction were forthcoming from Moscow or Peiping, the CPI would con-
stitute a serious threat to internal stability and in the event of war could
seriously disrupt India's war effort. There has been no diminution of those factors-
such as communal tansion, refugee problems, and general economic distress-which
encourage a growth of Communism.
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10. The recent death of Deputy Prime Minister Patel may have a significant
influence on the trend of both foreign and domestic Indian policy as well as
on India's political stability. The cleavage between the right and left wings
of the ruling Congress Party and between sectionally minded groups can be ex-
pected to become more pronounced, thus further weakening the Government. Nehru
has already strengthened his position in the Government at the expense of Patel's
followers. At the same time the extreme nationalist Hindu Mahasaba Party has
increased its criticism of the Government, and the Indian Princes have secretly
discussed vague plans for a coup d'etat.
U. India's economic situation has worsened during the past year. Because of
its embargo on Pakistan trade, India has been unable to dispose of much of its
produce profitably. Because of natural disasters, it is being compelled to
import increased quantities of food. It lacks the foreign exchange to purchase
either food or the capital goods necessary to improve India's industry sufficient-
ly to prevent a probable continuing decline in the Indians' standard of living.
The deterioration of the economic situation is further undermining the authority
of the Government and the prestige of the Congress Party.
12. It is evident from these various trends and developments that although India
is becoming increasingly disturbed by the implications of Chinese Communist aggres-
sion in East Asia, it has shown little inclination to support collective action
against the spread of Communism and is unlikely to be capable of effective resist -
ence to further Communist aggression because of serious weaknesses in its internal
situation and in its relations with its immediate neighbors.
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