POSSIBLE NIE ON INDIA'S POSITION IN THE WORLD BALANCE OF POWER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A000500040039-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 4, 2012
• Sequence Number: 39
• Publication Date: January 6, 1951
• Content Type: MEMO

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' 6 January 1951 ,
MEMORANDUM TO:THE NATIONAL ESTIMATES BOARD
FROM: Assistant Director for National Estimates
SUBJECT.: Possible NIE on Indies Position-:in the World Balance of
Power ,
...:11,7430,21=ENO.
Following is a text of a memorandum received from
on the above subject. It is herewith forwarded to you for
information and consideration at an early meeting of the National
Estimates Board,
90 It is suggested that serious consideration-be given to the de-
sirability of producing a National Intelligence Estimate on India's
Position in the World Balance of Power in order to assess 11013777ill,
as well as its capability, to resist Airther Chinese (or Soviet)
aggression in Asia, Although a number of India's leaders appear in-
creasingly disturbed by the implications of Chinese Communist aggression
in Korea and Tibet and have unofficially indicated a desire to establish
closer ties with the US, the Government of India, under the powerfUl
influence of Prime Minister Nehru, continues to pursue a "middle course"
in the East-West struggle. The Indian Government considers Chinese
Communist aggression less of a threat than Western Imperialism to
Asiatic nationalism and, 'consequently, is extremely reluctant to join
with the West in collective security measures against such aggression.
Even. if India's will to resist Communist aggression were to increase
significantly, there is considerable doubt as to its ability effectively
to resist such aggression, because of a number of potentially critical
developments both within India and on its borders,
"2. The advance of Chinese Communist troops into Tibet is expected to
result in the rapid subjection of all Tibet to Chinese Communist ruleo
Tibet's southern frontier is in places less than 250 miles from New
Delhi and less than 350 miles from Calcutta. Chinese Communist troops
in their drive into Tibet have been reported not only to have approached
the Assam frontier but to have crossed the frontier on certain occasions.
"3. If the French are driven from Indo-China and a Communist regime
is established in that country, it is generally expected that Siam and
possibly even Burma will not long be able to resist Communist pressures
and will also become Communist states. Chinese Communist troops are
reported near the borders of both countries,
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qt. China has long maintained claims to certain territory in north-
eastern India, and the Chinese Communist regime can be expected to take
advantage of these claims at an appropriate time in order to bring
pressure on India.
'50 India is disturbed by the possibilitY of Chinese Communist
aggression from Tibet against the border principalities of Nepal, Sikkim
and Bhutan andhas attempted by various means to increase Indian influence
over these states. It has been successful in establishing protectorate
rights over Sikkim and Bhutan, but its attempts to bring Nepal to heel
are meeting with considerable resistance from the hereditary ruling
clique in Nepal, the Rana family. Indiags chief instrument in under-
mining the authority of the Rana family is the Nepalese Congress Party.
The danger exists that the struggle between the Nepalese Congress Party
and the Rana clique will result in chaotic conditions within Nepal and
thus render that kingdom an easy prey to exploitation whether by a hos-
tile government in Tibet or by Communist and other disloyal elements in
India. The Nepalese Congress Party is itself suspected by many of harbors.
ing Communist elements, and the Communist Party of India is reportedly
planning activities to take advantage of the Nepalese situation.
Nepalese Government troops, who are currently having considerable diffi-
culty in suppressing insurgent forces of the Nepalese Congress Party,
could probably put up only token resistance to a Chinese Communist
invasion from Tibet.
;16. India is reported to have strengthened its garrisons along the
northern and eastern frontiers and to have built more airfields in the
north-eastern part of the country.
87. Although the Government of India continues to pursue a "middle
course" in the East-West struggle, its faith in the concepts of an Asian
accord and an Asiatic Third Force appears to be weakening. It recently
turned to the US with a request for 2,000,000 tons of wheat, although ad-
mitting that it was in? no position to pay for it. (At the same time,
however, it has concluded a modest barter deal with Communist China for
50,000 tons of rice in exchange for jute.) A leading Indian industrial-
ist recently proposed to the US Ambassador that India be assisted to
participate in the production of military equipment for the Western Powers.
Although the Government apparently desires to appear neutral, a number of
officials have discussed the problem informally. Various officials have
also responded enthusiastically to a US suggestion that the two countries
informaDy discuss the Southeast Asian situation.
118. The Kashmir issue continues to embitter India's relations with
Pakistan, which might well resort to arms to prevent the establishment
of an Indian-aligned Constituent Assembly by the present pro-Indian
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Kashmir Government. Preparations are already in progress for the
election of an Assembly which is tentatively scheduled to meet either
in May or September 1951. The disinclination of the UN to take any action
which would have the effect of interrupting or delaying these develop.
merits in Kashmir has induded in Pakistan a feeling that the great powers
are willing to sacrifice Pakistan interests rather than antagonize India.
Consequently, public pressure to pursue extreme methods in Kashmir is
growing, and Prime Minister Liaquat has refused to go to the London
Commonwealth Conference until he obtains an assurance that the Kashmir
issue will be formally discussed collectively by the Commonwealth Nations.
"9. Although the Communist Party of India has been weakened during the
past year by factionalism, there is considerable evidence that a de-
'termined effort is being made to heal the breaches in the party. Prepara-
tions are now in progress to hold a Party Congress in mid-January 19519
when an attempt will be made to establish a politburo and to devise a
untied program. If this should occur and if more energetic direction
were forthcoming from Moscow or Peiping, the CPI would constitute a
serious threat to internal stability and in the event of war could
seriously disrupt India's war, effort. There has been no diminution of?
those factors - such as communal tension, refugee problems, and general
economic distress - which encourage a growth of Communism.
w10.? The recent death of Deputy Prime Minister Patel May have a signi.
ficant influence on the trend of both foreign and domestic Indian policy
as well as on India's political stability. The cleavage between the right
and left wings of the ruling Congress Party and between sectionally minded
groups can be expected to become more pronounced, thus further weakening
the Government. Nehru has already, strengthened his position in the Govern-
ment at the expense of Patel 'a followers. At the same time the extreme
nationalist Hindu Mahasaba Party has increased' its criticism of the
Government, and the Indian Princes have secretly discussed vague plans
for a coup d'etat.
"11. India's economic situation has worsened during the past year.
Because of its embargo on Pakistan trade, India has been unable to dis-
pose of much of its produce profitably. Because of natural disasters, it
is being compelled to import increased quantities of food. It lacks the
foreign exchange to purchase either food or the capital goods necessary
to improve Indials industry sufficiently to prevent a probable continuing
decline in the Indians' standard of living. The deterioration of the
economic situation is further undermining the authority of the Government
and the prestige of the Congress Party.
"12. It is evident from these various trends and developments that
although India is becoming increasingly disturbed by the implications
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annIVIIM-MS031,61.
of Chinese Communist aggression in East Asia, it has shown little
inclination to support collective action against the spread of
Cormmnaism, and is unlikely to be capable of effective resistance
to further Comrtranist aggression because of serious weaknesses in
its internal situation and in its relations with its immediate
neighborso"
at)) t
WILLIAM L. LAMM
Assistant Direct
National EstiTates
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