ESTIMATE OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE EMPLOYMENT OF CHINESE NATIONALIST FORCES IN KOREA)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A000300050003-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 3, 2000
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 5, 1950
• Content Type: NIE

Office of Intelli. enc;a Research
DE1'aT1'gtp8, ogsA, prRelease 2001/08/31' CIA-RDP79ROL04'2A 300050003-9
EST IRATE OF THE CONSEQL1CPIS OF THE E{ LOY ENT OF
CHIMSE NATI2XAI ST FUR IIi Xo -_. ..
in Korea.
N lc-t-"
That hostilities have not spread beyond the bortiere of Korea
at the time of a decision to employ Chinese Nationalist forces
I. immediate tar C ences
II . Political, ana fitrr~tr~ s is Consequences
Omment No.
Review of this document by CIA has
determIn d that
p A has no objection to declass
if contains in-iormation of CIA
interest that must remain
classified at TS S
Authority; HR 70.2
p It contains nothing of CIA Interest
Date d a/&i Reviewer 19-702
C _
A. Chances of oant Of Chinese Nationalists
The United States would have little prospect of gaining UN
support for a proposal to use Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea since
a majority of the nations involved would be opposed, first, on the grounds
that such a move would increase markedly the danger of general war, and,
secondly, because of opposition to giving the support to Chiang K?ai=ebek
that such a move would imply. (For individual country reactions see
below.)
B. Effect of Unilateral US Etnnp] nt of Chinese Nationalists
1. Effect on UN and NATO Countries
A unilateral move by the United States would undoubtedlgy intensify
the current feeling in the UI?, particularly in Britain and France, that
Western European views are not being given sufficie:4t weight on Issues
felt to be crucial in averting full a scale war. The Western European
powers moreover, would feel strongly that the US was further jeopardising
the defense of the European continent a- to which they believe first
priority should be given ?v by becoming increasingly involved in long
drawn out ho.=tilities in Asia. In the case
of.}'Franc e, op osQition to the
State Dept. (~ecl a PAl s' `2&R1/3P`~I `RD~ 9M1 10+9300050003-9
SECIMT
 Approved Foil Release 2001/08/31 : GP79R0101A( 00300050003-9
4;1 -
use of Chinese Nationalist forces would be further bolstered by fears
less such action encourage the Chinese Communists to increase their
present assistance to Ho chi Minh while the United Kingdom would similarly
feel apprehenbiona concerning Chinese Coannunist moves with regard to
Malaya and Hongkong.
Australia and flew 7ealand would share the apprehensions of the
Western European powers that the United States was moving in a direction
likely to provoke general hostilities, but might nevertheless support
the US move since these countries are lees hopeful than the European
powers of the possibility of agreement with the Chinese Communists and
feel their strategic interests to be directly and closely affected by
developments on the Asiatic continent.
2. Effect on Other Asian Countries
Of the Asian powers, only the Philippines would approve
unconditionally. Thailand, although continuing to support the Us effort
In Korea, would be extremely uneasy with regard both to the prospects
of extending the war and to supporting Chiang and would be likely to
attempt to disassociate itself from the use of Nationalist troops,
probably by refraining from any official comment on the matter. Japan
would feel barred by its oocupied status from criticism of the move
but Japanese leaders privately would tend to feel that the possible military
advantages would be outweighed by the resultant weakening of UN unity and
the enhanced risk of general hostilities. Pakistan?s attitude would be
ambivalentt on the one hand, internal political considerations would
probably force the government to avoid public commitment on the question;
on the other, government leaders would feel privately that militarily the
move wad gblF a&&160/31 : CIA-RDP79R01012A000300050003-9
3 CR'
 Approved For lease 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP79RO1012A 00300050003-9
SECRET
Llsewher+e in Asia, sentiment would be decisively against the
United States move as providing a pretext for? increasingly militant
Chinese Communist activities and. closing all possible difilomatic channels;
undermining the U1 and the collective interests of Asia by unilateral
decision; and giving tupport to what Asiaticagenerally regard as a
reactionary and incompetent clique already repudiated by its own people.
In Asiatic countries with lame Chinese communities, the fear of internal
consequences would be strong, since it would be anticipated that US use
of nationalist troops would cause some hitherto neutral or lukewarm
overseas Chinese to align themselves definitely with the Communists.
Hostile reactions would be particularly strong in India where
indeed the government would probably use its opposition to unilateral tea
employment of Nationalist troops as a pretext for disassociating itself
entirely from the UPI action in Korea. Reactions of similar intensity could
probably be anticipated in Burma and Indonesia.
In Indochina both the French and the local population would
regard the move as increasing the danger of Chinese Communist invasion
while, among the local population, propaganda claims that the US supports
the reactionary elements of the Far East would be given additional evidence.
SECZ
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP79R01012A000300050003-9
 Approved For Release 2001/08/31P79R101 iiA900300050003-9
VW -4~
3m Effects on Chinese Nationalists
Chiang K?ai-shek and his supporters would welcome the opportunity to
employ Nationalist troops in Korea as providing them once again with a
foothold on the mainland; enhancing the status of Nationalist China as
a member in full standing of the.UN;'and minimizing the possibility, at
least for the present, of an alteration of the status of Taiwan,
The use of Nationalist troops in Korea could be aonomplished
expeditiously only by full recognition of Chiang?s authority over theme
Chiang?s leadership would thereby be reinforced; the pressure of a
pending UN investigation that seems to have been responsible for such
reforms as the MAT has made to date would be substantially diminished;
younger and more progressive KMT elements who hoped for a thorough going
revitalization of Nationalist leadership would be correspondingly dis-
heartened; while a large proportion of the Taiwanese would lose all
hope that UN action would either remove the authority of the XW or also
force the KMT to undertake reforms in the direction of making the
government more responsive to the aspirations and needs of the people
of Taiwan,
Furthermore) our acceptance of Nationalist troops for use in Korea
would enable Chiang to put increased pressure on the US for aid and encourage
him to seek to hold the US responsible for undertaking the support,
equipping., and effective use against the Communists of all the Nationalist
armed forces?
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP79R01012A000300050003-9
 Approved For D-ease 2001/08/31 S~ -I pP79RO1012AQA0300050003-9
The employment of Nationalist troops in Korea would be likely
to hearten strongly pro-Nationalist elements and to encourage some
active anti.-Communists who have no great sympathy for the Chiang govern.
meat but who nevertheless might view the entrance of Nationalist China
into the Korean war as a step toward the ultimate destruction of the CCP
regime, However, the group so affected probably does not now form a vary
significant proportion of the non-Communist populations
In spite of growing popular disillusionment and discontent
with the CCP,, the majority of the Chinese people have not forgotten the
corruption and incompetency of the Nationalist Government. Many farmers
and laborers, although lacking stron; political leanings, nevertheless
feel they have a vested interest in thu present regime and its promises
of land reform and better working conditions and would regard Chiang~s
possible return as a threat to their interests,
The reaction of the smaller, but politically more significant,
group of educated, middle class Chinese would be one of dismay. In their
minds US employment of Nationalist troops would indicate the inevitability
of conflict between the CCP regime and the US and destroy all hope for.
an eventual peaceful settlement of the present unstable conditions, Many
who still hope for the reorientation of the regime away from the USSR
and toward the West, or at least some rapprochement with the US0 would
lose faith in the USo Many would re?'retfully take the US action as
conclusive evidence of a US intention of restoring Chiang. to power on
the mainland and as final proof of Communist--alleged American imperialism in
Asia, Most of this group would see no alternative to complete support of the
Comnunists9 anti-Amsrioan course. Some might still hope for an Amerioan,
''~c~lrc9l~iPg'~@i~~~1 Rb6~~~~ ~19~~dPOp04@p~bl?~0~500E~a9rgent
Nationalist leadership in China,
 ? Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP79RO101~00300050003-9
SE RrT
-6-
5. Effect on OhiL
%?- Communists
US employment of Nationalist troops in Korea would cement and
strengthen the foundations of-the Chinese Communists'. alignment with the
USSR and would confirm them in support of overall Soviet strategy. .There
is fair ground for belief that the decision for Chinese G:ommunist inter-
vention in Korea was not adopted without considerable opposition by a
group within the top Pei--p'ing leadership which has not been happy over
the all-out Moscow tieup and which felt that China's involvement in war
with the US ..M at least at the present stage would be ultimately
disastrous for China and should not be considered as an inevitable contri-
bution to be made to Moscow's world program. Our employment of Nationalist
troops would discredit and disillusion this groin by providing "evidence"
of an unalterable o,etermin tion on the part of the US to accnmalish the
overthrow of the Comm,iunist regime and to replace it by the hated '{uomintang.
Under such circumstances the group would probably have no alternative bat
full support of Moscow's program. From the immediate standpoint, it would
reiove any slight chance there might be of the Chinese Communists' being
willing to accept a compromise settlement in Korea.
In the mwantime CCP would be quick to exploit the US support of
MT troops as final confirmation of all past Comm=1st allegations of
American Uimperial3sm10 and "aggressive designs" and thereby achieve
telling effects on all presently "fence-sitting" countries,
Approved For Release 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP79R01012A000300050003-9
 4 Approved For ease 2001/08/31 : CIA-RDP79RO101 00300050003-9
SFCRM
-7-
Another effect of our employment of Nationalist troops, which, while
perhaps not of immediate consequence, might be of later importance, is the
influence that'such action would have on certain military commands within
the Chinese Commnunist Army which, there is some reason to hope, might at,
some future --propitious moment be ready to defect from the Communist sides
6. giflect on Guerrtll. G r o w 2 g a n d T'nird F e P os it
Evidence suggests that, while certain guerrilla groups are under
Nationalist control or would accept r'.tirmalist.leadership, the greater
proportion of guerrillas and other discontented elements would not subscribe
to Nationalist leadership and would seek rather to accomplish their aims
through the organization of some form of third force., US employment of
KMT troops by discouraging both these elements and potential Communist
defectors as to the prospects of eventual US support for a third force
might destroy the possibility of the organization of such a force without
which there would be little prospect for the overthrow by internal action
of the relatively well entrenched CCF regime.
7. The USSR
Moscow would probably welcome a unil-teral US decision to employ
Nationalist troops as further embroiling the United States with Communist
China without forcing the USSR into decisive action, as driving a r
between the United States and Its allies, and as providing additional
support for the international Communist propaganda attempt to depict the
United States as imperialist, intent upon war, and fostering and supporting
reactionary regimes.
Approved For Release 2001 /08/34 Fi! DP79R01012A000300050003-9