TERMS OF REFERENCE: CHINA (FOR NIE-10)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A000300030022-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 13, 1999
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: December 13, 1950
• Content Type: NIE

Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79R01012A000030022-0
W
13 December 1950
TERMS OF REF.ERENCEs CHINA
The Problem:
To estimate the intentions and capabilities of the Chinese Com-
xainist regime, the role of Communist China in the Soviet power-complex,
and the courses of action which Communist China will follow in relation
to the USSR and the non-Coimiurdst world.
Ste:
This estimate should answer the following broad questions:
To what extent is the Peoples Republic of China a unified
and viable nation capable of playing a well-defined-role in the
Comunist world? Is it capable of eliminating effective opposi-
tion within China? Is it capable of early destruction of the
Kt1T regime on Formosa by military attack, subversion or otherwise?
What are Commnist China's objectives? To what extent are
China's objectives identical with Soviet-.Communist objectives?
If those objectives are not identical, does China have
either the propensity or the capability to follow an independent
course of action? What are the most likely points of disagreement
between Communist China and the USSR? Even if these disagreements
do not bring about a Soviet-Chinese break, will they weaken the
ties between the two regimes?
How far can Communist China and the USSR go in making a
common cause? What are the factors which underlie their joint
policies? Mhat specific courses of action can they be expected
to follow jointly?
Outline:
OIR
I. Stability of the Chinese Communist regimen
A.
Political composition.
1.
Ascendant or dominant influences in government.
2.
Role and political orientation of armed forces
and political police.
B.
Internal stability,
1. Extent of pacification ofcpposition forces within
mainland China.
2. Effectiveness of internal security mechanisms.
3. Immediate economic problems and effect on political
stability.
Approved For Release 2001/08i4VWW-RDP79R01012A000300030022-0
 Approved For Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79R0l012A00 00030022-0
Nw *0
SECRET
OIR IL Communist China's objectives.
A. Aims of Chinese Communism as exemplified in actions
and writing prior to success of revolution.
B, Objectives which emerge from internal and external
policies since success of revolution.
C. Relation of above to Soviet objectives.
1. Those which are identieeal with or similar to
those of USSR.
2. Those which appear at variance with or in con-
flict with Soviet objectives.
III* Communist China's capabilities.
G-2 A. The Soviet program of support.
OIR B. External economic and political factors which en-
large or limit Chinese Communist capabilities.
1. Role of overseas Chinese,
2, Effectiveness of pressure from other Asian
Governments.
3. Vulnerability to economic warfare.
1. Vulnerability to air bombardment and naval
blockade.
G-2 C. Immediate military capabilities, especially capa-
bilities to execute campaigns in:
1. Korea
2. Formosa
3. Indochina
4. Japan
5. Other areas of South Asia and South Seas.
OIR IV. Possibilities of conflict between China and USSR.
A. Capabilities of China for pursuing independent
course of action.
1. Control over internal instruments of power.
2. Degree of economic independence of USSR.
3. Possibilities of outside aid.
Be Conditions under which China might choose to pursue
an independent or anti-Soviet course of action.
C. Developments which would weaken USSR-Chinese ties
without promoting open break,
Approved For Release 2001/084&IMWDP79R01012A000300030022-0
 Approved For Relve 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79R01012A0 0030022-0
SECRET
D. Degree to which USSR would be willing to adjust
differences in interest of maintaining partnership.
E. Conditions or developments which would tend to
strengthen Chinese ties with the USSR.
F. Conclusions as to likelihood of joint policy or
conflict.
Reserved V. Probable USSR-Chinese in+entions and courses of action
likely to be followed in 1951-52 via-a-vie:
A. Korea
B. Formosa
C. Hong Kong and Macao
D. Southeast Asia
E. Japan
F. India and other middle-of--the-road powers
G, East-West power struggle general]3r
Detailed analysis of Chinese Communist immediate military capabili.
ties to execute campaigns in:
1. Korea
2. Formosa
3. Indochina
4. Japan
5. Other areas of South Asia and South Seas.
Approved For Release 2001/08/14 3CIA-RDP79R01012A000300030022-0