NIE 10: COMMUNIST CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A000300030021-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 13, 1999
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: December 18, 1950
• Content Type: NIE

Approved For, Release 2001/08/14: CIA-RDP79RO1012A000300030021-1
CENTRAL, INTELLIGFJICE AGENCY
Office of National Estimates
18 December 1950
SUBJECT NIE 1O COMMUNIST CHINA
r
r0
The Problem?
Tg st to the outcome of the struggle between Commmist and Nationalist
..pa io -ell, the courses of action which the Chinese Ccmuzr~i sts are likely
to follow elation to the USSR and the non-Co mumi a, to r1 r3 __ /tea +%m ?m.+*it
T
nation
it ca
apable of playing a we
e of eliminating effe
lets Republic of C
Communist world? Is
China? Is it capable
1-defined role in the
Ave opposition with
of early
with and
1and9 suet
trot of
Republic o
regime on Formosa by
otherwise? What is
thout increased US ai'
n guerrilla operatic
or a part of the Chi
China control and/or
e capability of the
, to resist attack,
military tttack, sub-
tionaliat Government,
o re-invale the main-
are the support of
and to what
xtent is that control
the Nationalist gone
or support limited
eventually regain con-
xtent doe;i the Poople0s
p peoples of China,
affected by the
What are e objectives of the hinese Commmist regime? To what extent
are the object ves of the Chinese Co ists identical with Soviet.Conmunist
objectives?
If those obj ctives are not identical, does the Chinese Commun st regime:
have either the propensity or the capability to follow an independent course
of action? What are the most likely points of disagreement between the
Chinese Communists and the USSR? Even if these disagreements do not bring
about a Soviet-Chirese Communist break, will they weaken the ties between the
two regimes?
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1, Stability of the, Chinese Communist regime-
OIR A. Politic . composition.
1. Ascendant or dominant influences in governanont,,
2? Role and political orientation of armed forces
and political police.
QIR B, Internal stability.
1. Extent of/~pacification of opposition, forces with n-
mainlayynd China0
2, Ability of the Chinese C gist regime to control
or hold popular support through Internal seovrity
mechanisms or other means,
3, Mediate economic problems and of ?ect on political
stability.,
C C. Prospects of scouring Formosa or containing the
Nationa lst government on Formosa.
1, Chinese Nationalist military capabilities with
and without Increased US aids
2 i,
a.. To defend Form. sae,
b,, To maintain organized or guerrilla forces
on ?W n1 1 of China.
c. To conduct amphibious assault,,
Extent of defection or subversion on Formosa,,
3.
Communist capabilities for ? mphibieau.s as .ualt,,
4.
Prospects for continued and effective US pro-
CiR
5?
tection of Formosa,.
Prospects of UN solution of Formosa question,,
CI. IIa
Conn
ist China's objectivesa
A. Aims of Chinese Connwism as exemplifi in actions
and writing prior to fraccess of revolution,,
B. Objectives tech emerge from internal and external
policies since success of revolution,
0, Relation of abcr to Soviet objectives?
1 v Those which are identical with or similar to
those of USSR.
2. Those which appear at variance with or in con-
flict with Soviet objectives.,
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In. Communist China's capabilities.
G-2 A. The Soviet program of support
OM B. External economic and political factors which en-
large or limit Chinese Communist capabilities a
1. Role of overseas Chinese
2. Effectiveness of pressure from other Asian
Governments.
3. Vulnerability to economic warfare.
4. Vulnerability to air bombardment and naval
blockada.
G-22 C6 Mediate military capabilitiess especially capa-
bilities to execute canpaigns In.,
1. Korea
2. Indochina
3. Japan
4,, Other areas of South Asia and South Seas.
OIR IV. Probable future relations between Communist China and USSR.
A. Capabilities of Coimmmist China for pursuing independent
courses of action.
1. Control over internal instruments of power.
2. Degree of economic independarnr;e of USSR.
3u Possibilities of outside aid.
Conditions under which Cam st China might choose to
pursue an independent or anti-Soviet course of action.
C,, Developments which would weaken USA-Chinese ties
without promoting open break
D,, Degree to which USSR would be willing to adjust
differences in interest of maintaining partnership.,
E. Conditions or developments which would tend to
strengthen Chinese ties with the 1YSSR,
F,. Conclusions as to likelihood of joint policy or
conflict.
Resc-rved V? Probable tISSRCChinese intentions and courses of action
likely to be fofowed in 1951 -52 vied-as vis W
-3-
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L Korea
B? Porno
Cn Hong Kong and Macao
D., Southeast Asia
E. Japan
F < India and other m .ddle f the aroad powers
G ,East-West power struggle generally
G--2 Amex
Detailed analysis of Chinese Communist Immediate military oapabili-
tie s to execute campaigns in.,
1. Korea
2 Indochina
3. Japan
4,, Other areas of South Asia and South Sew.
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