NIE-10: COMMUNIST CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A000300030016-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 19, 2005
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: January 9, 1950
• Content Type: NIE

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CENTRAL UTTEILIGINCE AGENCY
Office of National Estimates
9 Januaa-r 1950
SUBJECT: NIL-10: COM UNIST CHINA
THE PROBL,
To estimate the outcome of the struggle between Communist and Nationalist China
and the courses of action which the Chinese Communists are likely to follow in re-
lation to the USSR and the non-Communist world.
t1SSIThtPTI ON
That there will be no feneral war between the US and China and/or the USSR.
CONCLUSIONS
1. For the foreseeable future, the Chinese Communist regime, unless dislodged
from power by strong, outside forces, vdll retain exclusive governmental control of
,;h widespread anti-Communist activity eicists in mainland
mainland China. Althou,,
China, this activity is not coordinated, adecuately supplied, or provided with ade-
quate political leadership. The Chinese Communists are capable of containing and
controlling opposition elements under existing circumstances.
2. The main irmediate objective of the Chinese: Communists is the conquest of
all of China, including Taiwan, and the eradication of both i;ostern and Kuorii..ntWng
influence from China. Their general objectives are to achieve national autonomy,
construct a Larxist-socialist society in China, and to advance the cause of a world
Communist society. By pursuing their objectives in close association with the USSR
and in seeking to eliminate :':estern influence from Asia, the Chinese Communists are
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pursuing a course in which each Chinese achievement diminishes the strategic posi-
tion of the US and its allies relative to the position of the USSR and its satellites.
3. The Chinese Communists will not have achieved the success of their revolu-
tion until they have conquered Taiwan, an objective to which they are publicly com-
mitted. Considerable Soviet covert military support toward that end is a probability
if Chinese C ad.sts and. Soviet leaders determined that the Chinese Co nmist force
alone could not successfully take Taiwan. An amphibious assault on Taiwan might well
be attempted during favorable weather this year. Chinese Communist objectives and
military power also pose a threat to all of mainland Southeast Asia. The Chinese
Communists have the military capability, if not interdicted by Western counteraction,
of effectively intervening In Indochina, Thai..land, and Burma.
.. Communist China's maneuverability, however, is limited by Its vulnerability
to economic warfare, naval blockade, sabotage, and aerial bombardment. Cm to lment
of foreign trade by Western controls or embargos would handicap, but in itself would
not seriously damage, Chinese economic activity and military potential. An inten-
sive sabotage program and a naval blockade superimposed on trade controls would pro-
duce a more marked effect. An effective aerial bombardment program against rail
systems, industrial capacity and storage bases, if applied in addition to economic
warfare measures, would render a sustained external effort improbable and might
eventually neutralize China.
5. Ultimately, the achievement of Chinese Communist objectives depends not
only upon China's own militaryand economic capabilities and upon the nature and ex-
".T
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SECS'
tent of 2estern counteraction, but also upon the foundations and evolution of Comm-
mist China's relations with the USSR. All the relevant evidence at the moment indi-
cates that the Chinese Communist Party is acting on the thesis that its present and
future, as well as that of world Co monism, is bound to the present and future of
the USSR. Coordination of policy with the USSR is therefore a policy and a fact,
though not necessarily an i mutable principle.
6. The current Soviet program. of providing economic and military assistance to
Commmnist China cm either enhance or Limit the capabilities of the Communist regime
to achieve its objectives, At present., that program is enabling China to cope with
some of its economic problems and to move toward its objectives. Various factors,
such as Soviet willingness and ability to continue the program and the conditions at-
tachod by the USSR to continuance of aid, will determine the value of that program
to the Chinese leaders and will affect the ultimate relation between China and the
USSR.
7. China's ties i th the USSR would be strengthened if Y extern counteraction
created conditions which would mate China more dependent on the USSR, more convinced
of the threat of US policy to Chinese security, and more convinced of the necessity
of strengthening its alliance vt th the USSR. On the other hand, China's dependence
upon, need for, and respect for the USSR mould be weakened if the USSR failed to
carry out its commitments to China, acted with undue rashness in its propensity to
interfere in Chinese internal affairs, or attempted to assort leadership of the Asian
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Communist movements, to subvert the Chinese Communist Party and Army, or to take
control of China's economic resources. There is no evidence that the USSR has done
so or intends at present to do so.
8. It presently appears that, unless the USSR itself alienates China, China
will adhere closely to the partnership, primarily because it is a profitable alli-
ance and there is no feasible alternative. Only if the USSR became weaker in com-
parison with the West and concurrently the Chinese Communists had reason to believe
that they could retain their autonomy by an accommodation with the West, would the
Chinese Communists have reason to break their alliance with the USSR. Although
there is little firm evidence as to the extent of Soviet penetration at command
levels of the Army or in the Chinese Communist Party, we believe that the Chinese
Communists would still have the capability of breaking their alliance with the USSR
if they should wish to do so within the next few years. So long, however, as Cam-
mnzi.st China, and the USSR feel a need for each other and so long as Soviet power re-
r,W.ns the key to the achievement of Chinese Communist objectives, the two nations
can be expected to maintain their partnership and to pursue a joint course of action.
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