COMMUNIST CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A000300030004-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 13, 1999
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 17, 1951
• Content Type: NIE

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SEC R E T E T ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
FOR
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIlATES
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
COMMUNIST CHINA
B0X
NIE
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Published 17 January 1951
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CENTRAL .--INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
KT URN T C S: F!; F RDS CENTER
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This document contains information affecting the na-
tional defense of the United States within the meaning
of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended.
Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any
manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
COMMUNIST CHINA
N I E - 1 0
The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force participated in
the preparation of this estimate and concur in it. This
paper is based on information available on 15 January 1951.
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1. This copy of this publication is for the information and use of the recipient
designated on the front cover and of individuals under the jurisdiction of the recipient's
office who require the information for the performance of their official duties. Further
dissemination elsewhere in the department to other offices which require the informa-
tion for the performance of official duties may be authorized by the following:
a. Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Intelligence, for the Depart-
ment of State
b. Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, for the Department of the Army
c. Director of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy
d. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
e. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission
f. Deputy Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff
g. Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for any other
Department or Agency
2. This copy may be either retained or destroyed by burning in accordance with
applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by ar-
rangement with the Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA.
DISTRIBUTION (NIE Series) :
Office of the President
National Security Council
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Department of State
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COMMUNIST CHINA
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the stability of the Chinese Communist regime, its relations with the USSR,
and its probable courses of action toward the non-Communist world.
DISCUSSION
Stability of the Chinese Communist Regime.
1. For the foreseeable future the Chinese Com-
munist regime will probably retain exclusive
governmental control of mainland China. Al-
though there is undoubtedly much dissatis-
faction with the Communist regime in China,
it does enjoy a measure of support or acqui-
escence and is developing strong police con-
trols. No serious split in the Communist re-
gime itself is now indicated. In particular,
the regime has effective control of the Chinese
Communist army. There are no indications
that current anti-Communist efforts can
achieve a successful counter-revolution. On
the basis of the slight evidence available, it is
estimated that about 700,000 men may be en-
gaged in active resistance operations, ranging
from local banditry to organized guerrilla war-
fare. There is insufficient evidence either to
substantiate or deny Nationalist claims that a
considerable number of these are associated
with the Nationalist regime on Taiwan. These
forces are creating widespread disorders and
are handicapping the Chinese Communist pro-
gram despite the fact that they are uncoor-
dinated, lack effective top-level leadership, and
so far have developed no constructive political
program. By themselves and under present
conditions these resistance forces do not con-
stitute a major threat to the Chinese Com-
munist regime.
General Objectives of Communist China.
2. The main objectives of the Chinese Commu-
nist regime are to establish and perpetuate its
own control over all Chinese territory and to
construct in China a Communist economic
and social order. The Chinese Communists
aim at eliminating Nationalist Chinese and
Western power from China and contiguous
territories as rapidly as possible. With sup-
port of the USSR, they aim further at the
final victory of world communism and at Chi-
nese leadership of a Communist Far East.
Sino-Soviet Relations.
3. The Chinese Communists are clearly coor-
dinating policy and acting in close coopera-
tion with the USSR. There is between Pei-
ping and Moscow a defense treaty. There is
also at the present time a strong bond of mu-
tual interest in jointly protecting the security
of the two regimes, in eliminating Western in-
fluence from Asia, and in furthering the suc-
cess of international communism.
4. The current Soviet program of economic
and military assistance is contributing to
Communist China's ability to progress toward
its military objectives. Western counter-
measures against Chinese Communist ad-
vances would render Communist China more
dependent on the USSR for such further eco-
nomic and military support as the USSR
might be able or willing to provide. It is pos-
sible that such measures would result in Com-
munist China becoming an economic liability
to the USSR.
5. Latent possibilities of conflict between
Peiping and Moscow exist in such questions
as: (a) control of Chinese border territories
like Sinkiang and Manchuria; (b) ultimate
control over Korea; (c) Soviet efforts to in-
filtrate and control the Chinese Communist
government; and (d) failure of the USSR to
meet the economic and military requirements
1
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of Communist China. But these elements of
potential conflict between Chinese national
interests and Soviet imperialistic policy and
tactics are unlikely to develop at least so
long as Communist military operations against
the "common enemy" continue to be suc-
cessful.
6. If Soviet strength should decline sharply
in relation to that of the US and its allies, and
if, at the same time, the Chinese Communist
regime became convinced that it could remain
in power through an accommodation with the
US and its allies, the Chinese Communist re-
gime might conceivably attempt to break its
association with the USSR. This situation is
unlikely to develop in the foreseeable future.
Immediate Chinese Communist Threats
To US Security Interests.
7. The Chinese Communists are following a
course of action designed to destroy US stra-
tegic interests in the Far East and to reduce
the worldwide power position of the US and
its allies. in relation to the joint power posi-
tion of the USSR and China.
8. The scale of the Chinese Communist oper-
ations in Korea and the unwillingness of the
Chinese Communists to discuss a diplomatic
settlement except on their own terms indicate
that they intend to drive UN forces out of
Korea; they have already committed a large
proportion of their best troops for this pur-
pose, and are prepared to commit additional
forces.
9. The Chinese Communists have indicated
their firm intention of capturing Taiwan. in
order to complete the conquest of Chinese
territory and eliminate the last stronghold of
the Nationalist regime. The Chinese Com-
munists have the capability for mounting an
amphibious attack on Taiwan. So long as
the US Seventh Fleet is available to protect
the island, however, it is unlikely that the
Chinese Communists would undertake such
an operation.
10. The Chinese Communists at present also
have the capability of intervening effectively
in Indochina. They have been supporting
the Viet Minh for some time. Direct inter-
vention in strength is almost certain to occur
whenever there is danger either that the Viet
Minh will fail to attain its military objective
of driving the French out of Indochina, or that
the Bao Dai government is succeeding in un-
dermining the support of the Viet Minh.
Even if they do not openly intervene in Indo-
china, they can and probably will increase
military assistance to the Viet Minh in an
effort to make the French position untenable.
11. The Chinese Communists are also capable
of securing Honk Kong at any time, and they
are likely to do so whenever they have con-
vinced themselves that there is no longer any
advantage in leaving Hong Kong in British
hands and whenever they are 'willing to ac-
cept the consequences of hostile action against
British territory. Similar considerations ap-
ply to Macao. In the case of Hong Kong,
they might stay their hand so as to utilize
the Hong Kong problem as a continuing wedge
between the US and UK or to preserve the
flow of trade through Hong Kong.
12. The Chinese Communists have further ca-
pabilities of attacking Burma and of carrying
on subversive activities in other countries of
Southeast Asia. It is estimated that at pres-
ent they do not have the capabilities for mili-
tary attack upon Japan.
13. Under present circumstances, the Chinese
Communists probably have the military capa-
bility of concurrently carrying on their oper-
ations in Korea, intervening effectively in In-
dochina and Tibet, attacking Burma, and cap-
turing Hong Kong, while continuing to con-
tain opposition groups within China.
Vulnerabilities of Communist China.
14. Because of Communist China's well recog-
nized enormous numbers of ground forces, the
great extent of its territory, and the inade-
quacy of its communication routes for large-
scale Western-type military ground opera-
tions, the counter-measures to which Com-
munist China is most vulnerable are the fol-
lowing:
(a) Support of Resistance Forces.
By supplying the active anti.-Communist
forces already present in mainland China with
effective communications, military equip-
ment, and logistical support, Communist mili-
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tary strength could be sapped, and their capa-
bilities for operations elsewhere could be re-
duced. Even under these circumstances,
these opposition groups would be unlikely to
overthrow the Chinese Communist regime in
the absence of an effective counter-revolu-
tionary movement, a political program, a
clearcut organization, competent leadership
and a plan for action.
(b) Use of Nationalist Forces.
The Nationalist Chinese Government on
Taiwan has an army in being of approxi-
mately 428,000 troops. There is considerable
doubt, however, as to the reliability and effec-
tiveness of the Nationalist forces under
present Nationalist leadership. The morale
and combat efficiency of these forces could
doubtless be substantially improved under US
training and supervision. Given adequate
logistic support, a large portion of these forces
could be landed on the mainland. There is
considerable question as to whether the Na-
tionalists could mobilize popular support on
the mainland or command the effective co-
operation of present guerrilla forces. They
might, however, be able to capitalize on exist-
ing discontent with the Communist regime.
Such an operation would for a time occupy
considerable Communist military strength.
(c) Economic Warfare and Limited Military
Action.
Although the economy of China is mainly
rural and operates at the subsistence level,
the urban segment of the economy is largely
dependent on overseas and coastal trade, and
by reason of its concentration in a few locali-
ties, is particularly vulnerable to bombard-
ment and blockade. Curtailment of foreign
trade by Western economic controls, em-
bargos, or by naval blockade, would create
urban unemployment and unrest, hinder in-
dustrial production and development, and cre-
ate serious financial difficulties. A campaign
of aerial and naval bombardment against
selected ports, rail systems, industrial capacity
and storage bases, in addition to economic
warfare measures, would seriously reduce the
military capabilities of Communist China for
sustained operations, would impair the ability
of the regime to maintain internal controls
and conceivably might imperil the stability of
the regime itself.
(d) Continuation of UN Operations in Korea.
The continued maintenance of UN military
operations in Korea would result in a signifi-
cant drain on the Chinese Communists, would
pin down a large portion of their crack troops
and reduce their war-making capabilities else-
where. It could have other far-reaching ef-
fects, such as weakening the present feeling of
invincibility, reducing the prestige the regime
is gaining from current successes, encouraging
internal opposition and straining relations
with the Kremlin.
(e) Effect of Counter-Measures.
The measures outlined in (a), (b), (c) and
(d) above, if applied in combination, would im-
peril the Chinese Communist regime. These
actions would, however, create a grave danger
of Soviet counteraction and would increase
the danger of a global war.
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
COMMUNIST CHINA
NIE -10
15 January 1951
Advance Copy
In order to expedite delivery, this estimate is
being given a special preliminary-distribution.
The final printed copy will be disseminated as
soon as available.
The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force participated in the
preparation of this estimate and concur in it. This paper
is based on information available on 15 January 1951.
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ^
Li DECLA:SS!FIE D
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DATE: L#' v? Z___ VIEWEn: b19360 ....
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COMMUNIST CHINA
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the stability of the Chinese Communist
regime, its relations with the USSR, and its probable courses
of action toward the non-Communist world.
Stability of the Chinese Communist Regime.
1. For the foreseeable future the Chinese Communist
regime will probably retain exclusive governmental control
of mainland China. Although there is undoubtedly much dis-
satisfaction with the Communist regime in China, it does
enjoy a measure of support or acquiescence and is developing
strong police controls. No serious split in the Communist
regime itself is now indicated. In particular, the regime has
effective control of the Chinese Communist army. There are
no indications that current anti-Communist efforts can achieve
a successful counter-revolution. On the basis of the slight
evidence available, it is estimated that about 700,000 men may
be engaged in active resistance operations, ranging from local
banditry to organized guerrilla warfare. There is insufficient
evidence either to substantiate or deny Nationalist claims that
a considerable number of these are associated with the Nation-
alist regime on Taiwan. These forces are creating widespread
disorders and are handicapping the Chinese Communist pro-
gram despite the fact that they are uncoordinated, lack effective
top-level leadership, and so far have developed no constructive
political program. By themselves and under present conditions
these resistance forces do not constitute a major threat to the
Chinese Communist regime.
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SE C RE T
General Objectives of Communist China.
2. The main objectives of the Chinese Communist regime
are to establish and perpetuate its own control over all Chinese
territory and to construct in China a Communist economic and
social order. The Chinese Communist aim at eliminating
Nationalist Chinese and Western power from China and con-
tiguous territories as rapidly as possible. With support of the
USSR, they aim further at the final victory of world communism
and at Chinese leadership of a Communist Far East,
Sino-Soviet Relations.
3. The Chinese Communists are clearly coordinating policy
and acting in close cooperation with the USSR. There is between
Peiping and Moscow a defense treaty. There is also at the pres-
ent time a strong bond of mutual interest in jointly protecting
the security of the two regimes, in eliminating Western influence
from Asia, and in furthering the success of international com-
munism.
4. The current Soviet program of economic and military
assistance is contributing to Communist China's ability to prog-
ress toward its military objectives. Western countermeasures
against Chinese Communist advances would render Communist
China more dependent on the USSR for such further economic
and military support as the USSR might be able or willing to
provide. It is possible that such measures would result in. Com-
munist China becoming an economic liability to the USSR.,
5. Latent possibilities of conflict between Peiping and
Moscow exist in such questions as: (a) control of Chinese
border territories like Sinkiang and Manchuria; (b) ultimate
control over Korea; (c) Soviet efforts to infiltrate and control
CONFIDENTIAL
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SECRET
the Chinese Communist government; and (d) failure of the
USSR to meet the economic and military requirements of
Communist China. But these elements of potential conflict
between Chinese national interests and Soviet imperialistic
policy and tactics are unlikely to develop at least so long
as Communist military operations against the "common
enemy" continue to be successful,
6. If Soviet strength should decline sharply in relation
to that of the US and its allies, and if, at the same time, the
Chinese Communist regime became convinced that it could
remain in power through an accommodation with the US and
its allies, the Chinese Communist regime might conceivably
attempt to break its association with the USSR. This situation
is unlikely to develop in the foreseeable future.
Immediate Chinese Communist Threats to US Security Interests.
7. The Chinese Communists are following a course of
action designed to destroy US strategic interests in the Far East
and to reduce the worldwide power position of the US and its
allies in relation to the joint power position of the USSR and
China.
8. The scale of the Chinese Communist operations in Korea
and the unwillingness of the Chinese Communists to discuss
a diplomatic settlement except on their own terms indicate that
they intend to drive UN forces out of Korea; they have already
committed a large proportion of their best troops for this
purpose, and are prepared to commit additional forces.
9. The Chinese Communists have indicated their firm
intention of capturing Taiwan in order to complete the conquest
of Chinese territory and eliminate the last stronghold of the
CONFIDENTIAL'
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SECRET *400
Nationalist regime, The Chinese Communists have the
capability for mounting an amphibious attack on Taiwan.
So long as the US Seventh Fleet is available to protect the
island, however, it is unlikely that the Chinese Communists
would undertake such an operation.
10. The Chinese Communists at present also have the
capability of intervening effectively in Indochina.-. They
have been supporting the Viet Minh for some time. Direct
intervention in strength is almost certain to occur when-
ever there is danger either that the Viet Minh will fail to
attain its military objective of driving the French out of
Indochina, or that the Bao Dai government is succeeding in
undermining the support of the Viet Minh. Even if they do
not openly intervene in Indochina, they can and probably
will increase military assistance to the Viet Minh in an
effort to make the French position untenable.
11. The Chinese Communists are also capable of secur-
ing Hong Kong at any time, and they are likely to do so when-
ever they have convinced themselves that there is no longer
any advantage in leaving Hong Kong in British hands and
whenever they are willing to accept the consequences of
hostile action against British territory. Similar considera-
tions apply to Macao. In the case of Hong Kong, they might
stay their hand so as to utilize the Hong Kong problem as a
continuing wedge between the US and UK or to preserve the
flow of trade through Hong Kong.
12. The Chinese Communists have further capabilities
of attacking Burma and of carrying on subversive activities
in other countries of Southeast Asia. It is estimated that at
present they do not have the capabilities for military attack
upon Japan.
CONFIDENTIAL
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13. Under present circumstances, the Chinese Commu-
nists probably have the military capability of concurrently
carrying on their operations in Korea, intervening effec-
tively in Indochina and Tibet, attacking Burma, and capturing
Hong Kong, while continuing to contain opposition groups
within China.
Vulnerabilities of Communist China.
14, Because of Communist China's well recognized
enormous numbers of ground forces, the great extent of its
territory, and the inadequacy of its communication routes
for large-scale Western-type military ground operations,
the counter-measures to which Communist China is most
vulnerable are the following:
(a) Support of Resistance Forces.
By supplying the active anti -Communist forces
already present in mainland China with effective
communications, military equipment, and logistical
support, Communist military strength could be sapped,
and their capabilities for operations elsewhere could
be reduced. Even under these circumstances, these
opposition groups would be unlikely to overthrow the
Chinese Communist regime in the absence of an effec-
tive counter -revolutionary movement, a political
program, a clearcut organization, competent leader-
ship and a plan for action.
(b) Use of Nationalist Forces.
The Nationalist Chinese Government on Taiwan
has an army in being of approximately 428,000 troops.
There is considerable doubt, however, as to the
CON F9 DENTIAL
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reliability and effectiveness of the Nationalist
forces under present Nationalist leadership. The
morale and combat efficiency of these forces
could doubtless be substantially improved under
US training and supervision. Given adequate
logistic support, a large portion of these forces
could be landed on the mainland. There is con-
siderable question as to whether the Nationalists
could mobilize popular support on the mainland
or command the effective cooperation of present
guerrilla forces. They might, however, be able to
capitalize on existing discontent with the Commu-
nist regime,, Such an operation would for a time
occupy considerable Communist military strength.
(c) Economic Warfare and Limited Military Action.,
. Although the economy of China is mainly rural
and operates at the subsistence level, the urban
segment of the economy is largely dependent on
overseas and coastal trade, and by reason of its
concentration in a few localities, is particularly
vulnerable to bombardment and blockade. Curtail-
ment of foreign trade by Western economic controls,
embargos, or by naval blockade, would create urban
unemployment and unrest, hinder industrial produc-
tion and development, and create serious financial
'difficulti,es. A campaign of aerial and naval bombard-
ment against selected ports, rail systems, industrial
capacity and storage bases, in addition to economic
warfare measures, would seriously reduce the mili-
tary capabilities of Communist China for sustained
operations, would impair the ability of the regime
to maintain internal controls and conceivably might
imperil the stability of the regime itself.
CONFIDENTIAL
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SECRET
(d) Continuation of UN Operations in Korea.
The continued maintenance of UN military
operations in Korea would result in a significant
drain on the Chinese Communists, would pin down
a large portion of their crack troops and reduce
their war-making capabilities elsewhere. It
could have other far-reaching effects, such as
weakening the present feeling of invincibility, re-
ducing the prestige the regime is gaining from
current successes, encouraging internal opposition
and straining relations with the Kremlin.
(e) Effect of Counter-Measures.
The measures outlined in (a), (b), (c) and (d)
above, if applied in combination, would imperil the
Chinese Communist regime. These actions would,
however, create a grave danger of Soviet counter-
action and would increase the danger of a global
war.
CONFIDENTIAL
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