OIR/DRF CONTRIBUTION TO NIE 10 COMMUNIST CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A000300030002-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 28, 2000
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 29, 1950
• Content Type: NIE

Copy No,
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O:[R URA' CONTRIIUTION TO NYE 1()
COMMUNIST CHII
Dooember 29, i9 3O
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
PR ;LIIMIIJ .RY to DI TED DRAFT
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2. STABILITY OF THE CHINESE -C0ffi3UNIST REGDSt
Ae Politioal Composition
1. The Communist Party the Dominant Influence in Government.
The People's Republic of China was created by and remains under the strict
control of the Chinese Communist Party. The Party exercises its power at all
levels of government by means of a) staffing the key positions with party
personnel; b) overseeing all personnel prooedurea including training, selection?
promotion, assignments, and salaries; o) controlling policy-making, fiscal.
legislative and secretarial organs; d) retaining oomreand over the armed forces;
and e) controlling the disciplinary and polioix.g machinery both within the Party
itself and throughout the government. In addition the Party controls all
channels of public information, all semi-official agencies (such as the All
China Federation of Labor), an ever increasing number of industrial and commercial
enterprises, and the plethora of professional, cultural, and oe;upational
associations which in themselves act as governing bodies over the populace.
The Party also exercises a supervision over all tolerated minor parties amounting
to virtual control.
In recent months the Party has acted to tighten even further its hold over
the government processes by a) strengthening the internal organization and
discipline of the Party itself, and b) restricting further the influence of
non-party people in government affairs. At the same time the Party is training
the younger generation to serve as a new and presumably more trustworthy bureau-
cracy,,
2. Role and Political Orientation of Armed Forces and Police
The armed forces and political police, like the civil arm of the government,,
are dominated by the Party: -- most top-level military officials are trusted
party veterans; commanders at all echelon levels are checked by party-appointed
political commissar.; roughly 60% of the Field Army troops are party members;
and the entire body of military personnel are subjected to regular Party-imposed
indoctrination and discipline. Communist leaders have displayed great skill in
the maintenance of unity and coordination in the growth of the army, so that it
is not only well disciplined, but well controlled? Recent steps toward
"nationalizing" all armies have had the effect of materially reducing the chances
of ambitious commanders pursuing independent courses by exploiting their troops
personalized loyalty to them.
Since the arnr is an arm of the Party. its actions have always been linked
closely to the' Partygs political moves. In many cases the army has served as
the vanguard of the Party and thus has been one of the most important elements
in the Party's rise to power. Today the aruW represents the backbone of Party
control over the mainland as well as the basis for its power-politics approach
to international affairs,,
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The political policy, or public security force, is used by the Party
for bandit-suppression, counter-espionage, prevention of sabotage, and the
enforcement of political and ideological conformity to the Party's programs,
In general the police are less well oriented to Party leadership. While there
is no question that the Party directs the top organs of the police, the ,
efficiency of the police force is hampered by the necessity to retain ex.
Nationalist personnel in the lower echelons. The lack of competent and loyal
police personnel (which is leas of a problem in the rural areas where the
military has primary responsibility for public security) is currently being
corrected by intensive training programs and the weeding out of unreliable
individuals.
BQ Internal Stability
I. bxtent or paoifloation of Opposition Forces Within Mainland China.
Large areas, especially the newly occupied territories in East
South
,
and Southwest China, are not yet under the full control of the Chinese Communists.
The Communists, however, veterans in the arts of guerrilla warfare, have shown
themselves capable of effectively containing resistance elements and of keeping
down any serious uprisings.
There is no place on the China mainland today where an opposition force
has established a strong base of operations of a type similar to the Communist
border regions of preaoonquest days. Bandits and/or guerrilla bands have been
effectively isolated and their anti-&cvernment activities have been reduced to
scattered, sporadic operations limited by a general lack of weapons, funds,
leadership and organization.
Nationalist leadership has been thoroughly discredited in the minds of
guerrilla leaders and Nationalist support of their operations has been ineffective.
The prospect of an organized "Third Force" movement around which anti-communist
elements could rally also appears negligible at this t ime.
In the event of a sustained attack in force arainat the Chinese mainland
some measure of support could be expected from the anti-government elements on
the mainland if funds and materials were supplied in quantity. Short of such
aid the Communist military and militia appear capable of containing and eventually
of eliminating present opposition forces.
2. Abilit of Chinese Communist Regime to Control the Peoples of China
The Chinese Communist regime enjoys a strong position with respect to the
f;enar'l populace. In spite of growing discontent among some elements of the
population the regime has gained thi acceptance of important groups in the urban
areas (professional people, technicians, youth, student class, laborers, many
intellectuals, rank and file party and government people, etc.) and the passive
support of those who do not accept Communist policy but who grudgingly admire
the zeal, honesty, and competency of. Communist administration. Most politically
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In the rural: areas, especially those in the newly occupied territories south
of the Yangtze River, the Communist have experienced treater hostility but
here too their positive programs seem to have engendered some degree of confidence
among the people while their forceful police-actions have limited the avenues
of open resistance.
In assesing the degree of popular support enjoyed by the regime several
factors favor the Comnunists9s position:
(a)
The Communisi~s control of all civil, military, and police power.
Previous rulers (including the J MT) have governed China for
many years with considerably loss power than the Communists
now commend-
(b) The Communist's control over sources of livelihood.
(a) The Communists' positive p ogram of action administered by a
resourceful and political) astute leadership.
(d) The Com'munists' intensive propaganda and information program
backed by deeds and keyed to the nationalist aspirations of
the Chinese people. In this program the Communists have
identified the Party with the hopes and aspirations of almost
every class of society, while exploiting the failures and
political bankruptcy of the Kuomintang.
In the course of consolidating their position the Communists in-
evitably have aroused resentments. The chief causes of popular discontent have
been a) too much government and too much interference in the life of the
individual; b) burdensome taxes and general economic distress; c) failure to
fulfill pre-oonquest promises; and to a lesser extent, d) the pro-Soviet,
anti-American position of the Party. In addition the Communist have incurred
the hatred of those who have lost prerogatives. enjoyed under the Nationalists.
Too much weight should not be given reports of popular disillusionment
and discontent with the regime. The mass of Chinese have known nothing but
authoritarian government and they have demonstrated considerably forbearance
in the fade of longstanding abuses and maladministration. As long as the
regime maintains its vitality and its present record of success it will continue
to have the acceptance if not the active support of most mainland Chinese.
3. Immediate Economic Problems and Effect on Political Stability.
The most urgent economic problem facing the Communists today is the
necessity for increasing already burdensome taxes,in order to support increased
military requirements. The heavier tax burden will fall primarily on the rural
population and undoubtedly will provoke considerable discontent. The greater
part of the revenue, however, will be collected in the Yangtze Valley and
northern rural areas where Communist control is solidified and vdiere increased
unrest is not likely to affect the regime's control within the forseeable future.
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The Communists will-not press direct rural taxes too strongly in South China
until such time as they can spare the additional administrative and military
personnel required to first consolidate their position.
A second economic problem of immediate importance arises from the
Communist9e administration of the cities,, the center of Chinaas most politically
conscious population. So far the regime has gained the general backing of
the urban population by convincing the populace (a) that the Communists inherited
from the Nationalists a bankrupt economy aggravated still more by such external
factors as blockade, bombing, and national calamities, and (b), that the Communist
administration was capable, honese and earnest in its attempts to ameliorate
the situation. At the same time the regime has been able to claim credit for
domestic accomplishments (controlling inflation, rejuvenatinp urban-rural trade
to some degree, railroad reconstruction, etc.) and has been able to point to
achievements in international affairs (most notably the successes in Korea).
Despite the achievements to. date, the basic economic problems of the
cities have not been solved. Industry and trade remain dislocated and unemploy-
ment continues, while current military demands jeopardize the prospects of long-
range reconstruction. The persistence of such conditions will tax the administra-
tive resourcefulness-of the regime, and, in the long run, may adversely effect
its ability to retain the confidence of the urban population.
IC. S. Prospeata of
solution of Formosa question
There is little prospect that a solution of the Formosa problem can
be achieved through the UN. On the one hand there is no indication that
Communist China and the Soviet Union would accept any proposal short of
recognition of the sovereignty of the Communist authorities over the area,
or that the Nationalists would willingly relinquish their sovereignty. On
the other hand, there is little likelihood that the United Kingdom, India,
France and other non-Communist members of the UN would welcome or support
proposals looking toward some form of UN trusteeship over the island or giving
UN sanction to the continuation of Nationalist control.
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II . CHINESE C0,,UIUNIST UUJECrIVES
A. Objectives and aims prior to rise to power
The major objectives and ai.:.s of the Chinese Coirsautijsts before
their assumption of national leadership in October 1949 were sot forth
in the writings and speeches of :.,ao Tse-tung, notably "China's 1:ew
i mocracy" (1940) and "Un Coalition uovernnent" (1946). Those aims
.were as followa s
1. To destroy the authority of the Kuotintang. Party and
government and to destroy the power and influence of
those social- groups that, nad supported it.
2. To eradice16 eastern cultural and econo4c influence
in China dnd create a new political and cultural
orientation based on Soviet example.
3. To replace the far?ily-oriented outlook of traditional
Chinese isooiety with new political and cultural values
derived1fram Marxist ideology.
4. To create a centralized "coalition" government based
on an alliance of four Revolutionar;, classes -- the
national bourgeiosie, petty bourgeioisie, peasantry,
and workers -- an alliance led by the Communist Party.
5. To create a "semi-socialist" eoonoiry conbining vestigial
elements of private capitalism with cooperative, state-
directed, and state-owned enterprises.
6. To carry out a program of land reform calculated to
(a) eliminate local sources of political opposition;
(b) enlist peasant support; (c) bring the force of
Cornnunist authority .core closely to bear on the rural
communities.
7. To ire.;erve China's national autonor>y.
8? To retain membership in the world Coaununist movement.
~i. ? Ub ~eatives since rise to power
Since their successful establishment of national leadership in
China, in October 1949, the Chinese Communists have placed. increasing
emphasis on political and economic staoility, at the expense of the
rapid achievement of their long-range socialist objectives. toreover,
since June 1950, they have tended to sacrifice gains-in the field of
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domestic reconstruction at home by embarking on a policy of military
expansion abroad.
The major objectives which emerge from the internal and external
policies pursued by the Communist since 1949 are briefly as follows;
1. On the domestic front the Cormmunist objectives are:
a. To increase production, both agricultural and
industrial, while reducing consumption;
b. To create the foundations for a modern industrial
plant;
o. To shift the base of Party operations to urban areas;
d.' To eliminate counter-revolutionary elements by ri(
tightening ideological controls and by strengthening
the defense and security forces;
e. To carry out a gradual and limited program of agrarian
reform; one which will not interfere with the prior
of increasing or at least maintaining current
levels of agricultural production.
2. In the field of international relations, the~Cormmunist
objectives are:
a. To gain sovereignty over Taiwan and Tibet, by force
if necessary;
b. To aid and abet vorld Communist objectives in, Korea
and Southeast Asia;
o. To expel tiestern economic and cultural influences
from China;
d. To retain a position of informal leadership among,
Asiatic Communist parties;
e. To secure China's borders and to assure China access
to needed commodities;
f. To maintain close and amicable relations with the
USSR and world Communist leadership;
g. To gain recognition for China's equal and sovereign
position among nations of the world.
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C. Relation of above to Soviet objectives
The domestic objectives and cost of the international objectives
of Coru.unist China are compatible with those of the USSR., However, to
the extent that the USSR seeks (a) to consolidate control over Coc:u-.cunist
China and (b) eventually to establish Soviet domination over Asia,
Soviet objectives will come into sharp conflict with the Chinese
Communist aims of preserving national autoraony, securing China+s borders
and retaining a lea4ership position among other asiatic Communist parties.
(The situations under which these objectives are likely to conflict
together with an ap,'raisal of possible cocaproc:1ises; are discussed in part
IV below).
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III. RVIE i iL ECO'6Q.'.IC AND POI.ITIC& FACTO ;3
A. Role of overseas Chinese
The Chinese Communists, fully alive to potentialities of the
large Chinese overseas co:usunities, have. expended Great effort in
seeking to extend their control over those communities, especially
in areas near to China. Their strategy to gain such control has
involved principally the use of front organizations, appeals to
nationalism and self-interest, attention to youth, and pressure
exerted through control of remittances which overseas Chinese seek to
deliver to their relatives in China. The Chinese Communists have been
successful in securing a certain amount of financial assistance for
their regime, and have built up a nucleus of supporters who can b?
utilized for fifth colunn activitios if needed. However, the Communists
have not yet been able to induce the rsajority of even nearby overseas
Chinese to support their cause wholeheartedly. Progress is hampered
by the circumstance that almost all overseas Chinese come from areas
of south China where anti-oos.:,lunist sentiment is strongest. Reported
opposition by overseas Chinese to the Communists is not organized, nor
does it include any indication of a significant rebirth of confidence
in the Kuomintang. ..oat nearby overseas Chinese will probably offer at
least passive acquiescence to the Coam:,unists if they beco:..e convinced
that there is no practical alternative.
B. Effectiveness of pressure from other Asian governments
The Chinese Communists proclaim their role as defenders of Asia and
leaders In the struggle to elis,.Lnate foreign imperialism from Asia.
They may respond to pressure from other Asian governments on minor issues,
but not on major ones so long as those governments do not appear able
and willing to thwart Communist Aspirations. The Chinese Communists have
demonstrated their capacity to disregard the" desires of other Asian
governments if a serious conflict of interest exists, as in the case of
India in the recent Tibetan invasion. The Chinese Co.mmmunists obviously
regard the Asiatic nations as pupils requiring China's guidance rather
than as partners to be consulted. No Asian government nor likely cowbina-
tion of governments seems strong enough to be able to exert enough
pressure on the Chinese Communists in the iimiediate future to dissuade
them from-any action which the Communists consider essential.
C. Vulnerability to economic warfare
Although China has a predominantly primitive and rural economy,
the introduction of modern industry and transport has created a
small sector of the ooono.1r which is highly productive. The high
proportion of savings which can be made available out of the income
of this "modern sector" to finance current Covernaent requireuento
gives this area of the economy a special significance. According to
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current budgets, the Chinese Communists plan to finance through urban
revenues and the earnings of government enterprise some three-fifths
of their expenditures in China proper and three-quarters in Lianchuria.
The productivity of this "modern sector" is intimately related
to conditions of China's foreign trade. Most of China's exports
represent the activation of marginal resources which would otherwise
remain wholly or largely unemployed. Industrial, transport, and
communications facilities depend upon imports of capital goods, raw
materials, and producers' goods for their maintenance and operation.
Economic warfare could immediately reduce the income and productivity
of the "modern sector" in denying the advantages of exchange offered
by foreign trade, and in the long run, could effect a progressive
deterioration of the "modern sector" through denying essential imports
of maintenance equipment, raw materials, and producers' goods. This
deterioration, however, could be retarded somewhat through compensating
imports from the USSR. Economic warfare would not greatly affect the
rural economy, which employs perhaps 80 percent of the population, and
therefore would not necessarily affect the political stability of the
Chinese Communist regime. However, in destroying a major source of
government revenues, economic warfare would necessitate increased
rural taxes or a reduction in government expenditures. Since the
first alternative would probably require the re.-deployment of Military
forces for garrison duty, it seems likely that either eventuality
would reduce the Chinese Comaunist potential for external :military
efforts.
D. Vulnerability to air bombardment and naval blockade
Aerial bombardment and naval blockade could achieve the objectives
of economic warfare far more quickly. Naval blockade could ensure a
complete cessation of seaborne foreign trade, while aerial bombardment
could reduce modern transport facilities and industrial output. Aerial
operations against the Manchurian rail r-4 u,,,,x-k {ould minimize the
possibility of compensating imports from the USSR by rail.
In addition, aerial bombardment could directly affect the
military potential of the Chinese Communist regime. The disruption of
the E,1anchurian rail network would reduce the flow of material from the
USSR, while operations against the transport system: in China would
prevent the rapid movement of rd litary forces, thereby increasing
internal security requirements.
Aerial bombardment and naval blockade could therefore be expected
to reduce rapidly the domestic resources available to the Chinesq
Communist regime, to limit the flow of military supplies from the USSR,
and to increase the requirements for garrison duty to maintain order
within China. The effective achievexnent of these objectives could be
expected to limit the capacity of the Chinese Communists to sustain a
strong ext1,crn::1 military effort.
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IV- PROBABLE FUTUR LATIONS BETWEEN C0..1UUNIST CBI AND THE USSR
A. Basic Elements in the helationship between the Soviet Union and Communist China
Throughout its-history the Chinese Communist Party has acted in consbn-
anoe with the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. Following the Party's acces-
sion to national power in China, indioatims have pointed to an even stronger,
fixation of this alignment. There is no reasonable prospect that any change
in the relationship gill occur so long as the course of action charted by pre-
sent leadership of the Chinese party meets, with no overwhelming disaster.
The binding tie between the Chinese Communists and the USSR is a common
interest in the preservation and promotion of the world Communist movement.
All the relevant evidence demonstrates that the Chinese party, like most other
non-Russian Communist parties, has accepted and continues to accept the the4is
that its future and the future of the movement toward "world socialism" are
dependent upon the continued existence of the Russian Communist state, which,
in turn, is always threatened by the major non-Communist nations. Given this
fundamental tenet, subordination of Chinese policy to Soviet policy (or coordin-
ation of the two policies) is for the Chinese Communist leaders an entirely
logical and, indeed, necessary procedure.
When it is recalled that most of the Chinese Communist leaders have made
their oareere in almost total isolation from the non-Communist world,, it becomes
the more understandable that neither the shifts and turns in Soviet policy, nor
the burden of national responsibility in China have shaken their assumption
that an identity of interest exists between themselves and the Soviet Unions
It is possible that this conviction was hardened by actions of other powers,
notably by US assistance to the National Government during the post-1945 phase
of the Chinese civil war. There can be little doubt, however, that this,con-
viotion has been a basic part of Chinese Communist doctrine from the date
of the party's founding.
B. Possible Sources of Conflict between Communist China and the USSR
It is quite obvious that issues exist that oo-ld give rise to serious
differences between Communist China and the USSR. These issues may be summar-
ized under the following six headings:
(i) The probable anxiet of Peiping over the extent of the Soviet share
in the technical and nanaersat operations of indus ry in Manchuria and over
North hinao 'or Peiping, these circumstances represent a threat To He ultim
mate a to nment of full control over its own territory, and especially over
the Manchurian economy. For the USSRD these circumstances provide some check
on Communist China's actions now and. would facilitate any Soveit attempt to
dominate china eventually. The maintenance of Soviet advisors at their pre-
--,-sent posts in Lenohuria and the continuation of direct Soviet partici
ation
p
in the management of certain Manchurian factories would perpetuate the important
.Sgviet role in the growth of Communist China's chief source of modern military
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oquipmeu Ep -~i ale he teaanos of Soviet troops and nWal vessels in Kwantung
would somewhat enhance the Soviet Union's ability to attack Manchuria by land
from the north and by sea from the south.
(2) Possible Soviet' anxiet over the reintroduction of Chinese Communist
influence Into Korea. This development represents an alteration of the origin
a policy where y afore the June 1950 invasion Chinese Communist influence
within the Korean Communist leadership had been eliminated thus making the
Soviet border more secure in another quarter and consolidating the Soviet en-
circlement of Chinese Communist territory by land and sea. The diminuition
of Soviet influence in Korea, of whatever magnitude, might therefore augur
Soviet efforts to remove at some more propitious time both the Chinese Communist
troops and the Korean Communist afents of Peiping's will, or to achieve a
firmer control over these Chinese Communist troops by other means. For the
'Chinese Communists, the reassertion of their influence in Korea would help
to deny the USSR another base from which pressure could be applied against
Manchuria and would assist materially whatever plans they may have for aohievv
ing dominance over the Japanese Communist Party and ultimately for acquiring
unchallenged access to Japanese industrial products.
(3) The probable#nxiety _9-f-- ciping over the potential tent of
Soviet influenpp.-.in iang made possible by the anti- h sae sentiment
existing among the majority of.Sinkiang's inhabitants, by the presence of
non-Chinese Communists and the pressure upon Peiping to increase their num-
ber, and by the dominant Soviet role in the province's extractive ooonomyo
The withdrawal of Chinese Communist authority from Sinkiang would be a blow to
the domestic prestige of the Chinese Communist regime and would advance the
limits of iosoow's authority that much closer around China north of the Yangtze
River, an area containing the main material sources of Peiping's power. On
its part, the USSR recognizes Sinkiang to be a source of some essential mineral
(tungsten and tin) as well as a territory in which Peiping's authority can be
harassed if necessary.
(4) The possibility sf di f f ng- opinions over the aaturQ :and timing
of Chinese Communist and. Soviet' actions to be taken_with_respeat to the non-
pooasibisaibililt of henrs and
t, an3 ie
tgoIfrt the resentment Communist Parties in the Far Eaa d
t ent of one-eide at independent actions taken by the
other side in this sphere,
(5) The irritation of the Chinese Communists that would follow a fail-
ure_by__theSoviet Union to fulfil.l-_auch.-oommitmente. as it had made regarding
action in hurope for the purpose of rendering.ii1direot aid to Chinese Communist
plans and actions in the Far East.
(6) The res_entment._of'_ Peipisi _ at Soviet attempts to subvert the Chinese
Communist Party and its , instrumentalities. `~----
With regard to all of these possible, sources of oonfliot, certain factors
more or leas peculiar to the Chinese Communist position may.enhance the possi-
bility that differences will be difficult to-reoonoil*. Unlike the eastern
European.satellites, the Chinese regime oame into power mainly by its own
efforts. whatever debt may be owed for Soviet material aido no Soviet divi-
alone on the border or in the county;; are needed to prop up the government.
In the process of achieving power, the Chinese Communists appealed to nation-
alist sentiment and successfully attracted much of it to their cause. To
retain this support ?. or, negatively, to keen nationalist o osition within
tolerable si d.Ftp~e2~%q(j0# /i : `- Wea0igHP039R9~ppp to
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Russian interests in China. The presence of large numbers of Soviet "advisers"
in a country with so xenophobic a cultural tradition as China must be an irria
tacit even within the ranks of the Communist Party, It is al least imaginable
that ciroumstances could arise in which the Communist leaders would find it
politic to appease such domestic sentiment at the expense of the Soviet alliance.
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C. Capabilities of Communist China for pursuing independent courses of action
Objectively, there is no naeessary impediment to the choice by the
Chinese Communist regime of a course of action independent of the USSR.
The ultimate instrument of domestic power, the Chinese Red Army, is
uniquely the creation of the present Chinese Communist leadership. Its top
commanders are tested members of the inner circle of the Chinese Communist
Party. Although it is almost wholly dependent upon the Soviet Union for new
supplies of armor, vehiolee, and aircraft, its domestic responsibilities can
be discharged effectively without such equipment. Undoubtedly there has been
a measure of Stalinist infiltration into the command struoture and into the
political connisaar system. It is quite beyond belief, however, that this
process could have so subverted the arir{y's loyalty as to make it any decisive
degree unresponsive to the command of the Pei-p'ing government.
In China the political police constitute a distinctly secondary mechanism
of control. The organization is now undergoing a rapid expansion, presumably
under Soviet tutelage. There is no reason to doubt that the Soviet intention
is to capture and control it. There is equally no reason to sxpect the police
system to achieve sufficient power to enable it to sway the re':ime so long
as the aruy remains loyal to the Party's leaders.
The Chinese Communist Party itself -- and the labor unions and peasant
associations subordinate to it cannot yet have been brought under detailed
Stalinist control except on ^ localized basis, as in parts,of Sinkiang and in
the Kwantung peninsula of Manchuria where Soviet. influence has been dominant for
a number of years. The obstacles to wholesale Soviet penetration are simply
too great to make credible any other conclusion: the very size of the party
organization, the language and cultural barriers to be overcome, and, most
importantly,, the fact that the Pei-p'ing leadership to date has successfully
achieved the Party's immediate goals.
If this estimate is correct and obviously it rests not on detailed
intelligence reporting but on an analysis of what might be possible in'the
Chinese situation ? then. the Chinese party need not have undue fears as to the
effect of the USSR's intra-party influence in the event of a Sino-Soviet split.
Weapons at the command of the USSR, then, come to economic retaliation or
military intervention by the Soviet Armor. The Chinese leadership must be aware
that the one could not be decisive and that the other; from the Soviet point
of view, is impracticable. China not only is not dependent economically on the
USSR, but it cannot, in fact obtain in adequate quantities from Soviet sources
such critically needed imports as raw cotton and petroleum. The Pei.p'ing
Politburo would have to be totally blind to the lesson of Tito not to realize
that the Rest could be relied upon to more than compensate for a cessation of
Soviet exports to China. As for actual Soviet military intervention, the Chinese
planners could reason with assurance that the UScR'a strategic situation would
not permit the allocation of Red Arny resources to a potentially indecisive
adventure in China.
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It is possible, of course, that the leaders of Communist China have
concluded that by intervening ov=rtly in Korea they have forfeited any hope
of obtaining Western sympathy and asaistanoe and that they thus have a
choice only between association with the USSR and oomplete and hopeless isolation.
Such a conclusion would require so complete a misreading of the developments
in Yugoslavia and so absolute a misunderstanding of the current international
scene as to make it, conservatively stated, unlikely.
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D. Possibility of a break between the USSR and Communist China
If the potential motivation and the capabilities for turning
from the USSR can be said to exist, is there then any real likelihood
that a breakc will occur?
Abstractly, of course, it could. The Soviets might push too hard
and too fast for concessions in China that would take the present pro-
Stalinist Chinese leadership balk at accepting the burden of the result-
ing pro-Nationalist resentment. The Kremlin might insist upon
assigning to China anti-viestern tasks too hazardous even for the
Pei-piing regime in its presently reckless mood. A split in the
Chinese party might bring into power a nationalist Gomiunist leadership
comprised of military commanders unwilling to sacrifice Chinese
interests and armies to the Soviet Union's aims.
Already, certainly, there must be a wide measure of restiveness
within the Chinese party over the consequences of the Soviet associa-
tion. This ranges, probably, from resentzent occasioned by the preferential
treat4ant that undoubtedly is accorded in China to Soviet "experts" to
dismay at the risks incurred as a result of the USSR's original Korea
venture and the subsequent Chinese entry into a shooting war with the
best. The absence of any reliable reports of intro-party purges suaj;ests
that to date such disaffection been kept within narrow I! -,-its. h over-
theless, it can scarcely fail to grow if Chinese armies are embroiled
over a long period in a bloody war in Korea, as the hardships rosulting
from the diminution of trade with the hest become more burdensome, and
as it becomes fully clear that the job of national reconstruction and
development must be postponed into some indefinite future.
For all this, however, the expectation of any early split between
Pei-p Ling and '&'oscow reaiaina a matter of wishing and hoping by analysts
in Belgrade and in other interested capitals. Thus far, every word and
action of the Chinese Couu:unist regime has fitted neatly into the
Soviet scheme of things. i'urtheri.ore, the actions have been crowned
.with a large degree of success. On this point, it needs to be
recognized, no Chinese, in or out of the Communist Party, can be
entirely displeased at the exploits of Chinese armies against r+eetern
military power. If this is the case generally, how much more must the
Korean success have impressed the leaders in Pei>p?ing? Having taken
the gravest kinds of risks, in collaboration with Moscow, they have
thus far gained an accretion of power and influence probably far beyond
their original expectations. To break the tie with .Loscovvr now would
mean for them the abandonment of these very results of their so far
successful gamble.
It is far more realistic, therefore, to reason that the Chinese
regime, having committed itself to the i,:oscow association in about the
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most overt fashion possible, has no present intention of altering its
course. The possibility that the Soviets may overreach themselves in
dealing with so demonstrably potent a junior partner cannot be entirely
excluded. To look forward optitnittioally to such a development,
however, requires the adoption of two related premisess first, that the
Kremlin learned nothing at all from its 4eoalculation in Yugoslavia;
second, that tue?SoTiet Politburo is so laokint; in appreciation of the
USSR's short-term self-interest (during a period of utmost tension with
the West) that it would be uawilling to make the miuitnum concessions
and compromises needed to keep China Co-m-runist a willing and even anxious
ally. These prerr ises seat, hopelessly farfetched*
bibat may rationally be expected, then, is a continuance of close
foreign policy association between Communist China and the USSR for a
period of indefinite duration. For the Chinese regime, moreover, this
association will represent a voluntary act, calculated by its own
standards to serve its own overriding interests o
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