CONTRIBUTION TO NIE-9: TURKEY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A000300020004-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 26, 2000
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 8, 1951
• Content Type: NIE

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S
COI~'TRIBUTION T4 ILMa TU M
January 8, 1951
State Dept. declassification & release instructions on file
Office of Intelligence Research
Department of State
cot
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CONTRIBUTION TUPJ
PRO - To estimate Turkey's position in the Eist-West conflict
and the implications thereof.
'I. - , !S FOREIGN IC! ORIENTATION
A. k c PolUff tows the USSR a is S nilgg and toward
the Western mowers. Turkey's deep-seated fear and distrust of Russia "r
expansionist' aims may be traced back to the period of Peter the treat;
when the rising, Russian state began to contest Ottanan hegemony in
the Black Sea area. In the succeeding centuries the two powers were
frequently in conflict and sometimes at war, Possessing superior
strengths Russia continued to advance but was at times halted by
Western support of the declining Ottomn I+pireo The revolutionary
regimes which succeeded the old orders in the two countries were ter.-
17 aligned in the early 19203s, sharing a coonon desire to resist
Western interference and a common dismal of imperialist policies
of the past. Later in the decades holaever, relations be{;an to owl
as the Krenlin saw a nationalists non-Carmiunist.regime develop in TV
and as the Turks, consistently 6us:)3daus of Prussian expensionien
improved their relations with Western European powers. Turkey's
alignment with the West became clearer at the Montreux conference
of 19369 where the Turks gained the right to refortify.the straits.
The Soviet-German pact of August 1939 engendered the worst
fears in Turkish minds as to Russians purpose. The Turkish Government
then attempted to elicit from Nos r
de Iqr tion of esuranoe
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but was rebuffed. In October the UK and France signed with Turkey a
c~ra~rni
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mutual assistance pact which, although specifioelly excluding a
Turkish obligation to talce action 1334m4cal to the USSR, produced strew
uoua objections by I2osoow. During most of World War III Turd
pursued a formal ollay of neutralitg, inclining slightly in favor
of Whatever force urkeyI a vicinity was ` stronger at the - times As
the Allies gained ascendancy in Europe, Turkey broke t?ith the A,is
in 19" and in February 1945 declared war. on Germany and Ja'an, thus
gaining admission to the UN as a charter nember,
The USSRts ;)ost.A?rnr intention to deciinate peripheral. areas
was dernonstratdd, in March 1945'uhen Moseo : denounced the Russo-Turkish
treaty of friendship of 1925 and rejected Turkish offers to continue
or replace it. In the fbllocring years, the Soviet Union has consist.
ently applied official and unofficial pressure on Turkey, in 1946
the USSR demanded revision of the Montreux convention to place
eoritrol of the straits in the hand of the Black 'Sea -powers. Atakora
refused to deal unilaterally xrith the USSR and wan supported by the
Western powers, Soviet propagandists have enunciated claims to
territory In eastern Turkey, and have denounced the Turkish regime.
vilified Turkish leaders, attacked Turkeys close association with
the US, and attempted to incite revolt against the Turkish C-ovenamt,
In addition, Bulgaria has assd a threatening posture an acs
European frontier and recently announced its intention to expel to
Turkey 250,000 Moslems.
The Turks have stood firm against Soviet and Satellite
I pressure, On the one band they have refused to be Mmzked into
I hasty or ill-advised actions, have avoided aeessary provocation of
the USSR, and have Indicated a willir- ssto discuss issues with
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the USSR under appropriate circumstances. On the other hand, they
have made it clear that they are strongly adverse to a policy of
appeasement and are determined to resist any Soviet attempts to
encroach on their national independence and territorial Integrity.
In their search for support against the USSR, Turkey was
impelled to look beyond the veal ened nations of western Europe.,
in the post-war period,. partioularly after the We contraction of
its cairn itments in the eastern Meditexyrane*n, While the Turks re.
affirm their adherence to the Tripartite treaty of mutual assistance,
it is apparent that they consider that its value is less as a direct
guarantee of British and French assistance than as an indirect and
tenuous obligation on the US. Turke7vs participation in the UK is
domiu:ated by the same objectives, Turkish repiesentativee are
active in the. delegations of the UN and its associated organizations#
and the Turks generally support the UN as an emerging system for the
preservation of the security of all nations. Turkey is more
willing than most umbers to nake the UK an effective forme but have
no illusions as to its present strength,
Turkey looks to the US for present and future support. In 1947
the US, udder the Truman doctrine, be-an to supply military equipment
and technical advice, with the objective of bolstering Turkish
determination to resist Soviet pressure and of Increasing Turkey?s
capability to resist possible outright Soviet or Satellite animutar,
Later US economic aid, including EC& and Fbdmbank f ads, was extends
to assist the Turks in carrying the financial burden of Its defense
forces, and to build'a strong econanic base, both for its defense
effort and for the development of economic and political stability,
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Although US pronouncements of its interest in the preservation
of Turkey's security and extension of military-and economie assistance
have given the Turks a large measure of aesuranose they are still
deeply concerned by the lack of a formal guarantee that the U$ will remie?:
prompt and effective aid in the event of $u:aian aggression, Raving
been thus far unable to obtain a direct US commitment - consistently,
the primary Turkish objective - the Turks lave sought less direct
E guarantees through membership in NATO or -through the formation of
an eastern Mediterranean security organisation baOwd by the US, To
the Turksp associate membership in NATO represents only a alight
improvur~ent in their situation. Formation of a Mediterranean bloc
without A4 support would offer no advantages and has been firmly opposI
by Turkey,
8, Reasons for Turkevas astern alj t Turkey's foreign
policy is essentially a function of the desire of a smalls highly
unified nation to preserve its independence in the face of implicit
threats by a powerful neighbor determined to secure control over
peripheral areas, The Turks are acutely conscious that their
geographical position in this southern flank of the Soviet W aim
astride the waterway connecting the Black Sea and the Mediterranean
place their country in an area of primary ,ono m to the IESR0 More
realistic than most other nations, the Turks seek to ally themselves
with the power or combination of powers with the capabilltjr of
opposing superior force to the USSR. The political,, social'
and idaQiogical'affinities that exist between Turkey and the western
powers strengthen Turkeys a alignment, but they are of lesser important
App1~'! RS~1'acb2~ID0.ction
to the attempts, by foreign powers to dominate and then to dismember
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the Ottoman Empire. The nation that emerged in Anatolia under
Ataturkas leaders!4p was highly nationalistic and having in the follow.
ing years divested itself of disparate elements, is 96 percent ethnically
Turkish. Unified in their determination to preserve the natiam the Turks
oppose the USSR not necessarily because of the political and economic
philosophy which it professes,, but because the Soviet Union is the
heir of previous Russian regimes that had coveted Turkish territory.
Well in advance of other peoples, the Turks perceived that Cammmism
was essentially a new form of Russian imperiaaism. Few Turkish individ.
uals, therefore, are attracted to Communism as a politico.econaoie
doctrine, and those who have indicated a sympathy for Cammmiem are
soon imprisoned. Maintenance of internal security by the effective
Turkish police is a relatively easy task.
The political institutions of Turkey, modeled by Ataturk on those
of the westw were accepted by a great majority of the people and have
rapidly become rooted in the Turkish soil. The extension of democracy
is building a stronger base for Turkish national powers and is
developing ideological ties with the western democracies, It is not
improbable that a dictatorial Turkey would be as firmly aligned with
the west, but it would not possess as effective
national powerQ
The extension of US military and economic assistance to Turkey
rco! nforced Turkish determination to resist Soviet piessure but did not
create or substantially modify that determination. Perhaps the most
significant effect of US aid was to bolster the Turkish eoonagr, which
was sa/*ging under the weight of - defense. expenditures and decline of the
export trade,
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III. POSSIDILITIEs OF A SI
6
Virtually the only ciroasustanee that would lead Turkey to abandon
its present alignment with the US would be a decision by the tS to
abandon its global ec itmenta and to retire beind the Atlantic and
Pacific Oceans. It may be, presumed that the USSR would seize the
opportunity thus presented by insisting first on minor and then iman*e
important concession fray Turl:vV. The present Turkish government would
probnb3.y yield on some toints anc4 than resign in favor of neutrality.,
minded elements possibly nembers offt -atft+14?conservative Party of
the Nation in eaeibination with individual leftists in the hope that
the new government would be able to. reach an acc!miodation with the
USSR.
A reduction in the US power position as the result of local
Softet/tatellite victories in the Balkans or the Middle Heat or of
further reverses in the cold war would not significantly alter Tur4ey?s
aliment it, in suffering, such losses, the US demonstrated its
fundamental aim of continuing the struggle against the Soviet Unions
The Turks are conditioned to expect fwper reverses of the free
world, bat have faith that ultimately the US will lead the free world
to victory,
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V. PRODAME TURKISH OOURSES OF ACTION IN THE MOT OF IJAR .119D TE
IMMICATIONS THEM'
Ao
D.
Co
the event that the Korean conflict were expanded to involve dixaet
bostilities..wjth Cor mist China, the Ti?rkiah reaction would be
In
ambulant, On the one hand, Turkey would still bg lapelled to
support action against the Chinese Communists by its conviction that
all nations threatened by Soviet imperialism must stand together and
by its desire to demonstratefully to the US its reliability as an
a13y1 On the other bond' the Turks would become?much more concerned
with their own situation vie.a-1s the.USSR and would view unfavorably
any greater aothmitmeist of US military strength in the Far Eastp unless
such caarrasitment were ratcbed or even exceeded by expansion of US
strength In the eastern Mediterranean and US guarantees to Turkey,
The line of action actually adopted by Turkepr would be determined
largely by the TF Lah Oovertmentle estimate of its eeuuri- positico
at the moments, and the decision .muld not be made until after extended
eons derstion
if the UN formes were driven out of Norm and instituted a
campaign of social bonbardment and naval blockade against Cocmuniat
Chimp Turkey would undoubtedly give diplamatte supnort to such action
in the UN and elsewhere and would probably continue to provide the
services of the Turkish Brigade and possibly a naval emit or two.
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 US im olveent in a war with Ccrmn nist Chios would ereat .alum
in Turkey, not because the weakness of ocaman resolve in the tree emr3rd
would beams clears but because such a devslropment would lead the Turks
to question US capability to, assist Turkey if the latter were attacked.
In these oircumstanoesp Turkeyes.decisio would be long delayed and it
wrw3d be careful to avoid aqy now provaoatian of the USSR and its
Satellites*
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D. brbXvp M&-Ina Ren a not
att ems, The cardinal objectIVI in Turkish -strategic think
is defense of the countryae frontiers. The goverrmentas decision to sent
troops to Korea was reached only after long deliberation and was Justit?3.(r19
against opposition criticism, by reference to obligation of the UN
Charter. More Importantly, it was made under ciratmmetanees in which
a lesser Soviet satellite was the aggressor and the forces aligned
against North Korea appeared formidable.
In the event of a general war in which Turkey is not attacked
by the USSR, the Turks would not save immediately. Turkish action
would be governed largely by the Turks' estimate of the Western powers&
capabilities and intentions in the eastern Maditerraneaa,. Turkey is
not obligated by treaty to assist neighboring states to resist aggressic
and. is unlikely to join in any regional security pact unless such o pad
commits the US to cane to the aid of any member attacked. If an
obligation to resist aggression is laid on Turkey by UN action' Turkey
will still hesitate to act outside its frontiers until there is some
assurance of the development of Western armed strength in the area.
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