CONTRIBUTION TO SEC. III OF OUTLINE ON PROJECT KILROY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A000200030032-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 7, 2013
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: November 8, 1950
• Content Type: MEMO

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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/07: CIA-RDP79R01012A000200030032-3
O~GB MBYJZOY~GL?ZdZLYjZ ? UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
TO
DATE: 8 November 1950 .STAY
FROM BOb KOmer
suBJECT: Contribution to Sec. III of outline on Project Kilroy
1. It is impossible to divorce IIS policy toward Germany
from US policy toward Western Europe of which our German
policy is an integral part. The most 3.mportan t single element
of our. foreign policy is to build ttp a viable and defensible
Western Europe, first to prevent its absorption into the Soviet
sphere and second to use it eventually as a counterweight
against the USSR -(both we and the Soviets recognize that West-
ern Europe is the.only area with an immediately realizable
power potential which can tip the balance between East and~West).
We consider West Germany a vital element in this structure
both because of (1) positive military and economic importance
to Western Europe and, (2) the negative necessity of preventing
any German rapprochement with the USSR. Indeed we and all
other NAT countries now recognize that without a major German
contribution it will be impossible to create an adequate European
defense force in the shortest possible time.
2. Therefore our present German policy is;
A. To remove all remaining controls as rapidly as
feasible and to restore West Germany to a position of
equality. While we see the desira'bili.ty and. indeed the
political necessity (because of French fears) of retaining
certain controls we undoubtedly are prepared to remove
them all in due ~ime.
B. To tie Germany as fully as possible to the
West through a growing number of common institutions and
obligations on a European and broader scale. Thus we
favor fu.11 German participation in the Schuman Plan and
all other schemes ~'or greater European unification, plus
eventual full German membership in the NAT.
C. To aid Berman economic and, within limits
military recovery as part of the overall US effort to re-
vive Western Europe ~we will probably favor, say, five
German divisions by the end of 1951, ten by the end of
19 52, and tvrenty by 19 54.
All other NAT countries support these policies,
except for the hesitane~ of France._ While the French
accept the eventual revival of West Germany as an equal,
they would modify its progress towward that goal in order
to prevent Germans from ever again becoming a menace to
France.
See Reverse for Review i4ctiar~
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/07: CIA-RDP79R01012A000200030032-3
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/07: CIA-RDP79R01012A000200030032-3
3. The future effect of a successful US policy in Germany
and in Europe will be. to shift the balance of power in Europe.
from overwhelmingly in favor of the USSR, as at present, to
at first an equal basis and eventually in favor of the West (in
particular, a successful and safe revival of Germany within a
wider European context will provide the margin of superiority
which almost assures the success of our wider Etiiropean design).
In the first instance, it would write finis to Soviet hopes of
internal subversion and/or~military conquest of Uflestern Europe;
in the longer run it would have serious implications for contin-
ued Soviet control of their own sphere. A revived Western '
Germany, backed by a revived and rearmed Western Europe (and the
US) would exert a powerful attraction on East Germany. Moreover,
in reversing the present power position, it would enable the
West to begin putting pressure on the other Satellite states.
Finally, it would ultimately reduce the US burden of aiding
Europe anal permit us to divert resources to Asia and the Near
East.
On the other handy if the Soviets could succeed in
neutralizing Germany; or at least in delaying and hampering
its revival and Westward orientation, this would seriously post-
pone the successful realization of our objective, if not prevent-
, ing it entirely, and would complicate the whole problem by intro-
ducing Germany as a third and uncertain factor into the European
balance of power.
STAT
R.W. K011~.ER
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/07: CIA-RDP79R01012A000200030032-3