AGGRESSION FROM THE NORTH THE RECORD OF NORTH VIET-NAM'S CAMPAIGN TO CONQUER SOUTH VIET-NAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01001A001400010005-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 71
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 9, 2011
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: February 1, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

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his Document. Is
Source Reference t-n
A Historical Paper
DO NOT. DESTROY
Aggression From the North
The Record o' North, Viet-Nam's Campaign
To Conquer South ' Viet-Nam
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Aggression From the North
The Record of North Viet-Nam's Campaign
To Conquer South Viet-Nam
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 7839
Far Eastern Series 130
Released February 1965
Office of Media Services
BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C., 20402 - Price 40 cents
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"[Our purpose in Viet-Nam] is to join
in the defense and protection of freedom
of a brave people who are under attack
that is controlled and that is directed
from outside their country."
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON
February 17, 1965
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Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
I. HANOI SUPPLIES THE KEY PERSONNEL FOR THE ARMED AGGRESSION AGAINST SOUTH VIET-
NAM . . . . . . . .
A. The Infiltration Process 3
B. Military Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? . ? . . . . . . 5
C. Infiltration of Native North Vietnamese . . . ' ' ' ? ' ' ' ' . ? 6
D. Infiltration of Viet Cong Agents . . . . . . . . . ' . . . . . . . . ? . ? ? . 11
12
II. HANOI SUPPLIES WEAPONS, AMMUNITION, AND OTHER WAR MATERIEL TO ITS FORCES
THE SOUTH. , . . . IN
III. NORTH VIET-NAM: BASE FOR CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH . 14
IV. ORGANIZATION, DIRECTION, COMMAND, AND CONTROL OF THE ATTACK ON SOUTH VIET-NAM
ARE CENTERED IN HANOI .
A. Political Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1. The "Liberation Front" 22
B. Military Organization 22
C. Intelligence Organization . . . . . . . 23
. 25
V. A BRIEF HISTORY OF HANOI'S CAMPAIGN OF AGGRESSION AGAINST SOUTH VIET-NAM .
26
VI. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . ,
APPENDIXES
A. Findings of the International Control Commission . ,
B. Maps of Infiltration Routes . . 30
C. Detail on Military Infiltration With ? . . . . . . ? ? . 33
Case Studies ,
D. List of Communist Weapons Captured in South Viet-Nara . 33
E. Photos of Captured Viet Cong Weapons and Ammunition From External Communist Sources . 38
43
F. North Vietnamese Passports and Travel Documents Used by Liberation Front Officials .
G. The People's Revolutionary Party (South) and the Lao I)ong Party (North) Are One Corn- 54
munist Party . . . . .
H. Charts of the Viet Cong Organization, North and South . . . . . . 59
1. Detail on Viet Cong Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
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THAI LAN D
~?~-../ PLEIKU W
M 13 O D I A
BAN ME THUOT?
~iSOUTH
VIETNA
SAIGON
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Introduction
South Viet-Nam is fighting for its life against
a brutal campaign of terror and armed attack in-
spired, directed, supplied, and controlled by the
Communist regime in Hanoi. This flagrant ag-
gression has been going on for years, but recently
the pace has quickened and the threat has now
become acute.
The war in Viet-Nam is a new kind of war, a
fact as yet poorly understood in most parts of the
world. Much of the confusion that prevails in
the thinking of many people, and even many gov-
ernments, stems from this basic misunderstand-
ing. For in Viet-Nam a totally new brand of
aggression has been loosed against an independent
people who want to make their own way in peace
and freedom.
Viet-Nam is not another Greece, where indige-
nous guerrilla forces used friendly neighboring
territory as a sanctuary.
Viet-Nam is not another Malaya, where Com-
munist guerrillas were, for the most part, physi-
cally distinguishable from the peaceful majority
they sought to control.
Viet-Nam is not another Philippines, where
Communist guerrillas were physically separated
from the source of their moral and physical sup-
port.
Above all, the war in Viet-Nam is not a spon-
taneous and local rebellion against the established
government.
There are elements in the Communist program
of conquest directed against South Viet-Nam com-
mon to each of the previous areas of aggression and
-1-1
latter's undisguised attack, the planners in Hanoi
have tried desperately to conceal their hand. They
have failed and their aggression is as real as that
of an invading army.
This report is a summary of the massive evi-
dence of North Vietnamese aggression obtained
by the Government of South Viet-Nam. This evi-
dence has been jointly analyzed by South Viet-
namese and American experts.
The evidence shows that the hard core of the
Communist forces attacking South Viet-Nam were
trained in the North and ordered into the South
by Hanoi. It shows that the key leadership of the
Viet Cong (VC), the officers and much of the
cadre, many of the technicians, political orga-
nizers, and propagandists have come from the
North and operate under Hanoi's direction. It
shows that the training of essential military per-
sonnel and their infiltration into the South is di-
rected by the Military High Command in Hanoi.
(See section I.)
The evidence shows that many of the weapons
and much of the ammunition and other supplies
used by the Viet Cong have been sent into South
Viet-Nam from Hanoi. In recent months new
types of weapons have been introduced in the VC
army, for which all ammunition must come from
outside sources. Communist China and other Com-
munist states have been the prime suppliers of
these weapons and ammunition, and they have
been channeled primarily through North Viet-
Nam. (See section II.)
Th
e directing force behind the effort to con-
ersion. But there is one fundamental diffe
r- quer South Viet-Nam is the Communist Party in
ence. In Viet-Nam a Communist governm
t h
en
as the North, the Lao Don
set out deliberately to, conquer a sovPrei i g (Workers) Party. As
--- a neighboring state. And to achieve its end it I 1 t of tCommunist state, the party is an integral
has used every resource of its own government to e regime itself. orth Vietnamese cals have expressed their firm determination to ab-
carry out its carefully planned program of con- sorb South Viet-Nam into the Communist world.
cealed aggression. North Viet-Nam's commitment (See section III.)
to seize control of the South is no less total than Through its Central Committee, which controls
was the commitment of the regime in North Korea the government of the North, the Lao Dong Party
in 1950. But knowing the consequences of the directs the total political and military effort of the
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Viet. Cong. The Military Iligh Command in the
North trains the military men and sends them into
South Viet-Nam. The Central Research Agency,
North Viet-Ham's central intelligence org aaniza-
t ion, directs the elaborate. espionage and subversion
effort. The extensive political-military organiza-
tion in the North which directs the Viet. Cong war
effort is described in section IV.
Under Ilanoi's overall direction the Communists
have established an extensive machine for carry-
ing on the war within South Viet: Num. The focal
point is the Central Office for South Viet-Nam
with its political and military subsections and
other specialized agencies. A. subordinate part of
this Central Office is the Liberation Front for
South Viet-Nam. The front was formed at. Ha-
noi's order in 1960. Its principal function is to
influence opinion abroad and to create the false
impression that the aggression in South Viet-Nam
is an indigenous rebellion against. the established
government. (See section IV.)
For more than 10 years the people and the Gov-
ernment of South Viet-Nam, exercising the. in-
herent right of self-defense, have fought back
against these efforts to extend Communist power
south across the 17th parallel. The United States
has responded to the appeals of the Government
of the Republic of Viet-Nam for help in this de-
fense of the freedom and independence of its land
and its people.
In 1961 the I)epartment of State issued a report
called .1 Threat to the Peace. It described North
Viet-Ham's program to seize South Viet-Nam.
The evidence in that report had been presented by
the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam to
the International Control Commission (I.C.C.).
A special report by the I.C.C. in June 1962 upheld
the validity of that evidence. The Commission
held that there was "sufficient evidence to show
beyond reasonable doubt" that North Viet-Nam
had sent arms and men into South Viet-Nam to
carry out subversion with the aim of overthrow-
ing the legal Government there. The I.C.C.
found the authorities in Hanoi in specific viola-
tion of four provisions of the Geneva accords of
1954.'
Since then, new and even more impressive evi-
dence of Ilanoi's aggression has accumulated.
The Government of the United States believes
that evidence should be presented to its own citi-
zens and to the world. It is important for free
men to know what has been happening in Viet-
Nam, and how, a.nd why. That is the purpose of
this report.
For the test of pertinent sections of the I.C.C. report,
see appendix A.
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1. Hanoi Supplies the Key Personnel .for the
Armed Aggression Against South Viet-Nam
The hard core of the Communist forces attacking years. It can reasonably be assumed that still
South Viet-Nam are men trained in North Viet- other infiltration groups have entered the South
Nam. They are ordered into the South and re- for which there is no evidence yet available.
main under the military discipline of the Military To some the level of infiltration from the North
High Command in Hanoi. Special training camps may seem modest in comparison. with the total
operated by the North Vietnamese army give polit- size of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Viet-
ical and military training to the infiltrators. In- Nam. But one-for-one calculations are totally
creasingly the forces sent into the South are native misleading in the kind of warfare going on in
North Vietnamese who have never seen South Viet-Nam. First, a high proportion of infiltrators
Viet-Nam. A special infiltration unit, the 70th from the North are well-trained officers, cadres,
Transportation Group, is responsible for moving and specialists. Second, it has long been realized
men from North Viet-Nam into the South via in- that in guerrilla combat the burdens of defense
filtration trails through Laos. Another special are vastly heavier than those of attack. In Malaya,
unit, the maritime infiltration group, sends weap- the Philippines, and elsewhere a ratio of at least
ons and supplies and agents by sea into the South. 10-to-1 in favor of the forces of order was re-
The infiltration rate has been increasing. From quired to meet successfully the threat of the guer-
1959 to 1960, when Hanoi was establishing its in- rillas' hit-and-run tactics.
filtration pipeline, at least 1,800 men, and pos- In the calculus of guerrilla warfare the scale
sibly 2,700 more, moved into South Viet-Nam from of North Vietnamese infiltration into the South
the North. The flow increased to a minimum of takes on a very different meaning. For the in-
3,700 in 1961 and at least 5,400 in 1962. There filtration of 5,000 guerrilla fighters in a given year
was a modest decrease in 1963 to 4,200 confirmed is the equivalent of marching perhaps 50,000
infiltrators, though later evidence is likely to raise regular troops across the border, in terms of the
this figure. burden placed on the defenders.
For 1964 the evidence is still incomplete. How- Above all, the number of proved and probable
ever, it already shows that a minimum of 4,400 infiltrators from the North should be seen in
infiltrators entered the South, and it is estimated relation to the size of the VC forces. It is now
more than 3,000 others were sent in.
Thera is usually a time lag between the entry estimated that the Viet Cong number approxi-
of infiltrating troops and the discovery of clear matehT 35,000 so-called hard-care forces, and an-
evidence they have entered. This fact, plus col- other y 60,000-80,000 local farces. It is thus ap-
lateral evidence of increased use of the infiltration parent; that infiltrators from the North-allowing
routes, suggests strongly that 1964 was probably for casualties-make up the majority of the so
the year of greatest infiltration so far. called hard-core Viet Cong. Personnel from the
Thus, since 1959, nearly 20,000 VC officers, sol- North, in short, are now and have always been the
diers, and technicians are known to have entered backbone of the entire VC operation.
South Viet-Nam under orders from Hanoi. Addi- It is true that many of the lower level elements
tional information indicates that an estimated of the VC forces are recruited within South Viet-
17,000 more infiltrators were dispatched to the Nam. However, the thousands of reported cases
South by the regime in Hanoi during the past 6 of VC kidnapings and terrorism make it abun-
765-438 0-.65--2,
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NORTH
V I E T N A M
~t--~ HANOI
XUAN MA1
(September 1, 1963)
M1, ice.
C(j
LAO S
VINH
IN LAOS I 1"k
1
ISeptember 4, 1963)
DONG HOI I
September 3, 1963)
1-DEMARCATION LINE
NINI
THAI LAN D 1~1,
CROSSED BORDER 14
Map showing infiltration route /rum the North by which a group Of North Vietnamese troops, including YC Sgt.
Nuynh Van Tay, entered South Viet-Nam in Sept. 1963.
L
(September 20, 1963)
SOUTH
w
VIETNAM
-CAPTURED
(April 6, 1964) DESTINATION
(November 26, 1963)
---,_ _ SAiGONj
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dantly clear that threats and other pressures by
the Viet Cong play a major part in such recruit-
ment.
A. THE INFILTRATION PROCESS
The infiltration routes supply hard-core units
with most of their officers and noncommissioned
personnel. This source helps fill the gaps left by
battle casualties, illness, and defection and insures
continued control by Hanoi. Also, as the nature
of the conflict has changed, North Viet-Nam has
supplied the Viet Cong with technical specialists
via the infiltration routes. These have included
men trained in armor and ordnance, antiaircraft,
and communications as well as medical corps-
men and transport experts.
There is no single infiltration route from the
North to South Viet-Nam. But by far the biggest
percentage of infiltrators follow the same general
course. The principal training center for North
Vietnamese army men assigned to join the Viet
Cong has been at Xuan Mai near Hanoi. Re-
cently captured Viet Cong have 'also reported an
infiltration training camp at Thanh Hoa. After
completion of their training course-which in-
volves political and propaganda work as well as
military subjects-infiltrating units are moved to
Vinh on the east coast. Many have made stop-
overs at a staging area in Dong Hoi where addi-
tional training is conducted. From there they
go by truck to the Laos border.
Then, usually after several days' rest, infiltra-
tors move southward through Laos. Generally
they move along the Laos-South Viet-Nam border.
Responsibility for infiltration from North Viet-
Nam through Laos belongs to the 70th Trans-
portation Group of the North Vietnamese army.
After a time the infiltration groups turn east-
ward, entering South Viet-Nam in Quang Nam,
Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Kontum, or another of
the border provinces.
The Communists have established regular lanes
for infiltration with way-stations established
about 1 day's march apart. The way-stations are
equipped to quarter and feed the Viet Cong pass-
ing through. Infiltrators who suffer from malaria
or other illnesses stay at the stations until they
recover sufficiently to join another passing group
moving south.
The map on page 4 shows the infiltration route
from North Viet-Nam to the South followed by
VC Sgt. Huynh Van Tay and a group of North
Vietnamese army officers and men in September
1963. Tay was captured during an engagement in
Chuong Thien Province in April 1964.
Local guides lead the infiltration groups along
the secret trails. Generally they direct the in-
filtrators from halfway between two stations,
through their own base station, and on halfway
to the next supply base. Thus the guides are kept
in ignorance of all but their own way-stations.
Only group leaders are permitted to talk with
the guides in order to preserve maximum security.
The, men are discouraged from asking where they
are or where they are going."
The same system of trails and guides used along
the Lao infiltration routes is used within South
Viet-Nam itself. Viet Cong infiltrators may re-
port directly to a reassignment center in the high-
lands as soon as they enter South Viet-Nam. But
in the past year or more some groups have moved
down trails in South Viet-Nam to provinces along
the Cambodian border and near Saigon before
receiving their unit assignment. Within South
Viet; Nam infiltration and supplies are handled by
VC units such as the Nam Son Transportation
Group.
At the Laos border crossing point infiltrators
are reequipped. Their North Vietnamese army
uniforms must be turned in. They must give up
all personal papers, letters, notebooks, and photo-
graphs that might be incriminating. Document
control over the infiltrators has been tightened
considerably over the past 2 years. A number of
Vietnamese infiltrators have told of being fitted
out with Lao "neutralist" uniforms for their pas-
sage through Laos.
Infiltration groups are usually issued a set of
black civilian pajama-like clothes, two unmarked
uniforms, rubber sandals, a sweater, a hammock,
mosquito netting, and waterproof sheeting. They
carry a 3-5 day supply of food. A packet of
medicines and bandages is usually provided.
The size of infiltration groups varies widely.
Prisoners have mentioned units as small as 5 men
and as large as 500. Generally the groups number
40-50. When they arrive in South Viet-Nam these
'For additional maps of the routes taken by VG in-
filtrators into South Viet-Nam, see appendix B.
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groups are usually split: up and assigned to various
VC units as replacements, although some have
remained intact.
The following are individual case histories of
North Vietnamese soldiers sent by the Hanoi re-
gime into South Viet-Nam. They are only an
illustrative group. They show that the leader-
ship and specialized personnel for the guerrilla
war in South Viet-Nam consists in large part of
members of the North Viet-Nam armed forces,
trained in the North and subject to the command
and discipline of Hanoi.
1. Tran Quoc Dan
Dan was a VC major, commander of the 60th
Battalion (sometimes known as the 34th Group
of the Thon-Kim Battalion). Disillusioned with
fighting his own countrymen and with commu-
nism and the lies of the Hanoi regime, he sur-
rendered to the authorities in South Viet-Nam on
February 11, 1963.
At the age of 15 he joined the revolutionary
army (Viet. Minh) and fought against the French
forces until 1954 when the Geneva accords ended
the Indochina War. As a regular in the Viet
Minh forces, he was moved to North Viet-Nam.
Ile became an officer in the so-called People's
Army.
In March 1962 Major Dan received orders to
prepare to move to South Viet-Nam. He had been
exposed to massive propaganda in the North
which told of the destitution of the peasants in
the South and said that the Americans had taken
over the French role of colonialists. He said later
that an important reason for his decision to sur-
render was that he discovered these propaganda
themes were lies. He found the peasants more
prosperous than the people in the North. And
he recognized quickly that, he was not fighting
the Americans but his own people.
With the 600 men of his unit, Major Dan left
Hanoi on March 23, 1962. They traveled through
the Laos corridor. His group joined up with the
Viet Cong First Regiment in central Viet-Nam.
The 35-year-old major took part in 45 actions
and was wounded once in an unsuccessful VC
attack on an outpost. As time passed he became
increasingly discouraged by his experience as a
VC troop commander. Most of all, he said, he
was tired of killing other Vietnamese. After
several months of soul-searching he decided to
surrender to the authorities of the Republic of
Viet-Nam. He has volunteered to do "anything
to serve the national cause" of South Viet-Nam
2. Vo Thoi
Sergeant Vo Thoi (Communist Party alias Vo
Bien) was an assistant squad leader in the VC Tay
Son 22d Battalion. On the night of October 7,
1963, his unit attacked An Tuong village in Binh
Dinh Province. After overrunning the village,
Vo's company was assigned to set up an ambush
against Republic of Viet-Nam troops rushing to
defend the village. In the ensuing fight Vo was
seriously wounded. He was picked up by local
farmers and turned over to the authorities.
Vo's life and experiences were similar to those
of thousands of Viet Cong. Born in Quang Ngai
Province in 1932, he went. through 5 years of school
and then worked on his parents'small farm. Dur-
ing the war against the French he joined the Viet
Minh forces. When the fighting ended, he was
transferred to North Viet-Nam with his unit, the
210th Regiment. He remained in the North Viet-
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namese army until 1960 when he was sent to work
on a state farm in Nghe An Province. Vo said
3,000 men and women worked on the farm, of
whom 400 were soldiers. In September 1962 Vo
was told he must join the newly activated 22d Bat-
talion. All the members of the battalion came
from provinces in South Viet-Nam, from Quang
Tri to Phu Yen. But it was not an ordinary
battalion ; two-thirds of its members were cadre
with ranks up to senior captain.
The group was put through an advanced train-
ing course that lasted 6 months. The training pro-
gram included combat tactics for units from squad
to company and the techniques of guerrilla and
counterguerrilla fighting. There were heavy doses
of political indoctrination.
On March 5, 1963, the 22d Battalion received
orders to move south. They were transported in
trucks from Nghe An Province to Doug Hoi in
Quang Binh, just north of the 17th parallel.
From there the unit was moved westward to the
Lao border. Then the more than 300 men began
walking to the south following mountain trails
in Laos and the Viet-Nam border area. They
marched by day, rested at night. Every fifth day
they stopped at a way-station for a full day's rest.
One company dropped off at Thua Thien Province.
Vo and the remainder of the group marched on
to :Pleiku Province. Two fully armed companies
from a neighboring province were assigned to the
battalion. The assignment given to the battalion
was to harass strategic hamlets in the Hoai An
district of Binh Dinh, to round up cattle and rice,
to kill or kidnap cadre of the Government forces,
and to recruit local youth for service with the
Viet Cong.
3. Nguyen Thao
Nguyen Thao was a VC weapons technician.
A native of Khanh Hoa province in South Viet-
Nam, he joined the Viet Minh in 1950. He worked
at a secret arsenal manufacturing weapons for
use by the guerrilla forces. He went to North
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Viet-Nam after the Geneva accords were signed
in 1954. In North Viet-Nam he attended it tech-
nical school specializing in arms manufacture.
He received special training in foreign small arms
and artillery.
At the end of 1962 ho was ordered to IIa Dong
to attend a special course of political training in
preparation for infiltrating into South Viet-Nam.
On completion of the training course he was as-
signed to a group of 14 men who would move
to the south together. Nguyen Thao said the.
group was composed of 4 armament. specialists, 2
chemical engineers, and 8 middle-level technical
cadre.
They left IIa Dong in March 1963, crossed into
Laos, and reached their destination in the north-
ern part of South Viet: Nam in May. Nguyen
Thao went to work at a secret VC arsenal near
the Quang Ngai border. Fifty men, some local
workers, manned the arsenal weapons section. The
group manufactured mines and grenades for the
VC units in the area and repaired weapons.
Nguyen Thao said he soon realized from talking
with the local workers at the arsenal that most of
what he had heard in the North about conditions
in South Viet-Nam was wrong. IIo said the Com-
munists had deceived him. Two months after his
arrival at the arsenal he decided to defect. He
asked permission to rejoin his family and to work
in a national defense factory and continue his
studies.
4. Nguyen Viet Le
This VC soldier was born in Quang Nam Prov-
incc in South Viet-Nam. He served with the
305th Division of the Viet Minh and moved to
North Viet-Nam in 1954. In April 1961 Nguyen
Viet. Le and his unit, the 50th Battalion, moved
into Laos. He said the unit remained in Laos
for 2 months, during which it fought in four bat-
tles alongside the Pathet Lao. During these en-
gagements one of the battalion's four companies
was badly mauled and had to be returned to North
Viet-Nam.
The other three companies were assigned to
South Viet-Nam. They arrived in Quang Ngai
Province in the summer of 1961. For a month
they rested and waited for orders. They took part
in a major action against an outpost. of the Govern-
ment of South Viet-Nam in September. Nguyen
Viet Lo was captured during a battle in Quang
Ngai Province in April 1962.
5. Nguyen True
Corp. Nguyen True was born in 1933, the son
of a farmer in Phu Yen Province in South Viet-
Nam. From 1949 to 1954 he served as a courier
and then as a guerrilla fighter with the Viet
Minh. In early 1955 he boarded a Soviet ship
and moved with his unit, the 40th Battalion, to
North Viet-Nam. He remained in the army, but
in 1959, bothered by illness, he went to work on a
state farm.
In August 1962 Nguyen True was notified that
he was back in the army and that he was being
sent to South Viet-Nam. He reported to the Xuan
Mai training center and underwent 6 months of
military and political reeducation. His unit was
the newly activated 22d Battalion. The training
course was completed in February 1963, but de-
parture for South Viet-Nam was delayed until
April.
For infiltration purposes the battalion was di-
vided into two groups. On April 27, Nguyen
True and his group boarded trucks at Xuan Mai.
They went first. to Vinh, then on to Dong Hoi, and
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finally to the Laos-North Viet-Nam border.
There they doffed their North Vietnamese army
uniforms and put on black peasants clothing.
The march to the south began, sometimes in Lao
territory, sometimes in Viet-Nam. They passed
through Thua Thien Province, then Quang Nam,
Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai, and finally to their
destination, Pleiku. Each day they had a new
guide, generally one of the mountain people of the
area.
Nguyen said that he and most of the troops who
were sent north after the Indochina War wanted to
return to their homes and rejoin their families.
In August 1963 Nguyen True was sent out on a
foraging expedition to find food for his unit. He
took the opportunity to defect to Government
forces at An Tue in Binh Dinh Province.
6. Nguyen Cam
Cam is the son of a. farmer in Quang Tin Prov-
ince. Born in 1929, he joined the Viet Minh youth
group in his home village in 1946. In one year
he became a guerrilla fighter. In 1954, as the
Indochina War was drawing to a close, he was
serving with the Viet Minh 20th Battalion. In
May 1955 he went to North Viet-Nam with his
unit.
Ill health caused his transfer to an agricultural
camp in 1958. By 1960 he was back in uniform,
serving in the 210th Regiment. In May of that
year he was assigned to a small group that was
to set up a metallurgical workshop. Early in 1961
he was sent to a metallurgical class in Nghe An
Province. They were taught a simple form of
cast-iron production, simple blast furnace con-
struction, and similar skills. Their instructor was
an engineer from the Hanoi Industrial Depart-
ment.
Their special course completed, Cam and his
group of 35 men prepared to go to South Viet-
Nam. They went by truck from their training
center at Nghe An to the Lao border. After 19
days marching through Laos, they arrived in the
vicinity of Tchepone. There they waited for 3
days until food supplies could be airdropped by a
North Vietnamese plane. Nineteen days of walk-
ing took them to the Laos-South Viet-Nam border.
Delayed en route by illness, Cam finally reached
his destination in November 1961. It was a secret
VC iron foundry in Kontum Province. Several
iron ore deposits were nearby, and the hill people
had. long used the iron to make knives and simple
tools. Cam's job was building kilns to smelt the
ore. The Viet Cong hoped to use the iron for
mines and grenades.
On August 4, 1963, Sergeant Cam went to a
nearby village to buy salt for his group. On his
return he found his comrades had gone to one of
their cultivated fields to gather corn, and he joined
them. The group was interrupted at their work
by a Vietnamese Ranger company. After a brief
fight Cam was taken prisoner.
7. Nguyen Hong Thai
Thai, 32 years old, was born and grew up in
Quang Ngai Province in South Viet-Nam. After
service with the Viet Minh he was moved to. North
Viet-Nam in 1954. After 3 years of military serv-
ice he was assigned to a military farm. In Decem-
ber 1961 he was recalled to his former unit, the
305th Division, and went to the special training
camp at Xuan Mai in preparation for fighting with
the Viet Cong in South Viet-Nam.
Training began in January 1962 and lasted for
4 months. The training group, designated the
32d Battalion, was composed of 650 men who came
from various branches of the North Vietnamese
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army-engineers, artillery, airborne, transport,
marines, and some factory workers and students.
Three-fourths of the training was military (guer-
rilla tactics, ambushes, sabotage, etc.) and one-
fourth was political. In the latter, heavy emphasis
was laid on the necessity for armed seizure of pow-
er in the South.
Group 32 was divided into sections and began
infiltrating to the south on July 14, 1962. It
moved in three groups. Thai said it took his
group more than 55 days to travel from North
Viet-Nam through Laos to Quang Ngai Province
in the south. He reported that all the communi-
cations and liaison stations on the route to South
Viet-Nam are now operated by the army of North
Viet-Nam. Soon after his arrival in South Viet-
Nam, Thai was promoted to the rank of lieutenant.
He was made a platoon leader in the 20th Viet
Cong Highland Battalion. In February 1963 the
unit moved from Quang Nam to IContum Province.
Combat conditions and the rigors of guerrilla
life began to depress Thai. He said he wanted
only to rejoin his family and live in peace. In
September he asked and received permission to
visit his family in Quang Ngai. When he got
home, he surrendered to a South Vietnamese Army
post.
8. Dao Hien Lap
Lap is a civilian radio technician. He has been
a member of the Communist Party in North Viet-
Nam since 1955. In February 1963 he was selected
for assignment to South Viet: Nam where he was
to work with the Liberation Front. He infil-
trated into South Viet-Nam with a group of about
70 civilian specialists. They included doctors,
pharmacists, union organizers, radio specialists,
propagandists, and youth organizers. One of the
infiltrators in Dao's group was a man named Binh,
publisher of the newspaper Labor of the Lao Dong
Party. Another was a member of the city soviet
of Hanoi.
The specialists in Dao's group received 3 months
of basic military training at Son Tay, and then
departed for the South in mid-June.. Their orders
were to report to the Central Office of the Viet
Cong in South Viet-Nam where they would be as-
signed according to their individual specialties.
Dao and Binh were to help run a radio station of
the Liberation Front.
Dao Kien Lap.
They traveled through Laos and along the Viet-
Nam border. They had to stop for several weeks
in Quang Nam Province to recuperate from their
travels. On October 1 they were directed by guides
to a VC station in Ban Me Thuot.
Dao said he had by then decided to defect to the
Government authorities in the South. He set off
with one companion, but they were separated as
they crossed a swiftly flowing river. Dao gave
himself up at a Government post in Ban Me Thuot
on October 13,1963.
9. Tran Ngoe Linh
Linh was a. Viet Cong senior sergeant., leader of
a reconnaissance platoon. He is the son of a mid-
dle-class farm family in Tay Ninh Province. He
served with the Viet Minh against the French and
moved to North Viet-Nam in 1954. He spent the
nest 7 years in the North Vietnamese army. In
September 1962 Linh was assigned to the Xuan
Mai training center at Ha. Dong to prepare for
duty in South Viet-Nam. His group was given
a 4-month refresher course in infantry tactics with
emphasis on guerrilla fighting. Then he received
6 months of special training in the use of machine-
guns against aircraft. Antiaircraft training has
become an increasingly important part of the prep-
aration of North Vietnamese troops assigned to
the Viet Cong.
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Linh and about 120 others made up the 406th
Infiltration Group commander by Senior Captain
Nguyen Van Do. They were divided into four
platoons. During the final 2 weeks of preparation
each member of the group was issued new equip-
ment-black, pajama-like uniforms, a khaki uni-
form, a hammock, mosquito netting, rubber san-
dals, and other supplies, including two packets of
medicine.
In the early morning hours of July 4, 1963, his
group started its journey. from the Xuan Mai
training center outside Hanoi. The convoy of six
Molotov trucks moved south along Highway 21
to Nghe An Province and then on to Quang Binh.
On July 7 they arrived at the final processing sta-
tion near the Laos-North Viet-Nam border. There
they turned in their North Vietnamese Army uni-
forms as well as all personal papers and anything
else that might identify them as coming from the
North. But their departure for the South was
delayed for several weeks. In August they set
off through Laos.
Twice along the way Linh had to stop at liaison
stations because of illness. When the infiltrators
recovered from their illnesses, they were formed
into special groups to. continue their penetration
into South Viet-Nam. Linh reported being de-
layed once for 8 days, and the second time for 10
days.
` Finally, in the first week of November 1963,
Linh was sufficiently recovered to begin the final
leg of his journey to a VC center where he was to
be assigned to a combat unit. He and three others
who had been similarly delayed by attacks of ma-
laria and other sickness made up a group. They
moved through the jungles of Quang Due Prov-
ince near the Cambodian border. On the morning
of November 9 they crossed the Srepok River.
There they ran into a unit of the South Viet-
namese Army. One of the infiltrators was killed,
Linh was taken prisoner, and the other two Viet
Cong escaped.
These are typical Viet Cong. There are many
other officers like Tran Quoc Dan, technicians like
Nguyen Thao, and simple soldiers like Nguyen
True. They were born in South Viet-Nam,
fought against the French, and then went north
and served in the army of North Viet-Nam. They
were ordered by the Communist rulers in Hanoi
to reenter South Viet-Nam. Violating the Geneva
accords of 1954 and 1962, they used the territory of
neighboring Laos to infiltrate into the South.
They are the means by which Communist North
Viet-Nam is carrying out its program of con-
quest in South Viet-Nam.Y
C. INFILTRATION OF NATIVE
NORTH VIETNAMESE
The Communist authorities in Hanoi are now
assigning native North Vietnamese in increasing
numbers to join the VC forces in South Viet-
Nam. Heretofore, those in charge of the infiltra-
tion effort have sought to fill their quotas with
soldiers and others born in the South. The 90,-
000 troops that moved from South Viet-Nam to
the North when the Geneva accords ended the
Indochina War have provided an invaluable
reservoir for this purpose. Now, apparently, that
source is running dry. The casualty rate has been
high, and obviously many of those who were in
fighting trim 10 years ago are no longer up to the
rigors of guerrilla war.
In any case, reports of infiltration by native
North Vietnamese in significant numbers have
been received in Saigon for several months. It
is estimated that as many as 75 percent of the
more than 4,400 Viet Cong who are known to have
entered the South in the first 8 months of 1964
were natives of North Viet-Nam.
Vo Thanh Vinh was born in Nghe An Province
in North Veit-Nam in 1936. He was captured by
South Vietnamese forces on May 5, 1964. He
described himself as a military security officer.
He infiltrated into South Viet-Nam in April 1964
with a group of 34 police and security officers
from the North.
Another native North Vietnamese captured in
the South was VC Private First Class Vo Quyen.
His home was in Nam Dinh Province. He was a
member of the 2d Battalion of the North Viet-
namese army's 9th Regiment.. He said the entire
battalion had infiltrated into South Viet-Nam
between February and May last year. He was
captured in an action in Quang Tri Province on
July 4. He told interrogators that the bulk of
'See appendix C for additional details on military
infiltrators.
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his unit was composed of young draftees from
North Viot-Nam.
Le Pham Hung, also a private first. class, was
captured on July 7 in Thua Thien Province. Ile
is a native of Nam Dinh in North Viet-Nam.
Drafted for military service in May 1963, he was
in the 324th Division. His group, consisting solely
of 90 North Vietnamese draftees, infiltrated into
South Viet-Nam in May 1964. He reported that
another company of North Vietnamese entered
the South at the same time as his unit.
A former member of the 90th VC Battalion re-
ported that his unit had been reinforced by native
North Vietnamese troops earlier this year. Le
Thua Phuong, an information cadre and a native
of Quang Ngai Province in the South, surrendered
to Government forces on April 2.3, 1964. He said
that the 90th Battalion had received 80 North
Vietnamese replacements in February.
A medical technician named Iloang Thung was
captured in Thua Thien Province on July 4, 1964.
He said he had infiltrated into the South in late
1963 with a group of 200 Viet Cong, the majority
of whom were ethnic northerners. 120 of them
draftees.
These reports destroy one more fiction which
the authorities in Hanoi have sought. so long to
promote-tliat the fighting in the South was a
matter for the South Vietnamese. They underline
Hanoi's determination to press its campaign of
conquest with every available resource.
D. INFILTRATION OF VIET CONG
AGENTS
No effort to subvert another nation as elaborate
as that being conducted by the Ho Clii Minli re-
gime against South Viet-Nam can succeed without.
an intelligence-gathering organization. Recogniz-
ing this, the authorities in Hanoi have developed
an extensive espionage effort. An essential part.
of that effort is the regular assignment of secret
agents from the North to South Viet-Nam.
The heart of the VC intelligence organization
is the Central Research Agency in Hanoi (see sec-
tion IV, C). Communist. agents are regularly dis-
patched from North Viet-Nam, sometimes for
brief assignments but often for long periods.
Many of these agents move into South Viet-Nam
along the infiltration trails through Laos; others
are carried by boats along the coasts and
landed at. prearranged sites. A special maritime
infiltration group has been developed in North
Viet-Nam, with its operations centered in Ha
Tinh and Quang Binh Provinces just north of the
17th parallel.
1. Maritime Infiltration
The following case illustrates the methods of
maritime infiltration of secret agents used by the
Communist regime in North Viet-Nam
In July 1962 a North Vietnamese intelligence
agent named Nguyen Viet Duong began training
to infiltrate South Viet-Nam. A native south-
erner, he had fought against the French and had
gone to North Viet-Nam after the war ended. Se-
lected for intelligence work, he was. assigned to the
Central Research Agency in 1959.
After a period of intensive instruction in radio
transmission, coding and decoding, and other skills
of the intelligence trade, he was given false identity
papers and other supplies and was transported to
the South. His principal task was to set up a cell
of agents to collect military information. He flew
from Hanoi to Dong Hoi, and from there the mari-
time infiltration group took him by boat to South
Viet-Nam. That was in August 1962.
In January 1963 Duong reported to Hanoi that
he had run into difficulties. His money and
papers had been lost, and he had been forced to
take refuge with VC contacts in another province.
Another agent was selected to go to South. Viet-
Nam. One of his assignments was to contact
Duong, find out details of what happened to him,
and help Duong reestablish himself as a VC agent.
The man selected for the task was Senior Captain
Tran Van Tan of the Central Research Agency.
Tan had already been picked to go to the South
to establish a clandestine VC communications cen-
ter. Making contact with Duong was one of his
secondary assignments. After intensive prepara-
tions Tan was ready to move to South Viet-Nam
in March. He was transferred to an embarkation
base of the maritime infiltration group just north
of the 17th parallel.
He was joined by three other VC agents and the
captain and three crewmen of the boat that would
take them south. All were given false identity
papers to conform to their false names. They
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also were provided with fishermen's permits,
South Vietnamese voting cards, and draft cards
or military discharge papers. The boat captain
received a boat registration book, crew lists, and
several South Vietnamese permits to conduct
business.
The agents and boatmen were given cover stories
to tell if captured. Each man had to memorize
not only the details of his own story but the names
and some details about each of the others. The
agents had to become familiar with simple boat
procedures so they could pass as legitimate fisher-
men.
The expedition left the embarkation port on
April 4. In addition to the four agents the boat
carried six carefully sealed boxes containing a
generator, several radios, some weapons, and a
large supply of South Vietnamese currency. They
also carried some chemicals and materials for
making false identification papers. Their desti-
nation was a landing site on the coast of Phuoc
Tuy Province.
Soon after leaving North Viet-Nam the VC boat
encountered high winds and rough seas. On April
7 the storm became violent. The boat tossed and
threatened to capsize. Strong northeasterly winds
forced it ever closer to shore. Finally the boat
captain, Nguyen Xit, ordered that the six boxes be
thrown overboard. This was done, and the boat
then was beached. The eight men decided to split
up into pairs and try to make contact with VC
forces. They buried their false papers and set
out. Six of the eight were captured almost imme-
diately by authorities in Thua Thien Province,
and the other two were taken several days later.
2. Student Propaganda Agents
The student population of South Viet-Nam is an
important target group for VC propagandists.
These agents seek to win adherents for the Com-
munist cause among young workers, students in
high schools and universities, and the younger
officers and enlisted men in the Armed Forces of
the Republic of Viet-Nam.
Typical of the agents sent into South Viet-
Nam for this purpose is Nguyen Van Vy, a 19-
year-old VC propagandist. He is a native of the
Vinh Linh District in North Viet-Nam, just north
of the Demilitarized Zone. He was a member of
a Communist Party youth group in his native
village. He was recruited for propaganda work
in the South in the fall of 1962. He was one of
40 young persons enrolled in a special political
training course given by the Communist Party
in his district.
The first phase of the training consisted of
political indoctrination covering such subjects as
the advance of communism, the North Vietnamese
plan for winning control of the country, the re-
sponsibility of youth in furthering this plan, the
war in the South, and the need for propaganda
supporting the Liberation Front.
Those who successfully completed the first phase
were selected for the second level of training, the
so-called technical training phase. In this the
trainees were given their mission in the South.
Vy was told he should infiltrate into South Viet-
Nam and there surrender to the authorities, de-
scribing himself as a defector who was "tired of
the miserable life in the North." He was to say
he wanted to complete his schooling, which was
impossible in the North. He was told to ask
to live with relatives in the South so he could go
to school. Once his story was accepted and he
was enrolled in a, school, he was to begin his work
of propagandizing other students. He was to
wait for 3 or 4 months, however, until he was no
longer the subject of local suspicion. He was
assigned to work under an older agent to whom
he had to report regularly.
A third member of the team was a younger man
who was to assist Vy. The three were to infil-
trate into South Viet-Nam separately and to meet
there at a rendezvous point.
At first Vy was to do no more than to observe
his fellow students carefully, collecting biographi-
cal data on them and studying their personalities,
capabilities, and aspirations. He was then to se-
lect those he thought might be most influenced by
Communist propaganda and try to make friends
with them.
Once he had selected targets, he was to begin to
influence them favorably toward the North and
to implant Communist propaganda. He was re-
sponsible then for bringing into his organization
those he had influenced effectively. These individ-
ua]Is were. to be given their own propaganda assign-
ments to work on other students.
Students who wanted to evade military service
in the Government forces were considered prime
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targets. Where possible, Vy was to help them
get to North Viet-Nam. Ile was also told to make
contact with any studeeits who had been picked up
by the authorities for suspected Communist activi-
ties. These, too, were to be helped to escape to
North Viet-Nana. Any useful information con-
cerning developments in the South or military ac-
tivities were to be reported through his superior,
Nguyen Van Pliong.
In case he became suspect, he was either to make
his own way back to North Viet-Nam or to go into
the jungle and try to contact a VC unit.
Vy entered South Viet: Nam on January 2, 1963,
by swimming across the Ben Hai River. Ile en-
countered an elderly farmer who led him to the
local authorities in Hai Gu. There he told his
story but it was not believed. Ile then admitted his
true mission.
3. Other Agents
The Communist authorities in North Viet-Nam
send their agents into South Viet-Nam by a wide
variety of means. A few like Nguyen Van Vy
cross the demilitarized zone, more infiltrate by
sea, and still more along the infiltration routes
through Laos. But there are other methods for
entering South Viet-Nam. VC espionage agent
Tran Van Bui attempted one such method.
Bui was a graduate of the espionage training
school in Haiphong, North Viet-Nam. Ile com-
pleted a special G-month course in July 1962.
The training included political indoctrination, but
most of the time was spent on such things as use
of weapons, preparing booby traps, and methods
of sabotage. He was also given instruction in
uietliods for enlisting help from hoodlums, draft
dodgers, and VC sympathizers. Once in South
Viet-Nam, he was to organize a small unit for
sabotage and the collection of information. On
specific assignment by his superiors he was to be
ready to sabotage ships in Saigon harbor and to
blow up gasoline and oil storage points and Viet-
namese Army installations, Ile was told to be
prepared to assassinate Vietnamese officials and
American personnel.
In September 1962 Bui was given his mission
assignment. He was to hide aboard a foreign
ship. When discovered, he was to claim to be a
refugee who wanted to "escape" to South Viet-
Nam. Ile was given an automatic pistol with
silencer, some explosive devices, and a small knife
that could inject poison into the body of a victim.
Bui stole aboard a foreign ship in Haiphong
harbor. After 3 days at sea-when he was sure
the ship would not turn around-Bui surrendered
to the ship's captain. When the ship arrived in
Bangkok, Bui was turned over to the Thai author-
ities. They in turn released him to the South
Vietnamese as he had requested. But in Saigon
his true mission was disclosed and he made a full
confession.
II. Hanoi Supplies Weapons, Ammunition, and
Other War Materiel to Its Forces in the South
When Hanoi launched the VC campaign of ter-
ror, violence, and subversion in earnest in 1959,
the Communist forces relied mainly on stocks of
weapons and ammunition left over from the war
against the French. Supplies sent in from North
Viet-Nam came largely from the same source. As
the military campaign progressed, the Viet Cong
depended heavily on weapons captured from the
armed Forces in South Viet-Nam. This remains
an important source of weapons and ammunition
for the Viet Cong. But. as the pace of the war
has quickened, requirements for up-to-date arms
and special types of weapons have risen to a point
where the Viet Cong cannot rely on captured
stocks. Hanoi has undertaken a program to re-
equip its forces in the South with Conununist-
produced weapons.
Large and increasing quantities of military
supplies are entering South Viet-Nam from out-
side the country. The principal supply point is
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North Viet-Nam, which provides a convenient
channel for materiel that originates in Communist
China and other Communist countries.
An increasing number of weapons from external
Communist sources have been seized in the South.
These include such weapons as 57mm. and 75mm.
recoilless rifles, dual-purpose machineguns, rocket
launchers, large mortars, and antitank mines.
A new group of Chinese Communist-manufac-
tured weapons has recently appeared in VC
hands. These include the 7.62 semiautomatic car-
bine, 7.62 light machinegun, and the 7.62 assault
rifle. These weapons and ammunition for them,
manufactured in Communist China in 1962, were
first captured in December 1964 in Chuang Thien
Province. Similar weapons have since been seized
in each of the four Corps areas of South Viet-
Nam. Also captured have been Chinese Com-
munist antitank grenade launchers and ammuni-
tion made in China in 1963.
One captured Viet Cong told his captors that
his entire company had been supplied recently
with modern Chinese weapons. The reequipping
of VC units with a 'type of weapons that re-
quire ammunition and parts from outside South
Viet-Nam indicates the growing confidence of the
authorities in Hanoi in the effectiveness of their
supply lines into the South.
Incontrovertible evidence of Hanoi's elaborate
program to supply its forces in the South with
weapons, ammunition, and other supplies has ac-
cumulated over the years. Dramatic new proof
was exposed just as this report was being
completed.
On February 16, 1965, an American helicopter
pilot flying along the South Vietnamese coast
sighted a suspicious vessel. It was a cargo ship
of an estimated 100-ton capacity, carefully cam-
ouflaged and moored just offshore along the coast
of Phu Yen Province. Fighter planes that ap-
Chinese Communist 75 mm. recoilless rifle captured in An Xuyen Province in Sept. 1963.
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Part of the hull (left) of a North Vietnamese cargo ship which delivered a huge supply of arms and ammunition to the
Viet Cong. It was sunk along the coast of Phu Yen Province by South Vietnamese aircraft. More than 100
tons of military supplies were seized.
proached the vessel met machinegun fire from
guns on the deck of the ship and from the shore
as well. A Vietnamese Air Force strike was
launched against the vessel, and Vietnamese Gov-
ernment troops movedinto the a.rea.. They seized
the ship after a bitter fight witl- the Viet Cong.
The ship, which had, been sunk in shallow water,
had discharged a huge cargo of arms, ammuni-
tion, and other supplies. Documents found on
the ship and on the bodies of several Viet Cong
aboard identified the vessel as having come from
North Viet.-Nam. A newspaper in the cabin was
from Haiphong and was dated January 23, 1965.
The supplies delivered by the ship--thousands of
weapons and more than a. million rounds of am-
munition-were almost all of Communist. origin,
largely from Communist China and Czechoslo-
vakia, as well as North Viet-Nam. At least. 100
tons of military supplies were discovered near
the ship.
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Part of the huge stock of Chinese and other Communist weapons and ammunition seized from the Viet Cong in Phu
Yen Province in Feb. 1965. A North Vietnamese military cargo vessel which delivered the arms was sunk.
More than 100 tons of weapons and ammunition were captured. (For other pictures of this incident, see
appendix E.)
A preliminary survey of the cache near the
sunken vessel from Hanoi listed the following
supplies and weapons:
-approximately 1 million rounds of small-arms
ammunition;
-more than 1,000 stick grenades;
-500 pounds of TNT in prepared charges;
-2,000 rounds of 82 mm. mortar ammunition;
-500 antitank grenades;
-500 rounds of 57 mm. recoilless rifle ammu-
nition ;
-more than 1,000 rounds of 75 mm. recoilless
rifle ammunition;
-one 57 mm. recoilless rifle;
-2 heavy machineguns;
-2,000, 7.95 Mauser rifles;
-more than 100, 7.62 carbines;
-1,000 submachineguns;
-1.5 light machineguns;
-500 rifles;
-500 pounds of medical supplies (with labels
from North Viet-Nam, Communist China,
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Soviet Union,
and other sources).
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.:
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The ship was fairly new and had been made in
Communist China. Documents aboard the ship
included three North Vietnamese nautical charts
(one of the Haiphong area and one of Hong Gay,
both in North Viet-Nam, and one of the Tra Vinh
area of South Viet-Nam). The military health
records of North Vietnamese soldiers were found.
One man had a political history sheet showing he
was a member of the 338th Division of the North
Vietnamese army. (See Appendix E.)
Also aboard the North Vietnamese ship were :
an instruction book for a Chinese Communist
navigational device; postcards and letters to ad-
dresses in North Viet-Nam; snapshots, including
one of a group of men in North Vietnamese army
uniforms under a flag of the Hanoi government.
Members of the I.C.C. and representatives of
the free press visited the sunken North Vietnamese
ship and viewed its cargo. The incident itself
underlined in the most dramatic form that Hanoi
is behind the continuing campaign of aggression
aimed at conquering South Viet-Nam. It made
120 rounds of Chinese Communist 75 mm, ammunition
for recoilless rifle-part of the huge cache of VC
weapons and supplies captured at Dinh Tuong in Dec.
1963.
ammunition ;
ammunition;
-100,000 rounds of 7.92 Mauser-type ammuni-
tion;
-110 lbs. (approximate) of TNT;
--Two 60 mm. mortars.
These weapons and ammunition are the sa
unmistakably clear that what is happening in
South Viet-Nam is not an internal affair but part
of a large-scale carefully directed and supported
-program of armed attack on a sovereign state and
it free people.
There have been previous seizures of large
stocks of ammunition and weapons and other mili-
tary supplies that could only have come from
Communist sources outside South Viet-Nam. In
December 1963 a Republic of Viet-Nam force at-
tacked a VC stronghold in Dinh Tuong Province
southwest of Saigon. A large cache of VC equip-
ment was seized. Included in the captured stocks
were the following weapons and ammunition, all
of Chinese Communist manufacture :
-One 90 mm. rocket launcher;
-2 carbines (type 53) ;
-120 rounds of 75 mm.
tion;
-120 detonating fuzes
munition ;
rifle ammuni-
for recoilless rifle
000 rounds of 7.62 (type P)
-160,000 rounds of 7.62 carbine
=150 fuzes for mortar shells;
MU as
those used in the North Vietnamese army. So
me
of the 7.62 mm. ammunition was manufactured
as recently as 1962.1
Materiel is sent into South Viet-Nam from the
North by a variety of methods-overland, by river
and canal, and by sea. In one instance Vietnamese
troops discovered a cache in which the 75 mm. am-
munition alone weighed approximately 11/2 tons.
It has been estimated that it would require more
than 150 porters to carry this quantity of ammuni-
tion over rough terrain. However, a few sampans,
each manned by a few men, could transport it with
little difficulty. It is worth noting, in this con-
nection, that the delta where the cache of materiel
was seized has 460 miles of seacoast as well as
1 On Jan. 29, 1964, the Government of the Republic of
Viet-Nam supplied the International Control Commission
with a list of weapons, ammunition, and other equipment
of Communist origin captured in South Viet-Nam since
June 1962. The list is summarized in appendix D.
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2,500 miles of canals navigable by large water
craft. and another 2,204) miles of canals over which
sampans can move easily. Much of the transport
of large stocks of ammunition is undoubtedly
waterborne for at least much of its travel into
South Viet-Nam.2
Large quantities of chemical components for
explosives have been sent into South Viet-Nam for
the Viet. Cong. During 1963 there were at least
15 incidents in which boats, junks, or sanipans were
seized with explosives aboard. More than 20 tons
of potassium chlorate or nitrate were captured.
All these cases were in the delta area, and the ma-
jority were on or near the Mekong River. Red
'Photograph-. of additional Viet Gong weapon4 and
ammunition of Commaniaa origin are contained in ap-
pendix H.
phosphorus made in Communist China has been
among the chemicals captured from the Viet Cong.
The Communists have shown ext reme sensitivity
to exposure of the fact that war materiel is going
to the Viet Cong from North Viet-Nam, Commu-
nist China, and other Communist countries. A
secret document. captured from a VC agent last
year reflected this sensitivity. The document was
sent from VC military headquarters in Bien Hoa
Province to subordinate units. It ordered them
to "pay special attention to the removal of all the
markings and letters on weapons of.all types cur-
rently employed by units and agencies and manu-
factured by friendly East. European democratic
countries or by China." It said incriminating
marking should be chiseled off "so thi.t the enemy
cannot use it as a propaganda theme every time
he captures these weapons."
Viet-Nam: Base for Conquest of the
III. North
South
The Third Lao Dong Party Congress in Hanoi
in September 1960 set forth two tasks for its
members : ,to carry out the socialist revolution in
North Viet-Nam" and "to liberate South Viet-
Nam."
The resolutions of the congress described the
effort. to destroy the legal Government in South
Viet-Nam as follows : "The revolution in this South
is a protracted, hard, and complex process of
struggle, combining many forms of struggle
great activity and flexibility, ranging from lower
to higher, and taking as its basis the building,
consolidation, and development of the revolution-
ary power of t he. masses."
At the September meeting the. Conununist lead-
ers in the North called for format ion of "a broad
national united front." Three months later IIa-
noi announced creation of the "Front for Libera-
tion of the South." This is the organization that
Communist. propaganda now credits with guiding
the forces of subversion in the South; it is pic-
tured as an organization established and run by
the people in the South themselves. At the 1960
Lao Dong Party Congress the tone was different.
Then, even before the front existed, the Com-
munist leaders were issuing orders for the group
that. was being organized behind the scenes in Ha-
noi. "This front must rally .."; "The aims of
its struggle are ..." ; "The front must carry
out ..."-this is the way Hanoi and the Com-
inunist. Party addressed the "Liberation Front."
even before its founding.
The Liberation Front is Hanoi's creation; it is
neither independent nor southern, and what it
seeks is not liberation but subjugation of the
South.
In his address to the Third Lao Doug Party
tbng}?ess, party and government leader Ho Chi
Minh spoke of the necessity "to step up the socialist
revolution in the North and, at. the same time, to
step up the national democratic people's revolution
in the South."
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The year before, writing for Red Flag, the Lion Government" would be established ; this gov-
Communist Party newspaper of Belgium, Ho had ernment would agree with'the North Vietnamese
said much the same thing : government in Hanoi regarding national reunifi-
We are building socialism in Viet-Nana, but we are cation "under one form or another." It takes
building it in only one part of the country, while in the little imagination to understand the form that is
other part we still have to direct and bring to a close the intended.
middle-class democratic and anti-imperialist revolution.
In the same vein, the commander-in-chief of the Thus," wrote Truong Chinh, "though South
North Vietnamese armed forces, Vo Nguyen Gia Viet-Nam will be liberated by nonpeaceful means,
p, the party nos achieving peaceful national
spoke at the 1960 party congress of the need to reunification is still ll correct."
"step up the national democratic people's revolu-
tion in the South." Earlier in the year, writin The official government radio in Hanoi is used
for the Communist Party journal Hoe Ta in both overtly and covertly to support the Viet
Hanoi, General Giap described the North as Gong effort in South Viet-Nam. Captured agents
"the revolutionary base for the whole count ? have testified that the broadcasts are used some-
Le Duan, a member ~. times to send instructions in veiled code to Viet
of the Politburo and first Cong representatives in the South.
secretary of the Lao Dong Party, was even more Tap explicit when he talked at the party congress about Hoc 1 stated frankly in March 1963: "They
the struggle in the South and the party's role. [the authorities in South Viet-Nam] are well
After noting the difficulties involved in overthrow- aware that North. Viet-Nam is the firm base for
ing the existing order in South Viet-Nam Ise the southern revolution, and the point on which it
Duan said : leans, and that our party is the steady and expe-
rienced vanguard unit of the working class and
Renee the southern people's revolutionary struggle people and is the brain and factor that decides all
will be long, drawn out, and arduous. It is not a simple victories of the revolution."
process 'but a complicated one, combining many varied In forms of struggle from elementary advanced, lcgal Don varied April 196'4 the Central Commit
Lao
and illegal-and based on the building, consolidation, and g Party issueda directive to all p e arty of theechelL
ons.
development of the revolutionary force of the masses. It stated : "When the forces of the enemy and the
In this process, we must constantly intensify our soli- plats of the enemy are considered, it is realized
clarity and the organization and education of the people of
the south,.... that the cadres, party members, and people in
Another high official of the Hanoi re ime North Viet-Nam must ... increase their sense of
Truong g, responsibility in regard to the South Viet-Nam
b Chinh, writing in the party organ Hoc revolution by giving Tap in April 1961, expressed confidence in the port to South Viet-Namingevery old"tical sup-
success of the struggle to remove the legal Gov- Nguyen Chi Thanh, writing in a Hanoi news-
ernment in South Viet-Nam because: "North
Viet-Nam is being rapidly consolidated and paper in May 1963, underlined the importance of
strengthened, is providing good support to the the role of the North Vietnamese army in Hanoi's
South Vietnamese revolution, and is serving as plans to unify Viet Nam under Communist rule
a strong base for the struggle for national "Our party set forth two strategic tasks to be
reunification." carried out at the same time: to transform and
He outlined the steps by which the Communists build socialism in the North and to struggle to
expect to achieve control over all Viet-Nam as unify the country. Our army is an instrument of
follows : The "Liberation Front" would destroy the class struggle in carrying out these two stra-
the present Government in the South ; a "Coa.li- tegic tasks."
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IV. Organization, Direction, Command, and Control of the Attack on South Viet-Nam
Are Centered in Hanoi
The VC military and political apparatus in
South Viet-Nam is an extension of an elaborate
military and political structure in Nortli Viet-Nam
which directs and supplies it with the tools for
conquest. The IIo Chi Minh regime has shown
that it, is ready to allocate every resource that can
be spared-whether it be personnel, funds, or
equipment-to the cause of overt hrowing the legit-
imate Government in South Viet-Nana and of
bringing all Viet-Nam under Communist rule.
A. POLITICAL ORGANIZATION
Political direction and control of the Viet Cong
is supplied by the Lao l )oiig party, i.e. the Com-
inunist Party, led by IIo Chi Minh. Party agents
are responsible for indoctrination, recruitment,
political training, propaganda, anti-Government
demonstrations, and other activities of a political
nature. The considerable intelligence-gathering
facilities of the party are also at the disposal of
the Viet Cong.
Overall direction of the VC movement is the
responsibility of the Central Committee of the
Lao Dong Party. Within the Central Commit-
tee a special Reunification Department has been
established. This has replaced the "Committee
for Supervision of the South" mentioned in intel-
ligence reports 2 years ago. It lays down broad
strategy for the movement to conquer South Viet-
Nam.
Until March 1962 there were two principal ad-
ministrative divisions in the VC structure in the
South. One was the Interzone of South-Centrl
Viet-Nam (sometimes called Interzone 5); (lie
other was the Nampo Region. In a 1962 reorga-
nization these were merged into one, called the
Central Office for South Viet-Nam. The Central
Committee, through its Reunification Department,
issues directives to the Central Office, which trans-
lates them into specific orders for the appropriate
subordinate command.
t'iidcr the Central office are six regional units
(V through IX) plus the special zone of Saigon/
Chalon/Cria Dinh. A regional committee respon-
sible to the Central Office directs VC activities in
each region. Each regional committee has special-
ized units responsible for liaison, propaganda,
training, personnel, subversive activities, espio-
nage, military bases, and the like.
Ilelow each regional committee are similarly
structured units at the province and district lev-
els. At the base of the Communist pyramid are
t he individual party cells, which may be organized
on a geograllllic base or within social or occupa-
tional groups. The elaborateness of the party unit
and the extent to which it operates openly or un-
derground is determined mainly by the extent of
VC control over the area concerned.
1. The "Liberation Front"
The National Front for the Liberation of South
Viet Nalil is the screen behind which the Commu-
nists carry out their program of conquest. It is
the creature of the Communist. Government in Ha-
noi. As noted above the Communist Party in the
North demanded establishment of such a "front"
three months before its formation was actually an-
nounced in December 1960. It was designed to
create the illusion that the Viet Cong campaign of
subversion was truly indigenous to South Viet-
rather than an externally directed Commu-
illst plan.
The front has wont support primarily from the
Communist world. Its radio faithfully repeats
the. propaganda. themes of Hanoi and Peiping.
When its representatives travel abroad, they do
so with North Vietnamese passports and sponsor-
ship.' The front`s program copies that of the Lao
l)ong Party in North Viet-Nam.
'Pictures of North Vietnamese passports and travel
documents used by front officials are in appendix F.
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In late 1961, in still another effort to conceal the
extent of Communist domination of the front, the
Communists announced formation of a new Marx-
ist political unit, the People's Revolutionary
Party (PRP). This mechanism provided a way
to explain the Communist presence in the front
while at the same time making it appear that, the
Communist voice was only one of several affiliated
organizations in the front. The PRP itself
claimed direct descent from the original Indo-
chinese Communist Party and from the North
Vietnamese Communist. Party in Hanoi .2
B. MILITARY ORGANIZATION
Military affairs of the Viet Cong are the respon-
sibility of High Command of the People's Army
of North Viet-Nam and the Ministry of Defense,
under close supervision from the Lao Dong Party.
These responsibilities include operational plans,
assignments of individuals and regular units,
training programs, infiltration of military person-
nel and supplies, military communications, tacti-
cal intelligence, supplies, and the like. The six
military regions are the same as those of the VC
political organization.
The military structure of the Viet Cong is an
integral part of the political machinery that con-
trols every facet of VC activity in South Viet-Nam
under Hanoi's overall direction. Each political
headquarters from the Central Office down to the
village has a military component which controls
day-to-day military operations. Similarly, each
military headquarters has a, political element, an
individual or a, small staff. This meshing of poli-
tical and military activity is designed to insure
the closest cooperation in support of the total
Communist mission. It also gives assurance of
political control over the military.
Associated with the Central Office, believed to
be located in Tay Ninh Province, is a military
headquarters. Through this headquarters, as well
as through other channels, Hanoi maintains direct
contact with its principal military units in the
South.
2 For evidence that the People's Revolutionary Party in
the South and the Communist Lao Dong Party in the
North are one Party, see appendix G.
In addition to its supervision of the, general
military effort of the VC, the military section of
the Central Office is believed to have direct com-
mand of two regimental headquarters and a num-
ber of security companies.
The hard core of the VC military organization
is the full-time regular unit usually based on a
province or region. These are well-trained and
highly disciplined guerrilla fighters. They follow
a rigid training schedule that is roughly two
thirds military and one-third political in content.
.This compares with the 50-50 proportion for dis-
trict units and the 70 percent political and 30 per-
cent military content of the village guerrilla's
training.
The size of the Viet Cong regular forces has
grown- steadily in recent years. For example, the
Viet Cong have five regimental headquarters com-
pared with two in 1961. And the main VC force
is composed of 50 battalions, 50 percent more than
before. There are an estimated 139 VC companies.
Hard-core VC strength now is estimated at about
35,000, whereas it was less than 20,000 in 1961.
The main force battalions are well armed with
a variety of effective weapons including 75-mm.
recoilless rifles and 81-82-mm. mortars. The com-
panies and smaller units are equally well equipped
and have 57-mm. recoilless rifles and 60-mm.
mortars in their inventory. It is estimated that the
Viet Cong have at least 130 81-mm. mortars and
300 60-mm. mortars. There is no precise estimate
for the number of recoilless rifles in their hands,
but it is believed that most main force units are
equipped with them. In at least one recent action
the Viet Cong employed a 75-mm. pack howitzer.
This mobile weapon, which has a range of 8,500
yards, will increase the Viet Cong capabilities
to launch long-range attacks against many sta-
tionary targets in the country.
Supporting the main force units of the Viet
Cong are an estimated 60,000-80,000 part-time
guerrillas. They are generally organized at the
district level where there are likely to be several
companies of 50 or more men each. These troops
receive only half pay, which means they must work
at least part of the time to eke out, a. living.
Below the irregular guerrilla forces of the dis-
trict are the part-time, village-based guerrillas.
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The smoking ruins of a Cao Dai temple in Tan Hanh village, Vinh Long Province, burned down by VC terrorists on
Aug. 10, 1964. The 64-year-old caretaker died in the flames.
They are available for assignment by higher head-
quarters and are used for harassment and sabo-
tage. They are expected to warn nearby VC units
of the approach of any force of the legal govern-
ment. They provide a pool for recruitment into
the VC district. forces.
The record shows that many of the village guer-
rillas are dragooned into service with the Viet
Cong. Some are kidnaped; others are threat-
ened; still others join to prevent their families
from being harmed. Once in the Viet Cong net,
many are reluctant, to leave for fear of punishment
by the authorities or reprisal by the Communists.
Lam Van Chuoi is a typical example. Ile was
it member of the Village Civil Defense force in his
home village in Kien Giang province. In March
1960, he was kidnaped by the Viet Cong and kept
a prisoner in the highlands for one most It. There
he was subjected to intense propaganda and indoc-
trination. Ile was returned to his village but kept.
tinder close observation and steady pressure.
Finally, he was convinced he must join the VC.
Later, lie was transferred to a Communist military
unit. in another province. After learning of the
Government's "Open Arnis" program, he decided
to defect, from the VC. In May 1964, he walked
into a Government outpost and asked for
protection.
Money to pay the regular VC units comes from
a variety of sources. Funds are sent from Hanoi.
"Taxes" are extorted from the local population.
Landowners and plantation operators often must
pay a. tribute to the VC as the price for not having
their lands devastated. Similarly, transportation
companies have been forced to pay the VC or face
the threat of having their buses or boats sabotaged.
Officials and wealthy people have been kidnaped
for ransom. The VC have often stopped buses
and taken the money and valuables of all on board.
For the most part, the VC have concentrated
their attention on individuals, isolated or poorly
defended outposts, and small centers of popula-
tion. `['Iiev have mercilessly killed or kidnaped
thousands of village chiefs and other local officials.
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But over the past year the VC have moved into
larger unit operations. Their ability to operate
on a battalion-level or larger has substantially
increased.
C. INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION
A key element in the Viet Cong effort is an elab-
orate organization in Hanoi called the Central
Research Agency (C.R.A.) (Cue, Nghien-Cuu
Trung-Uong). Though it handles Hanoi's intelli-
ence effort on a worldwide scale, the main focus
of its operation is on South Viet-Nam. This agen-
cy is able to draw on the intelligence capabilities
of both the Lao Dong Party and the North Viet-
namese armed forces for information, personnel,
and facilities.
The C.R.A. reportedly operates under the close
personal scrutiny of Ho Chi Minh himself. Some
of the top officials in the Hanoi government re-
portedly sit on its directing committee, including
Premier Pham Van Dong, Deputy Premier
Truong Chinh, and Defense Minister Vo Nguyen
Giap.
Considerable information on the organization
of the C.R.A. has become available from captured
Viet Cong agents and from the work of intelli-
gence agents of the Republic of Viet-Nam. Much
of this information cannot be made public for
security reasons, but it is possible to describe the
C.R.A. organization and its operations in broad
outline.
The headquarters of the C.R.A. in Hanoi is
divided into six main sections, not including a
special code unit. The six sections are respon-
sible for administration, cadres, communications,
espionage, research, and training. Each section
has units to handle the specialized activities of
its particular area of responsibility. The research
section, for example, has subsections that handle
political, economic, and military affairs respec-
tively.
C.R.A. headquarters directs a number of special
centers for overseas operations. One such center
maintains intelligence channels to overseas areas.
It operates through special units at Haiphong and
at Hongay.
A second special center is responsible for VC
intelligence operations in Cambodia and Laos.
A third center handles activities along the "demar-
cation line," the border with South Viet-Nam.
This unit, based in Vinh Linh in southeast North
Viet-Nam, is responsible for sending agents and
supplies to the South by sea. It also cooperates
with the North Vietnamese army in planning and
carrying out infiltration. The C.R.A. maintains
intelligence bases in Laos and other countries.
Inside South Viet-Nam the Viet Cong have a
large intelligence network. Some of its units
are responsible for receiving and sending on agents
arriving from the North. They feed and give
instructions to groups infiltrating into South Viet-
Nam. They take delivery of equipment and sup-
plies received from the North and relay them to
Viet Cong units in the South.
Many Viet Cong agents have been captured in
Saigon. They have exposed the extensive effort by
the C.R.A. to penetrate all Republic of Viet-Nam
Government agencies, foreign embassies, and other
specialized organizations. Party and military
intelligence units and agents work closely with
the C.R.A.
Each of the main centers operating under C.R.A.
headquarters has its own sections and units de-
signed to carry out its main functions. The cen-
ter at Vinh Linh, responsible for the main in-
filtration effort of the Viet Cong, has separate
sections for radio communications, coding, docu-
mentation and training, and liaison. It also has
specialized units for infiltration through the
mountains, infiltration by sea, and "illegal action"
in the mountain area.
The C.R.A. maintains a large and expanding
radio communications network. Agents also are
used to carry messages, usually in secret writing
or memorized.
Taken as a whole, the North Vietnamese intelli-
gence operation in support of the Viet Cong is
one of the most extensive of its kind in the world.'
1 Charts of the VC organizational structure are in
appendix H.
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V. A Brief History of Hanoi's Campaign of
Aggression Against South Viet-Nam
While negotiating an end to the Indochina War
at Geneva in 1954, the Communists were making
plans to take over all former French territory in
Southeast Asia. When Viet-Nam was parti-
tioned, thousands of carefully selected party mem-
bers were ordered to remain in place in the South
and keep their secret apparatus intact to help pro-
mote Ilanti's cause. Arms and ammunition were
stored away for future use. Guerrilla lighters re-
joined their families to await. the party's call.
Others withdrew to remote jungle and mountain
hideouts. The majority-an estimated 90,000-
were moved to North Viet-Nam.
Hanoi's original calculation was that all of
Viet-Nam would fall under its control without.
resort to force. For this purpose, Communist
cadres were ordered to penetrate official and non-
official agencies, to propagandize and sow con-
fusion, and generally to use all means short of
open violence to aggravate war-torn conditions
and to weaken South Viet Ham's Government and
social fabric.
South Viet-Nam's refusal to fall in with
Hanoi's scheme for peaceful takeover came as a
heavy blow to the Communists. Meantime, the
Government had stepped up efforts to blunt Viet
Cong subversion and to expose Communist agents.
Morale in the Communist. organization in the
South dropped sharply. Defections were numer-
ous.
Among South Vietnamese, hope, rose that their
nation could have a peaceful and independent
future, free of Communist domination. The
country went to work. The years after 1955 were
a period of steady progress and growing pros-
perity.
Food production levels of the prewar years
were reached and surpassed. While per capita
food output was dropping 10 percent. in the North
from 1956 to 1960, it. rose 20 percent. in the South.
By 1963, it had risen 30 percent-despite the dis-
ruption in the countryside caused by intensified
Viet. Cong military attacks and terrorism. The
authorities in the North admitted openly to con-
tinning annual failures to achieve food produc-
tion goals.
Production of textiles increased in the South
more than 20 percent in one year (1958). In the
same year, South Viet-Nam's sugar crop increased
more than 100 percent. Despite North Viet-
Nam's vastly larger industrial complex, South
Viet: Nam's per capita. gross national product in
1960 was estimated at $110 a person while it was
only $70 in the North.
More than 900,000 refugees who had fled from
Communist rule in the North were successfully
settled in South Viet-Nam. An agrarian reform
program was instituted. The elementary school
population nearly quadrupled between 1956 and
1960. And so it went-a record of steady im-
provement in the lives of the people. It was
intolerable for the rulers in Hanoi ; under peace-
ful conditions, the South was outstripping the
North. They were losing the battle of peaceful
competition and decided to use violence and terror
to gain their ends.
After 1956 Hanoi rebuilt, reorganized, and ex-
panded its covert political and military machinery
in the South. Defectors were replaced by trained
personnel from party ranks in the North. Mili-
tary units and political cells were enlarged and
were giissing
:I a I-esult of Viet l1 tPrrori-t 1' 11VIIie-during 1:11;;. ('oloirtt''a haltie~arcnot included.
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it
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(i`-)
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'I- ln' f ollo?in~r (:11111' IInL~.~ th1' nnnlher 1:f ttI id1'nt- of iet ('oug terroti,nl -xhntage, forced
1'UIYL_rallda -lIflllr, Illltl l ['In~'~l Itlf:U?Kr 11111'1 llg I:16 r1.
X17 1411 L s4 113 114 53 60 96
Attaekr
1. _ 1 1 . ? : .i 1 - (101 1 ' ' t - I . - 1 1 - 1 :0 0 123 1, 71 5 1 934 1. 790 391 1, 719
1'r?rruri ul
1 _r11 I:i.ti l6!.17 176 256 315 4S2 450 247 31S
'al HrLa er _.
I'ropag:ur'lll 1 7I 167 1.;; 140 162 224 173 174 197 109 121
~ouu' III thl ourcl~u('u''('>. 4 V'ir't ('')11r terr(Il'-111 ;III',lrov~11 111 the Io(Iolll,aII Ill_r photographs.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/11/10: CIA-RDP79RO1001AO01400010005-4
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/11/10: CIA-RDP79RO1001AO01400010005-4
Wreckage of a freight train derailed by a Viet Cong mine at Thu Due, northeast of Saigon, on 5. The
,an, 17, 1965 The
engine was destroyed and two Vietnamese trainmen were seriously wounded.
The Viet Cong destroyed this railway bridge at Vinh Binh in 1962. The transportation system of Viet.Nam isya
favorite VC target.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/11/10: CIA-RDP79RO1001AO01400010005-4
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/11/10: CIA-RDP79R01001A001400010005-4
ll
Finn liin-t rillagr hospital ti' trnrerl by (onnurnist terrorist in 1962. The t iet Cung usUar sere all medicines
for their ours use in surh attrrrks.
I his bus carried .irilian passengers bettceen Ries Minh
ert,j 1 e IIou in Bien 1uung Yrorinee. or, 5fa.' :3?
jybI. it u'as destroyed b, a Diet Con; nine; 14 pas-
srngers 1' (17-01 killed and 15 were injured. Maw of the
i etints were n onten and childrert.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/11/10: CIA-RDP79R01001A001400010005-4