POST MORTEM: NIE-35/1, 'PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA THROUGH MID-1952', PUBLISHED 4 MARCH 1952, AND NIE-35/2, 'PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA THROUGH MID-1953', PUBLISHED 29 AUGUST 1952

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00971A000500020007-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 26, 2006
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: December 4, 1952
• Content Type: MF

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M~2t&?At~l3U23 F .:
SE
O TIE OF NATIONAL ESTNATES
4 December 1952
Mr. Allan Lena (ota)
Colonel Gerald F. Lillard, USA (G-2)
Captain Allan. L. Reed, USN (TI-L. _ . ,
4 March 1952, and NTE-35/2, "Probable Develop--
rtesnts in Indochina through Mid-1953", published
29 August 1952
a 1. Procedure for Reducing Intelligence Def i--
ciencies in =Vs, dated 3 June 3.952
twin John A. Holbrook, USN (JIG)
Fort-Tor ms 1 .-35{`1., "Probable Developments
in Indochina through Mid-1952", published
ENCLOSURE : A. List of Intelligence Deficiencies Revealed
in the Preparation of NIE-35/i and NIE-35/2
1. You will recall that last Agri]., your representatives
met with us and discussed a list of intelligence deficiencies
which had been revealed in the preparation of NIE-35/1. (Office
of National :intelligence memo dated 18 April,, with Enclosures. )
2. The net result of these discussions were :
a. A procedure was agreed upon (reference a);
b. No formal action was taken on the list of defi-
ciencies except to agree to their incorporation
in the terrtl9 of reference to NI . -35/2 s' and
e. Each agency informally undertook to take Steps
to improve the collection from the field to
enable it to make more adequate contributes
to NIE-35/2.
'V9! E li C
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SECRET
3. Us have now conducted a post-mortem on 1I.35,# and
find that no appreciable ,gains were discernible in filling
previously identified gaps.
4. The enclosed lisstt of deficiencies therefore bears
a remarkable resemblance to the list discussed by your repre-
aentatives last April.
5. The Board believes more positive steps need to be
taken during the caning year to reduce the deficiencies in
intelligence on Indochina. We are therefore submitting the
attached list for your consideration and for subsequent discus.
Sion in accordance with established procedure.
6. Please have your representative meet with us at 10x 00
Monday, December 15, in Room 346 South Building.
D Asat.Director/Adm.
Distribution VIB"=
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N%Wpi NW
4 December 1952
ENCLOSURE a"A"
LIST CF INTELLIGENCE DEFICIENCIES REVEAL IN TI PREPARATION
of nT~_Ar~ ra
loin order of r?riority
A. Viet t_U.nh Deyel o nts
I Bins considerable intelligence
on the military, economic, and
pzo-LIT a situation the ;,net Minh, the quality of such Intel-
ligence is generally too low to support firm or conclusive
estimates. This may be an Insoluble problem because of the
great difficulties involved in the collection process. 1there
at all possible, however, US estimates would profit from the
following..
1. bore reliable intelligence concerning the Viet Minh
manpower situation.
2. Moro reliable intelligence concerning the state of
morale among the Viet T?4inh leadership and Army, and
among the population within Viet Minh-controlled
territory.
3. t'jore reliable intelligence concerning the extent of
consolidation of control over territories held by the
Viet Minh; the political, economic and police instru-
ments of control; the extent to which the regime is
welcome and supported; the degree of power, if any,
enjoyed by non-Communist Tarty leadership.
4. More reliable intelligence concerning the present role
of 116--Chi-Minh; the other important figures in the
Viet YZinh (bacl rounds., responsibilities, etc.).
5. More reliable intelligence concerning the frictions,
If any, ttieh exist between the Viet I !inh and the
Chinese Canmrnists; the effect of traditional Chinese-
Indochinese ill.--feeling;; the existence, if any, of
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Viet Minh "rationalist," as distinguished from "Communist,"
aspirations; the displacing, if any, of indigenous leader-
ship and influence by Chinese pressure or personalities.
6. "'yore reliable intelligence concerning the relations,
if any, between the Viet 1Linh and Soviets; the existence,
if any, of frictions between Peiping and I loscow concern.
lug superior influence over the Viet Minh.
B. Chizxsge Gomun t Deyelomoents
A situation somewhat similar to that discussed above exists 25X1
as far as Chinese Co riunistt support of the Viet Minh is concerned,
There is here a gre ity of rewrtiw than there is
the Viet Minh itse
report ng.
a , ver, the reliability of this Intelligence in for the 25X1
moat part poor, although reports on developments within China are
generally superior to those concerning Viet ? `inh territories.
Where at all possible, US estimates would profit from the following:
I ;-lam reliable intelligence concerning Chinese Communist
"advisors" with the Viet Ilinh; the number, training, status,
function, and influence of these people.
2. riore reliable intelligence concerning Chinese Comrnznist
"volunteers," if any, with the Viet Binh; the number,
method of integration, corrnnnd relationships, training,
status, function, and influence of these people.
3. tore reliable intelli7ence concerning Chinese Communist
capabilities with respect to Indochina: Ob, transportation
improvements, stockpiling, and air force and naval develop-
ments; economic capabilities for riore active participation
in Indochina..
. Tlore reliable intelligence concerning indications of
Chinese Communist intentions with respect to Indochina.
C. French Coelo
Mqnt
I-lore reliable intelligence would be helpful concerning:
1. Indications of French intentions with respect to Indochina,
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Reported exploratory negotiations for some Lind of
sr et" .e-mentrt bet-,men French and Viet T h., Chinese,,
r. dror : oviet officials-, if such negotiations have
actually taken place,, the nature of them; if they
have not, the source of the hors of such negotiationsa
Sy LT
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