POST MORTEM OF NIE PRODUCTION FOR FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1954

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00971A000500010007-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 15, 2007
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: October 20, 1954
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2007/02/',45~1~00971A000500010DUT~b
GENTRAL INTELLIGENGE AGENC~t
MEMQRANDU~Bdi F~?I3,: Mr a Allan Evans (OIR)
Colonel VAT. H. Heanig, USA (G-~)
Gaptaiu H. E. ~-iggin, USN (ANI)
Colonel William S. Bogd, USAF (AFOII3-213~j
Colonel Floyd E. Duna, USA (JIG)
SUBJECT: Post-M?rtem of NIE Production far First
Six Months of 1954
1. There is attached as Enclosure A a draft of consolidated
findings on intelligence deficiencies noted in NHE production far the
period 1 January - 30 June 1954. Tab A to the enclosure lists
the estimates produced in We six-nnonth period on which the
findings are based.
2. This review of intelligence deficiencies has base prepared
in compliance with the IAG action of 11 May 1954 (IAG-M-151)
directing Wet such a paper be psoduced semi-aaaaually for IAC
noting and circulation by the DGI.
3, 2~lease review this draft for substance and have your
representatives meet with us at iA:OA, Wednesday, 27 +October. in
Room 132 South Building,
I?eputy Assistant Director
National Estimate s
This me~-orandum may be downgraded to SECRET when attachm:eat 25X1
is removed.
The classification of TAB A is SECRET
z
!VO CHAfh;a[ {N CLASS. t
CJ LIECLAS81FtED
SECRET ClASB. CliANGEfl Td: TS 4
~ g 9
ATE
:
NEXT REVIEW G
AUTFi: pHR~7~fl,-,~2s~
20 October 1954
~__ 1.n1
Approved For Release 2007/02/16 :CIA-RDP79R00971A000500010007-4
 Approved For Release 2007/02/16 :CIA-RDP79R00971A0005C~Q~1Q~~ ~~
TGP SECR~'~
C~N'I.1t.~L I1~TE~I..IG~I~TCE AG~NC~
2~3 Gctober 1954
SU$~7~~~': I'ost~-~ortem of NIA ~'roduction for the ~'eriod
l ~Jnnua~ry to 30 June .1954
'The following is a review of intellige~act defici~snci.es revoaled
in the preparation of National Inta~lligence ~stianates d:~a:ring the
first six months of 154. 'I'he~se deficiencies identify s,reas i.a which
intelligence info:?naation ie inadequate due wither to cps in coll~r:ti~~n
or in research and anallrais. No attempt is made to deal with the
validity of substantive judgments resale in the estixxsates. No coYd~ir
of priority is ixrplied in the listing of gaps witxaixs sections. The
estimates upon which these eox~solidated findings are bas~:d arcs
listed in Tab A.
1. General
Since the intelligence deficiencies Hated in this report
re~~'lect only the estimates undert~-ken during the sip-month pes,y,od
being reviewed, the list is by no meatus compl~stQ. In spite of the
subgtant3al intelligences iraforar~ation available, there continue to Lis:
numerous areas in which significant data are lacP~ing. In geners,lr
Approved For Release 2007/02/16 :CIA-RDP79R00971A000500010007-4
 Approved For Release 2007/02/16 :CIA-RDP79R00971A000500010007-4
it will be noted mat #.hhe moat important intelligence deficiency fn
the Savia*.t $loc is one of collection. a fact which esnphasixasa the
necessity for full exploitation of available information as well as
greater collection efforts. Ire rnoet other areas, notably in 'Western
Europe, the over-all coverage is good and va.at quantities of data
are availables. 'the problem here is largely one of research aa~d
analysis rather than collection.
Z. Soviet bloc ~excludang Connmunist ~China~
C3aps in intelligence ors the Soviet Eloc continue to be
those inhere~at ~o fleas restrictive security policies of the Comanun,ist
states. 13owever, the anethods open to US s.ntelligence far explsiting
the l:laxiited range of elate available are probably capable of further
dasvelopxnasnt. In ges~~sral, the most significant gaps in this
exploitabl+s area cox~tinua~ to lye theses relative to asconomic trends and
certain s.spects of So~rigt military capabilities, particularly in the
air. Estirr~aative ~aaosk is the period under review ixydicated a neasd
for gra~ar.fiar collection efforts ox more efs~ctive and mare generally
acceptsblas an~slytical xrethc~cls in the fallowing fields:
a. Soviet Ecoxa~ Iutalligence on the Soviet economy
coxntinues to be scaazty, bat collection efforts do not
Approved For Release 2007/02/16 :CIA-RDP79R00971A000500010007-4
 Approved For Release 2007/02/70?~;
$R00971A000500010007-4
'~,,`
`
appear to be capable of any radical improvement at
presents Agencies having intelligence production
responsibilities in this field should e~eamine the
possibility of more effective collection efforts in
the Satellite area which might yield data of significance
for the USSIE~ as wall as for the Satellites themselves,
There is also a need for more agreema~nt among the
agencies on the axaalytical methods to be employed
in working from limited data, especially in each fiti~ asp
the calculation of gross natitanal product and rates of
econoxxaic growth, comgarisons of the magnitude of Soviet
economic achieveYraents with those of Western countries,
and emmti~~.tea of the proportion of Soviet economic
resources allocated to military purpo,aeso
b, Soviet Aircrafte There is urgent need for more. sad
more reliable. data on Soviet aeronautical research and
development programs; actual aircraft production; and
the capabilitiea~ og rxevv Soviet aircraffi types. especially
long-range bombers sad all weather interceptorso It
should also be possible to get rx~ore agreement artaong the
agencies concerned oa methods of evaluating such data as
Approved For Release 2007/02/16 :CIA-RDP79R00971A000500010007-4
 Approved For Release 2007/02/16 :CIA-RDP79R00971A000500010007-4
~` '~'~'
Tt~P S~CIt,]~T
are available. This u-ould result in metre expeditious
processing than heretofore.
c. Soviet Airfield Development. Ara intensified effort is
required to collect more information on the develapment
of Soviet airfields, especially those capable of supporting
long-range bombers for attacks on the US and its
overseas installations.
d. Soviet Air Logistics. A greater collection effort is needed
far information bearing on the Soviet logistic capability
to support continuing air operations in variaus theaters,
~srith special emphasis on the long?rangc: air force
and the air defense system.
e. ~iuided IViissiles. There is a continuing and urgent need
for more effective collection anal a greater analytical
effort ova all a~pec2s of the Sovief guided missile program.
3. ~'ar ~a~t
The mmat important defficiencies in this area recurred in
one form or mnother in the preparation of many of the estimates
Approved For Release 2007/~Z/'f6 `CI~P79R00971A000500010007-4
 Approved For Release 2007/02/16. ~~qq DpP79R00971A000500010007-4
pa~oduced du~cing this pex~iode Certain of the gaps listen ayes
,probably of an unknowable nature. others could be clased by greater
cr~lla~ction efforts, while the rer~nainder could be narrowed by
improved analysis o? available da~.o
Sinv-Soviet Ii,elativns o Mor? re~liable- iaformativn is
x~eceasary on these questions: What is Peiping"s role in
the formulation and execution of ma,~vr Comuiuniat
laolicies in Asia? What division s~f reapvnaibilities
s.xista with respect tv ~vrth Korea, Indochina, and the
,Asia.n Communist Parties? Are there any n;.s~jor
diff+areaces ove~x de aired atxategy ox tiaaning? Fvr example,
which partnex? was chiefly responsibAe for then ~ommuaist
decision for an ~-rmistice in k~orea? In Indochina?
Fvr whet roasans? What is the extr~xt and nature of
Soviet e~conosr~ic and military aasa~iatance, particularly
overland, tv Coxnrnunfat China? ~Iha-~k is they extent and
nature of Sc~~iet influence or contra! in the Chinese
Concamu~nist Partly and Governaneaat?
b, Chinese Communist Av:x,~atic Y3evelelrmertta-b The work
done by the XAC agencies in preparing NlE 13-54
'"Carnmunist China?a Power Potential through 1957,"
Approved For Release 2007/02/16 :CIA-RDP79R00971A000500010007-4
 Approved For Release 2007/02/16 :CIA-RDP79R00971A000500010007-4
~..r
resulted in better coverage then hitherto of developments
within Communist China, 'klowevar. the preparation of this
and other estimates during this period revealed that
our intelligence coverage on Communist China is still
very inadequate on a numbq~r of questions. as is to
a lesser extent our analysis of available data, We have
to rely almost completely on Chinese Communist public
staternesnte for our estimates of economic developgnents
in mainland China, Cur information is inadequate to
permit s.n agreed eatinnate on the capacity of the mainland
transportation system, In agriculture we lack reliable
information on production, the rate of collectivisation.
m~a~l peasant reactions to the regime's agricultural policya
~-Ve knour that soanle kind of dieciplini~g of party and
govern~scaent personnel at the highest level has been
occurring, but we have no firrs~ or detailed evidence
concerning palicy or persona.laty differences within Communist
China?s top leadership, Lastly, the preparation of
Nllr 13-54 has revealed that more reliable intelligence is
need~sd on the question of public attitudes in China toward
the regime,
Approved For Release 2007/02/16 :CIA-RDP79R00971A000500010007-4
 Approved For Release 2007/02/16 :CIA-RDP79R00971A000500010007-4
phis du