POST-MORTEM: NIE-35/1, 'PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA THROUGH MID-1952', PUBLISHED 4 MARCH 1952, AND NIE-35/2, 'PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA THROUGH MID-1953', PUBLISHED 29 AUGUST 1952

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00971A000400060031-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 19, 2006
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: December 4, 1952
• Content Type: MF

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL EUSTUIATIZ,
4 December 1952
twCff(ANDUIi FOR: llr. Allan Evans (OlE)
Colonel Gerald F. Lillard, t3A (G-2)
Captain Allan. L. Reed, IN (ONI)
Colonel Jack. E. Thomas, USAF (AFOIN-2A)
Captain John A. Holbrook, USN (JIG)
SUBJECT : Post-11ortem: NIE.-35/1, "Probable Developments
in Indochina through Mid-1952", published
4 I1reh 1952, and NIE-35/2, "Probable Develop--
ments in Indochina through Mid-1953", published
29 Aurust 1952
REFERENCE $,. Procedure for Reducing Intelligence Defi-
ciencies in NIE's, dated 3 June 1952
ENCLOSURE : A, List of Intelligence Deficiencies Revealed
in the Preparation of TSB-35/1 and NIE-35/2
1. You will recall that last April, your representatives
met with us and discussed a list of intelligence deficiencies
which had been revealed in the prenaration of NIE-35/l. (Office
of National Intelligence namo dated 18 April, with Enclosures.)
2. The net result of these discussions were:
A procedure was agreed upon (reference e);
b. No formal action was taken on the list of defi-
ciencies except to agree to their incorroration
In the terms of reterenco to NNIE--35/2; and
c. Each agency informally urndertool! to take steps
to improve the collection from the field to
enable it to make more adequate contributions
to N TJ -35/2.
25X1
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N"w
3. 'ye have now conducted a postmortem on IM-35/2 and
find that no apireciable gains were discernible in filling
previously identified gaps.
4. The enclosed list of deficiencies therefore bears
a remarkable resemblance to the list discussed by your repre-
sentatives last April.
5. The Board believes more positive steps need to be
taken during; the coming; year to reduce the deficiencies in
ence on Indochina. We are therefore submitting the
telli
i
g
n
attached list for your consideration and for subsequent discus-
sion in accordance with established procedure.
6. Please have your representative meet with us at 10:00
Monday, December 15, in Room 146 South Building.
D/A?st.Director Awn.
Distribution "B"
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4 December 1952
LIST OF IT TELLIGENCE DLFICIENC.IS REVEALED IN TIM PREPARATION
in order of Priority
A. Viet jagh Deyel.o-aments
Although US intelligence obtains considerable intelligence
on the military, economic, and
political situation in the Viet YMinh, the quality of such intel-
ligence is generally too low to support firm or conclusive
estimates. This may be an insoluble problem because of the
great difficulties involved in the collection process. Where
at all possible, however, US estimates would profit from the
following:
1. More reliable intelligence concerning the Viet IMInh
manpower situation.
2. More reliable intelligence concerning the state of
morale among the Viet Minh leadership and Argr, and
among the population within Viet Minhh-controlled
territory.
3. More reliable intelligence concerning the extent of
consolidation of control over territories held by the
Viet Minh; the political, economic and police instru-
ments of control; the extent to which the regime is
welcome and supported; the degree of power, if any,
enjoyed by non-Communist Party leadership.
4. More reliable intelligence concerning the present role
of Ho--Chi-i linh; the other important figures in the
Viet limb (bacl-grrounds, responsibilities, etc.).
5. More reliabl. intelligence concerning the frictions,
if any, tithich exist between the Viet ttinh and the
Chinese Coimnc niots; the effect of traditional Chinese-
Indochinese ill-feeling; the existence, if any, of
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SECRET
Viet Minh "nationalist," as distinguished from "Communist."
aspirations; the displacing, if any, of indigenous leader-
ship and influence by Chinese pressure or personalities.
6. More reliable intelligence concerning the relations,
if any, between the Viet Minh and Soviets; the existence,
if any, of frictions between Peiping and I Moscow concern-
ing superior influence over the Viet Minh.
8. Chl.neso Co uun t Develoiments
A situation somewhat similar to that discussed above exists
as far as Chinese Conminist support of the Viet IUnh is concerned,
There is here a greater quantity of reporting than there is on
the Viet Minh itself
reporting.
9 however,, the reliability of this intelligence is for the
most part poor, although reports on developments within China are
generally superior to those concerning Viet ? .inh territories.
Where at all possible, US estimates would profit from the following:
1. Fiore reliable intelligence concerning Chinese Cc>anmunist
"advisors" with the Viet I4inh; the number, training, status,
function, and influence of these people.
2. More reliable intelligence concerning Chinese Communist
"volunteers," if any, with the Viet flfnh; the number,
method of integration, comanand relationships, training,
status, function, and influence of these people.
3. Dbre reliable intelligence concerning Chinese Communist
capabilities with respect to Indochina: OB, transportation
improvements, stockpiling, and air force and naval develop-
ments; economic capabilities for more active participation
in Indochina.
4.. More reliable intelligence concerning indications of
Chinese Communist intentions with respect to Indochina.
C. French Deyelcnts
More reliable intelligence would be helpful concerning:
1. Indications of French intentions with respect to Indochina.
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2. Reported exploratory negotiations for some ]rind of
n settlements between ] `reneh and Viet 11nh, Chinese,
and/or aoviet officials; if such negotiations have
actuallg taken place, the nature of them; if they
have not, the source of the rimors of such negotiations.
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