POST MORTEMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00971A000400060014-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 13, 2006
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: April 14, 1954
• Content Type: MF

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CONFTIALI
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
34 April 1954
ME ORAN'DUM FOR: Mr. Allan Evans (07R)
Colonel W. A. Hennig, USA (G-2)
Captain Allan L. Reed, USN (ONI)
Colonel Charles F. Gillis, USAF (AFOIN:-2B2)
Captain Ray Malpess, USN (310)
SUBJECT : Pbst Mortems
1. The IAC representatives met on 15 February and oon-
sidered a draft post no ten statement, dated 5 Febrruary, on
1953 production.
2. Attached is a revision of the earlier statement
incorporating the substance of the 15 February discussion as
well as material subsequently received from State.
3. At the meeting, the chairman reserved ONE's position
on the need for Including a statement on the analysis of
Soviet propaganda. After further consideration, we believe
that a modified statement such as now appears under para-
graph 1 g is both appropriate and helpful.
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Terms of reference for NTE's should be gotten
out as early as possible to permit the various
agencies to make more vigorous use of them as
collection guides, at home and in the field.
ONE should be more vigorous in going back to
the agencies informally on specific gaps found
in the agency contributions to NIE's.
5. AAct o
CO
4.
ich are not reflected in the present text are:
Supplementary points made by the IAC representatives
Please review the prresent text and be prepared to
it at[1o:00 ri>nday, 26J April, in Room 132 South Building.
,I ,, 00 7"";Ax.y 27
CONFIDENTIAL
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r
Deputy Assistant Director
National Estimates
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CONFIDENTIAL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
14 April 19514
SUBJECT: PAST Cr MMM 1953 PRODUCTION
The following is a review of intelligence deficiencies revealed
during preparation of National Intelligence Estimates during 1953.
The principal estimates upon which these findings are based are listed
in TAB "A."
1. SAL
a. An isprovsaent in the liaison between operational
and intelligence echelons in the field and, in
Washington would result in the acre tinily receipt
of intelligence and the receipt of additional
intelligence. (: difficulties of getting
fira Intelligerce on Id's intentions and capabilities,
encountered in prepamtIon of SZ 1e8. )
b. Generally, inforaration is norm easily obtainable
on the Satellites (Particularly on East O"Jany
and Brit edit) than on the X. Since intelligence
on the Satellites is of considerable help in
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CONFFIDENTIAf
low
aaa lyzing develo nts in the USSR, an ezpanded
effort should be made to exploit all available
c is for obtaining econceic, political,
and military information on the Satellites.
c. In view of the relative paucity of information
and intelligence an the USSR, it is important
that what is available be exploited fully. One
of the sources which possibly could be more fully
exploited is that of Soviet da.
2. SOVIN BLOC
The gaps in our intelligence with respect to the Soviet Bloc
Lava been widely recognized for a long tism. bar of thews will
probably never be filled. During 1953 a need was expressed for
moro effott on the realstance potential in the Bloc. Accordingly,
the IAC authorized creation of an Ad Boc Resistance Intelligence
Coss ttee on 8 December 1953. B rrience during 1953 also
Indicated a need for greater collection and research efforts in
t following key areas:
aa. Aircraft Production. With the growth of Soviet
atonic powaz accurate estimates of Soviet long-
rang+e and figbter aircraft production are of critical
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fie. Strenuous efforts should therefore
be continued to improve the basis of estimates
of Soviet aircraft production.
b. g,Scie a sad iechnolQ . Special emphasis
should be put on the collection and research effort
in the field of electronics.
c . -fry (X reg Def . Continued s sis on
weapons having possible dual offensive and defensive
mission: missile developsent and production; and.,
aircraft development axed production.
d. ,iriet Offensive Ca, pabilities. 'Submarine characteristics,
^ PII.~.II..r.yr~IM...M
particularly propulsion, and, of weapons for use with
submarines (torpedoes and mines). Of continuing
interest are Soviet capabilities and developments
in the fields of AW, 1 IO BW, and CV.
e. Soviet Defensive Capabilities. early earning,
filter process, and commmieations relating to
air defense. Also airborne radar.
f. 8ccmo?ie MteM da. Basic data an the various sectors
of the Soviet econombr are Inadequate for fully
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satisfactory analyses of econic developments
and trends. This points up the need for a
continuing collection effo> in this field.
~? tin Sate l1i s. Significant gaps in intelligence
an the Satellites revolve on the extent and nature
of resistance s, and the nature of the
Soviet a eb niam for axercisivur ccntrol in these
countries.
3. FAR n
XmW of the Intelligence deficiencies in the Camonist Far
east are similar to those that exist for the Bloc as a whole. The
most critical gays throughout the Per East include:
a. Our ability to estimate
C st capabilities and courses of action in the
Far East will depend to a large extent on oear
knowledge of the nature of the Sino-Soviet relations.
This is largely a collection proble* and should be
given a very high priority.
Chime C It . mrPerience during 1953,
Particularly in the preparation at SE-37, indicated
a continuI need for =ogre infor tion on use
economic develcpant. An* Iqlportant facet is
China's transportation capabilities, particularly as
these effect Chinese aeilitery capabilities.
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as Viet Minh Cepabilities a ][atanticas. Despite
resmri.i YMepYA+a ^il lgll m.Y qq aY?.AF1. tlMO. 1WM ?M.~idA on
Sam iiprove nt, we continued turfing 1953 to rely
too heavily French sources for 3nfarsstion on
Viet Minh capabilities and intentions, both military
and political, and an Chinese Cos iunist s sit of
the Viet Binh. In view of the possibility of a
French &rsad for greater US iavalveuent in the
Ind aching var, steps to close this gap should be
given a very hfJ" priority.
e. Inds. Preparation of UN-77 and 89-51
revealed the contAwdia and urgent wed for
more iaforzntion an the political orientation of
the Indonesian ramanwe nt and the capabilities and
intentions or the Caaomist and other dissident
groups In Indonesia.
P. Bur
. The fluid and confused situation in Murm
requites a steady flow of Information on the
orientation of the mesa Government and its
capabilities and intentions with respect to Coo-
mmist and other dissident groups.
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5. NN R ZAN-AFRICA
mo;
Superiance during 1953 indicated that over-all intelligence
coverage at the I ddle Bust is good. Tlie top priority targets
remain. Iran and. Egypt. The principal intelligence gaps noted
and these were not critical -- were:
a. Israel. Time was inadequate infarssticn an
the internal political situation, the capabilities
of the Israeli armed farces, and the role played
by the Israeli gray in the determination of Israeli
policy toward the Arab states.
b. Indian Border Areas. Reporting from the Indian
border areas, partiaularly from Easbmir and Nepal,
was inadequate in view of Increasing Cam=mJLBt
interest in the area and indications at increasing
friction between these areas and India*
c. Egypt. Although coverage of the Ang1c-E9yptian
dispate was emeelleat, further coverage would be
useful an the internal political situation,
particularly on the activities of the appositioxi.
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Vol
d. Africa. Intelligence coverage of Africa is
meager. We rely too heavily an the European
mrtropoles far the united iafarmatic n we
receive on such issues as Com uenism, nationalisa,
racial tension, end. Intertribal relations. Assuming
continued growth an the Importance of Africa as a
raw material source for the My and growing unrest
throughonrt the continent, broader intelligence
coverage will became Increasingly important.
6. LATIN A==
Over-all intelligence coverage of Latin America is good. Hr-
ever, Important deficiencies exist in the following lds:
a. Military opinion. Fuller reporting is desirable
an the political positions of important military
figures and an trends in the political views of
both senior and junior military officers. With
respect to Ouatsmala, there is a look of information
an the degree of disaffection or anxiety in the
officer carps resulting from Arbens' collaboration
with Camminists and the amt's inability to obtain
us military msteriel.
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CO FIDENTIAL
b. C e u raise. Fuller inforsation is reacted on treads
in Ct mist Party strsagths, and an Coemmist
infiltration of gent, labor, and Intellectual
circles, especially in Argentina and Bolivia.
c. The situatioon of lam. More concrete intareation
is desired on the politicma orientation and the
econasde status ct bath orgBenised and nscrg nis.d
labor in all the countries with politically
sigatficaat labor mm Bents.
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TAB "A"
CONFIDENTIAL OR 1
14 April 1954
fftI IPAL NIB > 0Dt1C'i X(i BASE FCFt 1953 PON MMMM FIaDI i8
1. SO.? BLOC
W-65 Soviet Bloc Capabilities throw 1957
MR-81 Probable Soviet Courses of Action with
Respect to Gee any through Mid-1954
MM-87 Probable De lop onta within the Burapan
Satellites through ULd-1955
NIB-90 Soviet Bloc Capabilities through MA-1955
-95 le Soviet Bloc Courses of Action
tbraa fit.-1955
SE-36 Soviet Capabilities for Attack on the t
through WA-1955
SR-36/1 Soviet Capabilities for Attack on the US
through Mid-1955
SE-38 Soviet Bloc Capabilities and Probable
Courses of Action in. 1eatradrsgn+atie:
Warfare
SE-39 Probable C quences of the Death of Stalin
and of the Elevation of eov to
p in the U
SS-40 Cosunist Reactions to US Establieh tt of
a "Volunteer Freedon Corps"
SE-42 Current Cc uniet Tactics
S$-46 Probable Lmg-ftm Develop ont of the Soviet
Bloc and Western Pater Positions
SE-47 Probable Effect of Recent Developaeata in
ftetern Gummy on Soviet Policy with
Respect to Gersaw
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2. FAR BAST
Ala-74 Probable Ds~nelonts in Burma throes 1953
NI3-77 Probable Developunts in Indonesia
NI3-1O Coammmiist Capabilities and Probable Courses
of Action in Korea
NI3-91 Probable Developments in Indochina throw
. 1954
S3-37 Probable Effects on the Soviet Bloc of Certain
Courses of Action Directed at the Internal
and External Connerce of Communist China
SB-45 Thailand s Ability to Withstand Comwmist
Pressure or Attacks through M141-1954
SE-48 Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action
of the Republic of Korea with Respect to
the Armistice in Korea
SIB-51 The Significance of the New Indonesian Government
SE-53 Probable Communist Reactions to Certain Possible
Developments in Indochina
3. WEST ( EUROPE.
.HIS-63 France's Probable Future Role in the Western
Security System
NIN-63/1 Probable Short Term Developments in French Policy
NIE-71 Probable Outlook for Italy
NIIE-93 Probable Developments in Yugoslavia
5E-54 The Political Outlook in Italy
Cp rMID TIAL
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4.
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NEAR Ede AFRICA
NIZ-73
Conditions ant. Trends in the Middle East
Af eating us security
NIC-75/1
Probable Developments in Iran through 1953
NIS 76
Probable Developments in Egypt
EMB79
Probable Developments in South Asia
Nis-83
Conditions and Trends in Tropical Africa
NIE-92
Israel
NIS-102
Probable Developments in Iran through 1954
SE-49
The Current Outlook in Iran
Nm-84
Probable Developments in Guatemala
NIE-85
Probable Developments in Chile
NIE-86
Probable Developnents in Brazil
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