MAKING ESTIMATIVE JUDGMENTS: SOME LESSONS LEARNED FROM MISJUDGMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00971A000400040001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 9, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 5, 1967
• Content Type: PAPER

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5 September 1967
MAKING ESTIMAT1 c]E JUDGMENTS : SOME LESSONS
LFAPMED FROM MISJUDGMENTS
Willard C. Matthias
fa -,i;`3. G 1~1fd. L 7 TO. 1'S S C
AUTN: Fri 70.2
DA E: RF'VIE1"JEl`f:._-
1. Nearly every one is familiar with the procedure by which
National Intelligence Estimates are prepared. This precedure is
important because it is designed to ensure that those responsible
for policy decisions receive an agreed view (or a carefully de-
lineated disagreement) based upon the best information and most
thorough review possible. But these procedures only provide the
framework within which people function, and the estimates are only
as good as they are made by those who operate the machinery.
2. In this machinery the Board of National Estimates (BNE)
plays the most important managerial and intellectual role. The
BNE controls the draft; it is prepared by the O/NE Estimates Staff
under the Board's direction, it is the Board's draft which is
discussed with the USIB and CIA component representatives, and it
is the Board member who has chaired these discussions who presents
the estimate to the USIB. The staff member who prepares the
initial draft also plays an important role; he is more familiar
with the information than most Board members are, and if he is a
skillful writer and convincing defender of his views, he puts a
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stamp on the draft which is ineradicable. The Board chairman --
particularly if he has had a long familiarity with,the subject
of the estimate and is temperamentally inclined toward playing a
strong role -- will also put his strong stamp on an estimate.
3. Nevertheless, it is the Board in its corporate capacity
which assumes the responsibility to the DCI for the form and
substance of the estimates. The Board of National Estimates is
his Board to formulate his views and to take account for him of
the information and judgments which are applicable. While he
personally may rely upon some Board members more than others,* in
his official capacity his concern is that the Board is sufficiently
competent and balanced in composition and experience that he can
be confident that all significant aspects of a problem have been
considered. This is not to say that he does not question or
modify the Board's formulations, for he does; but it is his arm
and he must look upon it in a corporate sense, even though he
knows that all members are not equally well versed on all subjects
or participated equally on all estimates.
4. How the individual Board member performs and how he
formulates his views are thus of very considerable importance to
the Director and to the other intelligence chiefs who are called
upon to affirm or dissent from the views which the Board puts
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forth to the Director and on his behalf. The writer, as a
Board member (and former staff member) can only speak for himself.
He does not and could not claim a specialist's competence on more
than a few areas or subjects, though he has written or presided
over estimates regarding every major area of the world. Nor does
the writer claim any particular method or technique for arriving
at judgments on particular questions. Each estimative situation
is unique, and one must rely upon a variety of supports -- the
amount and persuasiveness of the evidence; the methods of analysis
used by the contributor; the judgment of those in whom special
confidence is reposed -- whether because of their study, experience,
or sharpness of mind; his own background in the subject and, for
want of a better word, his own "hunches".
5. In the dictionary sense of the term, a "hunch" is a feeling
or suspicion not based upon evidence but upon premonition. I do
not believe in premonitions, but I will admit of the "hunch" if
I can define it. It must of course be compounded of something:
a sense of the logic of the situation, a ring of authenticity
concerning certain evidence, a feeling of uneasiness because some
factor in a situation is unexplained or`prima facie unexplainable,
a sense of the general weight of evidence though no individual
piece of it is persuasive or conclusive, a belief that some leader
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or group -- because of emotional or ideological predilections is likely to act in a certain way despite the irrationality or
illogic of such a course. These kinds of factors enter in most
frequently when no solid factual base exists or when the evidence
is contradictory. The most notable case of a correct "hunch" was
in 1962 when Director John McCone kept worrying the possibility
of the Soviets installing missile bases in Cuba despite the
absence of reliable evidence to this effect and despite the BNE's
belief that the Soviet leaders would not do anything so foolish.
6. In some ways the estimative job is easier than it was
ten or fifteen years ago. We have, for example, much more and
better evidence on many aspects of Soviet military capabilities
than we did then; collection methods have improved and analytical
skills developed. But there are still many problems which strain
the estimator's capacity. Some which cause the most severe doubts
are those relating to (a) likely courses of action in unstable
areas or situations of tension, (b) the likely course of events
in situations where the strengths of competing forces appear
evenly balanced or are difficult to assess, and (c) where the
evidence is contradictory, often because strong efforts are made
to conceal or deceive. In each of these types of problems, the
Board of National Estimates has made misjudgments, and in each I
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have participated in those misjudgments. I would like to describe
as best I can recall my role in three estimates over which I
presided and which -- if not explicitly, at least implicitly --
rendered an incorrect judgment.
A. Courses of action in unstable areas or situations of
7. Estimates of this type are both the most challenging
and the most discouraging to make. The natural reaction is that
one is being asked to do the impossible; yet, this is often the
most rewarding if done successfully(and although I here speak
of a failure, it often is done successfully). It is, of course,
impossible to predict the course of events, but one can describe
how the parties involved apparently think about a situation, how
they have acted toward it, and how they might act toward hypothetical
changes. The case I would like to take up is that of an estimate
entitled, "The Arab-Israeli Dispute: Current Phase," published
13 April 1967.
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8. This estimate was undertaken, as it is stated in the
introduction, in the context of "an increase in the recurrent
cycle of tensions" in the Palestine dispute and in the wake of the
Israeli raid on Samu in Jordan in late 1966 which shook the
monarchy in Amman. These raised the question of whether the
modus vivendi which had prevailed between Israel and its Arab
neighbors since 1957 was coming to an end. Most of what the
estimate said was right:
a. "Rivalries and disputes among the Arabs reduce
their chances of doing anything significant about their
quarrel with Israel; these rivalries also create some danger
of precipitating crises from which large-scale Arab-Israeli
hostilities could develop."
b. "The Israelis seem likely to continue existing
policies, including occasional retaliatory action; they would
resort to force on a large scale only if they felt their
security seriously endangered."
c. `fThe Israeli) could best any one of their neighbors
and probably all of them collectively. Arab cooperation
being what it is, Israel probably would not be obliged to
take them on all at once."
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d. "The Soviet leaders almost certainly view the
Arab-Israeli dispute as promoting their interests. .....
But the Soviets do not want an outbreak of large-scale
conflict in the area, since this would carry serious
risk of a US-Soviet confrontation and thus threaten the
positions which the Soviets have already won in the area."
The estimate had one final conclusion which, though it was
technically correct, conveyed a sense of reassurance which, in
light of the events of May and June 1967 was not the. full story:
"Although periods of increased tension in the
Arab-Israeli dispute will occur from time to time, both
sides appear to appreciate that large-scale military action
involves considerable risk and no assurance of leading to a
solution. In any event, the chances are good that the
threat of great power intervention will prevent an attempt
by either side to resolve the problem by military force."
9. I say that this last conclusion was essentially correct
because the recent war was not an attempt to "resolve" the Arab-
Israeli problem by military force. It fits under the rubric of
the conclusion (see a above) that rivalries among the Arabs
created the danger of "precipitating crises from which large-scale
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Arab-Israeli hostilities could develop." A review of the
available information quite clearly indicates that the Soviets
had a role in precipitating the crisis by passing intelligence
information about Israeli plans for a punitive expedition
against Syria to the Syrians and Egyptians (see d above,
"The Soviet leaders almost certainly view the Arab-Israeli
dispute as promoting their interests"). Nasser, who had been
accused in the past by his Arab rivals of hiding behind the
skirts of the UN, this time sought to avoid this charge. His
mobilization and the events which followed then led the Israeli
leaders to conclude that their security was "seriously endangered"
(see b above). Quite clearly, both the Soviets and the Egyptians
made some miscalculations about the consequences of their actions.
10. One can, as I have done, exculpate oneself by this kind
of textual exegesis. But there was in the estimate a serious
lacuna; we did not sufficiently treat the possibilities arising
out of terrorist activities, border raids, troop movements,
propaganda, political warfare, and the psychological effects of
these in Israel and the Arab world. Had we understood these
better, we should have ended the estimate by noting the dangers
which these could have provoked rather than upon the unlikelihood
of a deliberate resort to force.
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11. Why did we make this error? I think we were under two
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misapprehensions. The first was that we over estimated Soviet
good sense, something we have done before (e.g., our judgment
that the Soviets would have better sense than to deploy missiles
to Cuba in 1962). It is, I think, a safe judgment that if the
Soviets thought in mid-May what they knew on 5 June, they would
have kept certain intelligence information to themselves.
What I have learned is that how the Soviets may think about a
particular area and what they may do tactically may not be
entirely consistent. We as estimators must recognize more
frequently (as we often do in observing the tactical moves of
governments regarding which we have more complete knowledge)
that specific actions taken by the agents of a government do
not always flow from the general policy objectives or posture
of the leadership.
12. The other misapprehension, I believe, was a failure
to comprehend the dynamic aspects of Near Eastern politics. We
did not realize how much more confident in themselves both the
Israelis and Egyptians had become. We did not therefore realize
how much lower was the threshold of Nasser's readiness to expose
himself to danger, and how much lower was the threshold of Israel's
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readiness to fight against creeping threats to its existence.
I cannot say whether this was a failure in intelligence reporting
or in analysis; I suspect it was a bit of both. US personnel
abroad are often too absorbed in the day-to-day business of their
operations to detect a growing change of mood; analysts in
Washington are too often cynically prone to think their clients
are the same feckless (or scheming) fellows they always were and
that nothing much changes. I, for one, am prepared to be a bit
more cynical myself about area specialists.
B. Course of events where strengths of competing forces
appear evenly balanced or are difficult to assess.
13. The estimate I would like to discuss in this connection
is one which had a long and tortuous history. It was initiated
in October 1962 and was finally cleared by the USIB in April
1963; it was entitled, "Prospects in South Vietnam." These
were days when Diem was still president of South Vietnam and
Madame Nhu still riding high. The US commitment was still in
the form of advisors and logistical support. We were to try to
assess how things were going, what the problems were, what the
prospects were. I do not wish here to examine all the estimates
in the paper, but only those general statements about how the
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war was going and what the prospects were for South Vietnam in
the kind of struggle that was going on then. I quote from some
of the conclusions of the draft finally approved by the USIB:
a. "We believe Communist progress has been blunted
and that the situation is improving. Strengthened South
Vietnamese capabilities and effectiveness, and particularly
US involvement, are causing the Viet Cong increased
difficulty, although there are as yet no persuasive indi-
cations that the Communists have been grievously hurt."
b. "Assuming no great increase in external support
to the Viet Cong, changes and improvements which have
occurred during the past year now indicate that the Viet
Cong can be contained militarily..... However, we do not
believe that it is possible at this time to project the
future of the war with any confidence. Decisive campaigns
have yet to be fought and no quick and easy end to the war
is in sight ..."
c. "Developments during the last year or two also show
some promise of resolving the political weaknesses,
particularly that of insecurity in the countryside, upon
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which the insurgency has fed. However, the government's
capacity to translate military success into lasting
political stability is questionable."
14. The estimate thus rang no tocsin. To put it in simpler
language: things are not going to hell; we don't know how it
will all come out, but the South Vietnamese are not doing so
badly; Diem is improving, he might win the military struggle,
but even if he does don't think the political troubles of South
Vietnam will be over. It is not necessary to spell out for the
reader how Diem was ousted a half-year later, and how the
political and military situation degenerated to critical pro-
portions by the end of 1964. Why was the estimate so wrong?
15. This was a case where the original draft prepared by
the tO/NE staff was essentially correct, but was fatally weakened
as the process of view and coordination proceeded. This was a
long and painfullyprocess for me as chairman, since I helped the
staff prepare the initial draft and myself wrote the conclusions
to that draft. Let me quote some of these conclusions, c below
being the final one:
a. "There is no satisfactory objective means of
determining how the war is going. The increased US
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involvement has apparently enabled the South Vietnamese
regime to check Communist progress and perhaps even to
improve the situation in some areas; however, it is
impossible to say whether the tide is running one way or
the other ..."
b. "On the South Vietnamese side, new strategic
concepts, such as the fortified hamlet, and shifts in
military and security organization, training, and tactics
have strengthened the counter-guerrilla effort. However,
very great weaknesses remain and will be difficult to
surmount. Among these are lack of aggressive and firm
leadership at all levels of command, poor morale among the
troops, lack of trust between peasant and soldier, poor
tactical use of available forces, a very inadequate intel-
ligence system, and obvious Caanmunist penetration of the
South Vietnamese military organization."
c. "The struggle in South Vietnam at best will be
protracted and costly. The Communists are determined to
win control, and the South Vietnamese alone lack the present
capacity to prevent their own eventual destruction.
Containment of the Communists and reestablishment of a
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modicum of security in the countryside might be possible
with great US effort in the present political context of
South Vietnam, but substantial progress toward Vietnamese
self-dependence cannot occur unless there are radical
changes in the methods and personnel of the South Vietnamese
Government. Even should these take place without mishap,
this would only be a beginning; the Communists retain
capabilities and support which will require years of
constructive effort to dissipate."
16. Some of the process of dilution began in the Board
itself. The Board did not change the main thrust of the paper,
or alter essentially the wording of the conclusions cited in a
and b above. But it did eliminate some of the prescient words
frown both the text and the conclusions that are cited in c above.
The final conclusion now read simply:
"With US help, the South Vietnamese regime stands a
good chance of at least containing the Communists militarily.
However, the modus operandi of the Diem government, and
particularly its measures to prevent the rise of contenders
for political power, have reduced the government's effective-
ness, both politically and militarily. We believe that unless
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radical changes are made in these methods of government,
there is little hope that the US involvement can be sub-
stantially curtailed or that there will be a material and
lasting reduction in the Communist threat."
The serious weakness of this change was that it shifted the
emphasis front the inherent difficulty and long-term character
of the problem (to which Diem contributed) to an indictment of
the Diem regime. This led us into trouble with the State
Department representative at the coordination meeting.
17. The military representatives at the coordination
meeting were quite satisfied with the paper. Some had served
in South Vietnam and had been appalled at the South Vietnamese
military performance. The emphasis in the paper on political
weaknesses as a major cause of the military failures quite
naturally appealed to their professional instincts as well as
confirmed their own observations. The indictment of the Diem
regime, however, caused the State representative considerable
the
pain, no doubt because it called into question/existing US
policy of working with the Diem regime. He thus reserved his
position on this aspect of the paper. The State Department
representative also thought the estimate underestimated the
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prospects for gains through an improved military effort,
regarding which we had stated, "With US help, South Vietnam
stands a good chance of at least containing the Communists
militarily."
18. Thus, the DCI and the USIB members were presented
with a paper which -- even without the gloomy long-term prospects
which the Board of National Estimates had eliminated -- was a
fairly dolorous document. The existence of a reservation
obliged them to look at it carefully, and the DCI, who was then
John McCone, was particularly uneasy, since it seemed to
contradict the more optimistic judgments made by those in policy
circles who had been sent to Vietnam to make on-the-spot appraisals
and recommendations. He therefore decided to postpone USIB
consideration and asked the Board of National Estimates to
consult with some of those who had been on such missions. These
were General Wheeler, who was then Chief of Staff of the Army,
General Krulak, who was special assistant to the JCS for
counterinsurgency affairs, Roger Hilsman, who had only recently
of State
become Assistant Secretary/for Far Eastern Affairs, and Mike
Forrestal, who was a special assistant to the President.
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19. None of these consultations was particularly helpful.
It appeared to me that these witnesses were reluctant to make a
frontal assault on the judgments of the paper, but equally reluctant
to endorse it. There was a general tendency to take issue with a
particular sentence purporting to state a fact, rather than an
estimative judgment, and to enumerate evidence to the contrary.
This or that was "too pessimistic," but there was no clear line of
argument which emerged. All held forth some degree of optimism,
largely based upon the belief -- often supported by particular
y
examples -- that things were better than the
'Fis indeed
may have been true, but this did not establish how badly things
were going before or how this degree of improvement stood up to
the task, namely to deal with a determined and resourceful opponent
who was immeasurably helped by the profound underlying political
weaknesses of South Vietnam. None of them was attempting to mislead,
but the simple fact was that each of them in some way and to some
degree was committed to the existing US policy and was not intel-
lectually free at that point or in those circumstances to stand
back and look at the situation in its broadest aspects.
20. The drafters then returned to their desks and prepared
a revised draft. The staff members, although becoming increasingly
weary of the controversy, were nevertheless much inclined to stick
to their guns. I had also become weary of the controversy but
somewhat more inclined than they to shade the estimate in a more
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too gloomy; at the. same time I had to get an estimate through,
and the DCI had set us a new deadline. I did not believe that I
could get the DCI and other components of the agency to go along
if I stuck to the original draft, that that draft might produce a
military as well as a State Department dissent if I insisted
upon it (since high-ranking personnel had now become engaged),
and that such a situation would result in a paper more offensive
to the judgment of myself and the staff than one which moved
slightly toward a less pessimistic view. What we wrote were
approximately the conclusions I have cited above (paragraph 13).
I gaveled such a paper through over some staff objection and
rode easily through the USIB with the DCI's full concurrence.
21. The final estimate was not designed to, or did it,
give anyone a sense of comfort. Indeed, very recently a senior
State Department official, who has had a close association with
Vietnamese affairs and who had most likely seen only the finished
product, remarked to me that it was "too bad" more attention had
not been paid to this estimate by the policy-makers. Nevertheless,
what disturbs me today is that it did not sound the alarm which
it should have and which was sounded in the first draft conclusions.
But I am not alone in my regrets. About six months after the
estimate was completed, Diem fell. About a year after the
estimate was completed, Mr. McCone took the occasion to express
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to me and to Sherman Kent that he regretted his own role in the
affair and that we were "right the first time."
22. The lesson which I learned from this experience is to
shun the advice of those who in one way or another are committed
to or responsible for a particular line of policy. There can be
no doubt that they are well-informed, but it is also their fate
to be hopeful. Above all, their responsibility is to their policy-
making chiefs, and they can hardly be expected to recite before
an intelligence working group information or beliefs which implicitly
or explicitly might suggest that existing policy is based upon
unsound premises. Study of the premises of national policy is the
business of intelligence officers, and it is as unfair to ask the
executors of policy to testify on the soundress of those premises
as it is unwise to accord uncritical acceptance to their views.
C. Likely Courses of Action when evidence is contradictory
23. I would like to discuss in this connection an estimate
which was not very important in terms of its policy impact; the
judgment made was so equivocal that it provided the warning needed.
It was, however, wrong, and I thought it wrong at the time. It
was a crash estimate, requested on the morning of December 12, 1961
and approved by the USIB on the afternoon of the'following day, on
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the likelihood of an Indian attack upon Goa. During the preceding
few weeks Indian troops had been concentrating in the Goa area,
public opinion -- especially on the left -- was clamoring for action,
and a strong momentum in favor of invasion had developed. Yet, the
evidence was conflicting, and it was possible that these activities
were designed purely to apply pressure and bring about the incorporation
of Goa into India by peaceful means.
24. We thought that Nehru had not made up his mind and was
being subjected to contradictory pressures. We concluded:
"Clearly there is strong evidence pointing to an
invasion -- the military and political preparations have
gone so far as to be difficult to reverse without some loss
of prestige to the Indian government. Although the Indians
perhaps still hope that their warlike activities will extract
concessions from the Portuguese, in doubt that the Lisbon
Government will move far enough -- if at all -- to meet Indian
requirements. However, relying chiefly on our judgment of
what Nehru conceives to be India's basic interests and our
assessment of his past behavior, in believe that the chances
of a direct military invasion are still about even."
Five days after this estimate was approved the Indians seized Goa
by military force.
ezw, I-
25. The formulation in the final estimate was
-t-heNE 4 raft. In a
post-invasion memorandum to the Chairman of the Board of National
Estimates, the Chief of the ONE Near East Staff stated that initially
he and his O/CI colleagues had rated the chances as less than even,
"relying mainly on Nehru's restraint in previous crises over Goa and
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their estimate of his attitudes, objectives, and ability to
control developments." He noted further that from informal.
talks with the State Department intelligence research people,
he had learned that they rated the chances of invasion as "con-
siderably less than even," a view shared by the Bureau of Near
Eastern Affairs and the Policy Planning Council. The O/NE staff,
impressed by the evidence of advancing preparations, departed from
its Near Eastern confreres far enough to qualify the chances as
"slightly less than even."
26. The Board of National Estimates agreed generally with
the experts. I was in a difficult position as chairman, since I
was impressed more by the evidence than by the history of Nehru's
political attitudes; to me, the reports from those agency and
defense personnel who had seen the preparations and talked with
the Indians sounded as if the Indians meant business and intended to
finish the Goa business once and for all. I did succeed in moving my
colleagues a little closer to dead center; the text finally read,
"the chances of a direct military invasion are still only about even."
I succeeded in one other thing; by the wording we did imply that
as long as preparations continued and the Portuguese failed to give,
the chances of invasion might rise.
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27. The coordination meetings did not help me very much.
The representat~i waned""to cdowr~grade the chances, the
Ali-Por4e wished to raise them, while the others wanted to
. St
IN I did not fin
peeially helpful, since
wanted to add another paragraph about the threat to
US-Portuguese relations and US base rights in the Azores if the
Indians went ahead with invasion. It seemed to me that the -" r-- coo
^rs position was derived more from departmental
interest than objective judgment, and this I could not accept in
an intellgence estimate. We stayed with the BI'E "still about even"
I'
formula, and this was also agreed by the USIB without dissent.
28. The day after the estimate was approved, the estimated
odds on an invasion rose perceptibly in reports from New Delhi.
~K
The Army Attache said he believed invasion would "take place very
soon."
The only person who did not seem to think an invasion was on was
the US Ambassador in New Delhi, who expressed the belief less than
24 hours before it began that action was not imminent.
formula .its ems....,
25X1
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29. The actual invasion provided me with a certain amount
of professional satisfaction, but it also raised the question of
why the others had been wrong. The only answer I can give is
that the evidence, though conflicting (the Ambassador no doubt
was the victim of some deceit), did include reports with a
decided ring of seriousness. These reports were of course read
by those who still rated the chances of invasion as even or less
than even. They were relying on Nehru's high-mindedness, and
since this did not jibe with the evidence, they had nowhere to go
and had to sit on the fence. The lesson to be derived from this
experience is not to look only at the evidence and to disregard
the doctrines and attitudes of leaders; that would be folly. The
lesson is to try to reconcile the two; in so doing we perhaps would
find that, as in the law, there is more than one line of precedent.
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30. My colleagues could, I am sure, make an analysis of
estimates in which they actively participated and which fell short,
and they could draw similar lessons from them. In time we could
have so many "lessons" floating around that we would become tongue-
tied. We could fall into the tragic error of the young man whose
aggressive and fast-moving brother killed himself by wrapping his
car around a light pole; the surviving brother was so determined
to plod about on foot that he was run over by a truck. Our job
is to make estimates; we have to take the plunge. This does not
mean reckless diving, but it does not mean standing helplessly on
the end of the diving board worrying about every conceivable
hazard to health and safety.
31. There is no alternative to regarding each estimative
problem as a new one and applying one's accumulated knowledge and
experience to it. It helps to try to determine why we were right
or why we were wrong and to use these determinations as signposts
along the way, but we must also remember that the specialist who
misled us on one estimate corrected our misapprehensions on another,
that the political philosophy which a national leader seemed to
negate in one action he might never negate again. The problems
we are dealing with are too complex for simple rules or simple
?lessons." The magic words "estimate" or "Judgment" are simply the
exercise of good sense in light of everything it is possible to
learn or to ponder concerning any particular matter.
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