ESTIMATES OF CAPABILITIES OF THE UNITED STATES COMBAT FORCES IN-BEING 1 SEPTEMBER 1951

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00971A000300020002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 511
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 8, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 1, 1951
• Content Type: STUDY

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ARMY, NAVY, USAF, OSD
& DOE REVIEWS
COMPLETED
4
ESTIMATES OF CAPABILITIES
of the
UNITED STATES COMBAT FORCES IN?BEING
, September 1951
DOCUMENT NO.
CHANGE IN CUSS.
DECLASSIFIED
(ILES& CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HE 1C4
REVIEWERL.
,..
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NOTICE
The Estimate of Capabilities of the U. S. Combat Forces In-being
of / September 1951 is the result of 99 man-weeks of work spread over 10
meeks, 25 June - 1 September 1951.
The Research Staff consisted of 17 indi-
viduals
Biology :
1
History :
8
Chemistry:
2
Mathematics:
1
Classics :
3
Physics
1
English
1
Although eleven of the staff were in the Armed Forces during World
War II, none was in a strategic echelon; and those in Intelligence units were
concerned with Tactical rather than Strategic Intelligence. Therefore, the
resulting product muse be considered the work of laymen and not professionals
in either Military Strategy or Strategic Intelligence, The conclusions,
which we hope to be reasonable ones supported by the evidence presented,
must be considered the products of amateurs and not professional Intelligence
Analysts.
Furthermore, only unclassified materials were used and only 10
eeeks available to search theme Few materials back of 1 May 1931 were exam-
ined and numerous other sources 'were not touched, e.g., local newspapers of
Eavy ports and cities near Army and Air Force installations. The Intelligence
Office of a foreign power using this research technique presumably would have
beea at work much longer, with a larger staff, covering more materials,
Finally, the Intelligence Office of a foreign power would have data
collected through an Espionage System with which to supplement the data here
presented, notably on such matters as aircraft and armament production and
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perhaps research and development projects. Therefore, the estimates made and
the conclusions reached must be taken as the minimum of information on U. S.
cap4bilities available to a foreign nation's Intelligence Office.
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Table of Contents
Section
I General Summary
II The U. S. Army
III The U. S. Navy
IV The U. S. Air Force
1
14
169
251
VI Electronics (all Services)
501
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SECTION I
GENERAL SIMILAR!
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U. S. ARMY
CSection II Below]
The U. S. Army is at present in a state of partial mobilization,
consequent upon the outbreak of hostilities in Korea in June, 1950. Its
present strength is close to the authorized cieling of 1,550,000 men. This
force now includes 16 fully organized divisions, 6 of which are in action in
Korea, 2 in Japan, 3 in Germany (in addition to the U.S. Constabulary), and
5 in the Zone of the Interior; two of these last have been alerted for move-
ment to Germany in the near future. In addition to these 16 active divisions,
there are 12 training divisions in the United States. Plans call for the for-
mation of a total of at least 18 and possibly 22 active divisions and 18 Regi-
mental Combat Teams by 30 June, 19,52. Including the Constabulary, this will
be equivalent to a force of 25 to 29 combat divisions.
Present forces are equipped with sufficient supplies and weapons for
purposes of training and for the conduct of limited operations such as that
in Korea. Most equipment, however, is of World War II types. Only limited
ese of newly designed equipment - notably the 3.5 bazooka - has been made in
Korea. The T-46 medium tank, one batallion of which ia in action, is a post
-
World War II model, but has already been superseded in production by the
improved T-47 model, Large orders for production of new equipment are now
being placed. For example, it appears that approximately 5,000 T-47 tanks
have been ordered under 1951 appropriations. But delivery of much of the
equipment now on order will not take place for a year or more. What has so
far been accomplished is creation of a production base rather than production
t;f available equipment.
1,10& troops now engaged in action in Korea are almost as numerous as
all Y.1. S. troops in combat one year after Pearl Harbor. Total military supplies
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ehipped to the theater of operations in Korea during the first 12 months
of hoetilities amounted to 10,278,000 measurement tons, as compared with
9084:000 tons to all theaters in the same period after Pearl Harbor.'
The Army is in a position to fulfill adequately its present commit-
ments, but not materially to increase them. In the Far East the forces under
General Ridgeway's command are the maximum which can be -supported logistically
in Korea and are fully capable of carrying on the type of defensive and limited
offensive campaign to which they are committed. There appears to be no disposi-
tion to attempt again an advance to the northern borders of Korea; manpower is
not available to defend the greatly extended front which would then be created,
When the 28th and 43rd Divisions join the occupation troops in Germany, the
six divisions promised for that function will be complete. A strategic reserve
of only 3 trained divisions will then remain in continental United States,
Any considerable fresh military commitments for the use of U.S.
ground forces will require further decisive movement toward full mobilization.
The rate of production of military equipment will probably not make such a
step feasible before the summer of 1952.
U. S. NAVY
[Section III Below]
The Navy has on board at present approximately 755,000 officers and
men, the Marines 194:000, Current plans call for Navy to increase by mid-1952
to 805,000, for the Marines to decrease to 1769000, though pending legislation
proposes a Marine force of not less than 300,000 or more than 400,000.
There are approximately 1,050 ships in the active fleet, of which
400 have been demothballed since June, 1750. In the reserve fleets are about
10770 ships the Atlantic Reserve Fleet contains 305 major combatant units:
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the Pacific Reserve Fleet 296), and roughly 100 are assigned to Naval Reeerve
Training.
The major combatant units in the active Atlantic Fleet are 3 CVB,
2 CV, 4 CVL, 7 (WE, 2 BB, 7 CA, 2 CL, 101 DD of all types, 6 DE, 49 SS. The
Sixth Fleet is the only major operating force.
The major combatant units in the active Pacific Fleet are 8 CV,
I. CVL 6 CVE? 2 BB, 6 CA, 2 CL, 87 DD of all types, 12 DE, 27 PP, 34 SS.
The Seventh Fleet and Naval Forces Far East are the major operating forces.
The most important items in the conversion of shins for combat dury
are the strengthening of carriers to handle heavier aircraft, modification of
DDs to DDEs, and "Guppy" conversions of SS.
Regular Navy and Marine Corps aircraft number about 6,600; the prin-
ciple types now in use by combatant Naval and Marine forces are: 1) Fighters:
F9F? F7F(N)0 F4U? F211; 2) Attack Planes: AD, A2D, AJI; 3) Carrier-based A/3
Aircraft: AF2S? AF2W, TBM; 4) Patrol Planes: P2V? PBM, NM, PB4Y2. In the
active fleet at present are 14 carrier air groups and the following squadrons:
13 VS, 10 BC, 30 BP, 3 ZP, 18 VMF and WM, 3 VEEP.
The fleet is still basically equipped with the weapons employed in
dorld War IL Improvements in shipborne ordnance consist mainly of better
automatic fire control and faster rates of fire. Important developments in
rockete and sonic torpedoes have been announced. Guided missiles are still
in the test and evaluation stage.
The Navy is greatly expanding facilities at many of its existing
fleet bases. Funds have been appropriated for a new secret base in the At-
entic area: and negotiations are in progress for bases in Spain. Three new
air stations are being constructed in the Far East, and the Navy is devoting
large funds to developing facilities for jet airdraft at its existing air sta-
tions.
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Undersea warfare has the highest priority in Naval planning. Since
November, 1949, technological development, training, and expansion of forces
for ASW have been greatly stepped up. Experiments are being made with sub-
marines for novel purposes, and much effort is now going into such new
projects as the nuclear-fission engine.
The Navy today is the most powerful afloat, Able to defeat any other
surface fleet in the world. At the same time, the active forces are capable
of very great expansion. It is unlikely, however, that any war in the near
future will see fleet actions similar to those fought in the Pacific from
1942-194'. Naval forces will be called upon primarily to launch and support
large amphibious operations, and to protect both their own units and the
merchant navy from air and submarine attack. For these purposes the active
fleet is at the moment inadequate. The combatant units afloat appear
sufficient only to execute a relatively small amphibious operation over any
extended period of time. In other words, they constitute merely a good
striking force, even though some naval aircraft may now be able to deliver
the atomic bomb. AS forces are insufficient and will remain so for some
time, despite the existing program for properly equipping small naval and
coast guard ships.
The conclusion is inescapable then, that, owing probably to the
state of public and congressional opinion rather than to the wishes of the
Navy Department, the United States now possess what is fundamentally a
peace-time Navy for a state with all the commitments that this country now
has.
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IJAPII, FORCE
[Section IV Below]
Prmsent St_rEtyk
81 combat wings. The 78 which have been identified are composed of 26 Bombardment,
39 Fighter and 13 Troop carrier. Total personnel: 78'4000 (106,500 officers,
657,500 airmen). The total of first-line combat aircraft available is between
4,742 and 50,000 (bombers 677, fighters around 4,000); this means that the 26
Bomb. Wings are ander strength and the Fighter Wings have less than a 1 to 1
eeplacement ratio. The Troop Carrier Winge are adequately supplied with air-
craft.
5tren.gth_by.Alt1952.
8 more wings will be added by July 1, 1952 (but these will be combat-ready wings
of 4 squadrons). Officer strength by July 1, 1952, will be 136,000, airmen 925,000.
The 26 Bomb. Wings should be up to fulrncrrthe complement of aircraft And the 39
Fighter Wings should have an adequate reserve. But the 95 wings which will
then be in-being will not be fully equipped.
421121litielOtratsis.
The AF undoubtedly has a sufficient supply of atonic bombs, the planes to get
them over the target and the technique and instruments necessary for extremely
accurate bombing. But it does not at present have enough planes to maintain a
etrategic offensive very long, if plane losses are even moderately high.
Tactical
The AF has no modern light bomber available in quantity. And its fighter-
bomber strength is not at present adequate for the high attrition rate of opera
tions against modern aircraft and ground fire.
Defense
General Vandenbergle recent estimate that the AF could destroy less than 34
of an attacking bomber force is confirmed by all available data. The AF does
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not possess a fighter capable of effective combat performance at stratospheric
levels, and the all-weather fighters needed for interception [F-94 and F-89]
aeem to be in short supply (of the 16 Fighter Wings identifiod as part of ADC
one at least is flying F-51s and one is even operating with F-478). The GOC
is woefully under-manned; the radar screen for continental U.S. will be reason-
ably complete by the end of 1951 but not until next year for Alaska.
111212ERSPA.
The main weakness is the lack of bases in Europe, where the AF cannot count on
using bases in Germany in the event of an enemy offensive. It will have to
rely on bases in England and the new bases being built in the Mediterranean.
Work on the North African bases is being pushed and building is going on in
Cyprus, Crete and Greece. But it is not likely that these new bases will be
fit for SAC operations for some time to come. Bases in the Far East are ade-
quate for present and probably for all future operations.
WEAPONS
[Section V Below]
Section V is primarily concerned with developments in the field of
weapons and equipment which have taken place since World War II. Many weapons
utill being used by the armed forces are World War II models - the M1 rifle and
the Sherman tank; for example. Detailed descriptions of the characteristics
of such items of armament are readily available in TheAmy,Almanac (Washington,
1950), and G. M. Barnes, %mug. World War II (New York, 1947). Both Barnes
end John E. Burchard (ed.), Rocketax!Guns and_yEett (Boston, 1948), contain
information about the problems with which Ordnance and other experts were
wrestling at the end of World War II. Many of these problems are still plaguing
the weapons development program; but some of our most recent weapons are the
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ELECTRONICS
ESection VI Below]
The development, during World War II, of very small radio tubes for
use in proximity fuzes was widely extended. As a result, electronic equipment
designed since World War II, while more flexible and efficient than the equip-
ment it replaces, also is generally smaller and lighter.
At the same time, this equipment is designed as a small number of
component units rather than a large number of individual parts. Now, if a
radio set fails to function, a dozen or so components are tested, rather than
a hundred tubes and an equally large number of resistors, condensers, etc.
Due to its small size, it is economical, and of course much quicker, to re-
place the whole equipment. Maintenance of electronic equipment, which be-
f,./tme a major problem toward the end of World War II, has thus been greatly
As a result of the research and development done since the end of
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World War II, military electronic equipment has been developed which is of very
high quality and variety. We are far ahead of any other country, except pos-
sibly for Great Britain, and we seem to lead her by a considerable extent.
,It ahould be noted that what we have are refinements of World War II equip-
ments. Padically new devices, if any, have been well concealed.
Production, however, is a different matter. In the summer of 1951?
production of this new electronic equipment Was sufficient in most cases to
allow its installation in new aircraft, tanks, ships, etc., but not enough
to permit refitting of previously constructed units. On the other hand, by
the end of 19510 retooling and construction of new factories will be largely
oompleted$ and by the end of 1952 large quantities of the new electronic
equipment will be available.
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,ek, General
1? Nisgion
State of Mobilization
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-15
15
3. Strategic Factors Governing Mobilizaticn 19
4. Relation to Allied Ground Forces 21
5. Effects of Actioa in Korea 22
6. Capabilities 23
13, Admanietx,ative Cegnniation 28
10 Comtitution of the Army 28
2. Compand of the Arqv 28
3. Department of the Amy (Appendix 1) 28 ?
Arqr Field.Forceo 29
(Appendix II) 30
Contiziental Comwands
Glerseas Cowanls 31
7. Branches of the Amy 12
8. Woments Arpy corps 33
Tactical Organization 34
Regimmtal Combat Tema 34
2, Division (Appendix_ I1_)34
(Appendix rir)
3. Goi-pa 35
4. Field Army 36
.400
ilmy Group
Diviaion Slice
Z. (Alex. of 3att13
Zone (of7 thT,
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Section II0 Amv* Contents* iCe
30 American Ground Forces ftn Emropc 48
40 Other Oversee Commands 54
Memporter and Training 57
10 Ar3ny Strength 51
2* Soarcas of Manpower ,
3e Aznw-TrainingProgmn 65
70 Decant Developments in Army Preeponv and Est/want 73
1. Small Arms and, Infantry Equipment 74
20 Mortars 77
30 Artillery 78
40 Tanks and. Armored Cars (AnpandirITI) 79
5*Va1son Aircraft (Appendtr1FI) 84
G* Comments on Principal Source 86
10 Tie Army Almanac 66
2, Army Orders 87
30 Hearings at Cengressional.Camml,ttees 89
40 New To Times *id Harald Tribma 91
5* The liew Eaten Register 93
6. Stars and Stripes: European Edition 9)4
70 Stars etnd Stripasv, Pacific Edition 95
90 Saturday Evening Post 96
LI No DI.,ssZi71.49/3 97
LO n APO Listings fj1T17111Atz .i) 97
On the Efficiency of Censayip 99
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Section 110 Any. Contents. (Cont.)
APPENDICES
To Departmint of the Arnor (Chart) 102
110 Arm Arms, zone of the Interior ()Aap) 102
Divisicti Tables of organization 103
IV. Compar!.son of Marine and Amy (Infantry) Divisions 106
V. Order of Battle ? U. S. Ary 109
VI. 'ranks and Armored Cars (Chart) 157
VII. Liaism Aircraft 157
Villo APoil 156
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A. General
1. Mission.
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3ECTION II
U e 6. ARMY
The major missions of the U. S. Army as recently stated by the
Chief of Staff, Gen. J. liswton Collins, are
a. TO maintain adequate forces in occupation areas and to maintain
strategic oversee bases with a strength sufficient to meet extended emer-
gencies, including armed aggression.
b. To aid in bringing the war in Korea to a successful conclusion
while maintaining the security of Japan.
c. To develop a general reserve of sufficient size and readiness
to provide for the security of the United States.
2. State of Mobilization.
In order to carry out these missions the Army began partial
mobilization immediately after the outbreak of hostilities in Korea in
June, 1950. The size of the Army was increased from 593,000 on 30 Junee
1950 to approximately 1,531, 00 on 30 June 1951. According to official
etatements these forces are being organized to form 18 combat divisions
and 18 regimental combat teams, in addition to the Constabulary in Germany.
These will provide the equivalent of 25 combat divisions, together with
necessary supporting units. Four additional divisions may be formed
before 30 June, 1952, partly by calling to Federal service two additional
National Guard divisions and partly by assigning a higher proportion of
existing troops to service in divisions.
At present there are 16 divisions in the combat theater, combat-
ready, or in final stages of training. Eight Army eivisions are in the
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Marine division in Korea. Three divisions are in Germany in addition
to the Constabulary, which is the equivalent of one division. Five
active divisions are in the Zone of the Interior as general reserve; two
of these are scheduled for movement to Germany before the end of the year.
In addition to these 16 active divisions there are 12 training divisions
in the Zone of the Interior.
There has been a corresponding increase in production of military
supplies and in appropriations for the over-all needs of the Army.
Appropriations for the Army increased from $4.4 billions in the fiscal
year 1950 to $19.3 billions in fiscal 1951. For i. cal 1952 the Appro-
priations Committee of the House of Representatives have approved
expenditures of $20.1 billions. This figure gives only a partial indica-
tion of foreseeable expenditure for 19520 since it does not include 81.4
billions requested for military constructions or the cost of continued
combat in Korea which has been estimated at $7.0 billions.
3. Strategic Factors Governing Mobilization
_ . ? _
Analysis of major emphasis in the Army budget for the fiscal
year 1952 provides a key to certain fUndamental factors in general stra-
tegic planning. The most striking aspect of the budget is the high
proportion of total appropriatious requested for major procurement and
production. A comparison of expenditure for primary items in the budget
for fiscal 1950 with the corresponding percentages projected for 1952 brings
out the radical shift of emphasis in respect to procurement:
Object of Expenditures
Percentage of Appropriations
_
Personnel
Major Procurement and Production
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Most of the equipment to be provided by the 4506% of 19521appropriations devotee
to major procurement and production will not be complete and available for
use before the latter part of calendar 1952. $5.5 billions, or more than
one quarter of the entire Army budget, are intended solely for tanks and
combat and other vehicles, items which have a long production lead time -
the period intervening between placement of orders and delivery of finished
goods it may be concluded that present mobilization plans are based upon the
following assumptions:
a, A major war is not to be expected in the immediate firture. EM-
phasis is therefore being placed upon the creation and maintenance of a
production base rather than upon all-out production for immediate use.
It is the policy of the Army to encourage manufacturers to operate on a
one shift basis, so that there will be a maximum number of plants with
production lines in being, which can be put into round-the-clock operation
when greater urgency is felt. The Army's Detroit Tank Arsenal, for ex-
ample, is producing at less than one quarter of capacity, on a one shift
basis.,
bs War within two or three years is nevertheless so likely that
tooling up and initial production of major ordnance and other equipment cannot
safely be delayed. The heavy investment now being made in current models
of such items as tanks will necessarily discourage radical changes in
design for a considerable period in the future. An indication of a sense
of urge:we in production of equipment is provided by a recent relaxation
in U. S. insistence on complete standardization of equipment with the
Allies, although discussions are continuing on the .30 vs. .28 caliber rifle.
These conclusions are supported by the fact that the manpower leeel
of the Army is to be kept unchanged for at least a year. The present size
of VApriteViad.En*Releastergeetitir
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before the first World, War. It seems lieely that this size will remain
fairly constant unless there is a radieal ehange in the international bal.
ance of power, which may be produced either by a spread of the Korean
conflict -which will lead to all-out mobilizen!.on, or by the development
of European ground forces strong enough to provide an effective Ixtrrier
to Soviet forces in Western Europe without permanent U. S. Army support.
he Relation to Allied Ground. Forces.
A basic factor in all Army planning is a recognition that the
U. S. Army can never approach numerical equality with its probable enemy.
A result of this fact is an emphasis on the building of a system of
alliances, encouragement of the concept of a United Nations Army, develop-
ment of a combined staff structure for the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion, and the Mutual Defense Aid Program. Although the particulars of
these matters lie beyond the scope of the present study, their importance
in relation to U. S. Army strength is indicated ny the advice of
Secretary Marshall to the Senate Foreign Relation:, Committee, that re-
duction in U. S. military appropriations would be preferable to a cut in
the sum requested for fureign arms aid. Marshall at the sane time
nada' American purpose clear when he stated (requesting that his words not
be published) 'Me are proposing dollars to arm men other than our own
men. we are contributing dolIareisth r than men, although we have made
some sacrifices of our own in Korea. The other side Lioe., the European
Allies] is thinking of
In pursuance of this policy, .nea united States has already sent over
one billion dollars worth of equipment to its allies, including 4?500
tanks and combat vehiciee 2,900,ne3or field artillery pieces, 19,000
general purooee vehicle en ae well as small arms, amennition, bazookas,
i3PelivelctEes.Ree6F,29NPETi2gii3.4 efik99 VA? 99e3SP 161 ?
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lOerld War II -stocks which are being replaced by new models for the Army
own used Orders have, however, been placed for
to be ehileped to the allies when produced?
5, Effects of Action in Korea?
m...1311.1111EN,Io.11??????,-Wit-
the now N647 medium tank,
The chief immediate effects of experience gained in Korea
for Argy planning and training have been the following:
a. Reaffirmation of the primary role of ground forces in warfare.
In presenting to Congress the Armyls 1952 appropriation request for Research
and Development, Maj. Gen. Tard H. Marie (Chief, Research and Development
Division, Office of the A.C. of S., GAO stated that allocation of 66% of this
budget to the Ordnance Corps "is consistent with the major combat role
which must be assumed by ground troops in any war of the foreseeable
future.0
boAtougher and longer training program, with more emphaeis on
physical conditioning!, night fighting, and guerilla warfare?
c. Provision of lame numbers of combat-experienced men to provide
training cadres. At present 30,000 men are returning each month from
the Far East to the Zone of the interior preference in this rotation is
given to combat troops senior officers, including divisional and corps
commanders are also rotated after relatively short periods of command so
that their experience can be utilized in training of fresh troops.
do Greater emphaeis on the need for air-ground cooperation. The
efficiency of the Marine Corps in this field has been particular17 no-
ticed, but the need for general improeement is still apparent.
e. Testing of new arum and eeeipment. Noteworthy examples have
been the 3,5 bazoo7:a and the Patton mediumegun tank. The latter has
shown its superiority to the Soviet T-34 tank by an l84 margin of victory
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as only 5 to the enemy's 90. The value of Korea as a proving ground has,
however, been sharply limited by a policy of refraining from the use of new
equipment unless there is real tactical need for its employment.
6. CaEabilities.
The U. S. Army is not now in a position to assume commitments
considerably greater than those it has already assumed.
The six Army divisions now committed to action in Korea, together
with the two formerNational Guard divisions on occupation duty in Japan,
form one half. of the Army- s trained divisions. Of the remaining eight
divisions three are already in Germany and two more are scheduled to
join them before the end of November. This will leave as strategic
reserve in the Zone of the Interior only. three divisions other than
training divisions, nameay the 1st Armored, 11th Airborne, and 82d Air-
borne. None of these three is likely to be sent overseas without extreme
reluctance until additional National Guard divisions have been Federalized,
brought up to full-strength and given considerable training - a process
which Would require a minimum of 6-9 months. Gen. Collins has stated that
the calling up of two additional Guard divisions is under discussion; but
no decision has been announced. Although no dates have been revealed,
two to five active divisions are eventually to be formed out of existing
training divisions. It is possible that speed-up in formation of one or
more of these divisions might permit release of a colibat-ready division
for oversee duty somewhat sooner than the calling of a Guard division,
but this is uncertain.
In addition to the three Army divisions which, subject to these
qualifications, are available within the Zone of the Interior for active
duty, it is believed that the 2d llorine Div., now stationed at Camp aejeuneA
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The Three of one Marine and six Army Divisions now engaged in Korea
is coneidered to be the maximum which can be logistically supported in
view of the terrain and rail and road conditions in Korea. This force
has shown itself capable of highly successfUl defensive and limited
offensive action against the present enemy. SVom statements made at
the 'MacArthur hearings, especially the tentative plans for evacuation
at the time of the successful Chinese offensive of December, 1950, it
appears highly probable that if the situation in Korea should again de?
teriorate-severely, withdrawal from the peninsula is more likely than
large reinforcement.
In Europe there has been a considerable strengthening of U. S. forces
during recent months. This increase in strength is continuing, with the
announced goal of 3140,000 men in Europe by the end of 1952. This nuMber
will include the troops now in Europe, the 28th and 143d Divisions which
have already been alerted for movement to Germany, and necessary corps,
army, and other supporting troops,. Although the end of 1952 is the
projected date for fulfillment of this goal, almost 411 of the combat
elements will be in Europe by 30 November, 1951; it seems probable that
the remaining troops could be made available quickly, if the situation
should make this necessegy.
Other troops availeble from the Z.I. for European duty have been
discussed above. If a decision should be made to withdraw from Korea,
the bulk of the forces no; engaged there could possibly be released for
European duty. In view of the overwhelmieg U. S. naval superiority
in the Far East, it is possible that a total force of four divisione
might be considered adequete garrison for the Japanese Islands if
hostilities in Europe should cause a decision to concentrate all available
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It may therefore be concluded that the maximum number of divi?
sions which could be made quickly available for European duty, addi?
tional to those already scheduled, would be one Yarine and three Army
Divisions from the Z.I., and possibly five divisions from the Far East.
This figure of nine divisions is a maximum, and it is highly unlikely
that a decision would be made to accept the strategic risk which would be
involved in such a concentration.
The present U. S. and Allied force in Western Germany includes
U. So 3 divisions and the U. S. Constabulary
British 4 divisions
French 3 or 4 divisions
By the end of the year theae will have been increased to include
U6 S6 5 divisions and the U. So Constabulary
British 4 divisions
French 10 divisions,(5 in combat readiness, 5 at
3 dayer notice)
Belgium I division
There is considerable doubt whethee this French conslitment will be fill?
filled.
It is evident that either the forces presently available or those
expected by the end of this year would be in a very vulnerable position
if subjected to a determined attack from the East. The present front,
stretching from the Baltic to Jugoelavia, is 700 miles long. To defend
this line there are now not more than 12 divisions, some of them
partially trained and not at all fully equipped. They face the danger
of airborne operations aeainst the Rhine crossings in their rearo Air
protection is inadequate since the ring of fighter air bases projected
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14,
1 The difficulties or this position could be partially met by withe
1
drawal to the Rhine and the Alps. Defense of the Southern sector would
presumably devolve upon the Southern Command of SHAPE. The line of the
Rhine would then extend some 350 miles from the Swiss border to the sea.
If this shorter line could not be successfully defended, a possible with-
drawal from Westeee Europe north of the Pyrenees appears to be contem-
plated. Two recent developments support this conclusion. One is the
change in the line of cormanications of the European Command, which no
longer originatesin Bremen but instead passes from Bordeaux through Verdun
and Metz. The other development is the agreement, details of which are
inomplete or unannounced, between the U. S and Spain. Unless a retreat
into or beyond southern France is considered possible, the value of U. So
bases in Spain does not seem to justify the political risks involved.
Present capabilities in Europe seem to be indicated accurately by
the statement of Lt. Oen. A. M. eruenther? Chief of Staff, SHAPE, in
June of this year, that while "significant n progress has been made, owe
are still not in a position to defend Western Europe. ff (quoted in the
N. Y. Times, June 29, 1951).
These estimates of the very limited immediate capabilities of the
U. S. Army in terns of combat divisions seem in general to be supported
by the situation in regard to weapons and equipment, Supplies of World
War II materiel are being depleted both by the action in Korea and by
contributions to D. S. Allies under MAAP. New equipment and weapons,
production of which has been authorized by recent appropriations, will not
be an imoortant factor for nearly n year. It seems that the policy of
maintaining the sine of the Army unchanged throagh the fiscal year 1952 is
at least in part determined by the quantities of weapons and equipment
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17
This statement of present ArAf capabilities does not take into
consideration the possible use and effectiveness of new and unconvent-
tional weapons of atomic, biological, radiological, and chemical warfare,
which are treated elseWhere in this report.
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130 Magma= oinalvaioN
Constitution. of the it
3,11MUVASalkIditaaf tv is
The 1/050 Army leteludee the Rogaler Arch the Nationel. Guard of
the United States and the Organized Peewee Copce
20 Command of the A
HiadISERSMINIKLIME.PCIR-Mees...F xis.. TAN'
Command of the Amoy and ell cumponents thereof is exercieed by
the President throude the Secretary of Defame end. the Secretary of
the Army0 Ith.o directly represent MT"
3.1 DVEIVP#:ece PIR,AxR7.
ae The Department of the .Army is a military dope_ emit within
the Department of Defence* It was GO established by the National
Security Act of 19470 as mended by the Ilational Security Act
Amendments of 1949e The Amy OrEflaiStitiOn. Act of 195C peteridod for
the organization of the Army end the Deparkeent of the .Armye In
generale this Act followed the polity of Testi:me bectad orgenizational
powers in the Secretary of the AZW2 aubject to delegation by him0
rather then srpecifying the duties of auberdimate officers* A chart
of the organization of be Department of the Army is battened as
Appendix le
be The Secretary of the Airy is the head or the Department of
the AlSgra Subject to the directionr; anthority0 and control, of the
President and the Secretary of Defenee0 the Secretary of the Any
conducts ell affairs of the Amy Establishment* EXt is assisted by
an Under Secretary, two Assistant Seceeetartes? a legal Departeent
Counselor, and an Administrative Asseeeetee,
c The Chief of Staff of the Amy is the principal military
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the Sseretury of the Arzw for tho offickmcy of tba Array, its state
of preparation for military operatione?, and plans therefore Lb
p sides over the Avow treummits to the Secretary of the Anny
plena and recommendations preparad by the AlwarSta2T advises htn in
regard thereto?, and. acts as the meant of the Soo Ian, or the Amy
in carrying the crams into effecU Ve to the rowe&entative of the
.Army amon the :rant Chiefs of Staff, By virVao of hia position he
takes rank above all other officers of Pe ArsmA,
do The Amy Staff is the Staff of the Secretary of the Army at
the seat of- government, It Includes the Chief of Staff raid him
immediate assistantse the General and Spacial Staffss and the
A4ministra1ivo and Technical Staffso The precise fUnstion of each
of these are defined In the U.S Government Organimtion Manual
?3,11.A.ei.,,,ind?rVOZ,458.,,XMAI?NLIS-.11.0111,14
194;1:21,yp 174.4350
GreArth in the size and importance of the Aziw Steil" has been
signifioant feature in the devolonnent of the Amy structure sines
the bog:filming of ISOrld War 110 On 2a Fobrr,aryv 2.951? military
pereonnal on cbity in the Departmest of the .Army .ucludod $410 officers
and 474 0331tetti1 Men& The relathfo i? istAtution of Val perconnol
13 indicated by the ronowirks table ahotvi-- diwtribtation iatrit)triatoly
before the ou.tbreek of hostiMM in :ko. each ewe it 13
probable that the present number 50 to 0% Ian-era
Office of the Secretary of ha krAV 100
Office or the Chief of Staff 300
Divisions of the General Stet 600
Special Staff ZOO
Technical Staff
Administrative Staff
Amy Field YOlteeS
swerAwitIms...a.armumaoz*....newretveuglramat.ivas,rar,
?rglaWriktlategA/067a:rRiSg9litleigg466666621661324;
to stipends:6- tho trairdmr, JECILETauals ? all'dite isocl
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haw in the ie140 and to- suporTLte tha Tollowing Army'Fiald Ferns
Boardss
ao Board Neo 15 at no Briat5 troCo5 which ts responsible for
testing of A:rove:demon Gw.ipuatt,, airborne squipment and Tiold
Artillery cauipmento
be Board No 2, at Fort Kno=0 Eyoc, which is rospahsible for
autonctive_equipment and heavy fire-control equipment in connection
with armored vehicleso
co Board Roo 55 at Ft o Braggo FroC,5 which le responsible for
I .t7 equiymsato
do Board No, 4, at no Bliss, Tazoi Which it rasponsfble for
anti.airoraft artillery and guided mlesilemp
eo T
Arctic Teat Brunel% of the four Army Field Force boardez
Which is responsible for all forms of ectoipmant under Amotic conditionso
Tho headquarters of the Array Yield Perces Is at Ftw Uhur000 va,
Continental Colgrands
Th s commanding
neral of each of the Continental Arnies and
the Military District of Washington commands all aults,, aetiv1ties1
and installations within bla area =apt those specifically =monde.
by the bead of an Administrative or Tecimical service or other agency
of tiv) Dopeatoont of the Arroyo Be is zasponsible for the operatiens
trainingt sdmlnistration5 servioso5 and supply of all nnitem activitIes,
and installations of his caumand5 and for certain activities at
installations reporting to -he Doparbvent of the Arsqo
Tho aceo4lanyingyov al' the UvIted Eiwitef4 attached. as Appen4V4
IX.,) indica:Fats the AIWAroaa of the Contizestal CmmaniMe, VII Any
Areaso Beadquars?erso and territory inuluftd rive as follows:
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First Ar270 ato 0overnoxiv8 bNG
Connacticot Nvs .7-aTiecy
Maim Now 76:1-:k
Moneachnsatim iniotle Mena
Now shire Vermont
Second Army's Ike no ?torso Ga ricadot,
Meow= Ponnoylvaria
Kautuitty Virginia
Norylasoi ilost Virginia
Ohio
WW1 Amin r[9.0 Ft, MoPheroon Ca.
Alobasa- No2th Otroliva
2Iorida South Carolina
aeorgia %maim?
Miesioalypi
north ArorD Pte Sinn 1301.131ifnlp Tf.a.tt
AIIMPITSB Oklahoma
LattiBleZEt TantS
New Mexico
Fifth Arisyt, FaoFLS ridanf,IlL
Colorado !Amoco%
Miacoorl
Indiana Rehr:I:Wm
lowt Mrth aatota
Kansao South Watts
Michigan Wisconsin
Wyoming
Sixth Amy? Plq, Procidic of Son Frouciocos ulifo
Arizona TavaeNa
California Oregon
Nebo Utah
Montero 1WhimSton
6. Overcoat Cconsarls.
(u Far Beat Comsonk Bq Tokyo, Tainan9 U,ST. Armty Fa:memo
Easto aro aanintstratively illteSratTO, Vith la* Per Fact Como:A
vbich consists of four aiist3?ati E&b11:0*
(Kona) IL,S, Array Forces in Talaillar, Rpli1713 00211alldv and ble.5?iouas-
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It* Earopear, Comand5 Ftqp 33cf.doltoTz, Cierwarya? troSo -112w7 POrcee
la :blaropeo including the &worth AraTo aro under ths administrative
jurisdiction of the European C
Or*
and the operatAral control of
Supreme Eno, Allied Powers In EtImpeo U.Cio 242recs in Austria is a
subL-counand of the..naropoen Comaamiz.
co 1305. An227 AlaakeD is undo the jariedictf.onr tbei Alaater,
Command; the latter is rnder an Air Ibros officer*. Erelo are at no
Richardacho Alaskao -
do U J:atly5 Caribbecoli uat.ar the Nae-Vhb9821 CorMinto which
ie v..nder an Army officero Iicio are et Post of Coaam7 Faightne Canal
Zomo Ay Forcesu Antilloos, is a suh-coraaind of the Caribbean
021:0611Thdo
so Amy Pacific is under :,;nrisdi*tiou of the Pacific
Oomaaadnwiox ta under a naval orrbuer,6
the
Tt.
)7.40 ex,0 n. EThaftersi
4NJAINT.ItTante
Time are tuelve Besic_Branchos and three Spsiaial Bzancheso
latter with separate promotion
co Basic Brand's:
Iatantry
Armor
Artillery
Enenear Corps
Signal, Corps
Adjutant Genera19 s Corps
76, Special Branches
ltateo
Q:lartscv.utaster 05rps
Finance Corps
Ordinance Corp;75
Msmtoal Corps
Tren5portation Corps
MI/nazi Police CorpH
.Tadge Advocate ConAraPs Corps
Azszy Medical Service 1..nol'Iadln3 iifealoA Colve:c. 1)sntal
Vatevintrey CF,erpso Medical Stroloe Corree?, Arr.w Ilarre Cogpet:
anon's Medical Sorvice Corps)
Chaplains
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43
The VAC la a Gervrate aompoment of the Ammyo The amber of
arum Vih0 1147 servo at pay ctee tlaie numbes's of the ENO-az' Arn7
lo fixed at two pernemt a the ()twin:gat of the regmler eatebliehmeato
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C. TACTICAL ORGANIZAITCN
10 jy)gAiental Combat Team,
Although the Division is asual1y considered Mse smallest composite unit
capable of operating independently, the Regimental Combat Team han recently re-
ceived considerable emphasis as a unit of greater maneuverability than a divi-
alien and capable of undertaking independent combat missions, A Regimental
Combat Team appears to consist basically of an infantry regiment, an artillery
batallion? and an engineer company, together with attached armor and service
units. Present Army plane call for the formation of 18 such units. The 187th
Airborne R.C.T. has been in action in Korea, though recently withdrawn to
Japan, The 45th Infantry Division, now on occupation duty in Japan, is organ-
ized into three R.C.T.ts, rather than the normal organization.
2, 12ivislolla
There are three types of U,S, Army Divisions, Infantry, Armored, and
Airborne, Tables of Organization of these three types of divisions are attached
as Appendix III.
a, The Infantry Division has 18,804 men. It normally
travels and fights on foot, but there is a growing tendency to provide
motorized transport directly to the combat area. Recent developments
in provision of armored personnel carriers are directed to this and,
The increasing use of VT fused ammunition, with its distractive ef-
fects on unarmored troop concentrations, has been a major incentive
to this development.
b. The Armored Division has l57!, men - foot, motorized,
and mechanized elements.
c. The Airborne Division has 166O men, and is capable
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1;47
ing transported entirely by air and landed in the combat zone ?
by parachute. Because of the present tendency teward air transport
bility of the Infantry Division, the distinction between Infantry and
Airborne Divisions is tending to disappear. The First Infantry Divi-
sion now in Germany, is capable of moving by air with all of its
equipment except the 155 mm4 howitzera
do The relative efficiency of Army and Marine Divisions
has recently been the subject of public debate. The meuttqw of
considerable expansion in the size of the Marine Corps, and its
position in the Armed Forces; is at present uncertain and subject to
Congressional decision. Attached as Appendix IV are tables showing
the Table of Organization of a Marine Division, and a comparison of
the weapons of Marine and Army Divisions.
3. Ccn:49,
The next higher headquarters above the division is the corps. It
consists of a corps headquarters, certain corps troops, and such divisions as
may be assigned to it.
a. The corps is primarily a tactical unit. The corps
headquarters is designed for the purpose of coordinating and con-
trolling the combat operations of two or more divisions by a single
commander who is not burdened by supply and administrative responsi-
bilities.
b. Unlike the division organization, the corps is not a
fixed self-contained unit. It normally consists of two or three In-
fantry Divisions and one Armored Division; but it may be composed of
any number of divisions required for the accomplishment of its mission.
It total strength, therefore will vary.
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co Sxamples of corps troops, available to the corps com-
mender for attachment to his subordinate combat units are:
1) Heavy Artillery
2) Various types of Engineer units
3) Armored Replacement Bns.
4) Signal Bn.
.5) Quartermaster Truck Rgt. or Bn.
6) Ordnance Bn.
7) Military Police
3) Medical Dn.
40 yield qmx.
The Field Army is the next higher organization to the corps. It is
composed of a headquarters, certain army troops, a variable number of corps,
and a variable number of divisions. Like the division, it is self-contained,
in that it has the means for independently carrying out tactical and administrae
tive responsibilities. It normally consists of two or more corps plus a pool
of reinforcing units termed army troops. It may also contain additional divi-
sions not assigned to one of its corps.
5. Army GT2142.
An Army Group is the largest field organization handled by a single
commander. An Army Group is formed when the forces within a theater of opera-
tions consist of several Field Armies. It may include from 400,000 to 1,500,000
troopso The formation of Army Groups is primarily for taciscal purposes and
facilitates the control of the various armies by the theater commander. Unlike
the Corps and Field Army, he Army Group ordinarily does not have a reserve of
reinforcing anits.
6. Division Slice.
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contained in a division and required to support it in the field. It is proper-
ly restricted to troops in a theater of operations, either in the combat sone
or the zone of communications. In general, it is considered to include:
a) The Divisions themselves
b) Corps and Army support troops
c) Corps and Army headquarters troops
d) Logistical support troops within the theater.
According to a monograph published on the Division Slice, written by Genal
Ogden and published In the Hearings of the House of Representatives Appropria-
tions Committee on the Department of Defense appropriations for 1952 (Part ld
page 31) the typical planned division slice is 50,000 men The following table,
derived from this source, shows that this figure indicates a considerable rela-
tive decrease in the number of non-divisional troops included in the typical
division slice since World War II.
Dion Army Zone Slice Theater Slice
World War II 13,500 21,000 41,000
Typical Field Army 18,000 36,000 50,000
Percent of Increase 33 33 22
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Do ORDER OF BATWA
1,0 The Zone of no interior
Ramon gTKSNMMIVCA,WINr,PKA.ECLIP'Wli.,r,a,gz;,,,,,..,,,,r,,,,,,,
Inspection of the tap takes it plain the%) vhatever considerations
dictate the placing of troops ia tho 'Malted Statos the idea of equal
protection for all parts of the country la not one of them, At the
outbrees of hostilities in Tuly 1950.0 the following serviceable
divisions
re in this country:
2 Infantryn Fort Lewis: Wash
3 Infantry Bort Benning? Ga,
I Marinen Camp Pendletonn CalM
2 Artoredn Fort Bbodn TeMo
11 Airbornen Camp Oompbollo Ey?
82 Airborneo Fort Braggo
This disposition of 2 on the Pacific Coast,,,, 1 In Kentuaky 2 in
the Southeast end IL in the deep South suggests only that trersportation
within the country was ogpeetod to ba able to take care of any
necessary movementec no particular movement being anticipate&
Those were in various states of readiness but the first three
could be shipped to Korea? the latest by Nevevben 1950, Thie was by
mane of borrowing men and unitsn The 11 Airborne contributed the
187 Rain end the 3 Division took the 65 ROT from Puerto Rico,
Simultaneously the 2 Armored was rednoed to organize the I Amoreds
also at Fort /*pods The build-up in Korea left only one ready division
the 62 Airborne.- in the United State% The an transportatioa of
the 5 Infantry Dsion weal, of ooure9t. neoessItsted by the feet that
there were no troops to be had nearer thi. zoom) of sotion,,
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The 40 Infantry f,16.G. Calif.) and 45 Infantry (N.G. 0k1a0 were
aalled up with the &Noreen purpose of sanding tham to Yepan an
replacement for troops withdrawa frmg the r* to Korea. Their training
areas? Camp Ocoke9 Calf, and OaAp Polka Lao 'respectively, were chosen
for convenience in the allele and. not in accordance with any permanent
When the stibsewnt expansion of the sr/Jr/began there was no
attempt to fill the places left vacant. No mew divisions were organized
at Lemis? Cooke, Pendleton, or Pon* At Banning the 4 Infantry was
made ectiveo not to take the place tt the 3 Infantry but presently to
.be traio?t to Germany* Only at Ebod was therO plan for what might
be celled replacement, the 1 Armored being made ready and the 2 Armored
sent later to Germemlro
The psnt placing of active divisions (In different degrees of
activity) is as renown:
28 Infantry* Camp Attorbu,* Ind4,
43 Intantry Camp Dix* W.T.
11 Airbornet, Camp Campbell* Ky*
82 Airbornee Fort Bragg N0C,
Ammorede Fort Ecoda Tex*
Of those the 28 Infantry and the 43 Infantry have been designated for
movement to Europe in October and Novamborf, 19510
It is evident that troop location did not and does not conform to
any conception of a general garriaan for the country. In this conneettan
it may- be noticed that plans Ter detense against air attack scan to bo
vowlittle advanced as yet,, The nature of those plans are indicated
in the placing of AA headquarters et Air Force bones, sot.:
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sq. Eastern AA Command? Stewart; Ma N.Y.
:fX,4 First Azwr AA Gomrank Mitchell AFBaLL
BAL. Fifth Army AA Comani, Ent ArB1 Colo.
liqo sixth Arm, AA Cu Hamilton AF Ba
Either their security 13 very good:, or these aro. commands without many
guns. There are few signs of ALA concentration around such cities end
industrial areas as would rAnke likay tarota for air attack. Thia may
be because trained crows 8TO not yet, availmble or because defense IS
te be committed to Air Force intorception instead of th AA. That nor
is some measure of truth in the l!ermer possibility is suggested by As
concentration of AA urlta at such :points as Ed aideMass," and Stemerta
Gael, which must be trAming centervr, since they are 17ot placed to
defend anything in particular. A few movements toward centers of
population may be the precursors of a general distribution of tbat kind:
51 AAA Brigader, Stewarto 2 NOT0 1950
Chicagoa 4 .A7ag. 1951
00 AAA Groupa Dvsne O Dee. 1950
Totten (E. Y.0) 24 Nev. 1951
209 AAA Groupa Stet a 2 NOV4 1950
Indiantown Gap (i') rjXuly 1951
260 AAA Grouna Edwards to Meade (Baltimore)1 :Kara-Apr.0 1951
9 AAA Gun Bno3 Bliss 10 Feb. 15.)51
Son Francisco, 11 Augc, 1951
35 AAA Cvn Bnaa Bliss, l0 Febn 1951
Made, 12 May 151
The present aspersion of vound troops iv largely the reau1t of
circumstancesz Installations aketady in being must be used are
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poealble, and large camps have in the past been built in the South
(*cause the Iseather allowed more days for training, and in the Bast
to In accensible to the centers of population* These considerations
F.111 govern the training programs There are the following traiwlng
livisions now in the Federal service:
5 Infantry, Indiantown Ceps Pao
6 Infantry, Fort Ork, Calif*
8 Infantry, Port Tackson, 5.00
9 Infantry, Fort Dix, N47.
10 Infantry, Fort Biley? Kan*
31 Infantry, Fort Zaakson, S* C*
47 Infantry, Camp Ruaker? Ala*
3 Armored, Fort Knox, Ky0
5 Armored, Camp Chaffee, Arko
6 Armored, Fort Leonard Wood, Md. (?)
7 Armored, Camp*Roberts? Calif*
101 Airborne, Camp Breckinridge, E70
Of these 14 6 are east of the Mississippi, 9 east of the mountains;
only 2 are north of Baltimore*
While these training units are organized as combat divisions,
essential/7 the IMMO basic training is given at each, regardless of the
designation "Infantry", "Armored", or "Airborne%
A large part of the armed forces in this country are organized not
by divisions but by lesser unite, and it Is impossible to say what
their combined strength is at present. Most of them are undoubtedly
undergoing training, and some centere of specialized training are
indicated by concentration of certain arms at the following points:
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AAA; (Amp ,ide? Mcsa,
AA4.0 Fort MOVe0 Hda
AAA, Fort Stewart, Gee
AAAD Camp Custer? Raabe
Ahei.0 Fort Lewis Weeho
Amtlileryo Fort Bragg Ne0.
Artilleryo Camp Raki, lee
Artil1ery0 Camp TAcCeyo Wise
Artilleryt3 Caw Cor 4 Coloe
Armorc_Cap Mike La&
Engineers9 Camp Campbell', Kyo
Engirserss Fort Lewin), wash,
Englreersz Camp Robe rts Ga/iTe
Infantry.(Banger) Camp CerseN Coloo
Reeoansissanos Camp Pickett.1, Vac,
Ca%culation of American potential rast take into townet the
National Guardv since that is regarded as the firct source of nor
combat unitse Or1g1nally0 of coursc.,;? the National Cua7d would have
Alrnishod garrison troops? There Is :WWI, houmers no diepositien to
amoclate tham with their hems ntataa once they have been called ic
ti-he Federal servicee
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24, Far EasteI?n
gouvreit
#.5
The main ground force of the Far Eanuern ?amend consists of 8
Infantry Divisions (2 In ;repent) 6 in Korea . the 1 Cavalry being
organised as Infantry), 1 Mnrine Division (in Korea) and 3 Regimental
Combat Teems (2 in apan, 1 on Okinawa)* Sines the units are reported
to have been at full strength since May? 19510 this gives a force of
about 186,500 man* The shooting strength can be reasonably calculated
as:
78,622 mall arms offensive weapons
1,592 mortars
1,089 recoilless rifles
1,352 tanks
702 artillery pieces
111 flame throwers
256 M46 SP AA weapon
06 M-19 SP AA weapon
(The basis of this estimate is given on the table of Offensive Tempo=
eppended$ To this must be added Corps and Army troops in unknown
amount*
It is Impossible to 'calculate what total this would products,
*punting troops of all services, because 1) the mutual contributions
of U.S. and Rolc services is unknoen, and 2) the extent to which civilian
labor can replace military in Tapan and Korea is eqsalkyunknown*
Senator Douglas' figure of a total ?5?000 necessary per division of
18,900 would give 659,000 army personnel (plus 70400 Marines) which is
clearly impossible it the whole army was 1,5000000 - 1,600,000 in Tune*
Even Arentinb Faraelentiat20041Et:
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given to the House Bridget Comittoel?, would amount to 4390000 without
the Marinel4 leaving only 10164000 for the establishments in EuropeL
Amerioafs, and the outlying JeraIends The estimates of 5006000 in the
Far East (Hsrald.Tribune 200 Xune) and 250:,000 plus (Time, 9 XulY)
seeu to be no more than guesses?
The organization, 3f the ground forces of the Far Eastern Contaand
la as follows:
tat* Matthew Bik RickgriaYe 00
Lto Gana Doyle 0? Hickeyo C of S
GHQ Tokyo
XVI Corps
GHQ Reserve Corps redesignated XVI 13 May 1951
Tajo Gen. Roderick R4 Al1er4 CO
HQ Camp Sendalo Tapan
Components:
40 Inf. Div ? (OB of the several Divisions appended)
45 Info Div*
34 Rar
187 ROT
Ryakyna Command
IQ Okinawa
Components:
, 29 RCT
65 AAA Gun Bno
947 .AAA Gun Bn.
22 AAA and AW Rao
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Eighth Army
1.40 Gen* Tames A* Van Fleets CG
Tato GOD.* 7ohn Bo Couttorl Deputy Commender
HQ Possibly Puma
Corpo
IA* Gene Fronk W* Milburn (relieved Augo 1951;
successor not announced)
Brig* Gene Thomas I. Harolds Deputy
Brig* Gene Rinaldo Van Brunt s C of S
lest Front Koreas no HQ known* APO 356 S.F.
Components:
1 RaK Div.
1 Cavalry Dive
3 Into Div* (until 17-16 Mays 1951)
25 Info Div*
IX Corps
VAjo Gen* lobe M0 Hoge, CO.
Brig* Gen* Thomas 7, Cross
Central Front Korea., no HQ known, APO 264 S.F0
Components:
24 Info Div*
1 Marine Div,
7 Info Div*
X Coma
Moja Gen* Clovis E. Byerss CO.
(Established in Korea 23 Sept 1950 with components:
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Eighth Army, (Conte)
corps, (Cont.)
7 Info Div.
24 Info Dime
25 Info Dive
1 Caw, Div.)
East Central Front Korea, no m known
Present Components:
3 Info Div, (since 17-18 May 1951)
2 Infs. Div,
To the right of X Corps are (or were in May)
3 ROK? 5 ROK
7 ROE and 9 ROE
' At the outbreak of hostilities in Korea each Infantry Regiment in
Japan except one, was 1 battalion under strength; the 4 divisions,
therefore lacked a total of 11 Infantry Battalions, They also lacked
11 FA Batteries, Righth Army as a whole was 32,000 men short of T/0
strength, In the first three months of hostilities, 100,000 troops
and 2 million tons of equipment ware sent to Korea; 9 bus, of infantry,
armor and artillery? while individuals fran every organization in the
Army formed trained cadres for 6 additional bne, 2 Inf, Div, was
brought up to strength by similar stripping of other unite and sent
to Korea, 5 Inf. Div, was not yet up to strength when it sailed; the
65 info Reg, from Puerto Rico was its third regiment, 11 Aire, Dive
was stripped to form a full strength Airb. RCT, the 187, Tghen the
troop build-up in Korea was complete, 82 Airb, Div. was the sole
remaining combat-ready division in Z I. ugh March 1951 U.S.
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Divisions in Korea were nearly 29000 men under etrength, the difference
being made up by Korean units. The integration of Korean soldiers
into American ranks began with the 1 Cavalry Division in the summer of
3.950 and proved so successful that the practice was ex?ended to all
American units in Korea. It was expected that American divisions in
Korea would be at full strength by May 19510
Aside from U.S. and ROK troops IA action in Korea there are the
following allied units:
British let Cormonwealth Div. (with Belgian and Luxemburger
troops attached)
Turkish Brigade
21. Thailand Info Reg" attached to U.S. 8 Cave Rego
4 Greek Bno9 attached to U.S. 7 Cm.. Reg.
Belgian Eno, attached to U.S. 3 Info Div.
Dutch Bno9 attached to U.S. 2 Into Dive,
French Bile, attached to US, 2 Info Div.
Colombian Bno
Ethiopian Bno
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3e American Mound Feroes in Eteope
WIVIS2A6MINAV Vt%.
The ground forces of the European Conmand COh ist of the U.S
Constabulary? 2 Infantry Divisions,. 1 Armored Division? and 3 Regimental
Combat Teams, ae well as varioue unattachedvor unlocated units, Assuming
these divisions to be at full strength, and omitting troops assigned to
service units, the combat strength of our ground forces can be computed
at pproximately 86,000 men as of I August 19510 Shooting strength,
calculated on the basis of the appended table, t`an rersonably set at:
32 851 smell alms offensive woapons
723 mortars
405 recoilless rifles
1,269 tanks
342 artillery pieces
224 Ale16 EP AAweepores
224 M-19 SP ALA wespono
Total ground strength including service, Corea and Army troops is
estimated to be approximately 150,000, The New. York ?Aloft reported
100,000 in February 19510 and Times estimate of 139,000 (23 ;rely 1951)0
based upon 850000 combat soldiers, aepears to be not far wrong,
The organization of emerican groend forces in Europe in as follows:
Supreme Hoadquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE)
Hq Rocqueneourt? France
CO: General of the Army Dwight D, Eisenhower
Depuby CG: Field Marshell Yonteomeey
C/S: Lt e Gen, Alfred M, Gruenther
Allied Forces, Central Europe
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AMOriCRE GrOund Forces in Europe* (C3nt4,)
Deputy 00: Gene Augustin Guillaume
Allied Forees2 Southern HUrepo
Gormand.= Admiral Robert Bo Gamily
Ground Commander: Gano Maurizio Ln do Castiglione
CiS Majo,Geno Tames Gavin
United States Fora in Europe (EUCOM)
Ego: Baidelbergz Germany
: Gen,. Thome To lizndy
C/S Majo Gen, Daniel Noce
Seventh A-vmx
FAO Stuttgarte Germany
Lto Gen, Manton Sc Eddy
V Corps
Ego: Bad Neuhalml Germany
OG: Maj., Gen, Zohn E Dahlquist
U.S0 Constabulary
1 In Div,
4 Info Dive
2Am, Div.
United States Forces in Austlim cum)
Salsbarg Austria
OCT Lt. Gen, S, LeRoy Irwin
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Amerie
und reeves in Europe o Cont.)
Ttleete U 'tad States Troops (Treat)
Bee: Trieete
Ca : Maj. Geno Edmund Bo Sabres
The exact relationship existing between SHAPE, EUCCM and Seventh Army
at the present time is not clear? Before the outbreak of war in Korea,
EUCOM exercised authority over all American forces in Europe, the principal
tactical units being the let Infantry Division and the U.S. Constabulary
when the Seventh Army was reactivated, in November 19500 it assumed
tactical control; and Eucaul became primarily a logistical support commando'
In theory, the Seventh Alley is already subordinate to General Znin, Allied
Commander for Central Europe under SHAPE.. SHAPE ?3 to be operational
headquarters for all allied force n Europe, while EUCOM will handle
administrative peobleme for American troops Acteally, however, EUCOM
appears to be still under the direct control of the Department of the
Army and perfoems meat of the functions not already taken over by the
Seventh Armee
Eventually, of course, American forces will be mexe closely integeated
into the projected Allied armies under SBAPE. Men the organization ef
SHAPE is completed, the Seventh Army will take its place beside other
Allied units onder the central authority. But it is probable that MUM,
or a similar eomaana will be retained as a direet channel of communication
between WeehiPston and American troopsin Europeo
Since 'Jalapa 1950, two dierieions, the 4 Infantry Division and the
2 asmored Divisione have been sent to Europe o Before the end of 1951
they be joined by two more, the 28 Infantry Division and the 43
Infantry Division. With theee will go VII Corps Beadeaarters now Ii
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Amerioem Ground Forces in Europe. (Cont.)
the Second Army's, &I. Unlike moot Faticual Guard divisions of World
War 11 the 28 and 43 retain. their Ketional Guard cadres almost intetto
In spite of some shortage of equipment their condition iconsidered
good 2 thozigh far from perfecto This will provide a force equivalent
to 6 divisions (4 Infantry 1 armared2 and the Constabulary) a112 except
the 26 and 4, under the recently established V 0o/pso On the basis of
General Ogden/s monograph on the so-so/lad division slice presented to
to the Abuse Committee on Appropriations, which allows 50,000 theatre
troops per division of 182000 mono total American ground forces in
Germany would then amount to roughly -500,000 men. This rigure4 when
increased by the units assigned to Austrian Trieste 2 The United Kingdom
mad elsewhere2 appears compatible with Seorstetrzr Marshal:Vs estimate of
3400000 ground troops in Europe by the end of 1952, by which time; all
divisions and their supporting units should have arrived. General 0ollins.9
figure of 2862000 ground troops by 50 Tura /952 indicates that these
supporting units will be transferred to Europe mere slowly than the
divisions.
Recent developments have shown the general form to be anticipated
for EUCOM0 The port of entry as Late as lune 1951 was Bremerhaven; a
line from Bordeaux through Verdun and Metz has now been designated as
the cemmunication zone o This would obviously be a great advantage if
American forces ware compelled to withdraw to the Rhine. Another
arrangement looking in the same direction, and alse.a step in the
general integration of the European ;ort...en, i6 the estebliehnt of em
American supply base at Kaiserslauternn and a training iraa suet to
the north at Batimholder, both in the :Trench Zone west of the Rhir",
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American Ground Foroes in Europe (Conte)
The area from the Rhine to the present line is evidently being cleared
so far as possible of all except combat troole.se It is signifieant for
the understanding of their proposed function that the 28 and 43 Divisions
are to be given training against airborne attack from their rear. One
other recent event shows the increased importance of poeitions in the
South: the landing at Leghorn of 1,200 troops, 100 of whom were to be
kept to operate the base while the rest go to MIA*, (5er:eldeyriburet
13 Aug 0 1951) This may be a step in the utilization of Mediterranean
ports, adequately protected by the fleet:, as major bases for the forces
in Austria.
Finallye. total Allied strength rests not only upon the contribution
of the American army but upon those of our allies- as well. At preeent,
British and. Frenoh troops on occupation duty in Germany provide the bulk
of these forces. According to the New brk irMetst (15 end 20 May 9 Jruly
1951) present plans call for .4 British divisions:, 10 French (5 ready and
5 in reserve)* 5 Italian? and various units front the smaller countries
to be- available by the end of 19510 According to the New Yogsp72:?13
(12 Aug. 1951) the troops available to SHAPE by 31 Dec. 3.951 will be
4 British divisions; 10 French (5 combateroady? 5 at 3 days' notice);
5 Italian infantry divisions, 2 brigades of Alpine troops, and 3. armored
brigade (but the training and equipment of these are inadequate);
Danish division (brigade accordieg to the lieralt,ItTr,iblatt. Nay 19511
this together with one Norwegian brigathe would be in Schleewigefliellseeen
to guard the Kiel Canal); 1 Netherleinle ROT (6,000, eon); 5 Belgian
divisions. The Times (25 Zuly n51) 6f3titreatOS that, by tt4 end of this
year there ii1i be 500,000 A.111-ed sold:bees and ainreerA in Germany. It
mat
S.
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Allled Ground Forme in I Cont )
and Secretary Marehe13.90 atatement that tb.s NATO powers will have
205000000 men in active service by the end of 102 (pw. !tat- Ilnyas
? 28 'July 1951) will require the maximum effort end efficierey of all
oarties concerned?
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Other Oversee Commands
no leeland Defense Force
Advance detachment of 200 treSe taps arrived in Iceland, 7 May
19510 This is a unified force, consisting of Army, Navy, and Air Force
nereennele It is under the operational control of CIC? Atlantic Fleet,
Activities center on two airports, Keflavik and Reykjavik* Listening
posts and other strategic installations are located elaewherce Radar
and weather etations are to he eatabliehed on a largo smile*
be Aia4can Commaad Alm Alaska
The principal Army installations in Aleska are those at Fort
Riehardeon and at Ladd Air Force Reee. Fort Richardson 7 miles
northeast of Aneherageole the headqeaxtees and center of all Army
activity in the area In March 1950, total strength at Fort Richardson was
4,185 men, charged primarily with the defense of EleendorZ Air Force Besse
in Jelly len? the 196 ReT, a South Dakota National Guard unit in training
at Camp C4rson? Colorado-, since August 1950, was ordered to Anchorage,
Alaska* It was to proceed by sea to Baines. Alaska; and enago in
mareuvers during the month of August before teking up permanent etation
at Anchorage*
Ladd Air Force Bees, Fairbanks, Alsam, had a station complement of
396 men in March 19500 Its facilities are being emeanded, however, and
elements of the 4 Info Ret e from Ceme Carson have arrived* The station
mill eventually be capable of aocomodating an entire regiment. The
teoops ere -intended for defense of the Air Baas, the most northerly
bomber and fighter base in Alaska. Arctic teat facilities are .to be
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4, Other Oversee. Commands, (Cont)
Another station-worthy of note is Eielsou AF Base, AG miles
southwest of Fairbanks, The largest bomber bass in Alaska it had a
defonding force of 166 men in Ally 1950. Plans appalr.antly exist for
the eorpMnsion of this force, Budget plant presented to the Flbuse
Appropriations Committee in /961 call for conotruction of barracks for
400 men; but this was said to be far short of etentual needs and the
ultimate planned strength of the bass is classified ,information,
In Xuly 1950* 884 men were stationed at Whittier, Alaska, the
port, of entry for troops and supplies for both Ary and Air Force on
the mainland. There is no indication that the strength of this post
has been increased, Finally,, Big Delta, Alaska, ASO 733, 105 miles
southeaot of Felrbanks, should ba noted as the home of the Army Arotic
Trainiug Center,
Strategic plans- for Alaska are discussed in. the New York Times
of 19 August 19510 Half a billion dollars are scheduled for the next
4 years, almost all4?-propriated or authorized since Tuly 1950,6 Persomnel,
at air' basesare now being increased, radar and A& installations built
up along the sea coast, hichways oonstruoted to connect air fields with
harbors, The garrison of Marks Field Air Base at No is being increased
The .defense lino now rung from Fairbanks down the Alaska railroad through.
Elmendorf Field, Ft, Richardson area to Kodiak - a 550 mile line of air
bases and garrisons,
o, Caribbean Command (rftS. 011117- Caribbean?)
The defense of the Caribbean area has bewo entrusted to a unified
armed forces command oonsisting of U.S. Army Caribbeon, the Caribbean
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Oth,1:, ?verso& Ocarnands. (Coat
Air 012sand and the Caxibbean Sea Frostier. Unita listed in Apperzlix V
are t:, only erns, aside from Puezto Ric cn National Guard outfitE4 which
0?0/1 be located in this area.
Pacific Command SU.8. Army? Pacific)
Like the Caribboan the Pacific Oxameend has been largely by-passed
by recent military developments. The increasing _American commitments
to the defense of the Far East have cantered upo;:x Korea? 5apenv and
Okinawa; and there is no evidence of any build-up of ground forces
.118ewhere in the Pacific area.
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E. Manpower and Training
1. Army Strength
In June, 1950, the Secretary of Defense reported 593,000 men on
active duty in the Army. This force was organized as 10 divisions,
additional regimental combat teams and supporting units. By June, 1951,
more than 1,2000000 men had been called to service, leaving a net total
of more than 6,550,000 for the Army. Present plans call for stabiliza-
tion of Arpy manpower at between 1,500,000 and 1,6000000, according to
General Collins. About 630,000 vill be eligible for release in fiscal
1952 and present plans call for recruitment of enough new nanpower to
maintain the balance. This will provide the equivalent of 24 divisions
-18 organized as divisions andthe rest as RCT is (18). Two more divi-
sions added to the 16 currently on active duty will complete this total.
In addition to the 18 divisions General Collins has predicted the
federalization of two additional National Guard divisions; and Mrs. Rosenberg
has stated that two divisions will be recruited by June 1952 from troops
now assigned to non-combat duty. These additions would make a grand total
of 29 divisions or their equivalmt, including the U. S. constabulary in
Germany, at the end of the current fiscal year.
The distinction of U. S. ground forces at the present time is roughly
as follows. The projected strength of the Army as of 30 June, 1951 was
1,552,000 men. MaXiMUM strength of forces in the Zone of the Interior
during fiscal 1951 was 981,988 men. EstinvIting 1500000 troops in Europe
approximately 420,000 resin for the Far Etstern and other iwernca2
commands of thesop probably 400,000 arH actual in the ksr Eattt,,
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The avelage strength of the Army for fiscal 1951 and 1952 had been
presented to Congress as follows:
195.2:. .
1952
_......,._.
Comnissioned officers
89,172
120,600
Warrant officers
7,925
14,700
Nurses and MSC
5,296
8.,000
Enlisted pereennel
984,647
1,385,200
Cadets, USMA
2,33t
2phCO
/
Totals 1,089,374 453102002
-1 July, 1950x 539,000; 30 June 1951: 1,5310000.
21 ,July, 1951 and 30 June? 1952.
2. Suarees of manpauer
Ore of the basic problems with which the armed forces must
deal is that of recruiting and maintaining, in the most efficient and
equitable ray possible, a force commensurate in size and degree of pre-
paredness with their broadening responsibilities. Furthermore, plans
are being made to keep available, or in ready reserves trained troops to
meet emergency requirements during an indefinite period of international
tension, It vas to meet this need that the Department of Defense
proposed a Universal Military Training program, now to be elaborated by the Nation-
Ea Security Training Commission in accordance with the terms of the Select-
ive Military Training and Service Act of 1951.
The act provides for the establithment of a Universal Military Training
'nog:elm under which 18 year old men Will be trained for 6 months in a
National Security Training Corps. Upon completion of this period, the men
well be held in a Reserve Corps for 71 years. Such a program, if
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Army in time of need while avoiding the necessity of maintaining an
expensive military establishment during periods of relative peace.
Actual setting-up of laa must wait upon approval by Congress of regula-
tions to be dreun up by the National Security Training Commission and
proclamation by the President that men under 19 years of age are no longer
needed for the draft. It is not expected to go into effect in the near
future.
For its immediate needs, the Army must rely upon existing means of
procuring eanpower. Enlistments, Selective Service, the National Guard
and Reserve programs are the channels through which the strength of the
Army is sustained.
a. Voluntaay enlistment.
Voluntary enlistments between July 1950 and April 1951 were
198,000 men, in addition to whom the Army reported 61,000 immediate and
33,000 delayed re-enlistments for a total of 292,0000. Of the 630,000 men to
he released from service during fiscal 1952, 200,000 are expected to re-
enlist. The reliability of such expectations, however, together with
that of predictions as to the number of first-time volunteers, depends
almost entirely upon future events. Mhile the Army mast obviously attempt
to calculate the number of voluntary enlistments it can count upon during
the months ahead, such calculations must always be held sUbject to change
without notice. International or militaey developments, or changes in
regulations concerning the draft, may, as they have in the past, bring
about striking upeard or downward fluctuations in the rate of volunteering.
b. Selective Service.
The Selective lilitaey Training and service Act of 1951 now
governs the recruitment of military personnel by means of the draft,
Tizder
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all of the 1925,- age group has been exhausted by their local board.
Physical standards have been reduced to those acceptable in January 1945;
4,11ei the carrerit?mental etandard is a score of 65 on the Amy General
Classification Test. The new standards should make available approximately
500,000 men previously classified le-F. Under. earlier draft legislation,
816,124 men between the ages of 19 and 26 were reported eligible for induction
in October 1950, with 457,000 more becoming available annually. In addition
to the 500:000 4-Fs, the Act of 1951 makes available an undetermined number
of 18i year olde, while changes in deferments on account of dependents are
expected to release 235,000 moreibr 1-A classification. It is apparent
that the new law has, thus, significantly increased the manpower pool
on which the angled services can dreew.
With the October 1951 quota, the number of men drafted since June:
1950 will reach 675,004of whom 430,000 men: chiefly from the draft: will
be necessaxy as replacements during the coming fiscal year.
Monthly draft calls have recently been increased. In July, 1951,
only 15,000 men were drafted. The August quota of 22,000 has been raised
to 35,000 with 7,000 going to the Marine Corps* The September quota is
34,000: of which 6:000 are for the Marines. In October: 14,000 are to
be called: mith 5,000 of that number going to the Hardnes. A rise in
the monthly draft. quota to 65,000 men has been predicted for the near
future? and it is probable that monthly quotas will at least continue
. to run above 40,0oo. Here again, circumstances as they develop AIII
'unquestionably affect ultimate decisions.
c. National Guard.
- The strength of the National Guard on 30 June 1951 was 235,000
men, organized in 3,588 units. Most of these are organized as infantry
divi'3/-0170?adraketigSaW4/81/ffiel* M0094TAS8Regio'Or ar0 the
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organized Guard Divisions, those now active being rmsrked
26 Mass.
27 N.Y.
*28 Pa.
29 md., Va., W. Va.
30 Ala., Miss.
32 Wis.
33
34 Iowa, Nebr.
35 Kan.,
36 Tax.
37 Ohio
38 Ind.
39 La., Ark.
ith0 Calif.
hi Oreg., VJash.
h2
*143 Com., R.I., Vt.
hh hUb
*45 Okla.
46 Mich.
*47 Minn.., N. flak.
48 Pla.01 Ga.
49 Calif.
51 S.C., Fla.
Armored Tex.
50 Armored N.J.
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In additions the following non-divisional tmite are projected:
21 RCTs
103 Maine
107 Biz.
iii Pa.,
114 N.J.
:49 KY.
150 W. Va.
157 Colo.
158 Ariz.,
163 Mont.
166 Ohio
176 Va.
178 Ill.
182 Mass.
195 N.H.
196 S. Dak.
278 Tenn.
295 puerto Rico
296 Puerto Rico
293 Hawaii
299 Hawaii
The allotted strength of a Guard Division is 130941 men; a Guard RCT
is allotted 30465 man. But the 1952 budget liermits 100% officer strength
and 50% enlisted strength for all units now organized or authorized0 not
including units on Federal duty. The proposad strength of the National
Guard/03A% dePdr laggaA01440/21(4:SXAW,PYR009',11A0etideb6204420@fl power
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is to be recruited in the following nanner:
Returning guardsmen
281583
Returning guardsmen with
incompleted terms of state enlistment
150000
New recruits for present 30588 units
26,000
New recruits for 325 new units
10:000
Additions from pool of 350,000 returnees
14,806
Total
843389
The training of National Guard units is treated in the discussion
of the Amy training program. During the summer of 1951 approximately
4,000 Guard units trained at summer camps across the country. At
Pine Oetmps New York: alone: 65,000 guardsmen and reservists received
2 weeks! training?
More than 100,000 National Guard troops have been called to active
(duty with the Army since the outbreak of rer in Korea. 12224 National Guard
company-size units had been called by 30 Novembers 1950. These units:
averaging 50% of T.O. strengths were filled by men drawn from the 0.E.C.
In addition to the 6 National Guard divisions sir:nal-3y federalized,
General Collins has predicted that trio additional divisions may be called
up during the current fiscal year, These divisions will probably be
New York, Texas or Illinois guardsmen.
National Guard divisions: including those about to be sent overseas,
have been used as replacement pools for units already in combat. The
28 Infantry Division (N000) has sent 6,000 trained draftees to other
unit,s. The 31 Infantry Division (N cGo) has lost 49300 men as replacaRralts
to other units; 'stile the 113 Infantry Division (N.G.) has trained 6s5O0
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draftees and sent them elsewhere. Clearly, National Guard units Which
are used for such purposes should be considered a part of the basic
training program.
d. Organized Reserve Corps.
New policies for reserve forces Imre announced by the Secre-
tary of Defense in April, 1951. They are stated in Department of Defense,
Office of public Information, release No. 516-51. Some of the policies
announced have already gone into effect, but many await authorization by
Congress before the contemplated revision of reserve policies can be coal-
? pleted. A fundamental change which the new program will effect is the
division of the Reserve into Ready, Stand-by and Retired classes, based upon
differing degrees of preparedness and availability. Recent Changes in regu-
lations concerning the Organized Reserve Corps have generally been steps in
the direction of re-organization along the lines laid dawn by the basic
policy statement.
On 1 Mar& 1951, the O.R.C. reported 158,989 reservists in organized
units and 313,931 individual reservists, including honorary and Inactive
Reserve. The total for the Active Reserve was 293,320 men. The budget for
fiseal 1952 provides for an end strength of 205,000 active members for the
O.R.C. aEarly readya units are to be at 100% officer and 50% enlisted strength.
BY 3. January 1951, 783 Reserve units had been celled to active duty,
with 50477 officers and 20,222 enlisted men. Mary reservists have been
celled up on an individual basis, to strengthen National Guard and other
outfits. 33,410 officers and 94,843 enlisted men had entered active
service on this basis by the same data. Additional units and individuals
have been called up since January - the number of units was 852 by March -
but the bulk of those likely to be drawn upon were Probe:We" called in the early
months of the ewe Present plans ca
resezeliptemidfletaoihRP
their replacement by other pore
nntar I nckti- I A
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v lei
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3. Aralrainiqg_tr_ogram
'3m
To an extraordinary degree the efficacy of any Army depends upon
the character of its training program. This is particularly true of countries
lacking a strong military tradition or enjoying relatively high standards of
civilian life under urban conditions. Men from such backgrounds must be
thoroughly trained to the rigors of life in the field and to the habits of
discipline and cooperation so vital to successful military operations.
The process by which civilians are being made into soldiers deserves
attention as a clue to the caliber of the fighting men the United States is
capable of putting into the field.
Like many other aspects of the Army, its training program has been
considerably revised sihce the outbreak of the Korean War. Increases in the
draft and in the demand for combat soldiers have necessitated enlargment of
training facilities. The training establishment in the Zone of the Interior
has more than doubled since June, 1950? In July, 19510 the basic training
period was increased from 14 to 16 weeks to provide more time for combat train-
ing. Qualitatively, too, basic training has been improved. Greater emphasis
is being put on physical conditioning, infiltration courses, night problems
and other exercises simulating combat conditions, notably the use of live
ammunition in training exercises. In recent months veterans from Korea have
been brought home to assist in the training of recruits. These men have been
critical of the program for its failure adequately to prepare men for combat;
and, 'with their aid, trainees are now receiving more realistic preparation.
Commanders responsible for the training program have kept in close touch with
developments in Korea and have constantly recommended changes to bring training
more closely into line with the practical lessons learned there.
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At present there are 16 training and indoctrination centers handling
recruits. Ten of these are operated by the training divisions listed =dim
311 Appe4dix Vp
2iimmilimmixixnx Zone of the Interior. As noted there, these divisions,
whether designated as Infantry, Armored or Airborne, all handle general indoc-
trination, basic infantry combat training, squad tactics and subjects common
to all arms and services. The other basic training centers are located at
various service schools, where the same program is carried on for the first
six weeks. At the end of this period recruits selected for specialized train-
ing are released and sent to the special service schools or to specialist
training units for the remainder of the training period. Those who are to
remain in the Infantry, or who are candidates of officer of NCO training,
continue the regular basic training course. The latter portion of this course
stresses training under field conditions and in larger units.
Between 30,000 and 35,000 men are now being turned out monthly by
the basic training program; and it is expected that the number will reach
50,000 per month before the end of the year. The chief difficulties encounter-
ed to date have been the lack of experienced cadres and of sufficient weapons,
especially of new types, for the training centers. As production increases
and more veteran combat soldiers are brought into the program these problems
should disappear. There have been scattered complaints of facilities inade-
quate in other respects, each as housing, but these have been largely the re-
sult of rapid expansion and will probably be corrected in time.
Special service centers or schools exist for each branch of the
service. At these centers advanced training in the weapons, techniques and
duties of the branch is given. The following are the stations and branches of
the special service schools:
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Ft. Benning, Ga. Infantry
Ft. Knox, Ky. Armor
Ft. Sill, Okla. Artillery & Helicopter
Ft. Bliss, Texas AAA I Guided Missile
Ft. Belvoir, Va. Engineer
Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md. Ordnance
Ft. Lee, Va. QM, AG
Ft. Eustis, Va. Transportation
Ft. Monmouth, N.J. Signal
Ft, McClellan, Ala. Chemical (effective 15 October 1951)
Edgewood Arsenal, Ind. Chemical
Camp Gordon, Ga. Signal & MP
Ft. Sam Houston, Texas Medical
Ft. Lewis, Washington Clerk-Typist
Ft. Benjamin Harrison, Ind. Finance
Officer candidate schools are now in operation at the Infantry
School, Ft. Benning; the Artillery School, Ft. Sill, and the Army General
School, Ft. Riley. Additional officer candAate ezhools will be opened at
the Signal, Engineer and Armored Schools, 1 September 1951. A five-month course
is given officer candidates, who will now number approximately 8,000 a year.
In addition to the branch service schools the Army operates a number
of specialist schools and colleges to train officers and some enlisted men in
complementary techniques. These specialist schools are the following:
*Armed Forces information School, Ft. Slocum, N.Y.
Army Language School, Presidio of Monterey, Calif.
Army Security Agency school, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.
In cooperation wrthiavy and Air Force.
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C1C School, Camp Holabir. Md.
Sinal Photo Scl,00l,
Sbecial Service School, Ft. Monmouths N.J.
*Strategic Intelligence School, Washington, D.C.
Quartermaster Subsistance Schools Chicago, Ii1.0 QM Depot
Army Medical Department Research Graduate Schools
'4Aehilegton. D. C.
Psychological Warfare Schcoi, Ft. Riley, Kansas
Ooint service schools, training senior officers in joint and calbined
operatetons, strategic planning and logistic-economic factors affecting national
policy are:
;National 4ar College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.
Armed Forces Staff Colicges Norfolks Va.
Industrial College of the Armed'..,orces Washington, i) 4C
The Coymend and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, trains Army
officers in tactical and staff operations at a somewhat lower level.
This training provided by the schools listed is primarily indiYidual
in nature, concerned with acquainting the individual soldier with the noilede eechniques necessary for the bast performance of the functions assigned him.
At leart equally important is group or unit training in tactical operations at
aLl Levels, Onle through such training can the officers find the oppeetunity
to put their knowledge of tactics and planning to the teet of practice, and
?mil officers and enlisted men font the habit of working together as a enit in
cooperation with other units. Likewise, the leesons learned in the spoeleitst
br ,-10.1.3 are tsere put to use in A eleee rcaiist'ce way, unit training:
ippliefi a test of iudivicuaA. ,aoat.4-53 at ;-it same Lime a i J)e.pares /
tn coonraton with Navy and Air For,D,
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the unit foe combat operations. In every sense? operations of this type are
the keystone of the entire training system.
Unit training may take seseral forma. In some instances, divisions
or other units set. up special schools to train all, or a part of, their men in
some particular technique. The I Arm. Division, Ft? Hood, has established
both a Chemical Defense School and a Ranger Training Program for its men.
Units may be assigned to a particular locality to take advantage of its geo-
graphical or climatic peculiarities for training purposes. Examples are Camp
Carson, Colo., where units are trained in mountain and cold weather warfare,
or the Army Arctic Training Center, Dig Delta, Alaskd. Camp Irwin, Calif. has
recently been reactivated as the Army Armored Combat Training Center and units
of the 43 Division, shortly to embark for Europe, hays been sent there for
tactical training in the desert. It As, perhaps questionable whether the desert
is the ideal place to train troops few of whom are likely to see combat Linden
desert conditions; but it may be the only practical place from the point of
view of availability.
At a higher level of training joint maneuvers, such as "Operation
Southern Pine" currently in progress in North Carolina in which elements of the
82 Airborne, the 11 Airborne and the 28 and 43 Infantry Division are partici-
pating, provide opportunity for expeeience in cooperation for large-scale
operations and for testing the validity of previous training. Such maneuvers,
furthermore, approach as closely as possible to operations under actual coabat
eonditions, Their value lies VI the accuracy with which they reveal flays
in training which need to be eliminated before units arc committed to the )ina.
For instance, early stages of the Southern Pine op-ration showed a serious
breakdown in air-ground co-ordination through shortages and failures in reffo
equipment. Five field exercises of this kind are planned as the culmination
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of training for major units before July 1952.
Even after units are ready and have been shipped overseas, training
programs are continued to keep them ready for action. In Japan, the 40 and the
45 Infantry Divisions, whose departure from the ZI was rushed, are continuing
their training at Camp Sendai. In Germany, a German army training area at
Grafenwoehr has, until recently, been used by American units of regimental
size or smaller. A new area is to be used in the future. This is presumably
at Baumholder, west of the Rhine, where elements of the 4 Inf. and 2 Arm. Divi?
sione are now in training. The 1 Inf. Division, in Germany since 1945 on
occupation duty has been trained in airborne operations and is now capable
of packing and loading all its equipment except the 155 mm. howitzers. This
training may well have been carried out with any eye to rapid evacuation in
the days when the division was almost alone in Germany. Indication of the
nature of future training overseas is given in the report that the 28 and the
43 Divisions, after their arrival in Germany this winter, will undergo special
training in dealing with airborne attacks in their rear. In addition to such
operations, less spectacular forms of training are constantly in progress at
the unit level.
Also in Europe, the Army operates a group of schools and training
centers whose object is to maintain a high level of competence and to provide
opportunities for advancement for able men. These are:
Ansbach, EUCOM Signal School
Bamberg, EUCOM Ordnance School
Eschwege, Ordnance School
Crarmlech, intelligence and M? School, Engineer School
Hemmelburg, Army Training Grounds
Kitzingen? Kitzingen Training Center
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Mannheim, EUCOM Transportation, School -
Munich, Constabulary. NCO Academy
Oberammergau, European Command Intelligence School
Vilseck, Tank Training Center.
Foreign soldiers have participated in the training offered at these centers,
but there has been no participation to date of allied and U.S. units in com-
bined maneuvers. Combined maneuvers of British, French and U.S. troops are
scheduled for 14-23 September 1951.
A discussion of the Armycs Information and Education program is not
considered to fall within the limits of this report. The National Guard,
A.O.T.C. and O.R.C. programs, since they are expected to account for over
350,000 men in 19512 are worthy of notice.. The National Guard program is
based on a weekly drill supplemented by occasional week-end training periods
and by an annual two-reek field training period. Since these units are at far
from full strength the value of their training is questionable, or at least
variable. Of the four National Guard divisions called to Federal service
?since June 1950, none is yet considered ready for combat duty; and all have
undergone extensive training periods in spite of the training previously carried
on. On the other hand, the 278 infaatry Regta Tennesse National Guard is con-
eidered a crack outfit. After training at Ft. Devens and Fine Camp, one of
its companies was assigned to Camp Buckner, West Point, in June, 1951, for
two months training with the cadets of the United States Military Academy.
The Organized Reserve Corps sustains a somewhat similar training
program, based on a combination of weekly drills and an annual field training
period. Evaluation of the program 13 impossible sinee there have been nore-
ports on Reserve units in action and since the majority of Reservists have been
called as individuals and assigned to Regular Army or National Guard units.
It would appear, however, for various reasons including the lack of sufficient
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funds, that the Reserve program to date has only begun to develop its fall
potentialities. (For further discussion of the National Guard and O.R.C.
see section on Manpower.) The R.O.TX.? rhich now supplies more than 60%
of the newIrecommissioned officers of the Regular Army, has become a crucial
factor in Army plans and training. After four years of military training in
college and one summer of field training, the men from this program are ab-
sorbed into the Regular Army where they are providing an increasing proportion
of the necessary leadership.
Finally, it may be observed that with training, as with every other
aspect of military preparedness, "the battle is the pay-off." The effectiveness
of Aruy training receives its ultimate test in combat, while the lessons learned
there must be incorporated into arty realistic training program. The battle-
field is, consequently, the most important training area of all. In this respect,
the Korean War has exerted an undoubtedly beneficial influence. It has cetab-
lished practical standards against which the whole training system can be
measured. And it is now beginning to supply combat-tested cadres, personally
familiar with the latest developments in warfare, to bridge one of the most
important gaps between the training centers andthe front lines.
A late addition to information concerning training:
1. Training manoeuvers scheduled for the coming year and referred to
above have been identified as:
a. Operation Sand Hill, involving 2 Infantry and 1 Airborne divisions -
approximately 110,000 men.
b. Operation Snow Fall, scheduled for January-February, 1952, involving
1 Airborne division, 1 ROT and 1 Armored Cavalry. regiment
(300000 troops) in venter operations.
c. Operation long Horn, with I Armored division, 1 Infantry division
and I riCT at Ft. Hood, Texas, stressing .air-ground training
for 80,000 troops.
ApimploOftengfiltismia0,94/Sgnae '41 RAW (19MPPAYR41.9ch are
still to be made.
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F. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ARMY rEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT.
Weapons and eppipment common to all services are treated in Section
V of this report. The developments with which this section is concerned
are primarily those affecting the offensive weapons of the Infantry,
Artillery and Armored branches. Modernization of weapons and equipment
in these categories vas already underlay before the beginning of the
Korean ware Neu tanks were being developed and tested, while many of
the basic infantry weapons were undergoing striking changes,
Events in Korea have provided an enormous incentive for the per-
fection and production of experimental models. At the same time, the
Army has been forced to draw heavily upon its slim stock of modernized
equipment. It was front page news when a new and improved bazooka was
rushed to the front in the early months of the Korean war. Units sta-
tioned in the Zone of the Interior were stripped of their equipment to
supply the combat forces. To date, only one battalion of Te46 Patton tanks?
already on the wee to obsolescence, has been reported in action in Korea.
U. S. forces in Europe have no tanks of the latest models; and the 28
and 43 Infantry divisions, soon to sail for Europe, lack their full TO
and E allotments of even basic infantry equipment. Tank production is
currently running 20% behind schedule.
Despite these difficulties, progress it being mules and the following
peges and tables will show the extent to which new weapons and equipment
are becoming available. In general, two fundamental trends are discernible
in recent developments in this field0 In the first place, increased
mobility for infantry and armor has been considered of great importance.
The lightening of infantry weapons, the use of armored personnel carriers,
the improved engines in the new tanks, air training for infantry divi-
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All conform to this trend.
The second trend is the effort to increase the fire power of combat
troops. For the infantry, this takes the form of increased rates of fire
for most basic infantry weapons and larger caliber weapons, i.e., e5J0 cal.
machine gun and 105 mm. recoil-less rifle. In artillery and tank arma-
ment, the trend takes the form of higher . muzzle velocities for the guns.
Specific information concerning improvements in certain weapons
and equipment follows:
1. Small Arms and Infantry Equipment
woosisc+ssoransuans,,Airs....ramaalvramn
The two main trends in connection with infantry are:
a) to increase the mobility of the individual soldier
b) to increase the fire-power of the individeal soldier
a. As a means of increasing the mobility of the individual soldier,
including the economy of transporting him be air, it is hoped to reduce
the weight of his equipment and arms by as much as 65%. Items in this
program are:
New helmets in ehich steel is replaced by an aluminum
shell with nylon-plastic lining, which weighs 8% less
_and gives 15% more protection.
Nea entrenching tools which reduce the soliderqs load by
3 lbs. 14 ow,
NOW 3.5n bazooka, lighter than the old 2.36n.
Lighter rifle, pistol, machine gun and =munition.
b. It has been estimated that sometimes 75% of availeble rifle firu-
power is not used by riflemen in combat. This must be Overcome Chiefly by
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training, but the introduction of new weapons ha o so far affected the
situation that while the division has increased since world War II from
13,500 to 18,900, its fire-power has increased 50%.
Setting aside weapons well-established and well-publicized by the
end of World War II, information on which is available in the Army Almanac
and in Barnes* Weapons of World War II, the following are worthy of comment:
Oilkaitamm.m?????????04.1.
N2, .30 cal. Carbine. Selective automatic version of the
semi-automatic carbine; 30 round magazine; cyclic rate of
fire 750 rounds per minute.
T20? (or O25?), JO cal. Rifle. Fally automatic; 2i lbs0
lighter than the Garand; 20 round clip; 750 rounds per
minute. Expected to replace both rifle, 111 and carbine
and perhaps the light machine gun.
N18, 57 ma. Reccealess Rifle; weight 40.25 lbs., =denim
range with heavy anti-tank ammunition, 4400 yam; muzzle
velocity, 1200 feet per second; elevation -665?, -27?.
M20, 75 mm. Recoilless Rifle; weight 103 lbs.; maximum rage
with high-explosive anti-tank al-munition, 7000 yards;
muzzle velocity 1000 feet per second; elevation 465?1 -270
.
105 rm. Recoilless Rifle; weight 750 lbs.; length 13 feet; ranges
5 miles; rate of fire 10 rounds per minute. Jeep-mounted.
Primarily an anti-tank weapon, which can K.O. any known
foreign tank.
.60 cal. Machine Gun. Fires faster and hits harder than the 050
cal. which it is expected to replace; it has higher velocity
and flatter trajectory. Farthermore? the barrel can be
=sera-Aid without tools and another substituted which fires
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20 uffri, shone, It can be set up in position and fid
by remote control, having been loaded with anough rounds
to operate all night under normal conditions.
Anti?tank grenade now being purchased from Belgium. Fired from
N1 rifle3 range about 100 yards; shaped charge lbsc;
pierces 200 mm?, of tough armor. The grenade is pecultarly
ridged and not readily deflected from the most sharply
angled armor plate.
The army has ordered 6,918 aniperscopes, infrared telescopos
mounted on M2 Carbine and powered by springmound 10 lb?,
generator. The operator mars special goggles which Wow
him to see the infrared ray in the dark.
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2, Mc rtezt
The effort to :lighten the soldier's load has led to experiments
with a titanium baseplate for the 60 mm. and 81 mm. mortars.. See the report
on chamieals for further information.
A second important development affecting mortars is the incorpora-
tion of the 4.2" mortar into the infantry regiment. Formerly, the 4.2" was
opsrated exclusively by personnel of the Chemical Warfare Service, working in
close cooperation with. the infantry. Since 1945, a tisavy ;Mortar Company has
been assigned to each infantry regiment, replacing the anti-tank companies of
World War II.
Monster mortars -include the 250 MU6 mortar, built for use against
the Siegfried line, which was never actually employed in coMbat, and the
914 ma. mortar (Little David) which, did see action in World War II. While
it is rumored that the latter may be capable of firing atomic shells, it
seems more probable that the development of guided missiles and atomic artil-
lery will make the large mortarsobsolete. A reported new locator which
finds end directs fire on Mortar emplacements, if praTed practicable, should
contribute to this result.
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71
. The in eases in range and in muzzle velocity which are the goal
of most of improve artillery weapons, regnike similar increceees in
the size and weight of the galas. Thie situetion presents a challenge for
the development and application of new materials and techniques if mobility,.
one or thevital aspects of modern artillery, is not to be seriously reduced,
Almoet all of the basic artillery weapons now in use are World Wee
II models. Modifications are dependent primarily upon ballistic and metal-
lurgical experimentation to develop light-weight, erosion-reeistent alloys
suitable for high velocitye rapid fire. Etperiments in new types of shells
and barrels were well under way. in 1945; but little of the knowledge gained
has as yet appeared in actual firing pieces, It may be that, in the long
run, the guided missiles program will develop a more effective answepr to the
problem of high-velocity, longer-range bombardment.
A few- now artillery pieees, or modifications of old ones have al-
ready appeared, in addition to the 57 mm. and 75 mm. recoilless rifles dis-
cussed in the section on small arms. In general, the new developments reflect
the emphasis on longer range, higher muzzle velocity and greater mobility.
The Anti-tank Gun , is a 57 non (1), single-shot, hand-loaded
weapon, capable of firing 10 rounds e minute to a maximum range of 5 males.
Another new anti-tank weapon is the 1051wn. recoilless rifle, listed under
small arma. An 8-inch gun weighing 52,620 pounds is now in use, whereas the
earlier medal weighed 69,300 pounds.
During World War II the Army resorted to the use of gums mounted
mounted upon tracked vehicles to provide a highly mobile, suit-propelledar-
tillery force. A new 155 .mm. Howitzer Mbeter Carriage, Me41, has since been
added to this group.
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40 TANKS AND ARYORED CARB
At the end of World Aar II the United States had on hand 28,776
tanks of all types. 17,901 of these remained on 1 July 1950, of which 6,600
were suitable for combat use. The tanks which first saw action in Korea were
almost entirely World War II models, since the Armyls new tank development
program was not yet fully under TiNay. Since the outbreak of war the funds and
the stimulus necessary to bring the program into full operation have been sup-
, plied. The annual appropriation for tanks and other combat vehicles rose from
103,360,949 in Siscal 1950 to $2,322 954,552 in fiscal 1951. The estimated
budget for fiscal 1951 allots ?i,4?201p456,000 for this item. Despite the increase
in appropriations and the fact that the Detroit Arsenal was said to have the
capacity to turn out as many as 5000 tanks in the first 12 to 18 months of pro-
duction, the new tanks are coming off the lines more slowly than was expected.
Less than 600 tanks were produced in 1950. In December it was announced that
the Army had been unable to meet its minimum requirements in modernized equis-
ment. As recently as July, 1951, tank production was officially reported 20A.
to 251. behind schedule. Unofficially, the major bottlenecks were identified
as the casting of armored hulls and fabricating of the electric wiring sys esle,
Nevertheless, the past year has seen notable progress from the stagn
of planning to that of actual eroduction. Production lines are being set up
at four new plants and tanks are already being turned out by at least two of
them, the Cleveland Arsenal, operated by Cadillac, and the American Locomotive
Co. We are said to be preparing capacity to produce 35,000 tanks a year, al-
though nothing like that amount 19 being ordered at present.
A table of detailed Information concerning recent tank and armored
car models appears in ioshe. Appendix 11I0
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The most important general trend in recent planning for the improve-
ment of tanks and other armored vehicles has been the evolution of the concept
of the tank-automotive "family." Baste to the concept is the application of
the principle of interchangeability of parts between the various types of com-
bat vehicles. Transmissions, cross-drives, wheel assemblies and even engines
are now being made for use in armored cars and light, medium and heavy tanks.
The advantages of such a program are obvious. Speed and economy of manufacture,
ease of repair and availability of spare parts are among the more important.
Other new developments of a more speelic nature are summarized in the follow-
ing paragraphs.
I. Tnks.
Two new light tanks, the T-57 and the T-41, have been produced in
recent years to supplement the standard M-24. The M-24 is widely used and is
still in production in small numbers. The first production model T-41s appeared
in March, 1951, and full scale production is now under way. Over 1,000 of this
type have already been ordered. No information concerning production of T-370
has been obtained.
Several important developments have taken place in medium tanks. The
World War II Sherman tank, MreViEb? has seen duty in Korea but it is no longer
in production. The Pershing, M-26, is obsolete. M-26$ are being converted into
M-46 Pattons, of which only one battalion has thus far been reported in action
in Korea. Conversion includes replacement of the old engine by a more power?
-
ful one (see section III, Engines) and the installation of a cross-drive, torque
converter transmission and "wobble-stick" steering device which permit the
tank to turn completely around without moving forward or backward. The M46
is also capable of travelling through water to the depth of six feet, through
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the. use of a special Fording Kit which includes synthetic rubber nhields, in-
take and exhaust stacks and sealing compounds. The capabilities of the Patton
are indicated by the report that, in direct tank vs. tank action in Korea,
Pattons have scored a knock-out margin of 18-1 over Russian T4s.
Yet even the M-46 is little more than an interim model. The M-47,
Patton II, is probably superseding it on the production line. The Patton II
mounts an improved gun; and the hull has been remodelled to enlarge the interior
and to reduce the likelihood of point-blank hits by increasing the angle at
which a shell is likely to strike. The 1951 appropriation is sufficient to
pay for about 5000 M-47s.
About another medium tank designation, T-42, less is known. Probably
the number was applied to pilot models of the M-47, although there is some
indication that it may be an entirely different tank. The best evidence sug-
gests that the T-42 and the 1-47 are one and the same; but the question is in
need of further clarification.
In the field of heavy tanks new models have appeared, although the
Army is reluctant to commit itself heavily. Several considerations are respon-
sible for this position. Cost is, of course, an important factor, since each
heavy probably costs about 000,000 -- a large amount to venture against
destruction by a single well-placed shot. In addition, the need for such
giants is thought to be relatively small. Few targets are worthy of such
heavy armor. A small number of T-43s have been ordered; but few are likely
to be secured unless experience proves that the new medium types are not
Aeav eso
capable of doing everything expected of the ne e---4 A second heavy mode/ is
the T-30, which mounts a 155 mth. gut.
Il. Armored Cars.
ti
interest in armored care as german - carriers has been heightened by
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.he developitent of the VT fuze. Icgainst an enemy using VT-fuzed shells, in-
fantry xelding on tanks or deploying on foot is at a great disadvantage.
Armored personnel carriers make It possible to transport troops close to the
front lines without risk from this type of ammunition. They also afford pro-
tection against small arms a fact wh%ch makes them of particular value in a
war of rapid movement or for operations in areas subjected to guerrilla ac-
tivity. The Armored Personnel Carrier., T-18E2, capable of carrying a squad
of 12 men, is the latest vehicle of this kind. The tracked carrier, Armored
Utility Vehicle, ?M-39? although it is still organic to armored units, has no
overhead protection. It may probobly be considered obsolescent.
III, Enpines.
. -
A new 12ecylinder, V-type engine, using 80-octane gasoline, rated
at 810 horsepower and 1040 horsepower with the use of a supercharger its being
produced by Continental Motors Corp. In line with the trend toward interchange-
ability this engine is used in recent model tanks, T-41, 146, T-30 and probably
T-42 and T-43.
IV. Armament.
Increasing use of high-velooity guns is apparent in the field of
tank ? armament.
It has been estimated that new tank guns have a 34, higher
-velocity than earlier models 11-46s, L47s, T-41s and very likely, T-42s
and T-43s, Mount super-high-velocity weapons.
V.. Note on Sources.
The Hearings of Congressional Committees on. Appropriations have been
the outstanding .single source of infoemation concerning tank peoduction and
development. Since the information they contain is of an official nature,
they have been used also wherever possible as a check against data collected
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elsewhere. Statistics of appropriateons for tanks and other combat vehicles
and of unit costs of some items have been assembled from the heerings. A ma-.
plete cost and production analysis of the whole tank program is not possible
on the basis of the data so far collected. Such a project might well be given
a high priority if the present study were to be continued. An important source
for such an analysis, and one not available for this report, would probably be
the various reports, magazines or newsbulletins published by the manufacturers
associated with the tank program. Using information collected there, together
with material presented at future Congressional hearings, it might be possible
eventually to construct a more complete picture of the tank program than can
be presented here.
Scattered news reports have supplied occasional information concern-
ing tanks; but, aside from the Hearinps referred to above, the service maga-
zines Ordnance and Armor have made the most important contributions to our
--
knowledge of the tank program.
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use of small aircraft for liaison and artillery tkvervation
' 3-ii.01141 was an important tactical development of the secoad World War:.
A:J=tt experience in Korea has confirmed the usefulness of trilwo, c-eRft,,
aealoped new uses for their peculiar capabilities and Sti7M1AtC1 4
,,ral effort to speed production of new and better type. ftirth
wk Forces supplemental appropriation bill for fiscal 19.1 illcided
341503000 for Army aircraft of this kind. Contracts have haeTi t
Lcoon of the latest models is under way. The appended table
4aamaetx VII) dhows the characteristics of the types now an military- use
or on order lbr the ground forces.
Laaison aircraft are divided into two basic categoriesg standaad.
fleedeving tnes and zvtarrawingeds or helicopters. Increasing use of
'Ett,ter has been highlighted by events in Korea l and it EICOMYS Aksly
aetary?winged crafty-ill ultimately replace most, if not ail, of the
Uxed?wing planes. Helicopters possess advantages of ability to hover
aroceed at lower speeds? to rise and descend vertically, waieh mele
team particularly adapted to difficult terrain.
Helicopters and fixed?wing liaison planes are now assigned to ever'
combat division. At least twenty helicopters are used by Divisive !vaa,
and Division Artillery. In Korea, helicopters have dramatically enared
I heLrn usefulness for evacuation of the wounded. In addittoe to lleien-
and observation for the artillery, maw new uses have been developed
lor the helicopters by Army and Marine commanders. Reconnatasence and
Eupply problems have been greatly facilitated be their use. They have
teen used in establishing and maintaining advance OP's and 13rols and or
Jawing telephone wire. They are frequently discussed as petential taoce
carriers: and large models with detachable pods are being deieloped to
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perform this mission?
In Korea, helicopters have been stationed from one-half to five
mi:.es behind the front lines, and their bases are moved closely behind
the front. This, and the fact that they are in constant use; has areated
difficult problems of maintenance and repair. However, increasing pro-
duntion both of the craft themselves and of spare parts should make
possible the solution of many present difficulties. The automatic pilots
be:mg developed by Sperry, Goodyear and other companies will reduce the
neod for pilots, allow the pilot more time in flight for other activities
and make possible takeoffs in dark or bad weather
To train helicopter pilots in close cooperation with ground troops
an Army Helicopter Aviation Tactics School has been established at Fort
SE.1 in connection with the Artillery School. Helicopters have been
asnigned to units in the Zone of the Interior, notably the First Army
Av:Ation Squadron at Fort Monmouth; but all suitable craft have been
sent to Korea for combat service.
Vote on American Helicopter
This magazine was the source of virtually all information concerning
thn production and use of helicopters. Its yearly December issue regularly
pr:nts pictures and specifications of the outstanding types, both for
miitary and for civilian use.
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Go COMIEN113 ON PRINCIPAL SOURCES
IP D.* anal
A point of departure is furnished by The AznyAlmaneci, Goverment
Printing Offloe9 19500 Sims most of the information contained is
current as of OetOber 19489 it must obviously be used with eaution9
but such features as lts Tables of Organisation and Equipment (T/0 &I)
fa.rnlah a basis which may then be revised by new information from
whatever source, A large part of the volume is taben up with historical
end other extraneous material; the following Is a list of the passages
useful for this investigation:
no 16. 30 The National Military Establishment
pp. 266 Z4 Table 400 Infantry Division Organic Composition
p0 275 First Cavalry Division authorized Strength April? 1.948
P. 277 Armored Division TiO & E 17111 6 Oct" 1948
p0 279 Airborne Division TIC & E 719 16 Doe., 1944
p0 305 Oversee Cammmnds (map ;10 307)
pc) 313 Table 420 National Guard Troop Basis as of 1 Sept" 1948
Po 314 Table 430 Allocation by as of 1 Sept" 1948
pp. 335-400 Army Educational System (locations and functions of the
various schoolsopessim, with historical material)
pp. 401-408 Lists of Posts, Camps and Stations in the U.S.
pp., 517 f0 Table of elements of Infantry Divisions In World War II
p0 573 Table of Armored Divisions in World War II
p0 685 Table of Airborne Divisions in World Mar II
There are also charts which may prove convenient:
po 8 Schematic Functional Relationship of Elements in
National Security
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1, The amsnacto
(Cont,
p, 30 Organization of the Department of the Army (1 April? 1948)
The chart on p, 8 has one detail highly suggestive for participants
in this enterprise, The Central Intelligence Agency is found on the
extreme left, and from it to the National Security Council is a film
black line labelled "Intelligence". From the Agency to the Chiefs of
Stan, on the other hand, runs only a dotted line labelled nothing atell,
while there is, no suggestion of contribution fran the Toint Chiefs of
Staff to the Agency, If the description of the Agency on pc 7 is read
with this in mind it will give grounds for doubt as to whether the attempt
to coordinate and disseminate intelligence has been wholly successful,
If it does not succeed, the extravagance of duplication and even
competition of various agencies of intelligence will continue to add
its share to the confusion of national defense,
2, AmOrders
An excellent source for the location of units is the ArnntOrders?
published weekly by the AzINay Air Force Tournal and the Army Navy
Air Force Reaister;, 'Zan an assignment is to a division or higher
command the number and location of the unit is always given, The
location (or APO) of lower units is given and the assignment to a
division is specified often enough so that when such notices are
accumulated an Impressive proportion of the composition of divisions
is fixed and a large number of unattached units located. Similarly
the association of Amy Post Offices, sometimes with units and sometimes
with stations, added to the association of units with stations allows a
number of important APegs abroad to be pinned down (a list of APOgs
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20 am Orders* (Cont.)
Publishing Coop 19509 pp. 454-4380 is a useful beginning, but can be
both expanded and revised from Army Ox?ders). Given the composition of
a normal division fran the Th & Bp reeinents and battalions may often
be confidently assigned to divisions whams stations they share? This
is not always the case, however, since component units are sometimes
detached for specialized training, and the presence at a post of a
number of training units, seldom specified es sucha may make it
impossible to say which battalion of artillery or engineers is the one
organic to the poet's divisione Of couese, '43..e, movement of the division
will ultimately make that point clear. The composition of a division
in World War II (given in the .ir.,Almarao) *ill also sometimes be of
service in determining its present composition, sine a considerable
number of units are certainly still with the same divieIcne
The present study concentrates on combat units of the . of
battalion and above, but a great deal more information is available
there were time to assemble it? The disposition of such forces as
Medical Corps, Signal, Ordinance, and Qeartermaster would, of course,
be important for a complete picture? Mush might be done with units
identified only as AAU, ABU, 18U? The fnaction of many is specified;
by observing the brand and the rank of ofl:tcers assigned one can make
diductions as to its nature and its size: #ego an MU to which only
Signal Corps officers go will be of quite a different kind frmn one
recruited from all branches; the assignment to a mixed group of a Lt.
Col? of the Chaplains" or Tudge Advocate General's Corps means a body
;-;1' some size and importance Personnel files could be carried down to
any point desired? Ideally, if there were unlimited time, one could
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2. Amm Orders. (Cont.)
learn a great deal about the training program from following the movement
of junior officers. A more limited study might be made, with profit, of
such special bodies as those at Trieste or Sandia Base.
Both the Journal and the,Reeister print material supplementary to
that in the orders. Special articles reports from posts, notices of
decorations, soolal events, weddings, and obituaries often give valuable
data. Since these are not necessarily identical in the two periodic:ale
Tooth should be consulted. The orders, of course, are the same, though
the second version is a useful check when an item is suspect - typographical
errors occur and are sometimes misleading.
It takes about an hour and a half to go through an issue of the
journal and extract and consolidate the information of the level here
presented. Another half hour should euffice for the asaeL.er in addition.
To extract all the information from both papers would take a great deal
longer- four times as long, at a guess. Nhatever level of information
is desired the search should be eystematic; the mere noting of conspicuous
items will not give a sound body of information.
Hearings of 23.21eal_ Committees
In all matters except the location of individual units, the
hearings of Congressional Committees are likely to be the primary source
of information, Many facts which eventually appear in newspapers and
periodicals were originally revealed in these hearings. The most
valuable single source is the hearings before the Appropriations
Committee of the B6use of Representatives. All of the hearings on Army
appropriations for 1950, 1951, and 1952 have been read for the purpose
of vamp giocitpr maafftwavoeig8dirrimiegaReszi soaskoaveivigiui
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li.et...1..ratiaIlof..eams.CsinsualeCo (Cont.)
rhich have been read for 1950 and 1951s contain little information not
already covered in the Hbuse Committee. Hearings of the House and Senate
Armed Forces Committeess several of which have been reads are valuable
in parte s but ten to contain much irrelevant and no-factual material.
Information may be gained from these sources either from direct
etatements of facts or by inferences from several separate statements.
The latter method is particularly applicable to the interpretation of
etatistical tables s and to discussions preceding and following portions
of the hearings omitted from the record. Much of the material given above
concerning tanks end tank production is of this inferential nature. The
euggestion that 1951 appropriations provide for approximately 5,000
T-47 medium-gun tanks is an inference fran the following facts all
stated separately in 1951 and 1952 hearings:
a, 1952 appropriations include a deficiency allotment of $123,00010000
applying to a total 1951 appropriation of $2,838,000,000 for tanks
and other vehicles.
b. The deficiency applies essentially to a contract for16479s.
c The deficiency appropriation is 4-5% of the original approprietion.
do The deficiency percentage on 1647's is approximately 10.
e. The original appropriation for T-47.0 was about $2000000 per unit,
It is evident that an inference based on so many disparate facts, not all
completely clears is highly -uncertain. Nevertheless each procedure is
necessitated by the nature of this investigation. In a continuing
operation they would be subject to further check.
Important hearings which arrived too late for use in preparing this
report are those on Military and Naval Construction before the House
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Armed Services Committees and nit6tptual ,,eouriey erograms (revere
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3,, Hearinee, OfstommUs teg, Committees (Cont.)
the Heusi Committee on Foreign Affairs.
TI
4. New ibrk nat. and Herald Tribes*
These newapers have been read from 1 May to 24 August, 1951.
The information found in them reauges from identification of
ludividual?Fits to strategic planning. The chief classes of articles
in which spec:Lilo items of information have been found are:
a. Speeches, reports,. and press interviews of government and
'military officials, especially Secretary Marshall? General Collins?
and Mr, Charleift.;: Wilson.
b. Reports of hearings before the Senate and House Committees,
especially those on Anaed Services, Appropriations, and Foreign
Affairs. (These reports are eventually superseded by the committee
tesearts, but delay for printing makes recent reports unavailable for
this project. Furthermore, occasional leaks of off.thes-record"
testimony in news reports are particularly valuable.)
c, Special articles on matters of specifically military interest,
e.g. activation, training, morale, or overseas shipment and action
of units; new derie3.apnents in arms and equipment; status of forces
in overseas theaters or the Z.I.
do Reports of hostilities in Korea. (During the period covered
thea have produced exceedingly little specific material. The
communiques of the Army in the Far East have revealed nothing.)
e. Appointments to important oormands and promotions of general
officers.
f. Articles of syndicated columnists and special correspondents?
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New Itbrk Times andanaTribune (Cont,)
Middletone and C.L. Sulzberger are the most useful, All appear in
they...WA*
g. Passing remarks in general articles on foreign affairs and
ecionemie matters, and other news reports in which refereLce to
Arm- units is incidental; e.g. an automobile accident involving
a soldier whose unit and its location are given*
All of these classes of articles are repreeented in the following
infordatione found in the two newspapers for Setup*, and Sundays 28.29
Ally. 1951:
ate From. letter of Mrs. Anna Rosenberg to Senator Byrd of the
Senate Investigating Committee on Federal Expenditures:
That two or three new combat divisions will be formed by 30
JUne0 19520 through improved use of weapons.
b. From Secretary Marshals's testimony before the Senate Armed Forces
Committee and subsequent explanatory statements:
The U.S. will have 4000000 men in Europe by 31 December e 1952;
3400000 of this number will be ground troops,
The size and make-up of the "division slice*
The over-all value of equipment sent to our allies, and
Dome break-dawn by destination and types.
The strategic concept that,, as far as possible, the US, will
provide equipment the Allies, men. (This was "off.the-recordno
but published.)
e. From various special articles on military subjects:
The deactirization of the 109th AAA Bgd., of which three
major units have been in federal service since Mayo 1931;
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Its brigades and regiments constituting the British
Commonwealth Division in Korea?
The present planned strengths of the WeAoC.
do A report that Pyongyang radio has identified the 36th Rego of the
2nd Division as fighting near langgas and claims that it has
suffered severe casualties.
eo Appointments of C/S of let Army and of the Commandants Armored
Centers Ft. Knox.
f. An article by CoIe Sulzberger gives the number of divisions each
nation expects to have in Germany under SHAPE by the end of l9520
go An article by Drew Middleton, on Soviet forces in East Germanys
makes incidental reference to serious deficiencies in materials
especially signal equipment and transports as evident in U0$ and
British forces in Germany in winter of 1950-510
An average of one to one and a half hours is needed to read these
tee newspapers each days in order to be reasonably sure that all
relevant material has been noted* Items 6 and V are especially time-
on:warnings but they are necessary for full coverage. It maybe fairly
aesumed that nearly all matters of general national interest appear in
tiese two newspapers. Of the two, the Times is somewhat more useful
both because of the greeter value of its special writers end because
neme reports are often published in more complete form by the Times
taan by the Herald-Tribune. The additional material that may be found
la the Herald-Tribune Justifies only a cursory reading after careful
reading of the Times,
5 The New Haven Ettirvi.ster
Paperience pith The N
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(Cont.)
oonsulted? suggests that selected local papers can be a valuable source
of Information concerning the deployment and training of our armed
forces. Particularly noteworthy are the announcements of promotions,
assignnents? decorations and locations of local men. A significant
nmmber of Aregrunits have been located through public relations releases
to home town papers when no other news of their whereabouts has appeared.
SuOh information is often omitted by the larger metropolitan dailies
etich tend to ignore movements by units of less than division strength.
In an area in which National Guard or Reserve outfits have been Called
to active duty, it should be possible, through use of local papers, to
identify almost every unit and to find rather thorough descriptions of
their training, weapons, and future destination. Material of this kind
mot be used with a degree of cautions, however, since careless and
inaccurate descriptions of units are not infrequent. Ihen possible, it
mem advisable to corroborate local news reports from more dependable
uources. To cover the entire country through such materials is a
project so large and time-consuming that it could probably be handled
best and least expensively by hiring the services of a clipping bureau.
60 Stars and Stripes? Boma Edition
Probably the best single source of data concerning the disposition
of American troops in Europe is the European edition of Stars and Atztorlo
which has been consulted for the period, 1 April 1951 to 12 Tuly 1951.
On the basis of items printed here it is possible to identify and locate
the great majority of Army units of more than company size. While some
Cf this information can also be secured from home publications, many
units not mentioned elsewhere are freelymentioned here, _Outfits
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Stars and .?tri..? Eurp_p_wl.E.Alim (Mutt)
Soationed in outlying areas such as Austria and Trieste? sithouP
seldom mentioned by ordinary 319WErpaperev are given considerable publicity.
Pbr the identification of units, lists of proesetions? awerdso
accidents and contributions to the American Red Cross drive are
pertieularly helpful; but routine news stories supply enough additional
information to warrant close scrutiny. Histories of the divisions and
of the Constabulary make it possible to ascertain more of their assigned
components. The headquarters of many units can be readily located; and
these units can then be related to the appropriate military post or
subpost. In this way? it is possible to draw up a rather complete list
of the outfits situated in each of the main military areas.
70 Stars and arlEts.? Pacific Edition
This was available Z= April 1 to Ally 12, 1451. It furnished
material about the co osition and location of units in Korea and Xapan
not available from, other sources" The official communique's were no
mole informative -than those in the New York papers, but there were special
articles and random, notes which were much more valuable for the irarestigatorn
The desire to appeal to the particular pride and interests of readers in
combat units has understandably led to the attempt to include as many as
possible by name* The extent to which such items appear is of course,
dweermined by the censorship policy, of which striking examples are
obeervableo On May 26f, 27, and the Corps and Divisions on the West,
Central, and East Central front were listed in se.ch a way that a good
idoa of the order of battle was conveyed (the East front wa and still
io held by Republic of Korea troops ).A lemediately after this a double
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7, Stars and_AStime? Pacific Edition (Cont0)
censorship was imposed (8th Army and GHQ) with the result that uatil
ZIne 15 nothing was published which could give military information to
embody, With the return of single censorship on that date an article
aepeared giving the 'composition of the Regimental Combat Teams of the
45 Div? This was unique, however, and thereafter only isolated items
have appeared? These wometimes lead to larger deductions; notions of
tee order of battle may be gleaned from the representation at ceremonies
ot award or from the progress of Xack Beners show, but names of places
are now completely suppressed in connection with units, and there has
been nothing like the outburst of May 26-280 Quotations from papers in
the United States have occasionally contributed news of interest not
la the New 'York papers?
Eleja_SurdettlEPost
Harold He Martin's article, 'Tow wo stopped the biggest Chinese
offensive; August 40 19510 pp? 29, 83-850 gives a detailed account of the
teo actions of April 02 and May 17 and the following days c It records
the identities and movements of units, omitting only the 7 and 25 Infantry
Devisions and 25 Canadian Brigade, known from other sources to be on the
feont0 The object is obviously to give the public an adequate appreciation
oe a brilliant action; it would seam that the object was laudable and
that the article was likely to be successful? The apparent discrepancy
between its explicit informatien and the taciturnity of the official
communiques may be explained by the fact that this is historical while
they are conteeporary0 The difference is largely illusory, however?
Geven the conditions of battle and of the terrain displacement of large
ueitsRlif6ffetiVILN&HOWNAli &PFr7oripg149?Veragit
JEljne,a
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EglosaEVening Post (Conte)
May 1,-18 must be exceptional, and it may therefore be assumed
that the order of battle given in May is still substantially the order
of battle of August 1* But the poeition of units on the front will
certainly be known to the enemy very precaptly through normal Prisoners
aid Documents channels, and presumably there is no reason why Americans
&meld not know the order of battle if the enemy does already,'
9c Newm algazaa....es
Time Newsweek, and troSo News and Xtrld222211 have been consulted.
These magazines have supplied a smattering of information regarding many
aepects of the military program* Of the three, Newsweek has probably
provided the greatest number of valuable items* It hs run a series of
articles on manpower, equipment and other mobilization problems which
have dontained useful and accurate infOrmation0 Its feature, The
Periscope, often reports up-to-date military developments, some of which
have not been found elsewhere* The other magazines have been less helpful*
If analysis Of military potential were extended, however, to include
resources, Industrial production and logistics, U.80 News and World ,Report
would be a valuable aid. Its reports on manufacturing and business conditions
are its most significant feature*
io. Apo 1....71.2,
A record of APO listings can be a valuable adjunct to such a project
as the present one, A rather complete list can be compiled with the aid
of the Air Force journal..., the various editions of the Stars
and Str&e.1, and. letters to the editors of military publications and news
tie
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rntsrag 1
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lg. APO
Listings (Conte)
contains a list of APOss as of that date. This, however, is now
obviously out of date; new APOoa have been assigned and some of the earlier
ones appear to have been nominal even at that time.
APOos should probably be considered a secondary:, rather that a
primary source of information; they are not always as illuminating as
might be tweeted. In some instances, they are a sure clue to the
assignment of units concerned? APO 1, EterYOrk, for instance, belongs
to the 1st Division and all of its components. This tends to be true of
the low-numbered Regular Army divisions, such as the 7th? 24th? and 25th.
It is not true, however, of the 3rd or 5th e Later units were clearly
as3i8Asd APOos without regard for their unit numbers? This practice, of
course, makes location and identification mere difficult and was probably
meant to do soo
Even when APO and unit numbers do not correspond, unit assignments
are often clarified by knowledge of their APOos. In some cases the APO
can be confidently related to a general geographic area when the location
of even one unit having that APO is known? Other units in the name area
caxi than be occasionally related to the same APO; or other wilts having
the same APO can then be located geographicallye This method is not
infallible; however., Two units having the sane APO may be widely
separated, while several AFOos may serve units in a relatively restricted
area. Toe great a reliance upon the APO numbers can, consequently,
preduce real confusion. But, used with caution, the numbers can be a
helpful aid in keeping in touch with the location or movements of units
overseas.
Appendix VIII contains a list of APOos which have been identified,
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with units using the APO, and its apparent locatione
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fq
2L;1,0 On the Miami of Aswan.
The investigation has revealed some successes and some failures of
the system of censorship* Information on new weapons Is gratifyingly
herd to find* The transference of the 3 Infantry Divielon from Fort
Benning to Korea was accomplished with no indications given in sources
accessible to us* Theee are cases in which the advantage of secrecy
le obvious, On the other hand, impressive scientific generalities have
been published, doubtless with official sanction, and, for a similar
reason? the movement or troops to Europe has been advertized rather
than concealed,
Policy in regard to units in station is net clear, With respect
te units in the Zone of the Interior there is no official publication
of their positions except indirectly through Army Orders, but there
seems to be no attempt at concealment which would in any case be
impractical* Possible exceptions are certain Training Divisions (0,80,
5 Armde Dive) whose component units are never identified. It seems
mere likely, however, that the troops in training in such divisions are
not ozganized into 'Units with permanent designations. Otherwise we
must assume extreme differences of regulations between posts, On the
whole the Army's attitude toward troops in this country seems to be
that those interested will find out where they are, and need be neither
prevented nor assisted. Much the same principle seems to govern the
mention or troops in Europe and in Tapane
In Korea, however, the situation is quite different. For obvious
reasons, the location of Corps and Division Headquarters is concealed*
Furthermore, the position or troops relative to the front line is now
never indicated in official sources,. At the tbreak of hostilities a
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_papa the Ef_11/12Eez of (Cont,)
(Cont.)
great deal of information was given out, on the assumption that the public
Lad a ligitimate interest in the progress of battle. Commit:pas grew
.sore and more reticent as the principle prevailed that information as to
the location of troops would jeopard their operations. With some
fluctuations this has become so fixed as official policy that no unit in
combat is named any longer in communiqU'es. The previous theory lingered
on, however, in unofficial publications so that material rigidly excluded
from releases from headqoarters would appear in the Stars andad2215
Neweweek, or the New York papers. This is clearly the wrong way around.
It in useless for headquarters, which is beat informed of the facts, to
impoue silence on itself if what it conceals is to be published by other
BMW* One gets the impression that the difficulty is caused by
uncertainty as to what should be concealed and what can be. Prima facie
it would be well for the enemy to be entirely ignorant what troops faced
then on the line; practically the enemy knows almost at once what troops
face them. Concealment, therefore, operates only against friends, whose
indiscretion could not convey the news to the enemy as fast as the normal
prisoners and documents information. Posts of command, on the other hand,
can be bidden until their area is covered by air observation, and the
knowledge of such positions is properly restricted to the fewest possible
nIeber of people,
AR 380-5? MilitemSecuriIye, 60 M and o list as secret: "Information
iadleating the strength of our troops, air and naval forces, identity or
composition of units or quantity of specific iteas of equipment pertaining
taereto in active theaters of operations except that mailing addresses
mill include organizational designations" and
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ile pa tbe Aalsb_Lan ofp_traorip., (Canto)
"United States Order of Battle information end locations and moves
erecting the order of Battle,"
Aeidefom breach of these regualtions, the inconsistency in their
awlication results from the fact that they lay down no term for their
cioservance? and it is therefore left to different authorities to
dItermine hoe long after the event secrecy should be preserved*
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102
APPENDIX /
.ISE CHART . APPENDIX I
?
APPENDIX II
ESE MAP APPENDIX II
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APPENDIX III
DIVISION TABLES OF 010ANIZATION
Ao Infantry Division
Entire Division 18,804
0 958, No 49, Em 17,797)
Infantry 11,322
3 Regiments 3,774
3 Bns 917
3 Rifle Cos., 1 Rq. Coo 211
Heavy Tank Co. (0 6, EM 142)
4 Platoons, 5 tanks each
Heavy Mortar Co. (0 6, EM 184)
3 Mortar Platoons (0 1, EM 40)
Artillery
3 Ens 105 mm. Row (18 Raw. each)
3 firing Batteries (6 Now. each)
1 Bn 155 mm. Flow, (18 How.)
3 firing Batteries (6 WIN.)
1 AAA kW En
3,668
Tank Battalion (144 tanks) 677
3 Tank Cos,
Engineer Battalion
h Eng. Coe.
972
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Br, Armored Division
Entire Division 152973
(0 897, WO 832 EM 24,993)
Armored Infantry
4 Ens,
4 Rifle 00s,
3 Rifle Platoons (0 1, EM 43)
Mortar Platoon (3 60 mmo Mortars)
Tank Battalions
1 Heavy
3 Medium
Artinex7
3 Ens 105 mme Howe (Sp)
J. Bn 155 mmo How* (SP)
1 AAA 0 Bn (Sp)
4,276
1,069
4434
677
757
3,735
Engineer En 19095
Reconnaissance Bn 629
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CO Airborne Division
Entiro Division 169230
(0 941p NO 56, EV 15,233)
Infautry
3 Abn Inf Rcig.
Support co?
2 HeEW Mortar platoons
(4 Mortars each)
Artitank platoon (6 90 mm AT guns)
Artillery
1 BA 355 mm. How?
3 Duo Abn 105 mm. How.
Tanks
? 2 lizavy
2 Medium
1 Roconnaissance co
JOE
For operations divided into assault, followi-up, and rear echelons.
Assault echelon, an infantry- combat team plus divisional units ail capable
of being landed by parachute and of holding position until arrival of
the followi.up echelon.
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APPENDDE IV
COMMON OF MARINE AND Aluir (INFANTRY) DIVISIONS
A. Marine Division Table of Organization
Entire Division
/06
21,198
Infantry 11,265
3 Regiments 3,755
3 'Jana 1,081
4 cos. 228
Artillery
3 Ens 305 mm. Haw. (18 How, each)
1 Bn 155ii Hatiro (18 Howo)
Tank Battalion (9 tanks M4A3
85 tanks LI 26)
ca 720
The reinforced 1 Marine Div, was between 24,000-25,000 men in
January 1951.
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Bo LIVEtms. of Marine_and lazz (1nfant17) Divisions
April 1953.
Marine Army
Infantry
Carbine cal. .30 M2 9,470
Rifle, U.S. cal. .30m].
Rifle, automatic, cal. .30
Ettmadng, 141918 M2
Guns, machine, cal. .30
Browning, 141919 A4 flexible
Gun, Machine, cal. 30
8,2748
7,474
6,933
903 412
575
Browning, 111917 Al
54
Ito
Launcher, rocket, 5.5 in. 1420
376
546
Flamothrower? portable 112-2
Mortar, 60 nm. 112
81
84
Mortar, 81 mm. M1
54
40
Mortar, 4.2 in. 112
24
36
Artillery
Howitzer, 105 mn. 112 Al
54
54
Howitzer, 155 mm. 143.
18
18
Tanks
Tank, medium m4 A3
9
111?1.4f
Tank, medium 1426
85
144
Gun, machine, cal. 050
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Marine law
Gun, submachine cal. .45
Thompson M1 Al 99
Rifle, 75 mm. M20 12 39
pistol, automatic, cal. 045
M1911 Al 3,196 2,769
The above is taken from tables offered by Senator Douglas at Hearings
before a Senate Sub-Committee on Marine Corps Strength and Joint Chiefs
Representation, 13, 17, 21 April, 1951. Since they were designed to
show that a Maxine Division has a higher proportion of fire power than
an Infantry Division they are not altogether free from ex parte coloring.
E.g. Senator Douglas (p. 22) remarks, "The Marine division has . . 98
(sic) submachine guns whereas the Army has none.' In the Tb C & E of a
Regimental Tank Co. (Infantry Journal, June, 19500 p. 23) 31 submachine
guns are listed among the regulation weapons (giving a total of 93 for
the Division). It seems most unlikely that between June, 1950 and April
19510 these arms should have been withdrawn without the issue of some
other eqpivalent protection.
Infantry companies are now to be equipped with 7 sniper's rifles per
Co.
T/0 & E7 (7 July, 1951) assigns 18 liaison planesper infantry Divi-
sion.
Each Division has 20 or more helicopters divided between Hq. and Divi-
sional Artillery.
SECRET
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APPENDIX V
ORDER OF BATTLED U. S. ARMY
CONTENTS
Zone of the Interior 110
First AMY 110
Second Amy 111
Third Army 116
Fourth Amy 120
Fifth Army 122
Sixth Arpy 127
Far Eastern Command 130
Japan 130
Korea 132
Non?Divisional Troops 137
Korea 137
Japan 138
Okinawa 138
Offensive Weapons: Strength of U. S. Ground Forces, FECOM 139
Anerican Ground Forces in Europe 140
United States Forces in Germany
United States Perces in Austria (USFA) 144
Trieste united States Troops 144
Miscellaneous Units Europe 145
Military Posts and Subposts, Europe 146
Offensive Weapons, Strength of U. So Ground Forces., Europe 154
Other Oversee Commands 155
Iceland Defense Force 155
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ORDER OF BAT= UNITED STATES ARMY
Zone....1.12. or
First Am
late Gone Willis Do Grittenharger6 00
Eke Co ?a Islandp NOM
9 Infantry Division (Training)
NW* Gene WillissmKo Harrison
IKto Port Dlno NoTo
Gomponentss
39 Info (from Banning between Ang01950 and Irob01951)
49 info
60 Info (EdzI, ET 2 July 1951)
364 Info
365 Info? LAM 26 Ango 1950)
26 PA Bno
34 TA MI6
84 FA EW6
Firs.....1.N...p217.1M9rion_al_t_paroo 0
PbTt Davana9 Masao
3.0 PA Bno
Camp EdigardS0 Masao
56 AA Brigade
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245 AAA Gun Bne (NY)
259 AAA Gun Brio (INT)
359 AAA Gun Bn*
466 AAA Gun Bn*
635 AAA Gun Dm, (MIT)
Was Point
278 RCT (NG Tenn)
278 Inf*
191 FA En*
Fort Totten, N.T0
80 AAA Group
526 MA Gun Bne
Fort Hancock?
41 AAA Gun BEte
Second Amx
Lto Gen* Edward H* Brooks, co
WI* Fort George Meade, Ma*
- VII Corps
Maj* Gen* Withers A1,0 Burros?
ENL0 Camp Meade, Md,
5 Infantry Div* (Training)
Hcb, indiantown Gap, Pa*
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Second Armz
VII Corps
43 Info Div o (NG Vtoo Congos) Rao)
Melo 0en1 Kennethiro Cramer, 02
Eno Com Pickett, Vao
Components:
102 Info
169 Info i
1?2 Info
963 TA Bno
143 Tel:IR:Eno
126 Combo PM6
45 IV Coo
43 TA 030
Mlle& Bno
Itierod`for movement to Europe? Will take part in
exercise Soo Pine at Bragg 13 Ango - 2 SePte
3 Armored Division (Training)
Brigo GM) Raymond E0 50 iVilliamsono cG
B40 Fort Knoo4 Kyo
Components:
06 Maw Tank Eno
30 Tank Bno
84 Tank BD.?
131 Tank Brio
?8 Arm& FA Bno
83 Reeono Bno
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Soc9nd.
Li Airborne Division
Majo Geno Lo Lo Leannitzer? CO
11q0 Can Campbell., 140
Components:
188 AbnoIn
503 AbnoIn
511 ROT
511 Abno
675 Abno FA Bno
89 Abno FA Bno
4$7 Abno FA Bno
544 Abu,. FA Bno
6'75 Ala 11W Bne
'176 Itcro Tko Bac.
141 Mode Tko Bno
710 'Ito Bno
127 Abno Emiso Combat Bno (with 187 RCT Korea?)
406 Abu. Coo
511 Abno Slgo Co