GUATEMALA: GODFATHER POLITICS*

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A001500050003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 31, 2006
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 17, 1972
• Content Type: PAPER

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
SUBJECT: Guatemala: Godfather Politics*
Recent reports that Communist terrorists are planning
to attack US officials as retaliation for the assassination
of party Leaders by the Guatemalan government are a reminder
of the special dangers involved in the US effort to assist
the Local security forces as well as to provide this
country with economic and social assistance. Partly because
of US urgings, the present government acknowledges the need
for social change and the dangers of recurring campaigns of
terror and counterterror. Yet because of unyielding histori-
cal and cultural factors, we see Little chance that the cycle
of political violence will terminate any time soon.
This paper has been discussed with other components within
CIA, but has not been formally coordinated.
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Political Violence and Gangsterism
1. Guatemala's political history can be written more con-
vincingly in terms of violence between contending forces than of
elections held and laws observed. The chronicle of coercion and
bloodshed picked up an overlay of ideological warfare in the 1950s
with the advent of the Marxist-oriented revolutionary government
of Jacobo Arbenz, and then with that government's overthrow by
the US-supported counterrevolutionary legions of Carlos Castillo
Armas. Assassinations -- including that of Castillo Armas in 1957
-- have been a recurrent feature of Guatemalan politics and the
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Guatemalan countryside has traditionally been the backdrop for the
2. Political murder assumed a new dimension in the 1960s,
when guerrillas used terrorism against symbols of authority such
as military, police, and government officials. These anti-
government terrorists were originally organized by a band of
rebellious military officers of no fixed political persuasion.
The Guatemalan Communist Party was soon drawn into the terrorists'
campaign, in part to protect its revolutionary credentials. The
Communists have always received financial and propaganda support
from the USSR, for both their political and guerrilla activities.
The Cubans also have supported the guerrillas. The Guatemalan
guerrillas, though continually racked by internal divisions over
ideology and leadership, constituted the most murderous subversive
group in Latin America during the sixties.
3. A counter-campaign of violence against the guerrillas
and other "subversives" began in earnest under the Mendez Montenegro
government (1966-1970). After three years of direct rule, a nervous
military had grudgingly relinquished power to Mendez, but demanded
carte blanche in security matters. Mendez, a moderate leftist in
the Guatemalan context, thought it necessary and potentially
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beneficial to the constitutional cause to accede. Mendez' mere
survival did represent a rare achievement. In Guatemala, few
elected presidents have completed their terms.
4. Under Mendez, the security forces began to use vigilante
groups to eradicate the guerrillas. Sophisticated political dis-
cernment has never been a strong point in Guatemala, and the "anti-
Communist" campaign resulted in more dead bodies than the Communist
party had members. Some victims were innocent bystanders; some
others were the personal and political enemies of the jefes of
law-and-order forces.
5. During the electoral campaign of 1969-1970, terror and
counterterror produced a particularly large number of political
murders. After Colonel (now General) Arana -- an anti-Communist
hero -- took office as elected president in July 1970, the battle
intensified until the forces of the right clearly gained the upper
hand. The extreme leftists now seem weak, divided, disoriented
and not at all sure they can afford to continue the deadly compe-
tition.
6. Vestiges of ideological warfare also persist in the con-
flict between the government and the legal opposition. Even the
moderates among leftist political leaders still identify with the
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revolution of the 1950s, and nurture a sense of denied legitimacy.
The rightist forces identify with counterrevolutionary hero
Castillo Armas and indeed many of today's government leaders
served in his administration. They tend to lump all opposition
in the Communist bag. Outspoken opponents of the government --
labor leaders, journalists, professors, and politicians -- at
times became targets of the counterterror effort on the grounds
that they were intellectual authors of the leftist campaign of
terror.
7. The protracted struggle between left and right, having
taken place over the years against a backdrop of banditry and
simple crime, has contributed to a general lack of respect for
the law. This in its turn has led to use of extra-legal violence
against delinquents and social undesirables. Now, even with a re-
duction in leftist attacks, bloodletting seems an "established"
part of the Guatemalan milieu. Indeed, an important part of the
violence of recent months evidently is intramural. Gangs with
connections to the government have, mafia-like, engaged in
assassination bouts.
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8. President Arana and members of his official family relate
violence and subversion to societal ills and agree that the
"marginal" Guatemalans must be given a better share of the
national assets. But they see.a need first to deal with the
immediate threat, to eliminate the enemy or to be always threatened
by him. Having greatly reduced the guerrilla problem, Arana has
been able to give some attention to the problems of economic and
social development. Performance has been mixed. Economic activity,
bolstered by good world commodity prices, has been at a respectable
pace -- the 1972 growth rate is expected to be over 6 percent.
Rural electrification and health programs are progressing, but most
other efforts at social reform have run into snags. Programs for
agricultural credits and technical assistance have not been going
well and tax reform has not been very successful.
9. The recognition of the importance of social development
at least is a step in the right direction. Although the prosperity
and up-to-date aspect of.downtown Guatemala City give little hint
of it, Guatemala remains one of the most backward countries in
Latin America.
Haiti, rescues
Guatemala from the bottom position on most socio-economic indices
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for the region. The overwhelming majority of Guatemala's 5 or 6
million are rural mestizos and unassimilated Indians scratching out
a living through primitive farming and having only a vague concept
of nation, government, or a citizen's role or rights.
Prospects
10. A presidential election is scheduled for 1974,
As the elections grow near, the fragmented opposi-
tion parties are likely to coalesce. The rightist incumbents
intensely fear a united opposition because they believe that the
"left" (i.e., the center and left) is able to attract majority sup-
port from the electorate. The government might not permit
the opposition, some of whose partisans they have had killed and
some of whose organizations they have suborned, a chance in power.
The opposition nevertheless seems committed to a major electoral
effort, probably via some form of united front. The rightist..poli-
ticians, to strengthen their position, are seeking their candidate.
from a traditional source of leadership in Guatemala, the military.
11. The approach of the election period is likely to usher in
another round of high-level. political killings and another surge of
leftist terrorism. Jockeying for favored spots even within each
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camp can provide disruptive developments, as recent gangster-style
killings have shown. Some of the contenders for high position are
among the strongest proponents of Guatemala's gangland politics.
The extreme left, although battered and weak, retains a capability
for violent action which it will be tempted to use during the elec-
tions, when such actions would receive world-wide publicity.. A
debate among the revolutionary groups is already underway to de-
cide whether to concentrate on a nonviolent political posture or
to resurrect their image by initiating a new terrorist campaign.
12. In short, most signs point to more spins of the cycle of
violence. The only glint of something new is the growing evidence
of displeasure on the part of a few military officers with the
situation as it stands. Some of the tasks given the army in re-
cent years -- civic action, assisting impoverished areas in the
city, combing the boondocks for guerrillas -- have personally ex-
posed some military officers to the country's many ills for the
first time. President Arana himself has expressed irritation over
the lack of movement in the social sphere and has chided -- some
think threatened -- the wealthy stratum for excessive self-interest.
Arana has warned them that their resistance to change is an
"i.nvitation to tyrannical government".
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13. This social concern of Arana and his military confreres
seems sincere but it is neither profound nor sophisticated. The
Guatemalan officer corps remains one of the least educated in
Latin America. Nevertheless the new concern has raised questions
among certain of the military about what their role should be in
developing the country, in light of the ineptitude of civilian
politicians.
14. The temptation to military elements to try to seize power
would be minimized, however, by the candidacy of a general as the
nominee of the right in the 1974 elections. It is too early to say
what the character of the next such "civilian" government would be.
Arana's successor may be even more inclined than he to push pro-
grams designed to aid the impoverished elements of society. His
style of rule would nonetheless be authoritarian, and interest in
social improvement would again have to compete with pressures to
eliminate subversives. Elements of the small civilian elite can
be counted on to stimulate godfather politics whenever its vested
interests are seriously threatened.
Implications
15. Because the unyielding historical and cultural factors
suggest little possibility that the cycle of political violence
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will terminate any time soon, relations with Guatemala will con-
tinue to pose periodic embarrassment and danger for US officials.
Longstanding US efforts at economic and social assistance have
been adversely affected by the limited ability of the Guatemalans
to absorb such help and by the resistance of the elite to meaning-
ful reform at its expense. The fruits of military and public
safety training and advice have similarly been limited. Famili-
arity with modern police techniques, laboratory equipment and
methodology probably are, of course, an asset to Guatemala, but
the tendency for the immediate future will still be to meet real
and perceived threats with brute force.
16. Part of the problem is merely the embarrassment that
follows recurrent press stories identifying the US with Guate-
mala's violence and brutality. More serious can be the conse-
quences of the leftist terrorists' linkage of the US with their
enemy, the Guatemalan government. The US ambassador and two
members of the military mission were murdered in 1968, and our
labor attache was kidnapped in 1970.
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Because of this persistent threat of retaliation, US mission chiefs
in Guatemala will continue to require personal security arrange-
ments as elaborate as those for the native jefes in Guatemala's
deadly game of politics.
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Ray S. Cline
Director, INR
A copy of the attached Memorandum has
been sent to Deputy Assistant Secretary Hurwitch.
JOHN IZENGA
Director
FORM NO,
AUG54 1o1 WHICH REPLACES
BEMUSED.
{ DATE)
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16 November 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William Jorden
NSC Staff
Attached is a memorandum giving some of the
background on the intractable problem of terror an
counter-terror in Guatemala. We do not see much
hope that anyone, including the US, can do much to
stop the violence. We indicate some of the
possible painful consequences for the US in the
last paragraph.
(DATE)
FORM NO. I~ REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 I~I WHICH MAY 8E USED.
16 November 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Robert A. Hurwitch
6260-State
Attached is a memorandum giving some of the
background on the intractable problem of terror
and counter-terror in Guatemala. We do not see
much hope that anyone, including the US,can do
much to stop the violence. We indicate some of
the possible painful consequences for the US in
the last paragraph.
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