SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY PERSPECTIVES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A001400030011-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 10, 2006
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: June 3, 1971
• Content Type: MF

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3 June 1971
SUBJECT: Soviet Foreign Policy Perspectives
We are thinking of doing another Estimate on the main lines
of Soviet foreign policy. Since we last approached the subject,
about 22 years ago, Soviet behavior abroad seems to have gained
in vigor and Moscow seems to have become somewhat readier to
take chances, e.g. in the Middle East. We will need to consider
to what extent this posture signifies a change in Moscow's per-
ception of its opportunities and its limitations. The ensuing
paragraphs state a number of propositions and ask a number of
questions which bear on this aspect of the problem. They are
not the outline of the projected new Estimate as a whole. In this
connection you may want to look at VIE 11-9-71 (Soviet Policy in
Asia) and NIE 80/90-71 (The Soviet Role in Latin America), which
are on the table.
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1. There was a time, during the first years after the
present ruling oligarchy took over, when it was common to
describe its policies, external and internal alike, as static,
or stagnant) or immobile, or even paralyzed. Where domestic
policy is concerned the rule is still hold the line. But the
same cannot be said about Soviet foreign policy. Here) since
at least 1967, when Moscow undertook a greatly enlarged role in
the Mediterranean, there has been considerable movement,
2. A more active Soviet foreign policy can be accounted
for in a number of ways. It is not simply the result of Moscow's
energy and ambition and growing strength. It is due in a number
of instances to developments which were haphazard, or even ac-
cidental, e.g., the course of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the US'
difficulties, the extremes of Chinese behavior. Be this as it
may, the conservative Soviet leadership, while still forswearing
high risks, is clearly pursuing a more assertive policy and is
extending its commitments abroad. Does this mean that, looking
at its international prospects, it sees enough in its favor to
warrant a mood of self-confidence? Evidently it does. But we
would also suggest that there are reasons why Moscow's self-
assertiveness is guarded and its self-confidence fragile. We
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do not see signs that the Soviet leadership -- which is probably
short on long-term perspective in any case hex developed a
comprehensive view of the world or has concluded that the "cor-
relation of forces" has shifted in its favor. There is much
that is experimental and short term in Soviet policies and con-
siderable uncertainty in Moscow concerning the likely courses
of its major adversaries, the US and China.
Basic Security Requirements
3. Moscow's central security concerns are its strategic
relationship with the US, its position vis-a-vis China, and its
role in Eastern Europe. The attainment of nuclear parity with
the US is a fundamental element in Soviet self-confidence,
important to the protection of its strategic position and its
prestige as a superpower. SALT is seen as a means of confirming
the USSR's equality with the US in this regard, It may also be
a means of discovering whether it is to the USSR's political and
economic advantage to stabilize the relationship at roughly its
present level and perhaps eventually at some lower level.
1. The Soviets have in recent years considerably enlarged
their capabilities, mainly naval forces, for distant operations.
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They regard these, like their strategic weapons, as an essential
attribute of their role as a global powear. These means have so
far had application mainly in the Middle East, but Moscow seems
to believe that they can be used.elsewhere in the future to
assist it to expand the area of its influence at the expense of
both the US and China. The question which thus arises is whether
Moscow believes it will have the opportunity under the cover of
mutual deterrence to pursue a more active and flexible policy
at the sub-atomic level.
5. The Soviets know that US prestige is at a low ebb and
that Washington is reexamining its international role. They
probably have reason to su;p se that the US may no longer be
willing to engage the USSR in the same ways and on the same scale
as previously. They cannot fail to take comfort from this develop-
ment, and they will almost certainly be inclined to push their
luck a little harder here and there. Are they persuaded, how-
ever, that the US faces a prolonged period of domestic discord,
which might cause it to reduce substantially its foreign engage-
ments? Do they also foresee a diminution of US military and
economic strength? Would they see this as giving them a chance
to relieve their own defense burdens or all the more reason to
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keep up their military strength? But if the Russians do see the
US as a waning fo-^ee, they are not sure that It knows how to
behave in a manner which befits that role. They say that they
are troubled by the unpredictability of the US -- the zig-zags
in its policy -- and they probably are. They can see themselves
running afoul of the US at several points -- in the Middle East
and Caribbean, for instance, if they press the US too hard. This
is something to be avoided, not only because of the risk of direct
encounter with the US, but because a severe turn for the worse
in the climate of US-Soviet relations might damage Soviet policies
elsewhere -- as in Europe -- and might mean the denial of US
cooperation in undertakings of interest to the Soviets (e.g.,
nuclear nonproliferation). Among their other concerns would be
the fear of pushing the US toward detente with the Chinese.
6. Moscow has gained for the short term some increased
freedom of maneuver by pacifying its border with the Chinese,
but nothing is fuller of uncertainties than the long term rela-
tionship with China. It is very much to be doubted that the
Russians really believe, as they say, that the Mao regime is an
aberration which will sooner or later be corrected. But, having
considered, and evidently rejected, the possibility of a military
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solution, do they have any alternative to a waiting game? This
entails, for now, combining high defensive readiness along the
border itself with attempts to construct a barrier of contain-
ment in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Far East. But the
Chinese, winding down the Cultural Revolution and emerging from.
their diplomatic isolation, are making this less easy for the
USSR. They are pursuing their rivalry with the Russians in many
parts of the underdeveloped world where their ideas have some
appeal in leftist movements. Their influence is one more source
of disruption among the Communist parties, even in Eastern Europe.
And they are causing tremors in Moscow by their response to US
overtures. Their potential as a strategic threat to the USSR
will, of course, grow with time unless they subscribe to some
kind of restraining covenant. This they are unlikely to do except
at a political price the Russians will find it hard to pay.
7. In the broader setting of Asia, the Soviets face a
formidable problem in seeking to assess the overall correlation
of forces in the decade ahead. They face, in fact, a series of
crucial imponderables: the policies and strengths of post-Mao-
China; the scope and intensity of US interests in Asia; the impact
of Japan's growing strength; and, in general, the effects of the
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emerging quadrilateral balance of forces in Asia, i.e.,, the
consequences of the interacti-)n between the four major powers
on the scene. (NIE 11-9-71)
8. Our draft Estimate on the Changing Scene in Europe
discusses the Soviet position in Eastern Europe and its policy
toward Europe. We propose here, therefore, merely to pose a
number of additional questions which might be examined more
fully in an Estimate on Soviet policy. Moscow is now committed
to the belief that Eastern Europe constitutes an indispensable
security and ideological buffer. As long as this remains true,
the Soviets seem likely to continue along their present course
of seeking to effect tighter economic and military integration.
But will this not, even if accomplished, mean that Eastern
Europe will increasingly become an economic, political, and
military burden to the USSR? Can Moscow consider an alternative --
steps which would permit the East European states some measure of
increased autonomy within the Soviet "sphere of influence" -- so
long as liberalization within the USSR itself is ruled out? To
what extent will Moscow's choices in this regard affect its ap-
proach to Western Europe? What are the prospects for an agreement
on force reductions? What will be the economic and political
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consequences for the USSR of progress toward integration in
Western Europe? Is Moscow chiefly interested in undermining
the US position in Europe or does it have an interest in European
stabilization for its own sake?
The Soviet Position in the Third World
9. The Middle East is the most striking example of Moscow's
success in substituting its own influence for that of the West.
It is also a case in which military instruments have had a large
role in the strengthening of the Soviet political position and
therefore the first real test of the efficacy of the USSR's
recently acquired capacity to operate militarily outside tradit-
ional spheres. Here it has come face to face with the dilemmas
as well as the advantages which stem from a substantial military
commitment. The choices it makes in the future between more
cautious or more forward lines of action there will probably be
symptomatic to some degree of its attitude toward further involve-
ment in other areas. Though Soviet involvement in the Middle
East has been partly a result of calculation and partly a result
of happenstance' it has led to steadily increasing engagements
and to a position where the USSR sees itself as having interests
worth defending even if this has meant raising the level of
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military risk. Much of this pattern could be repeated elsewhere.
But circumstances in the Middle East may prove to have been
unique both because of the special opportunities offered by the
Israeli-Arab conflict and the special dangers presented by the
US commitment to Israel.
10, Concerns related to the Arab-Israeli conflict seem
certain to have a central place in Moscow's decisions pertaining
to the shape and size of its military presence in the Middle
East for some time to come. For the sake of safeguarding its
political standing with the UAR and its own military prestige,
the USSR cannot readily accede to the UAR's being subjected to
further military humiliations at the hands of the Israelis and,
on this account, a substantial and probably prolonged Soviet
involvement in the UAR's air defenses is foreseeable. The state
of play between the Arabs and Israelis will also no doubt have
something to do with deployments to the Soviet Mediterranean
Squadron since deterrence of Israeli attack on certain Egyptian
ports, as well as intelligence-gathering vis-a-vis Israel, are
among its missions. But, in present circumstances, both political
and military considerations are likely in Moscow's thinking to
continue to weigh against its assuming any substantially greater
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risk of direct military involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict.
,It probably believes that its interests will be better served if
it can maintain a judicious balance between political and mili-
tary pressures, as on the whole it has succeeded in doing up to
11. The Soviet presence in the Middle East will no doubt
also serve and be shaped in the future, as it has from the
beginning, by objectives which have only a tangential relation
to the Arab-Israeli issue, These concern, in the first place,
the various operations of the Soviet Mediterranean squadron
aimed at countering NATO naval forces, and the 6th Fleet in
particulars including the improvement of maritime reconnaissance
and ASW capabilities. The naval and air facilities which the
Soviets have acquired in the UAR as a dividend from the 1967
war have enabled them to expand their NATO-oriented operations
in the Mediterranean. Evidence that the Russians are on the way
to gaining access to additional facilities of this kind on the
UAR's Mediterranean coast, in the interior of the UAR, and along
the Red Sea may point to a further expansion of such operations
in the future. Is it also possible to see in this the beginnings
of the formation of a network of air and sea communications
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leading from the USSR through the Mediterranean toward the
Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean area?
12. The kind of easily exploited opportunity which the
Arab-Israeli conflict has given the Russians in the Mediter-
ranean is not available to them in the Indian Ocean. The
evident Soviet preference for preserving some freedom of
maneuver in the Indo-Pakistan dispute means that even that
festering problem does not offer them such an opportunity.
There is, however, a considerable potential for turbulence at
many points along the littoral of the Indian Ocean and its
contiguous waterways, the Arabian Sea, the Persian Gulf, and
the Red Sea. Can one conceive of circumstances arising in
which the Russians would consider a show of force and even a
threat of intervention to be politically expedient and low in
risk? They showed off the coast of Ghana in 1969 that they
do not disdain the practice of gun-boat diplomacy. There are
possible trouble spots in some corners of the Indian Ocean
where even a small number of naval units raight be able to
tip the balance in a local conflict -- within a state or
between states, whether they actually intervened physically
or not. Any such use or threat of force might, of course,
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carry the risk of deeper involvement, locally or with outside
powers. By and large, the Soviets have been cautious about
accepting such risks. Is it correct to suppose that they will
continue to be cautious?
13. In general, is the trend toward a steady expansion
of the Soviet capabilities for distant operations likely to
be sustained? If it is, emphasis may be on both extending
the geographical range of operations and on developing im-
proved capabilities for logistics and air support. Unless
unforeseen events intervene -- the outbreak of large-scale
conflict on the Sino-Soviet border or the onset of a political
or economic crisis at home, for example -- the momentum of
military growth will itself probably be enough to carry the
Soviets in that direction. They will, moreover, have a
continuing interest in improving and extending their ASW and
intelligence-gathering operations. In any case, Moscow is
evidently convinced that such a further expansion is required
for the enhancement of its international prestige and the
protection of its positions in the Third World. And it will
no doubt continue to view this area as an active front in its
competition with the West and the Chinese.
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14. In some parts of the Third World Moscow has lowered
its sights, and its outlays. The experience of recent years
has led the Soviets to adopt a pragmatic and differentiated
policy. They have, nevertheless, made impressive progress in
the relatively short time they have been actively engaged in
the Third World. They have shattered the ring of containment
and have greatly enlarged the arena of competition with the
West. Diplomatic and trade ties have proliferated and are
now very nearly universal. The USSR is the dominant great
power influence among the radical Arab states. It can com-
pete on fairly even terms with the West in most of Africa.
Its influence is firmly established in South Asia. In South-
east Asia and Latin America their influence continues to grow.
15. Moscow has long regarded Latin America as a special
case, warranting a fair degree of Soviet reserve because of
US preponderance there. There are signs that this reserve
may be diminishing. The pattern of change in the area --
with the growth of radical nationalism -- seems to be promising
in the USSR's view and its interest and activities have
increased. The USSR's Latin American policy seems no longer
encumbered by the confusion and disarray which set in after
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the Cuban crisis. Moscow may believe that it can help to
hasten the decline of the US position and that with time many
Latin American governments will look increasingly to the
USSR.
16. What are the constraints on Soviet conduct in Latin
America? The situation there is probably still sufficiently
variegated and obscure as to warrant some uncertainty in
Moscow about future developments. Would the USSR want to
acquire more client regimes with the accompanying political
and economic obligations and the attendant danger of arousing
strong counteractions in the US and among other Latin American
governments? Have the Russians come to recognize that it is
not an easy matter to harness nationalism in the underdeveloped
world to their purposes? Any precipitious move to expand
military involvement in Latin America would risk a serious
worsening of the general climate of Soviet-American relations.
Nevertheless, is it not likely that Moscow sees its present
naval activities in the Caribbean as laying the foundation
for a larger military presence in Latin America at large?
The Domestic Scene
17. The USSR's economic resources have so far been suf-
ficient to enable it both to establish a position of nuclear
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parity and to support an expansion of its international commit-
ments. The present leadership is an Old Guard presiding over
the preservation of a mechanism which has, among other things,
enabled it to accomplish these things. Why tamper with it?
The notion, widely held by Western Sovietologists, that the
Party is obsolescent and incapable of fulfilling in an ad-
vanced industrial society the tasks of political and social
mobilization -- such a notion is probably totally incompre-
hensible to the Soviet leaders. But they have recognized for
some time that the Leninist ideology, in the absence of the
Stalinist coercive apparatus, is not enough to move the nation
and have relied on old-fashioned nationalism to perform a
good part of that function. Does this not, when put beside
the USSR's larger military role abroad, open the way to in-
creased military influence and, if so, with what consequences
for internal politics and foreign policy?
18. The Soviet leadership also recognizes the symptoms
of technological lag, though not necessarily its causes. It
no doubt understands that unless it makes headway in the
modernization of its economy through the introduction of new
technology and advanced organizational techniques, it faces
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the prospect of falling further behind the West in the eco-
nomic race. Economic considerations are one factor in Soviet
thinking about arms limitations. They also figure in the
effort to promote detente in Europe.
19. Quite apart from open protest and the ably articu-
lated dissent of such as Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov, there is
a growing tendency among the educated elite to question
official policy, or at least not to respond favorably to it
simply through fear or reflex. Some foreign specialists
believe that the problem of national minorities -- Soviet Jews,
the Baltic peoples, the Moslem peoples of Soviet Central
Asia, even the Ukrainians -- is becoming or is about to be-
come more acute. This problem, or potential problem, is
there but difficult to assign a weight to. Neither is it
easy to foresee what is likely to transpire within the leader-
ship itself. It has postponed its own renewal but cannot go
on doing so. The changeover might be accompanied by an
intensification of political conflict in which the posing of
alternative policies might figure. In any case, there is
probably enough on the domestic scene that is disturbing to
the regime to give it cause to seek to avoid a serious inter-
national crisis.
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20. There are other points that would need to be taken
up in an assessment of the Soviet outlook: the USSR's posi-
tion vis-a-vis the non-Communist border states (Turkey,
Iran, Afghanistan), its view of the non-Bloc Communist
Parties, and, in general, the influence of ideological con-
siderations on its international conduct. Our principal aim,
however, would be to consider whether the mainsprings of the
present assertiveness in Soviet policy are strong and durable
and whether the US can expect in the period ahead to face
intensified pressures from the USSR.
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