POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A001400030003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 83
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 14, 2006
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: October 13, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
13 October 1971
MEMORANDUM (0/NE Distribution Only)
This memorandum, which emphasizes the international impli-
cations of Latin America's endemic political violence, may be
of interest to members of the Board. It is based on the papers
I prepared earlier in the year for the seminars on political
violence of the Institute for Strategic Study. The last Chapter
is a summary of my views on the subject, filtered by the distance
and innocence of current materials
I would plan a meeting on the paper of in-
terested Board and Staff members for purposes of discussion only.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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INTRODUCTION
1. During the decade of the 1960s the previously insignifi-
cant Island.of Cuba exercised a remarkable impact on the course of
developments not.only in the rest of Latin America but in the rest
of the.world as well. Fidel Castro had appeared to topple the en-
trenched dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista in relatively short
order through a campaign.of guerrilla warfare: Castro had opened
his insurgency with a small band of men in a remote mountainous re-
gion in December 1956; his "army" had marched into Havana unopposed
in January 1959. Then over the next few years the Castro regime
proceeded to destroy Cuba's old political and social order and to
substitute a revolutionary new one. Over the same period Castro
proceeded to destroy as well his country"s old ties to the United
States, which had exercised hegemonic powers over Cuba for sixty
years -- and to substitute intimate political, economic, and mili-
tary connections with the Soviet Union, which at the start of 1959
had not enjoyed as much as diplomatic relations with the Island
Republic. And during these years Castro and his-colleague Ernesto
(Che) Guevara became tireless advocates of revolutionary political
violence on the part of radical groups in all other countries who
sought to duplicate Cuba's feat of destroying the established order
at home while defying the interests of the United States and other
foreign adversaries;
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2n The most dramatic consequence, of this process of politi-
cal violence and revolutionary change erupted from the establishment
in Cuba, literally on the Caribbean doorstep of the United States, of
a formidable Soviet military presence. In capitals throughout the
world, but especially in Washington and Moscow, the Cuban missile
crisis of 1962 evoked more intense fears of a possible nuclear holo-
caust than any other event before or since.
3a Even before the missile crisis, events in Cuba had con-
tributed to a growing sense of urgency among political and military
leaders in Washington regarding the need for a strategy to protect
the world position of the United States from the dangers implicit in
campaigns of political violence in "developing" countries., and the
need for tactics to counter the supposed special potency of insur-
gencies and other forms of "irregular warfare." Thus the Cuban
phenomenon was a mainspring behind the priority assigned under the
Alliance for Progress to the promotion of peaceful reform and de-.
velopment in Latin America, as well as to the dispatch of military
and police advisors and equipment to those governments facing a
threat from Castro-style insurgents. Along these lines, the Cuban
phenomenon probably was also one of the many factors responsible for
.locking the United States into its prolonged and costly military en-
gagement against Communist insurgency in South Vietnam.
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4. Once again closer to home, the Cuban example of revolu-
tionary change through political violence, the.Castro regime's
optimistic propaganda in favor of revolutionary violence, and its
willingness to provide material as well as moral assistance to
various receptive groups helped provoke campaigns of guerrilla
warfare and urban terrorism throughout Latin America. And even as
nearly all these campaigns failed or foundered, and Guevara met his
death while directing a particularly ill-fated one in Bolivia (1967),
the Cuban phenomenon and mystique appeared to strengthen the attrac-
tion of would-be revolutionaries in the United States and Western
Europe towards the use of political violence.
5, But why was there not to be a "Second Cuba" in Latin
America during the 1960s as Castro had hoped (that is, another case
in which a relatively small group of revolutionaries overthrow the
established order through a campaign of political violence)? And
why was there not a "Second Vietnam", to bleed the strength of the
United States in the heartland of South America, as Guevara had
dreamed? For one thing, Castro's dramatic success affected the
attitudes and behavior not only of would-be imitators and of con-
cerned foreign powers, but also of those groups within Latin America
which had to confront the consequences of revolutionary political
violence -- particularly the military establishments, The most,
"successful" form of political violence during the 1960s, just as
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during past decades, was the military coup d'etat. The Latin
American military were able to do precisely what proved to be
beyond the grasp of the guerrillas and terrorists: short-circuit
formal constitutional procedures by using force to obtain their
political objectives. Most of the 17 successful military coups
during the sixties (affecting ten countries) were at least in part
a reaction to the threat, immediate or imagined, of revolutionary
violence. And at least one of the coups, that in Peru in 1968,
appeared to steal the revolutionaries' thunder and in itself force
profound and far-reaching changes on the direction of domestic and
foreign policy.
6. The main purpose of this memorandum is to examine the
record of political violence in Latin America, particularly during
the 1960s, in search of patterns which may contribute to an under-
standing of the implications of insurgencies and military coups,
both for the countries of the region and for the world powers as
well. In other words, under what circumstances would Latin America's
seemingly endemic political violence be most likely to exercise :a
profound impact on the countries directly involved, and under what
circumstances would the security interests of outside powers, most
notably the United States, become dramatically engaged? What are
the prospects during the 1970s for a "Second Cuba", or a "Second
Vietnam", or for that matter for World War III somehow to break out
in Latin America?
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7. Section I of this Paper will attempt to address the issue
of political violence.in general terms, in order to place the
events in Latin America into a wider perspective. Section II will
present an analysis of the particular role of violence in Latin
American politics. Section III will assess the key events of the
1960s within Latin America, while Section IV will examine the role
played by foreign powers, particularly the United States and the
Soviet Union. Finally, Section V will present.some conclusions
and a brief look forward into the already turbulent seventies.
8. The countries of Latin America did not "invent" poli-
tical violence, nor do they now hold any monopoly on the practice.
Indeed there would appear to have been a resurgence in rebellions,
insurrections and such the world over in recent decades, or at least
in the attention such violence commands in the.absence of conven-
tional warfara between the major powers. During the past 25 years,
thousands of cases of political violence have been recorded, affect-
ing all but a handful of the 100 or so larger nations and colonies
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of the world.!/ The following examples of political violence,
culled from the chronologies of Strategic Survey 1970,2/ indicate
the geographic.range of countries affected in that one year (exclu-
ding Latin America): civil wars in Jordan and in Nigeria; military
coups in Cambodia and in Syria; guerrilla insurgencies by blacks
against Portuguese rule in Angola and Mozambique, by Moslems against
Ethiopian rule in Eritrea, and by pro-Communist forces in West Bengal
northern Burma, and East Malaysia; riots over "black power" in Bermuda
and Trinidad, over economic policy in Poland, over election results
in the Philippines, over the location of regional capitals in Italy,
and over the presence of American troops in Turkey; acts. of terrorism
by separatists in Canada, Northern Ireland, and Northern Spain, and
by various political extremists in France and the,United States.,
1/ See for example the data presented in Ted Robert Gurr's "A com-
parative Study of Civil Strife", Violence in America: Historical
and comparative Perspectives, edited by Hugh Davis Graham and
Gurr (New York: Bantam Books, 1969), pp. 572-631.
The case that there has in fact been an increase in the incidence
of political violence, as distinct from an increase in attention
to the phenomenon, is difficult to prove, especially when due
consideration is given the lower level of attention paid before
the Second World War to such matters as minor outbreaks of dis-
order in this or that British or French dependency.
2/ Institute for Strategic Studies (London), 1971, pp. 75-95.
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9. What is the common denominator of these varied events?
As used in this Paper, political violence refers to, the use of
force by organized domestic groups to achieve their political ob-
jectives. In the strictest sense.it is,civil violence in that the
primary target is the civil or domestic political process. Large-
scale combat and bloodshed are not essential characteristics, for
at times the political objectives can be obtained merely by mar-
shalling strength and threatening violence, as in the case of cer-
tain military coups. What is essential is the recourse to the
actual or threatened use of violence to manipulate the political
system through coercion, and thus sidestep the formal (and pre-
sumably peaceful) constitutional procedures. The goals of politi-
cal violence can be to make a revolution, or to prevent one; to
overthrow a tyranny, or to impose one; to gain control of the
government, or relief from its sway. It can be directed towards
a change in policy without changing the personnel or government,
or conversely towards changing the hand at the helm (or the till)
without much concern for the overall content of policy. In short,
much of what is recorded as political history -- some of man's
best moments and his worst -- seems to turn around instances of
political violence. And the prophets and practitioners of such
violence by definition should be considered neither the good nor
the.bad guys of history, but merely participants in the political
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process who, for a broad range of reasons, place their trust in
force and coercion rather than in debate and other peaceful pro-
cedures.*
10. Several authorities have defined political violence
within nations to be analogous to Clausewitz' classical definition
of wars between nations; i.e., political violence would be the con-
tinuation of domestic politics "by other means". In truth the
boundary line between regular political activity and political vio-
lence, as herein defined, is often difficult to discern in fact or
even to fix in theory. This is especially the case in societies
where politics still are bitterly contentious over basic issues and
the governments in power often are either the product of some recent
act of political violence or depend heavily upon coercion to main-
tain their hold on office. In such societies there can be an im-
plicit threat of potential violent action even in speeches delivered
peacefully within the halls of the legislature or to crowds outside
the presidential palace. Thus the spokesman may really be saying,
The definition of political violence used in this Paper is similar
to the one offered by Ted Robert Gurr in Why Men Rebel (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 3-4. "Political violence
refers to all collective attacks within a political community
against the political regime, its actors -- including competing
political groups as well as incumbents -- or its policies. The
concept. represents a set of events, a common property of which is
the actual or threatened use of violence, but the explanation is
not limited to that property. The concept subsumes revolution . .
It also includes guerrilla wars, coups d'etat, rebellions, and riots".
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AMW
"give us our fair share or we shall have to consider alternative
means for protecting our interests". Be that as it may, I would
suggest that the coercion implicit in political violence commences
when life, property, or fundamental rights are endangered; not
necessarily with the massing of a group, but with its first menacing
move. On the part of governments, political coercion would begin
when their actions go beyond the requirements for protecting normal
political processes and become open efforts either to quash specific
opposition groups or to take the offensive against the lives, rights,
or property of broad groups among the citizenry.
11. The boundaries between political violence (or civil con-
flict) and international violence (or war) are similarly clouded,
At least during recent decades, nearly all cases of political vio-
lence that were either relatively prolonged or profound in domestic
consequences embraced some important international aspects. Yet I
would consider the violence to be political whenever the practi-
tioners possess credibility as'a domestic political group and so long
as their principal purpose is to affect the politics of the "host"
country. Therefore I would not exclude cases merely because foreign
assistance is received (such as Castro has given to guerrilla groups
in Latin America and which he himself received from various countries
during his campaign against Batista), or because international bor-
ders are repeatedly crossed to carry out the violence (e.g., the use
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by Mozambique guerrillas of Tanzania as a staging ground and safe-
haven) and foreign countries otherwise involved (thehijacking of
aircraft, the kidnapping of diplomats),
12. This is not to deny the importance of foreign involvement:
As is apparent, when domestic violence seems to serve or threaten
the national interest of foreign countries they generally respond
accordingly. Premier Castro sent Cubans and equipment to support
the revolutionary insurgents in Venezuela; Presidents Kennedy and
Johnson sent a larger number of military and police advisors and a
greater volume of equipment to help combat them. And when a coun-
try becomes convinced that its national security is at stake in
another country's political violence, it may step in directly; e.g.,
the US military occupation of the Dominican Republic in 19650 At
a certain point, of course, intervention on a large scale by one or
more foreign countries turns a case of political violence into in-
ternational violence, whether or not formally called war by the
participants. Vietnam would clearly be one such instance.
l3? Once these definition are accepted it then becomes reason-
able to conclude that political violence dates back to the birth of
politics and has persisted ever since in nearly all relatively com-
plex political communities. Few indeed are the societies invariably
blessed with universal consensus on who should rule and how; where
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every group is content to play the game of politics according to the
formal rules., no matter how stacked these may be against their
special interests; and where the government and the elites it repre-
sents always place their trust in due process when challenged by
critics, popular and otherwise. What varies then -- over time and
from community to community -- is not so much the presence or ab-
sence of political violence, but rather such issues as its frequency,
intensity, style, objectives, and significance,
14. Some observers would perhaps point to traditional so-
cieties as ones, in theory, relatively free of political. instability
and violence. This may be true once the often bloody issues of the
legitimacy of the ruler, the geographic range of his realm, and his
relationship with his most powerful supporters are settled. After
that, and until the destabilizing process of modernization commences,
few subjects of the realm question the inevitability of the existing
order of things, including the legitimacy of the political hierarchy.
And fewer still see much profit in challenging the government per se,
which holds a near-monopoly of what passes for sophisticated imple-
ments of force. The trouble is that few societies today stand at
the point of stasis between the old and the new pressures for poli-
tical violence; perhaps few ever did.
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15. Again in theory, political. violence is not generally a
crucial problem in highly developed societies. This is partly b
cause the modernized state also holds a near-monopoly on sophisti-
cated.implements of coercion. What is probably more important is
the fact that such governments usually possess the capacity to deal
with the most pressing needs and demands of the population -- to keep
the system rolling more or less peacefully, as it were, by oiling
the most important squeaking wheels. Political. violence exists in
these societies; it may even be endemic. It is,just that:the vio-
lence does.not regularly threaten the government's hold on office,
much less the survival of the general political system. In part,
by calling attention to problems and quickening the pace of change,
violence may serve stability over the long term, even if at high
cost to short-term peace.
16. But the relationship between technological development
and the problem of political violence is a complex one. What of the
so-called. postmodern state? On the one hand, the more technologic-
ally complex a society becomes, the more it lies hostage to the vio-
lent disruptions of small groups determined to use the technology
against it (e.g., plastic bombs against government and,commercial
centers). On the other hand, the more advanced the technology, the
better able the government should be to meet the demands of the great
bulk of the populace, and to quash the remainder. Developments in
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the United States in recent years indicate the difficulties a
government can face in this equation. Perhaps the technology of
effective and responsive government tends to lag behind that of
war and violence. The physical size of the government and the de-
mands of various political groups grow apace - but not necessarily
the solutions to domestic problems. The "impotence of power" then
relates to the performance of governments at home as well as in
foreign affairs.
17. In any case it is in the transitional societies -- those
developing and modernizing -- that political violence is likely to
be the most prevalent or at least the most profound in its local
significance. These very processes tend to strip the reigning
hierarchies of their cover of inevitability and reveal their im-
potency when it comes to coping with the tensions of change, the
pressures of competing elite groups, and the demands for recognition
on the part of the formerly quiescent masses, In truth, effective
governments, whether skilled at solving problems or quashing oppon-
ents, do not often get overthrown even in the developing world, It
may be equally true that the leaders of successful coups against:
woebegotten regimes do not always provide noticeably improved govern-
ment. Yet neither the populae at large nor key elite groups are
likely to consider the deposed crowd a great loss, When they do,
coups frequently abort. In short, one key to political violence in
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transitional societies is weak and ineffective governments and
political institutions that can neither quash the violence nor
harness its energy towards the amelioration of societal tensions.*
18. Many factors that are at least partly independent of the
quality of government also influence the periodicity of political
violence and its prospects for profound impact on the history of a
developing society. Curves of economic prosperity and depression
would be one such factor, and so would such psychological varia-
tions on that theme as popular expectations re living conditions,
material and otherwise. Fluctuations in the views of key groups,
especially the military and the intelligentsia, on their actual
and proper role in society would be still another. Especially in
colonial. societies and those with restless and discontented ethnic
minorities, a frustrated nationalism can be the key factor in
chronic political instability and violence. But political exploi-
tation of local feelings against foreign interests and influence
can produce similar patterns in titularly independent countries
with relatively homogeneous societies.
This view is pressed at great Zength in SarnueZ P. Huntington's
Political order in Changing Societies (New Haven & London:
YaZe University Press, 1968), especially Chapter 1.
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19. The very pace of modernization can also be an important
factor, especially when it causes rapid increases in the number of
groups that are politically aware and places a great rush of fresh
demands against the government's relatively static financial and
administrative ability to cope. One final noteworthy factor would
be the influence of events and ideas from abroad which undersocre
the alternatives to the existing state of affairs. And these need
not come only from countries that have successfully developed so to
speak, As previously indicated, the example of Castro's success
against Batista had a marked impact on the rash of revolutionary
violence that broke out in Latin America during the 1960s -- much
more.so than did the ideology and clandestine operations emanating
from the Soviet Union. Similarly, Castro's physical elimination
of Batista's civilian and military supporters.had much to do with
the spate of military coups intended to counteract the aforementioned
revolutionary rash -- probably more so than the anti-Communist
rhetoric and the counterinsurgency assistance emanating from the
United States.
20. Presumably, steady economic expansion, accompanied by a
carefully-managed enlargement of popular participation in national
politics and in modern society generally, and a low level of upset-
ting nationalistic issues and exogenous examples would encourage
stability in a developing society. This course of events would
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suppose a relatively effective government, respected if not also
popular. In contrast, slow and uneven economic growth, together
with rapid expansion of the demands placed against the government,
as well as an abundance of disturbing nationalistic, and external
influences would stimulate instability and political violence,
Here we might expect to find, generally speaking, beleaguered and
ineffective government, neither popular nor particularly respected.
Such a doleful description would fit a good number of the Latin
American countries during the decade of the sixties.
II. SOME OBSERVATIONS ON POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN LATIN AMERICA
21. If one believed that political violence was by defini-
tion wrong and harmful, then contemporary Latin America would have
a most unenviable record. Since 1930 the Twenty Spanish-,
Portuguese-, and French-speaking independent countries of the New
World have experienced more than 100 forceful overthrows of govern-
ment, and many times that number of aborted and unsuccessful coups,
insurrections, and insurgencies. The record for "irregular" govern-
mental changes would probably have been considerably higher if
various dictatorial regimes had not managed to hold on to office
for extended periods through systematic applications of force and
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coercion (e.g., Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, 1931-61;
Francois Duvalier in Haiti, 1957-71; Fidel Castro in Cuba,.1959- )o*
22. The purpose of this section is to set down a series of
themes or observations to help explain this profusion of political
violence. and also the character it took, especially during the 1960s.
While some attempt at heroic simplification is perhaps essential,
it is also essential to acknowledge the imposing limitations to such
generalizations. First of all, despite important similarities in
history and culture, there is a remarkable diversity among the
twenty countries of Latin America. The differences among them are
fundamental and striking in such matters as area and climate, size
and composition.of population, mix and quality of natural resources,
and stage of economic development, as well as in the relative sogphis-
tication of political and social institutions and the actual
Political violence was probably at Least as prevalent in
earlier periods of Latin American history. We are obligated
to a nameless (and presumably tired) historian for the follow-
ing, reported in Atlantic Research Corporation,.A Historical
Survey of Patterns and Techniques of Insurgency Conflicts in
Post-1900 Latin America, 1P4:
Historians have grown haggard in the task of counting
up all the insurgencies and civil wars to which the
"Age of CaudiZZos " gave rise. Venezuela, for example,
had suffered 52 important revolts by 1912. Bolivia
had more than 60 "revolutions" by 1898 and had assas-
sinated six presidents. Colombia had experienced 27
civil wars, one of which claimed 80,000 and another
100,000 Lives. These are among the more extreme ex-
amples but many of the other republics did not Lag
far behind.
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interrelationships among them. Not only are there profound con-
trasts between such relatively advanced states as Argentina, Chile,
and Mexico on the one hand, and such less advanced societies as
Bolivia, Guatemala, and Haiti on the other; but there are also out-
standing differences between states in each of these categories --
e.g., the relative importance of elections and of military inter-
ventionin politics in neighboring Argentina and Chile. In short,
the differences in national character and political culture at the
extremes -- say between Haiti and Mexico, or Bolivia and'Chile --
are at least as great as those that would impede generalizations
on Europe meant to cover both Great Britain and Portugal, or even
Albania.
23; Sound and lasting generalization is also made difficult
by the fact that most countries in Latin America have been under-
going great pressures for change; in particular, the attitude
towards the phenomenon of change is itself changing, both on the
part of mass groups and key elites (e.g., elements within the mili-
tary and the Roman Catholic Church). The balance of forces between
these new pressures and the old ways both varies as between coun-
tries and shifts within the individual countries. Thus explanations
for the sixties do not quite fit the 1950s, and may have still less
relevance for the 1970s.
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24. Then there is the question of approach to a complex,
variegated and shifting reality which forces uneasy.choices in
emphasis. Some analysts and observers would prefer to place the
heaviest stress on the heritage of history, especially the
struggles for independence and the era of caudillos; some would
stress psychological factors, particularly the unsheathed drive
of Latin Americans to be macho or manly; some would stress inter-
national economic relations -- the instability perpetuated by neo-
colonial dependence on terms of trade imposed by foreign powers.
Alas, it is much like the proverbial peeling of an onion in search
of an elusive core. I prefer to emphasize the operations of the.
political systems of the Latin American countries, although I
recognize that other approaches which lead to different and at
times conflicting generalizations also have claims to validity.*
25. The preceding section makes:a point of weak governments
and political institutions as a root cause of political violence
I am indebted to several incisive studies for the honing of
the approach of the following paragraphs. I list them with
appreciation, though I recognize the authors may not appre-
ciate the specific molds and mixes I devise: Charles W.
Anderson, Politics and Economic change in Latin America
(Princeton: D. Van.Nostrand Co., Inc., 1967). R.R. Fagen
and W.A. Cornelius, Jr., Political Power in Latin America:
Seven Confrontations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:. Prentice-
HaZZ, Inc., 1970).
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in developing societies. But why, after more than a century of
political independence, are these still relatively weak inmost
Latin American countries? In good measure the answer is that
politically-significant groups prefer them to be weak; that is,
they choose to maintain options and alternatives to strong and
stable governments based on binding formal constitutions and laws
and on effective supporting political institutions. Certainly,
formal constitutional requirements (re elections and. such) and
regular quasi-constitutional procedures by which political parties
and other institutions complement and implement-the constitution
are not given the same degree of exclusive legitimacy in most Latin
American countries as is the case in the United States and Great
Britain. Expressed as a reciprocal, violence and coercion in poli-
tics enjoy a much higher degree of acceptability and, in effect,
legitimacy among key groups in Latin America than in countries
where violence in politics (however prevalent) is not considered
a proper means for effecting a change in the national government
or its key policies. This then is the central point: Important
groups in Latin American society with a major stake in its preser-
vation conceive of political violence as a suitable alternative to
formal constitutional procedures when deemed necessary to protect
their interests, solve national problems, and exit from political
impasses. Political violence, therefore, is not the exclusive
province of would-be revolutionaries bent on destroying the system
or of local groups acting out of either sudden anger or desperation.
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26. One expression of the weakness of governments in most
Latin American countries is the paucity of relatively principled,
disciplined, and broadly-based political parties, which are cap-
able of winning majority support throughout the nation in elections
and then of running the government effectively once.in office.
Political parties tend instead to be personalistic, loosely-
organized, and narrowly-based. As a result, governments. tend to
be dependent upon elaborate, diverse, and delicate coalitions of
political parties and other politically-articulate groups merely
to maintain office and certainly to govern with-any authority.
The president of the republic, in effect, requires the support of
various political parties represented, in the legislature and of
sundry local political bosses, and also of key elements from the
military, the social oligarchy, the business community, the pro-
fessional classes, organized labor, and the bureaucracy -- all
elite groups by contrast with the mass of.peasants and unskilled,
low-paid workers. The coalitions are intended to protect the
interests of the multitude of elite groups they represent; con-
sequently they tend to coalesce on basically pragmatic and cautious
programs rather than on innovative ones. If on& key element falls
out of the coalition -- because it sees its interests jeopardized
or slighted; or because its reach'exceeds its grasp -- it will
often take soundings for a possible coup d'etat or consider some
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other act of political coercion to protect its interests. Since
many elements in the informal coalition are potential if not
actual rivals to the faction titularly in control of the govern-
ment, major political crises frequently lead to increased sound-
ings for a coup rather than to a rallying behind the government
to tide it through its constitutional term of office.
27. The leaders of such coalitions. from time to time
attempt to consolidate their personal power, either through build-
ing a broad popular base or a coercive dictatorship based on con-
trol (not merely the support) of the military and other official
and unofficial security forces. Neither approach is a simple
task, especially in the larger and more complex societies, pre-
cisely because the various elite groups will work (and fight)
to maintain an independent influence on government. affairs.
Colonel Juan Peron, for example, came to power in Argentina
(1945) with the support of many elite groups including most
factions within the military. When he attempted to dominate
politics through a mass party and when his populist policies
tended to threaten the interests of various groups, his former
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military colleagues, egged on by civilian elites, forced him
out of office (1955).
28. The breach of -he.formal constitution by a military coup
is the most obvious form of political violence in Latin America.
During an earlier era, most countries were subjected to periods
of personal rule by a series of military eaudilios, and most coups
represented power grabs by competing ambitious generals or colonels.
In some of the smaller and chronically unstable.republics, where
the military and most other institutions. still tend to be more
personalistic than professional, some coups continue to represent,
to a considerable degree, a push for perquisites and power from
within the military establishment. However, especially in the
larger, relatively more developed and sophisticated countries,
with correspondingly more sophisticated and professional military
establishments, coups have come increasingly to represent not only
Perhaps the two most effective political systems in Latin
America during the Z960s were in Cuba and Mexico, Castro was
able, through force and popular appeal, to liquiZte the in-
fZuence not only of pro-Batista groups but also of competing
anti-Batista groups, including some which had contributed to
the dictator's downfall. In short, coalition politics were
eliminated. in Mexico, in contrast, the multi-faceted coali-
tion is institutionalized in a single political party. Its
genius is an arrangement whereby the powerful presidency
changes hands with each election, a contest which the "govern-
ment party" always wins handsomely, but which nonetheless
forces it to take careful soundings of the needs and interests
of coalition members.
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the individual interests of key generals or the corporate interests
of the officer corps as an elite but also the military's views of the
national interest. The element of push is rarely totally absent,
at least on the part of certain ambitious officers and factions; and
the military, as do all other elites, tend.to identify the national
interest with their special interests. Nonetheless, a strong ele-
ment of puZZ from the general society -- where problems are seen by
the military to be mounting and civilian leadership is found want-
ing -- is increasingly present.*
29. At times these latter-day military coups have fostered
important changes in society by reducing the exclusive hold on
power of a narrow range of existing elites or even of a reigning
military dictatorship. But by and large they have served as a
check against abrupt shifts in political power and national charac-
ter, whether represented by an organized political movement or by
the disorders attendant upon the impending collapse of a government,
Often the military or key factions within the institution exercise
their political influence by means short of a coup, which nonetheless
The concept of the military being motivated by factors of
"push and puZZ" is presented, within a somewhat different
context,.by Martin C. NeedZer, Political Development in
Latin America: Instability, Violence, and Evolutionary
Ch_ ange (New York: Random House, 1968), Chapter IV.
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serve to alter the personnel or policy direction of the ruling
civilian government. The element of coercion is often present,
for the alternative to the requested changes could, be a military
seizure of power.
30. Only rarely do the military stand and move alone in
exercising such political interference, aligned as it were against
a phalanx of all the other significant political forces -- the one
for resort to force in politics, the other for sole reliance on
parliamentary resolution of tensions and impasses. Usually, a
military coup has the positive support of important civilian groups;
at times the preponderant part of the politically-articulate popu-
lation accepts the coming of a coup with a combination of enthusiasm,
relief, and indifference. While some groups see their interests
jeopardized, others see them enhanced by the coup and the prospects
for a new. coalition of influence. Indeed, as previously indicated,
the civilian elements often take sounding among the military in
search of a coup that could advance their interests. Again, poli-
tical violence is seen by those satisfied with the overall political
system as an acceptable alternative means for manipulating said
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system. Elections are important in Latin America; it is just , that
they do not represent the only legitimate road to power,*
31. What about political violence on the part of small radi-
cal groups that seek to destroy rather than manipulate the existing
political system? Of course, if they could win the. support of the
military, or even of an important faction or installation, they
would consider a coup. Similarly, if they could bring the masses
into the streets behind their cause, they would consider urban in-
surrections and general strikes. Only rarely have they had these
options in any realistic sense; somewhat more frequently they have
participated, as welcome-or-not junior partners, when more formid-
able political groups have led the way. As a rule the radicals when
on their own are restricted to violent tactics which require neither
a military nor a broad political base; e.g., terrorism or small
Fagen and Cornelius, op. cit., p. 401, present the following
observation on the military in politics (italics in the ori-
ginaZ) :
The military could not possibly figure so prominently
in the governance of Latin America were they not so well
integrated into the political process. By this we mean
that, however much it might shock "democratic" sensi-
bilities, the Latin American military participate in
the political process with substantial civi,ian su wort,
as members of coalitions, arbitrators of disputes,
watchdogs of the rules of the game, an extremely power-.
fuZ corporate interest group, and consumers of the
national patrimony.
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violent demonstrations. In the past, this violence usually took
place in the larger cities where the radicals resided as students
or young professionals. Although semi-political outlaw bands.
operated in several countries during the 1940s and 1950s, Castro's
campaign was perhaps the first example in some time of urban-based
radicals undertaking guerrilla warfare in the countryside.
32. The operations of these radical groups in and of them-
selves can represent a potential threat to the government and to
the collection of special interest groups it serves, The fear is
usually present, moreover, that the radicals will somehow take
dramatic advantage during a.sudden crisis of the known grievances
and suspected. bitterness of such mass groups as the poor peasants
and the. urban slumdwellers. A more immediate danger exists. of
radical control of demonstrations. by such better-organized groups
as students and trade unionists. When tensions heat, therefore,
no matter what the actual role and influence of the radicals, the
response of many a government is to blame the "Communists" and
other extremists for the troubles, and to come forcefully to the
defense of the political system. With or without the urgings of
the military and other concerned elites., states of seige are com-
monly declared and various coercive acts by the police and other
security forces are employed (e.g.; preventive arrests and even
torture and officially-sponsored terrorism). The governments know
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MWI
that loss of control of the streets to the protestants can mean
loss of office to a military junta.
33. In general, then, political violence has its practi-
tioners both within and without the centers of political power,
and the.former usually possess distinct advantages in both ex-
perience and political and military strength in any contest of
"extra-constitutionalism" that serve to block the road to power
via violence for the latter. As a consequence of this, a sudden
profusion of political violence in Latin America has not generally
meant that the political system in the affected country is facing
imminent collapse. It has often been more symptomatic of the
operation of the system according to one widely condoned alter-
native path to formal constitutionalism than of any surge of
strength on the part of the enemies of the system or weakening
of the hold on power of the entrenched elites. In fact, periodic
outbreaks of political violence have been the basis for a kind of
stability of the ruling political.system (as distinct from the
reigning government), protecting it from sudden radical changes.
. 34. Indeed, the prevalence of political violence in Latin
America has not at all meant the prevalence of revolution, in the
strict sense of the term -- that is, relatively abrupt, profound,
and lasting changes, first in political power relationships, and
then in social and economic institutions as well, by means of
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which old elites are eliminated as well as new elites formed,
Castro's changes in Cuba following the fall of Batista in 1959
would be one clear case of thoroughgoing revolution. In,contrast,
as previously underscored, most successful coups serve to redis-
tribute power amongst existing elite groups, or perhaps to add
some new groups to elite status. The losing groups are moved from
the center of power and influence, but are not eliminated from the
political scene. At times they retain not only a degree of influ-
ence on affairs but also a power to veto or apply the brakes to
more drastic political and social changes.*
35. Given the general receptivity of most of the Latin Ameri-
can countries to violence as an alternative political procedure,
under the unwritten constitution as it were, there still is a need
for specific pressures and problems -- for indications that the
politicians in office were failing to cope -- to help account for
the spate of insurgencies and coups of the 1960s. The frame of
reference by which the revolutionary insurgents on the one hand and
Latin American authorities differ in their Listings of examples
of revolution in the twentieth century according to the strict-
ness of their definition. In addition to Cuba, almost always
included are Mexico (the elimination of the influence of foreign
economic interests and their wealthy and conservative Mexican
allies, starting in 1910) and Bolivia (the removal from power
of the native tin barons, the landed oligarchy, and foreign
economic interests, starting in 1952).
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the generally conservative military establishments on the other
interpreted the requirements of the national interest and the
dangers and inequities of the status quo may have differed con-
siderably. Yet both groups were responding to the same environ-
ment of tensions, frustrations, and uncertainties. Some elements
of this environment spell out previously mentioned factors of
political instability in developing societies.
36. Slow and uneven economic growth. The pace of economic
development for most countries in Latin America has been disappoint-
ingly slow as against the requirements for assuring further develop-
ment and assuaging existing poverty. In addition, some of the
countries that have already made substantial progress towards de-
velopment -- Argentina, in particular -- have suffered the frus-
trations of a stop-and-go pattern of alternating good and bad years,
The average annual rate of economic growth for the twenty republics
as a whole during the sixties was less than five percent. Mean-
while, the region has an average rate of population growth of three
percent, the,fastest of any comparable geographic area. Thus the
per capita rate of growth of gross national product has been less
than two percent -- modest indeed for "developing countries". Dur-
ing the decade, most of the countries fell still.further behind the
pace of technological change in the developed world. And in most
countries there probably was an increase in the absolute number of
persons living under conditions of more-or-less perpetual poverty.
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37. Pace of modernization. In most of the larger countries,
modernization in the form of urbanization has been extremely rapid
in recent decades. In 1940 there were five Latin American cities
with a million or more inhabitants, and these contained a total of
about 10 million people; the comparable figures for 1970 are nearly
20 cities and over 40 million people. Much more so than when tied
to the traditional society of the countryside, these new "citizens"
constitute a destabilizing force of potentially great magnitude in
the political as well as the economic sphere. For example, because
urbanization has generally not been fueled by largescale industri-
alization or any other spur to rapid economic expansion, a stagger-
ing proportion of the adult population in the cities lacks steady
jobs. In some countries the rate of urban unemployment and under-
employment (e.g., rag pickers, lottery peddlers) runs to about 40
percent. In most cases it is difficult for the government in power
to command the political loyalty of the urban poor. Many, perhaps
most, still are indifferent to national politics, but as the poor
become politically active they tend to be attracted to the political
groups that promise them the most.
38. Discontented elites. Even when various politically-
articulate groups agree that it is time for a change and raise
similar cries for greater national independence and such, they often
cannot agree on a basic program. The radicals, usually students and
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other members of the intelligentsia, raise the banner of "Social
Justice" and insist upon instant displacement of existing institu-
tions. The military raise the banner of "Order and Progress" and
insist upon economic development as the first. priority, and upon
orderly change.
39. Nationalism. Arnold Toynbee observed in 1966 that
nationalism in South America had "become,a more important religion
than Christianity". If anything, nationalism continues to grow
more pervasive and intense. Much of it is now directed against
the unquestionable presence and real and imagined influence of
United States interests, but it takes its toll against private en-
terprise generally. Since nationalism has become everyone's issue,
it can be exploited by groups from far right to far left: across the
entire political spectrum, often at some cost to political peace.
40. Exogenous influences. Latin American elites are reminded
of their shortcomings by the examples of developed societies, capi-
talistic and socialistic. Latin America's revolutionaries are re-
minded of their timidity by such examples as Cuba and Algeria.
Latin America's religious leaders are reminded of `heir responsi-
bility for the oppressive social conditions of their flock (more
than one-third of the world's Roman Catholics) by their counter-
parts in Europe and North America.
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III.: THE RECORD OF THE SIXTIES: INSURGENCIES AND COUPS
41. More so than any change in frequency, changes in the
causes and kinds of political violence in Latin America seem to set
the sixties apart from the record of previous decades. Whereas
guerrilla insurgencies had been rare before Castro's campaign,
more than a score.of attempts to duplicate that success were
mounted during the 1960s. None did, though several still are in
the field trying. There were also more than a score of attempted
military coups; 17 succeeded in altering the presidential succes-
sion, affecting 10 countries. These coup statistics are somewhat
lower than the average for the 1940s and 1950s, But much more
significant, in Brazil, Argentina, and Peru -- respectively the
first, third, and fifth most populous of the republics -- the coups
of the sixties led to the establishment of direct rule by the mili-
tary as an institution on a more or less indefinite basis.
A. The Revolutionary Insurgencies
42. Most of the attempts at insurgency by revolutionary groups
proved feeble.and shortlived: They were more a statement of the
perpetrators' quixotic enthusiasm than of any real ability to coerce
their country into a revolutionary channel. But there were more
potent campaigns as well, that at least for a time seriously threat-
ened either the stability of the country or the government's control
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over certain districts. These included Colombia, Guatemala,
Venezeula, and towards the end of the decade, Uruguay,
43. For the purposes of this Paper, perhaps the key questions
to be addressed regarding the revolutionary insurgencies are why
they were so numerous during the sixties, and why they failed or
foundered. The factors inspiring the insurgency campaigns were
many and intertwined and have been mentioned at least in passing
earlier in the Paper: the Latin American tradition of seeking po-
litical ends through violent means; the existence of groups of
radicals, mainly students and young professionals, who were at
once idealistic, ambitious, bold, and impatient; a feeling that
the regimes in powers were vulnerable -- that the times were right;
the example of Castro's.success and the assistance he tendered to
various groups; and the general lack of alternative roads to power
-- peaceful or violent -- for those determined to promote revolu-
tionary changes in policy.
44. The impact of Cuba -- the example, the propaganda, the
camps for guerrilla training, the funds and occasionally the weapons
and key personnel as well -- was both dramatic and complicated. In
most cases it served to expand the number of youthful rebels and to
speed their conversion from talking about revolution to taking up
arms against the established order. Castro's Cuba, moreover,
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strengthened the determination on the part of Latin American radi-
cals to fight for drastic rather than cosmetic changes in society,
and encouraged the choice of guerrilla warfare as against other
violent alternatives. Nonetheless, many of the insurgents would
have engaged in some form of anti-regime warfare irrespective of
Castro's existence.and encouragement; some of the leaders of guer-
rilla movements in the 1960s had participated during the fifties
in the overthrow of military dictatorships and the establishment
of civilian regimes (e.g., in Venezuela). During the sixties the
radical groups occasionally tried their hand at mass urban distur-
bances or military coups before turning to guerrilla warfare. But
such moves were usually far beyond the, capabilities of the far left
radicals. Whatever else may be said about guerrilla campaigns in
the countryside as a road to political power in Latin America, they
can be initiated by a small number of men who have but limited re-
sources and little or no political or popular following.
45. Most of the leaders and organizers of the guerrilla in-
surgencies are fairly labelled Castroists. This is not to imply
that Cuba either created or controlled the groups, but rather that
the insurgents shared Castro's political objectives and adopted his
style of political warfare. Many of the early activists came from
the youth wings of established political parties, especially from
the orthodox (pro-Moscow) Communist parties, The latter were
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generally led by elderly men who were content with their estab-
lished (if modest) place in the political sun, and professed belief
that the viia pacifica would eventually lead to revolution, and in
any case was much less risky than the via armada. The first insur-
gents also came from dissident, radical wings of center-left par-
ties, including Venezuela's Democratic Action, which controlled the
government for most of the decade.*
46. The leading insurgents were mainly students and young pro-
fessionals; for the most part lawyers and politicians, but occasion-
ally such others as physicians, soldiers, and clergymen. The
insurgent groups also attracted a number of professional adventurers
and congenital outlaws. Some of these as well as a number with mili-
tary backgrounds moved into positions of leadership because: of their
skill in the art of guerrilla warfare. Thus a few leaders came from
relatively humble backgrounds. Most leaders, however, were members
of the urban intelligentsia and had elitist or advantaged family
backgrounds.
It would seem to me that the term revolutionary would fit those
who seek drastic changes in society but does not require that this
position be backed up with either violent action or even pres-
sures for radical changes in the short term. Thus, many Latin
American Communists, though revolutionaries, would be neither
insurgents nor radicals. The revolutionary insurgents would use
violence to bring about radical changes. They would be Castroist
if they admired Castro's particular style of violence and revo-
lutionary programs.
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47. At times the fielding of anew group of insurgents turned
on issues of personal ambition or group rivalry. In essence, the
existence of a multitude of competitive, occasionally fratricidal,
groups on the far left encouraged the formation of competitive
guerrilla movements. In some cases the orthodox Communist parties
fielded their own guerrilla groups in order to arrest the loss of
youthful members to the Castroist parties and to curb Cuba's
criticism that the Communists lacked revolutionary credentials.
Pro-Chinese and even Trotskyite, groups joined.the fray as well, and
the competition between encampments in the mountains could.mirror
that among activist students on the university campuses, At times
even these relatively small groups split over issues or personality
and ideology, and there were instances in which one guerrilla band
engaged another in combat to determine control of the movement.
48. In good part the failure of the revolutionary insur-
gencies can be traced to the contrast between the circumstances
under which Castro operated against Batista in the 1950s and those
obtaining in most of the other Latin American countries during the
1960s. The particular course of action called for by the Castro
regime, especially in the mid-sixties, served to sharpen the con-
trast. Two important principles of Cuban propaganda were that the
circumstances of Castro's success were not unique in Latin America
and that insurgents could create the conditions for the revolutionary
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overthrow of the established order even when these did not objet-,
tively exist. According to the principal prophets, Che Guevara and
Jules Regis Debray, guerrilla warfare, by setting up a nucleus of
revolutionary action in the countryside, would polarize the political
and military situation nationwide. It would attract broad peasant
support, while forcing the government into mistakes that would iso-
late it politically and weaken it militarily. In time the guerrillas
would gain the military strength to defeat the government's demor-
alized forces. But from the start guerrillas, not politicians, were
to direct the revolutionary movement; guerrilla action, not political
action, was to dominate the proceedings; and urban-based political
groups and the urban masses generally were to be ignored as not
sufficiently committed to violent revolution.*
* Robert F. Lamberg, "Che in Bolivia: The 'Revolution' that
Failed", Problems in Communiam (Washington), January .1971,
pp. 25-27, explains that three distinct phases-in the evolu-
tion of Castroist ideology on revolutionary prospects in Latin
America can be distinguished. In the first, theory was formu-
lated after the fact to glorify Castro's success against Batista.
This is exemplified by Guevara's Guerrilla Warfare, first pub-
lished in Havana in 1960. In the second phase,.the "ideological
orbit of Communism" is added to the Castroist ideology. This
can be seen in Guevara's Guerrilla Warfare: A Method, published
in Havana in 1962. The third pase, the one described in the
text, reflected Castro's disdain for the Latin American Commun-
ist parties and their general unwillingness to participate in
revolutionary insurgencies. This phase is exemplified by Debray's
Revolution in the Revolution (New York: Monthly Review Press,
1967).
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49. The complex process by which Castro did defeat Batista
defies facile explanation. Yet certain points seem clear to most
academic analysts.* Many.important conditions underlying the suc-
cess of the insurgency were relatively unique to Cuba, starting
with Castro's plenitude of political skills and, equally signi-
ficant, Batista's dearth of same. Compared to most Latin Ameri-
can countries Cuba was both relatively prosperous and chronically
unstable. The extent of official corruption, favoritism, and in-
eptitude was very considerable, especially as compared. to the other
economically advanced republics. Just as Batista was usually more
engrossed in profitable and personal diversions than in govern-
mental problems, his military and police chiefs -- conditioned by
cronyism and corruption -- were neither greatly interested nor
skilled in their professional duties. Still another factor was
the considerable extent of popular participation in the national
political process, peaceful and violent, especially as compared
with the other small and chronically unstable republics.
50. Castro's major tactical objective, following Batista's
seizure of power in 1952, had been to deliver a golpe of his own
by storming a key military installation or urban center. He,and
his small band of desperate men took up guerrilla warfare in the
A most useful analysis is Hugh Thomas, Cuba or the Pursuit of
Freedom (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1971), especially
Chapter 85.
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the Sierra Maestra in 1956 only after their plans for a direct
assault for power had been thwarted by Batista's forces. Because
of their initial weakness, during their early months in the field,
the goZpistas-turned-guerriZZeros engaged more in hiding and in
seeking support from urban-based political groups than,in armed
combat.
51. In fact, during the most active period of the insurgency
(1957-1958), Castro's.guerrillas were only one of several political
groups engaged in using violence to unseat the Batista dictatorship.
A major part of the polarization that wore away Batista's support
and augmented the ranks of his opposition was provoked by bands of
urban terrorists, some independent of, others only loosely aligned
with Castro's movement. In time the anti-Batista forces repre-
sented a broad range of politically-active Cubans. The partisan
resistance was led mostly by students and young professionals. But
these were able to gain a legion of recruits from among urban workers
and peasants on the one hand, and financial support and smuggled arms
from certain wealthy politicians and businessmen, on the other.
52. Perhaps Castro's most important contribution was to stand
defiant (amidst intense publicity at home and abroad) as a "remote
but unifying national symbol" of the anti-Batista struggle. His
remarkable political skill enabled him to keep diverse and competi-
tive opposition groups committed to the struggle more or less behind
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his leadership. Because Castro's own political views were only
loosely formed at the,time, and because his skill at telling oppo-
sition leaders what they wanted to hear about his future, political
plans was quite advanced, he came across to most of the partisans
as a suitable leader for a post-Batista coalition government. Few
expected either a totalitarian or a revolutionary regime. In a
sense then Batista was overthrown more by the politics of political
violence than by the actual combat.es The coalition of political
forces behind his regime began to crumble as the resistance groups
provoked him into draconian security measures, which not only failed
to staunch the insurgency but also sped his political isolation.
Groups that had opportunistically supported his regime began to
search for some new constellation of political forces under which
to ply their special interests. The end came quickly when.the
United States withdrew its support of Batista in December 1958.
This act sapped the remaining morale of Batista's forces, greatly
encouraged the partisans (now relieved of fears that US intervention
would somehow save Batista), and sprung many of the remaining fence-
sitters -- including the Cuban Communist party -- into the opposition
camp.
Thomas, op.cit. pa 1040, estimates that Batista's Losses in the
war against Castro were probably no more than 300 men, from an
army of more than 30,000.
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53. Castro's broad initial popularity in Cuba, in 1959, was
matched elsewhere in Latin America, among moderates as well, as
radicals. The range of his appeal shrank sharply during the,early
1960s as his regime proved to be radical and revolutionary, totali-
tarian as well as dictatorial (the elimination of political factions
probably alarmed former wellwishers more than the: elimination of
elections), and closely-bound to the Soviet Union. Both Castro
and Guevara have made the point that they had.an advantage over
subsequent Latin American insurgencies in that-bourgeois forces in
Cuba and in the United States were confused as to where their in-
terests lay during the anti-Batista struggle. The later insurgen-
cies, in contrast, were self-defined as radical and revolutionary
from the start. Moderate and conservative forces, especially the
ruling elements at home and the US government, were forewarned.
Thus the insurgencies in their formative stages had little chance
of gaining broad political support, or of being ignored or toler-
ated as unimportant by the government.
54. In a sense the subsequent insurgencies suffered for the
lack of another Castro. While some of the leaders were perhaps.his
superior as military tactician, none could match his skill at po-
litical warfare. But perhaps even more important, there was not
to be another Batista -- both ineffective and unpopular, failing
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either to isolate the guerrillas politically or to bloody.them
militarily.* The regimes under attack fought back with a combina-
tion of moves, including, in most cases, at least a minimum of
political finesse and attention to strengthening the combat abili-
ties of the military and police through US assistance. The dominant
character of the responses in fact ranged from a.superb campaign of
political isolation in Venezuela to a brutal counter-terror cam-
paign in Guatemala.
55. Usually the process of political isolation was simple
enough. The guerrilla leaders, as a rule, were urban.and urbane in
character and both national and ideological in political approach.
This alone set them apart from the great bulk of campesinos, who
were cautious if not outright conservative -- married as it were to
the everyday practical problems of survival in the patria chica
(village), with little time or thought for the problems and pros-
pects of the patria grande. By and large they preferred to keep
the little they had in life rather than risk it in battle against
the patron and his army. They believed it wiser to hope that those
in power would grow more benign, rather than struggle to alter the
hierarchy of things. Even where the peasants had already been
A Colombian guerrilla leader once e.pZained his Zack of success
by observing that "we needed a Batista but had a Lleras" (re-
ferring to the then President LZeras Restrepo).
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politicized (as in Venezuela where they had been organized by the
center-left political parties), they tended to look upon the revo-
lutionary insurgents as aliens. In most cases the peasants probably
would have preferred not to take sides; but when they did they
usually favored the army with the information and cooperation needed
to.hunt down the guerrillas.
56. The process of military combat was often just as straight-
forward. Even armies that had little combat experience, and perhaps
little staying power if matters got rough, were not much tested by
guerrilla groups that had no combat experience and faced great dif-
ficulties in taking root. A number of insurgency groups were wiped
out soon after they surfaced as combatants. Soon after taking power
in 1959, Castro sponsored or sanctioned filibustering expeditions to
Panama, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti that were destroyed or dis-
persed upon landing (a fate Castro narrowly escaped when he landed
in Cuba, from Mexico, in 1956). Attempts by revolutionaries to field
groups in northern Argentina (1963), southern Brazil (1964), and cen-
tral Peru (1965) lasted only for the time it took for the military to
reach and comb the combat zone. The fighting phase of Cuevara's
famous guerrilla adventure in Bolivia.(1967) lasted little more than
six months.
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57. Each of the insurgencies, in truth, was characterized by
a unique combination of features, in terms not only of the political
and military responses of the host government, but also of the
general state of politics, the personal and group dynamics on the
revolutionary left, the role of Cuba and the local Communist. party,
the choice of battleground, and popular reactions both in general
and in the combat zone.*
58. Urban Terrorism. Che Guevara's failure in Bolivia under-
scored the futility of artificially inseminated guerrilla campaigns
in the countryside and sped the movement-among revolutionary insur-
gents towards concentration on warfare in their home grounds through
campaigns of urban terrorism. Such campaigns of course had been in-
tegral parts of the revolutionary warfare in both Venezuela and
Guatemala during the early 1960s. While the disruptive effect had
been very considerable, at least in Venezuela the urban warfare had
tended to alienate the general public without seriously weakening the
government or enhancing the revolutionary prospects of the insurgent
forces. For the most part the urban guerrillas in. the late 1960s
The original text contains sketches of t'he campaigns in Bolivia,
Colombia, Guatemala, Peru, and Venezuela, following para. 57;
and of those in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, the D.R., and Uruguay,
following para. 58.
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faced similar problems; they carried their campaigns into the early
seventies still in need of a strategy to convert their powerful
capacity for disruption into a revolutionary force.
B. The Military Coups
59. As with the revolutionary insurgencies, each of the
military coups during the 1960s was characterized by unique cir-
cumstances, including various combinations of push from within
the military establishments for power and perquisites and puZZ
from either the societies at large or the political systems in
distress. From 1960 through 1969 there were 17 military coups
that either led to a period of military rule or otherwise affected
the presidential succession. Several coup attempts were quashed
when the bulk of the security forces remained loyal to the govern-
ment; e.g., in Venezuela in 1960-1962. And of course a large
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number of plots seeded by one or another discontented military
faction aborted in the formative stages.*
60. Some optimistic observers had hoped that the advent of
the 1960s would give rise to an era of relatively low profile for
the military in politics in Latin America. Indeed, there appeared
to be a "Twilight of the Tyrants" as a consequence of the removal
from power of most of the military strongmen of the 1950s: General
Peron in Argentina, General Rojas Pinilla in Colombia, General
Batista in Cuba, General Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, General
Perez Jimenez in Venezuela. Yet by the end of the decade, military
The actual number of successful coups depends upon how many mar-
ginal cases are included. The present total of Z7 is derived
as follows:
Argentina (two): the overthrow of President Frondizi in 1962,
and of President IZZia in 1966; Bolivia (two): the overthrow
of President Paz Estenssoro in 1964, and of President Salinas
in 19fl9; Brazil (two): the military's limitation of President
Goulart's executive powers in 1961, and the overthrow of Goulart
in 1964; Dominican Republic (two): the overthrow of President
Bosch in 1963, and of the Reid Cabral government in 1965;
Ecuador (two): the overthrow of President VeZasco in 1961, and
of President Arosemena in 1963; Guatemala (one): the overthrow
of President Ydigoras in 1963; Honduras (one): the overthrow
of President Villeda in 1963; Panama (one): the overthrow of
President Arias in 1968; Peru (two): the overthrow of Presi-
dent Prado in 1962, and of President Belaunde in 1968;
El Salvador (two): the overthrow of the Lemus government in
1960, and of the resultant military junta in 1961.
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influence in politics had rebounded strongly. The military as an
institution ruled more or less directly in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Panama, and Peru; while in the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala,
Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and El Salvador the President
of the Republic was either a military officer or a civilian more or
less regularly concerned about the political temperament of the armed
forces. The military also play a prominent role in Cuba, where it is
difficult to decide whether Castro is essentially a military or civil-
ian ruler. Chile, Colombia, Uruguay, and perhaps Venezuela now have
fairly well.established traditions of civilian domination of the mili-
tary, though in periods of acute political stress concern about possible
military intervention can still arise, as was the case during the presi-
dential elecitons of 1970 in both Chile and Colombia. That would
leave Mexico which has a firmly established tradition of civilian
domination and Costa Rica which disbanded its military forces some
20 years ago.
61. One common thread of the political preoccupation of the
variously constituted military establishments of Latin America during
the 1960s was fear of uncontrolled political and social change that
could endanger their perquisites and residual political influence on
the one hand, and their view of the national security and welfare on
the other. Still worse, perhaps, from the military point of view in
many countries would be rapid and radical change directed by civilian
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politicians and groups considered to be the enemy of the military,
and by extension the enemy of the people. In a way, the example of
Cuba, where the Castro regime destroyed the old military establish-
ment and executed a large number of senior officers, depicted the
ultimate disaster to be avoided. These concerns, of course, were
sometimes conceived of and invariably paraded in terms of the
national interest. In some cases, especially in the smaller, less
sophisticated republics, fear of revolutionary violence and of
revolutionary successes and excesses caused the military, when they
intervened, to cling to the old ways more tightly than ever. But
in a number of countries, especially the larger ones, where the
military establishments were relatively more professional and
sophisticated, these same fears and concerns propelled the mili-
tary into the role of directing and monitoring the course of change.
62. In the smaller republics, where the military and most
other institutions are still characterized by a high degree of per-
sonalism and a correspondingly low degree of professionalism, the
bulk of the military coups turned around that most threatening of
political events -- the national election. In 1963, in both Guate-
mala and Honduras the military cast out the incumbent civilian
government to preempt the scheduled presidential election, which
the military feared would elevate to power an "unacceptable" candi-
date. In Guatemala the feared candidate was former president Juan
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Jose Arevalo, whose previous administration (1945-1951) had been
decidedly to the left by Guatemalan standards, and who (in 1963) was
suspected by the military of pre-Communist and pro-Castroist ten-
dencies. In Honduras the leading candidates had pledged to organize
a popular militia to counteract the political influence of the mili-
tary. In both countries, after a period of military rule, elections
for a new president were once again held, though this in no way
signaled a general retreat from a large political role by the mili-
tary.
63. In the Dominican Republic in 1963 the military overthrew
President Juan Bosch, seven months after he took office, Conserva-
tives in and out of the military feared that the Bosch administration
-- both through its reformist policies and its ineptitude -- would
undermine their special interests and at the same time open the way
for general political tumult and increased Communist influence. In
Panama in 1968 President Arnulfo Arias was cast out of office by the
National Guard eight days after his inauguration. This was the
third time he had been elected President, only to be sent packing
via a coup. The predominant reason was fear within.the National
Guard that Arias intended a reorganization to place friendly offi-
cers in charge and otherwise reduce the independence of the military.
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64. Even in the smaller republics the issue was not always
that of a conservative military versus a reformist civilian admin-
istration. General Omar Torrijos, ruling as head of the Panamanian
National Guard, has demonstrated hostile attitudes towards.the con-
servative elite groups that have traditionally dominated the country,
and he has attempted to introduce reform programs to assist the
lower classes, including the lower middle class from which he
springs. In Ecuador in 1963 the military ousted President Carlos
Julio Arosemena largely because of his public displays of drunken-
ness. Once in office the military attempted to introduce a series
of reform measures that were quite.forwardlooking for this conser-
vative and elitist republic. For their troubles, the military were
thrown out of office in 1966 by a countercoup sponsored by the much
concerned Guayaquil Chamber of Commerce.
65. Factionalism within the military and changes in the dom-
inant current of military thought were also complicating factors.
President Arosemena had been put into office by the military in
1961, succeeding from the vice-presidency when the military over-
threw President Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra. In El Salvador, the
military coup of September 1960 threw over a conservative military
ruler; when the newly constituted junta proved too radical for the
dominant group in the military, a new coup in January 1961 estab-
lished a moderate-reformist junta. The 1965 civil war in the
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Dominican Republic was precipitated when pro-Bosch military offi-
cers overthrew the civilian-directed junta (Reid Cabral) established
by the more conservative officers after their 1963 overthrow of
Bosch.
66. One thing the record of the 1960s makes clear is that the
professionalization of the armed forces in the larger and relatively
more sophisticated countries did not in itself quash the military's
drive to intervene in politics. Certain trends can be perceived as
these countries underwent the processes of economic development and
mdoernization. As the civilian institutions became stronger and
more professional, so indeed did the military, with its high coimand
taking on the character of a corporate board of directors rather
than, as formerly, a cabal of charismatic soldiers of fortune, But
then, the very processes of modernization and the usually rocky
course of economic development ushered in new tensions and crises
that greatly taxed, and at times overwhelmed, the cohesion and
flexibility of the political system. Meanwhile, in their efforts
to base promotions on merit and to keep up with the complexities of the
modern world, the military had been sending senior officers to schools
of advanced studies, whose courses cover the requirements of national
security from the point of view of economic and political problems
and "solutions". The new military, now increasingly technocratic as
well as bureaucratic, judged the performance of the civilian leadership
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by more sophisticated standards than formerly, and when they found it
wanting, they were ready once again to step in to set things right.
67. This is more or less the rationale behind the military
governments now ruling in Brazil (since 1964), Argentina (since
1966), and Peru (since 1968). It is obviously an idealized and
self-serving interpretation, but not.for what it includes as much
as for what it omits. In each case the military were concerned
about a growing political malaise, mounting economic difficulties,
and rising social tensions that they saw as threats both to the
prospects for national development and to the integrity of the
national character and institutions. They believed that inepti-
tude and excessive partisanship on the part of civilian political
leaders, as well as the selfishness and shortsightedness of the
social and economic elites generally, could produce an uncontrolled
collapse of the existing social order and open the way to power to
unprincipled extremist groups and demagogues. The military, more-
over, believed that they had the training, institutional structure,
and will to put into effect the changes needed to spur national
development and progress without undue disorder and disruption.
68. But in all three countries there was also fear (if not
also hatred) of a particular political group whose actual or pros-
pective control of the government threatened the independent role
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of the military as arbiter of the national interest: The Peron-
ists in Argentina, the political heirs of dictator Getulio Vargas
in Brazil (i.e., the Getulistas), and the Apristas in Peru (sup-
porters of perennial presidential candidate Victor Raul Haya de la
Torre). Moreover, there were individual officers, including some
prominent in the early stages of coup plotting, who were interested
in enhancing their personal status or power through a change of
government. Although these elements of push are also part of the
story, the following sketches of the major military regimes em-
phasize the elements of pull that brought the military to power
and the programs and problems that have characterized their rule.*
IV. INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS
69. In all the major instances of political violence in Latin
America during the 1960s, there was present some noteworthy foreign
aspect, at least of indirect influence if not also of direct in-
volvement. Yet only rarely did the foreign element appear to be
the decisive one in the outcome of the affair. Foreign influence
and intervention could and did affect the timing, character, and
course of a revolutionary insurgency or military coup, but the
* Country studies of Argentina, Brazil, and Peru are omitted
in this version.
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relative political skill and strength of the domestic adversaries
almost always determined the outcome. This was particularly true
in South America where the remoteness of the battlegrounds and the
complexity of domestic institutions tended to raise the cost and
lower the effectiveness of attempts dt intervention by foreign
parties directed against the control and policies of the ruling
governments and elites. -
70. Admittedly, it often is extremely difficult to separate
domestic from foreign elements in a political crisis. This would
especially be the case in the smaller and relatively less sophis-
ticated republics of the Caribbean, where the behavior of domestic
contestants for power is at times heavily conditioned by their
awareness of the overwhelming might and ubiquitous interests of the
United States, not to mention the past record of intervention in
local affairs by the "Colossus of the North".
71 While the United States is much less omnipresent in most
South American countries, even here it.almost always is engaged at-
.least indirectly in major political crises, if only because the key
assume
domestic participants/(often with exaggeration) that the wishes
and actions of one or another of the multitude of groups represent-
ing US interests will affect the outcome. Thus the domestic ad-
versaries tend to move either to assure the benefit to their cause
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or to counteract the harm from anticipated US moves. One scholarly
study of political crises during the early and mid-1960s has de-
scribed the impact of the United States on the "decisional environ-
ment" in Latin America as follows:*
One need not subscribe to classical economic thoories
of imperialism to appreciate that most Latin American coun-
tries are extremely vulnerable to penetration by men, money,
and ideas from the United States. Certain characteristics
of Latin American economies . . ., the beliefs of substantial
segments of the politically relevant population o . ., and
the weakness and paucity of developmental cadres and entre-
preneurial talent lead easily to dependence relationships
with the United States. Even were the United States not
partially responsible for the conditions that have led to
this dependence, the overwhelming political, economic,
military, and cultural hegemony of the United States within
the hemisphere would assure much the same situation. So
massive is -his hegemony, that were accurate measures avail-
able, we would probably find that no two Latin American
nations are as directly linked politically, economically,
technologically, militarily, and culturally with each other
as with the United States. Expressed differently, for all
Latin American nations (including Cuba in a special sense)
the "most significant other" is the United States.
72. In the most general sense, then whatever the United
States does or does not do in the midst of a political crisis is
likely to have some impact one its course and character -- again
especially in the smaller, historically more dependent Caribbean
republics. John Bartlow Martin, former US Ambassador to the
Fagen and Cornelius, op. cit.., p. 407.
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Dominican Republic, has.described how active interposition by
the United States.stayed the hand of military plotters against
President Juan Bosch during the early part of his seven month
term of office. According to Ambassador Martin, when reports of
an impending military coup arose once again in September 1963, he
was instructed by the State Department not to intervene on the
grounds that Bosch would somehow have to save his own skin sooner
or later. The United States, therefore, did not interpose its
will against that of the military plotters, and the coup came on
swiftly and, for the moment, bloodlessly.*
73. Thus, despite this pervasive presence as a willing or
unwilling participant in Latin American crises, the wishes and
actions of the United States are rarely the decisive factor in
the outcome -- unless the local forces are in close and precarious
balance, or unless the United States is willing and able to under-
take massive and direct intervention. For good reasons or bad the
United States government wished the more conservative forces to
triumph in the bloody civil war that erupted in the Dominican
Republic some 18 months after Bosch's ouster. Small and indirect
favors could not turn the tide of battle; only the intervention of
a large US military force did.
John Bartlow Martin, Overtaken by Events (NY: Doubleday, 1966).
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74. It is clear, moreover, that the actual influence of the
United States on Latin American affairs in general and crises of
political violence in particular diminished as the decade proceeded
and the force of Latin American nationalism expanded, and with it
the general discontent with the US hegemony over hemispheric rela-
tionships. Perhaps this trend was most clearly illustrated by the
declining ability of the United States to influence the timing and
direction of military coups. As previously indicated, the direct
participation of the Latin American military in national politics
is a basic indigenous institution, and not an episodic aberration
or a foreign transplant. This is not to gainsay US influence,
assiduously cultivated, over most of the Latin American military
establishments. But influence does not spell control, especially
when the local military establishment's interpretation of the
national interest pushes or pulls it in a direction opposite to
the advice proffered, openly or privately, by representatives of
the US government. Indeed, most of the military coups during the
decade represented an embarrassment to the United States and a
setback to official policy. Then again, the coups in Panama and
Peru in 1968 and in Bolivia in 1969-1970 produced military govern-
ments that were distinctly more hostile to close cooperation with
US interests than the governments that previously had ruled in
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75. In the infrequent instances when the United States
appeared to welcome a military coup -- most notably in Brazil in
1964 -- this fact probably facilitated the execution of the coup.
When Washington decided it no longer could cooperate with the
Coulart administration, the reduction of economic assistance and
the other evidence of estrangement contributed to the polarization
of pDlitical forces that precipitated the coup, In time, private
assurances of a resumption of close relations were no doubt ex-
changed between representatives of the US government and the mili-
tary and civilian plotters. The decisive factor by far, however,
was the perception by most of the senior military officers and by
a broad spectrum of influential civilian groups of the danger to
their special interests and to the national welfare posed by Goulart's
policies. Put another way, once the military and civilian elites
decided that Goulart had to be removed from office, it would have
taken a massive and direct intervention by the United States to
have stayed the coup for long -- doubtless many times the number of
troops used in the Dominican intervention the following year.
76. In most cases, US assistance to the governments engaged
in countering a revolutionary insurgency was facilitated by the
relative political isolation of the insurgents and the reasonably
strong public mandate for the government under attack to eradicate
them. The equipment, training, and advice -- to military, police,
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and intelligence forces -- was instrumental in defeating or con-
taining the insurgencies, but it probably was not the decisive
factor in any country. The revolutionaries simply lacked the
strength to overthrow the established order. Even in Bolivia,
where the security forces were particularly ineffective to start,
Guevara's forces were close to exhaustion, if not also to defeat,
when the army units benefitting from US assistance closed in for
the kill.
77. For most Latin American countries, Cuba was probably the
second most important other (after the United States) during the
1960s. Not only did Castro's example and assistance encourage a
host of revolutionary insurgencies, but the events in Cuba re-
shaped the parameters of the political dialogue generally. The
record of the sixties would show, nonetheless, that it is extremely
difficult to "export a revolution", especially by a country with
Cuba's limited resources. In a sense, Castro could neither convert
the doubting by turning his own revolution into a showcase of solu-
tions for Latin American problems nor adequately fund his foreign
disciples so as to tip the local balance of forces to their favor,
78. To some extent the Cuban attempt to intervene in the
affairs of neighboring countries appeared to work to the net dis-
advantage of revolutionary forces. Castro's promotion of guerrilla
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insurgencies exacerbated fractional conflicts among the forces on
the far left, and stimulated a greater defensive effort by the en-
dangered elites and by the United States (in terms of assistance
to Latin American security forces). Meanwhile, evidence of Cuban
intervention, which was most blatant in Venezuela and Bolivia,
appeared to incerase the political mandate for a government crack-
down on radical forces generally and for the acceptance of US assis-
tance towards the end.
79. One reason that Castro has so little to show for his
efforts was the lack of positive support on the part of the Soviet
Union. Indeed for most of the decade Soviet-Cuban differences on
the issue of promotion of the revolutionary insurgencies created an
intense strain in their relationship generally. The Castro position
was that insurgencies had to be encouraged in all countries, no
matter what the attitude of the local Communist party. Castro was
motivated by a combination of factors, including the feeling that
a "Second Cuba" was important to the survival of his regime, and the
drive to establish his credentials as a revolutioanry leader in his
own right by manifesting his independence of Soviet domination. The
vituperative clashes with the Soviet Union reached a height during
1966-1967, when the Venezuelan Communist Party, with Soviet blessing,
renounced the via armada and abandoned the Castroist MIR. Starting
in 1968, however, and continuing into the early 1970s, Castro appeared
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gradually and grudgingly to accept the Soviet position that guer-
rilla insurgencies were only one of several possible roads for
revolutionary forces to follow. Castro was probably influenced,
on the one hand, by his continuing heavy dependence upon Soviet
economic and military assistance; and, on the other hand, by the
failure of the guerrilla insurgencies (especially Guevara's in
Bolivia) and by the success of "progressive forces" through such
means as military coup in Peru and presidential election in Chile.
Although Castro's conversion would probably be sorely tested by
the emergence of promising new insurgent groups, his assistance to
the ongoing insurgencies did appear to decline noticeably during
the last years of the '1960s.
80. For a time in the early sixties, the Soviet Union, or at
least Premier Kruschchev, appeared to be more open.to a bold course
in Latin America. Castro's willingness to denounce Cuba's historic
ties to the United States and his self-proclaimed adherence to the
Communist bloc apparently caught the Soviet Union by surprise. Pre-
viously the Soviets had concluded that the US hegemony over Latin
America was relatively impregnable, certainly over the short term.
But in a major policy statement, in January 1961, expressing Soviet
support of "wars of national liberation" against "corrupt, reaction-
ary regimes", as well as against colonial powers, Krusc.hchev gave
special prominence to Castro's success and spoke of a dramatic weak-
ening of US domination over Latin America in general. The extent of
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Soviet support to Cuba in the early 1960s, including military sup-
port, may in part have been related to the perception of an oppor-
tunity throughout Latin America to reduce the US position sharply
and quickly.
81. But after the sobering experience of the missile crisis
of 1962, the Soviet Union reverted to a basically cautious and
pragmatic policy in regard to supporting revolutionary insurgencies
in Latin America. For the most part the Soviet Union concentrated
instead on a program of increasing its influence gradually through
an expansion of state-to-state relations. The role Moscow saw for
the local Communist parties (and which most of the local party
leaders readily accepted) was as part of the "progressive" bloc
of political forces working towards changes in society and foreign
policy through legitimate means. This course required a dexterous
discretion when it came to Soviet support of violent revolution.
As Castro was to charge, the Soviet Union placed its national in-
terests above its commitment to promote World Revolution as an end
in itself. The intermediate goals of building Soviet prestige (and
also covert assets) while at the same time encouraging a decline in
US influence were substituted for serious advocacy of the ultimate
goal of revolutionary destruction of the old order (the only goal
that Castro recognized).
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82. The Soviet policy enjoyed a certain measure of success
even before its stunning vindication in Chile in 1970, which saw
the election of a Marxist government with strong Communist party
participation. At the start of the 1960s the Soviet Union had had
diplomatic relations only with Argentina, Mexico, and Uruguay.
Cuba was added in 1960, and then followed all of the South Ameri-
can republics save Paraguay: Brazil in 1961; Chile in 1965;
Colombia in 1968; Peru in 1969; and Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela
in 1970. Promotion of lines of trade and aid as well as cultural
exchanges also characterized the Soviet approach. And although
both economic and diplomatic relations were characterized by a
considerable caution they did demonstrate the new reach of the
Soviet Union as a worldwide power. Interestingly enough, the
Soviets worked to keep all established lines open, even when
military governments came to power that used stringent, at times
draconian, measures against local revolutionary forces (e.g.,
Brazil).
83. The Soviet Union's decision to concentrate on promoting
the via pac fiea involved a series of calculations in addition to
its satisfaction with the seeming success of the policy of building
influence through state relations. These included the low priority
assigned to Latin America as an arena for a dramatic breakthrough
in influence as compared to other arenas of Soviet interest, such
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as the Middle East and the Indian Ocean, The Soviets, in addition,
held a very high respect for the ability of the United States to
bring great power to bear when and where it chose during a crisis
in Latin America. The Soviets apparently concluded that with the
available assets the via armada would prove counterproductive if
not also suicidal for the local Communists. In general, the Soviets
believed that time was on their side, that the historical tide of
the US hegemony in Latin America was running out on the basis of
local factors and would continue to do so without the assumption,
by the Soviet Union, of great costs or risks. Thus, although the
Soviet Union did support revolutionary violence when the local party
took the initiative -- as from time to time in Colombia, Guatemala,
and Venezuela -- by the end of the decade it had accepted (if not
also encouraged) a damping down of the insurgencies and the estab-
lishment of state relations with Colombia and Venezuela.
84. I have mentioned the missile crisis of 1962 as a turning
point in Soviet policy towards Latin America. While any detailed
assessment of the missile crisis would lie beyond the scope of this
Paper, some observations on the triangle of US-Cuban-Soviet rela-
tions in the early 1960s could serve to underscore the unique charac-
teristics that set the international aspects of this crisis apart
from those of the general course of political violence in Latin
America during the decade. Whatever may be said in the light of the
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values of the early 1970s, the course of US policy towards Cuba
in the early 1960s appeared solidly grounded in the then histori-
cal and contemporary values of US foreign policy. These included
the 130-year quest, under the Monroe Doctrine and its corollaries,
to exclude extra-hemispheric powers from the exercise of influence
over the affairs of the Caribbean republics; the 60 years of US
intervention, direct and indirect, in Cuban political affairs; and
the more than 10 years of the anti-Communist standard of the Cold
War.
85. Thus the US government, despite the dissent of some
officials, came to interpret Castro's strident anti-US policies
and his grasping for economic, political, and military ties with
the Communist countries as a damaging blow to US prestige and
national interests and as a potentially major danger to its nation-
al security, The argument that Castro was propelled to his course
by deep resentment of past US intervention and fear of future ones
seemed beside the point to most Washington officials and political
leaders.* US organization and training of a force of anti-Castro
Presidential aspirant John F. Kennedy, writing in April 1960,
stressed that Castro had betrayed the ideals of his own revo-
lution by transforming Cuba into a "hostile and militant
Communist satellite."
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Cuban exiles was begun in 1960 under the Eisenhower administration;
the ill-fated assault against the Bay of Pigs was dispatched in
April 1961 under the Kennedy administration. This attempt at
"export of counter-revolution" proved a dismal failure for a multi-
tude of reasons, not the least of which were underestimating
Castro's hold on his country and overestimating the ability of the
exiles to do the job without major participation in the assault by
US military forces.
86. In the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs episode, Castro's
hold on Cuba and his prestige elsewhere in Latin America were
further enhanced. His petitions to the Soviet Union for additional
military support were strengthened, or at the least the Soviet will-
ingness to risk a growing military involvement in Cuba was streng-
thened. Finally the level of Soviet influence in Cuba, including
the size of the Soviet military presence that the United States was
forced to tolerate, was appreciably enlarged. But President Kennedy
made it clear that his government drew the line at "offensive weapons"
-- those by which an attack on the United States could be launched
from Cuba. Offensive nuclear missiles would not be tolerated.
87. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union, for complex and still
partly obscure reasons -- military, political, diplomatic -- in-
stalled intermediate and medium range missiles in Cuba. Kruschchev
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apparently was surprised by the forcefulness of the US response
and the sharp drawing of alternatives for the Soviet Union: on
the one hand, either conventional war in the Caribbean or allout
nuclear war, neither of which Moscow was prepared to risk; on the
other hand, a rather humiliating withdrawal of the offending weapons,
which Moscow accepted. At least in retrospect it seems clear that
Kruschchev misjudged not only President Kennedy's character in a
crisis but also the range of options he faced as President of the
United States. It can be argued that the introduction of Soviet
missiles into Cuba did not in itself alter the strategic. balance
of m litany power that favored the United States over the Soviet
Union, or in any other way directly threaten US survival and secur-
ity. As one authority put it -- the stakes were "primarily a
matter of prestige, propaganda, and politics" . These, however,
were fine and porous distinctions from the President's point of
view. A serious (perhaps humiliating) loss of prestige abroad
and of confidence at home, while the Antagonist gained greatly
in prestige and confidence -- surely the way the Kennedy admin-
istration saw the stakes -- was hard to separate, then as now,
from a major setback to the national security.
88. In any case the US victory in the missile crisis was con-
siderably qualified, by the standards of the early 1960s. The
Soviet Union was permitted to maintain a position of considerable
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influence over a small Caribbean republic, including a substantial
conventional military presence; Castro's freedom to pursue policies
inimical to US interests elsewhere in Latin America were not much
curbed. In extending a pledge not to invade Cuba as a quid pro quo
for Soviet withdrawal of the "offensive weapons", the US, in effect,
was accepting a distinct reduction of its traditional hegemonic
powers over the Western Hemisphere. The US government apparently
recognized that Soviet "prestige, propaganda, and politics" were
also heavily engaged in Cuba, and therefore decided not to risk push-
ing its victory in the world's first nuclear crisis too hard for too
much.
89. From the point of view of the US government. qua
protector of its position of power in the Western Hemisphere,
then, its earlier reaction to the conversion of Cuba from a
quasi-dependency to a self-proclaimed Communist state with mili-
tary ties to the Soviet Union had been a case of too little-too
late. While the missile crisis itself was favorably resolved,
future direct action against the Castro regime was limited by the
recognition of a substantial Soviet stake in its survival. Rea-
soning along lines such as these was probably one of the key in-
fluences on the US reaction to the civil war in the Dominican
Republic in April 1965, in which the United States moved quickly,
massively, and essentially unilaterally to void any prospect of
a "Second Cuba".
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90. As previously indicated, after the September 1963 coup
against President Bosch, the military turned the government over
to a junta, presided over by a conservative businessman, Donald
Reid Cabral. By 1965 the Reid government had managed to antagonize
most of the important political factions, including the conserva-
tive military officers and the pro-Bosch forces in and out of the
army. The civil war was set off by a coup against Reid by pro-
Bosch junior officers. This force soon adopted the name "Consti-
tutionalist", and attracted civilian supporters ranging from poli-
tical moderates to members of the country's several fractious and
minuscule Communist parties. After some hesitation, the conserva-
tive military forces fought back for control. Both sides turned
to the US Embassy for support -- testimony to the extent of past
US intervention in Dominican affairs. The Embassy, and soon there-
after the government in Washington, decided it was essential to
block the Constitutionalists from power, because of concern that
the Communists and Castroists would stand some chance of seizing
control of the movement. When a Constitutionalist victory appeared
imminent, therefore, the United States dispatched a large force of
troops to terminate the military phase of the civil war and to open
the way for a negotiated political settlement-under US supervision
(though titularly under the supervision of the Organization of
American States). Resistance by extremists and diehards was
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quashed by the "Loyalist" Dominican military, now emboldened by
the presence of US forces,
91. A multitude of views, mostly critical, have been ex-
pressed on whether the US intervention was necessary, wise, and
properly executed. Much depends on alternative interpretations
of the role the United States should play towards political vio-
lence in the Caribbean, and of the course Dominican politics
would have followed if the United States had not intervened in
so direct and massive a manner. In terms of the fundamental
problems of Dominican development over the long term, little was
accomplished by the US intervention. But in terms of the imme-
diate US goal of averting a risk to its national interests judged
to be unacceptable, the intervention was "successful". The Castro
regime had a large emotional stake in the Dominican civil war; it
complained bitterly about the US intervention in Havana and at the
UN, but took no provocative action. The Soviet Union, with no,stake
and perhaps limited interest, made all of the obvious debater's
points about the iniquity and provocation of US action, but it too
saw no point in becoming involved, once the US had demonstrated
the extent of its concern.
92. The Dominican intervention, along with the much more
important Vietnam War, did contribute also to an increased
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expression within the United States against the foreign policy of
acting as "World Policeman" and defender of friendly (basically
conservative) governments and political forces. This was one of
the factors underlying the cautious and pragmatic US reaction to
the staunchly anti-US stance of the military government in Peru
following the 1968 coup. In addition to the changing times and
values, there were other obvious differences that set the Domini-
can and Peruvian cases apart. Peru was not in the Caribbean.
Because of the external unity of the military establishment and
the regime's successful manipulation of the rallying cry of na-
tionalism, there was neither a civil war nor even a crisis atmos-
phere in Lima. One additional factor is also worth noting. From
the point of view of the US government the Peruvian military regime
was judged to represent a formidable political force whose nation-
alism served to protect against the kind of vacuum that swept the
Castro regime into the Soviet orbit. Thus, the anti-US policies
-- however unpleasant to the US interests directly in the firing
line -- were judged not likely to provide open-ended opportunities
for an increase in Soviet influence. The Peruvian regime itself
repeatedly asserted its rejection of Communism per se as well as
of undue influence on Peruvian affairs by any foreign power. The
US government in recognizing the extent to which Peru's nationalism
was a native product, seemed also to recognize that the anti-US
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direction of the nationalism was a native reaction against the
previously ubiquitous presence of US interests, and not the pro-
duct of a foreign conspiracy. However irrational from a US in-
terpretation of Peruvian national interests this nationalism might
seem, the United States was prepared to try to live with it, and
to seek new terms -- if possible -- for renewed cooperation.
93. The Soviet Union has in fact moved cautiously to see
to what extent it might increase its influence in Peru. Diplo-
matic relations were established in 1969, and a search for mutually
satisfactory terms for some large economic aid projects was begun.
For their part, the Peruvian military, with some exceptions, seem
to approach any increase in relations with the Soviet Union as a
risky proposition that has to be justified on the basis of clear
advantages to Peru.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
94. The central thesis of this Paper has been that poli-
tical violence.-- the use of coercion in, domestic politics -- is
a fundamental part of the political system in most Latin American
countries. As a consequence, important groups with a major stake
in the preservation of the general political and social system
utilize violence to manipulate that system -- to protect special
interests, solve national problems, exit from political impasses,
control the pace and direction of change. Political violence is.
therefore not the exclusive province of revolutionaries bent on
destroying the system. The practitioners of political violence
from within the center of political power -- especially the mili-
tary establishments -- usually hold great advantages in any con-
test of "extraconstitutionalism" that tend to block the road to
power via violence on the part of small radical groups working
from without the center of power. The record of the 1960s: None
of the multitude of revolutionary insurgencies succeeded in over-
throwing the established order; most of the attempted military
coups succeeded in seizing political power, in some cases -- par-
ticularly Peru -- to effect far-reaching changes in policy under
military control.
95. Despite their failure to achieve political power, or in
most cases even to weaken seriously the hold on power of the
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established elites, the revolutionary insurgencies had an impor-
tant impact on the general political milieu in Latin America. Al-
though it is difficult to isolate the impact of the revolutionaries
from that of the many other forces for change operating during the
decade, they apparently did contribute to the greater urgency of
the search for new solutions to old problems on the part of groups
close to the center of power, including the military and the Church.
In a sense, the nucleus of political and social power, especially
in the larger and relatively more sophisticated countries, is shift-
ing from the relative center of the political spectrum towards what
formerly would have been considered one or another edge. This may
be seen in the growing nationalism of most regimes, civilian and
military, including the expansion of state controls and ownership
at the expense of private enterprise, domestic and foreign, In
some interpretations this is seen as a reaction against European
and North American. models of either right, center, or left, and a
return to the Hispanic and colonial traditions of statism. What
is new is the growing awareness that this state power must take
greater account of the real and symbolic needs of the general popu-
lation, if the old centripetal forces of society are not to be over-
whelmed altogether. But even where military regimes have overcome
both their former aversion to rapid change and the formal constitu-
tional barriers, the magnitude of the problems, the limited resources,
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and the conflict over priorities have given rise to.other barriers
to rapid progress.
96. Although some foreign element was present in the major
instances of political violence in Latin America during the 1960s,
the domestic balance of political skill and strength was nearly
always the decisive factor in the outcome. Castro's help could not
transform the generally weak and isolated revolutionary insurgents
into strong, let alone successful, contenders for power. US assis-
tance to the governments facing a threat from insurgents was in-
strumental in blocking their quest for power through the barrel of
a gun, but would have been no substitute for governmental determin-
ation and political skill. The outstanding exception to the rule was
the US intervention in the Dominican crisis of 1965, which reversed
the tide of victory which seemed to belong to the Constitutionalists.
This exception required a massive intervention by the United States
-- including some 20,000 troops.
97. It generally requires a clash of interests between at
least two major powers to precipitate a world crisis. Thus, during
the 1960s, Cuba was the only likely battleground, especially after
the 1962 crisis, which led to a much less adventurous policy on the
part of the Soviet Union towards the rest of Latin America. In
retrospect, there were probably only two crises that had much
chance of turning into a Latin American "Vietnam": The Bay of Pigs,
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where the US intervention failed to establish a beachhead; and
the Dominican intervention, where the massive US presence discouraged
prolonged resistance.
98. Turning briefly to some general remarks on the outlook
for the 1970s, it seems simple enough to conclude that political
violence will continue to be prevalent throughout most of Latin
America. Perhaps it really could not be otherwise given the slow-
ness with which political cultures can change under the best of
conditions, the legacy from the 1960s of ongoing revolutionary
insurgencies and "irregular" regimes, and the continuation of mas-
sive economic and social tensions that are likely to outweigh, if
not also overwhelm, the available resources and talent. A lack of
consensus among elite groups on priorities and basic direction will
in itself underwrite frequent recourse to coercion, in preference
to constitutional means, for the resolution of conflicts.
99. Predicting the character and direction of the political
violence is another matter. It is challenging enough to search for
the key themes of the recent past in a region of uniformly turbu-
lent yet otherwise diverse countries. The pace of change appears
to be accelerating, and with it the rate of surprises. Few in the
year 1965 would have predicted that in the year 1970 Chile would
be ruled by a Marxist President bent on "legitimate" revolution,
Peru would be ruled by a military junta bent on "orderly" revolution,
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and Uruguay would be badly disrupted by terrorists bent on violent
100. Yet if I had to choose, I would for most countries pit
the centripetal forces -- including the defensive agility of the
elites, the inertia of the peasantry, and the basic apoliticism of
the urban poor -- against the centrifugal forces such as the revo-
lutionary insurgents. Especially in the larger, more sophisticated
countries, the established elites will probably remain in control
in most cases, or at least retain a strong say on the course and
limits of change. The policies and postures of the elites may seem
more extreme than in the past. Yet I would see as the rule the
process of change managed through coalitions and manipulated through
coups -- leaving largescale civil wars and thoroughgoing revolu-
tions that drive the elites to the wall as the exceptions. There
are already several governments that are reaching for revolutionary
changes, and there probably will be more. These are more likely to
be led by men from established power groups who will not be free of
all restraints from the past -- General Velascos and President
Allendes -- rather than by Fidel Castros who will overwhelm the
center from the outside and proceed to destroy it.
101. One or another revolutionary insurgent may learn the true
lesson of Castro's success, and give as much weight to
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political maneuver as to armed combat per se. He may even be,
like Castro, a rare and supreme caudiZZp. But he would still
need certain advantages to succeed by revolt against the system
rather than manipulation from within -- such as indecisiveness
among the elites, and especially splits within the military. In
any case, in the larger countries, with the more resilient elites,
it will probably prove increasingly difficult to outflank and iso-
late the movable center, which in many cases will itself become
more nationalistic, if not also more radical.
102. At least for a while the revolutionary insurgents will
probably continue to concentrate on urban terrorism as a tactic.
This will generally provide them with a powerful disruptive force,
but not necessarily with an effective revolutionary strategy. The
force of disruption could produce political polarization, as in
Uruguay; a garrison state, as in Brazil; or an incipient civil war,
as in Guatemala. But if the government remains reasonably resili-
ent it would still stand a good chance to prevail, if only through
promising more for the masses and at the same time tightening the
screws against the revolutionaries. The greater danger of the sys-
tem snapping, as ever, will be in the smaller, less sophisticated
countries, where the governments, in a crisis, may rely solely on
repression: e.g., the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Guatemala. In
Bolivia, the collapse of the military through factionalism and
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indecision could also provide a special opportunity to revolu-
tionary groups, if they would be able to avoid the same tendencies.
103. As in the past, important domestic crises will almost
always contain some noteworthy foreign aspect. The seemingly in-
creased openness and confusion of politics may attract the ambi-
tious interloper (Cuba again?), while it traps the reluctant one
(the United States?). Both the ambitious and the reluctant alike
may not be able to place many sure bets on maintaining control, or
even strong influence, because of the growing nationalism and likely
persistence of political violence as a game that enemies as well as
friends can play. Foreign aid to revolutionaries and perhaps to
counter-revolutionaries (in Chile, in Cuba?) would not be likely
to prove decisive unless the established order is already in danger
of collapsing and the outside forces formidable in 'themselves.
104. The United States will probably continue to be the "most
significant other" for all or nearly all the Latin American countries,
even though its influence and levels of interest and concern are
likely to continue to decline. In most South American cases, the
US government will probably be prepared to suffer in relative silence
rather sharp reverses in interest, especially if a well-entrenched
government is directing the anti-US moves. While it cannot avoid
becoming involved in crises of political violence at least indirectly
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and on a minor scale, there is little chance of a massive and
direct US intervention against governments in South America.
Governmental moves to establish Soviet military bases, however,
would be likely to increase the pressures for US .intervention.
Concern for the Caribbean will probably continue at a higher
level than for South America, and thus provide a lower thres-
hold for intervention generally. Indeed, the US reduction of
presence in more distant regions of the world could increase
the desire to retain control in the region closest to home. US
intervention for governments -- i.e., against revolutionary in-
surgencies -- will probably continue, but at a more selective
level. Washington will not be without concern for avoiding a
Latin American "Vietnam".
105. Cuba is unlikely to remain the second most significant
other to the same extent as in the 1960s. Brazil, Chile, and Peru,
if successful in coping with national problems, would be likely to
become the models for the forces for change in neighboring coun-
tries. In addition, there would be some chance of direct inter-
vention by Brazil and Argentina in an Uruguayan crisis and by
Argentina and Peru in a Chilean crisis.
106. It almost certainly will require a confrontation between
two world powers to transform a national crisis into a world crisis.
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The United States, willing or not, could provide one side. But
would there be another? If logic is any guide, we can expect the
Soviet Union to continue on a cautious and pragmatic course in
Latin America.. It has more promising areas for expansion of in-
fluence elsewhere, and in any case would seek to avoid a crisis
in the Western Hemisphere unless the United States seemed un-
usually weak or uninterested. It could back or drift into a
crisis, based perhaps on misestimation of US intentions, but only
in areas. where there would already be a sizeable Soviet stake.
That would seem limited to Cuba now, and perhaps Chile later in
the decade.
107. Towards the end of the seventies, other world powers
might conceivably have a large enough stake in Latin America to
somehow become involved in a crisis. Japan comes first to mind,
because of its expanding economic interests; China perhaps second,
as a source of assistance to revolutionary insurgencies. In general,
though, the great powers may conclude that the costs of influence in
Latin America are too high, and the risks of reversals too great.
There may even be a tendency to permit Latin America, South America
particularly, to stew for a decade in its own juices to see what
emerges. Thus, while there certainly will be crises and headlines,
there is little chance of a Second Vietnam, or a Second missile
crisis, or a Third world war.
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