SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE COLD WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A001100030041-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 21, 2005
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: April 3, 1967
• Content Type: PAPER

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3 April 1967
SOV/EE Staff Rumination
Recent and proximate discussions of the Cold War have
prompted the following dissenting rumination. It may not
be a very rewarding exercise -- much is obvious, much is
inconclusive -- but I was moved to the effort by my con-
cern over the shape of an NIE to come (NIE 11-7-67:
Trends in Soviet General Policies) and by my discontent
with the notion that, changes in the world notwithstanding,
the Cold War remains essentially untouched. To hell
with plus, ca change, plus c'est la meme chose!
1. This paper argues that changes in the cold war in recent
years have been of sufficient size and scope to alter some funda-
mentals of the conflict and, incidentally, to make misleading the
very term, cold war, itself. The transformation seems to have been
in kind, not merely in degree, and if so, this would mean that we
have indeed arrived at a new stage in East-West relations.
2. At the same time, this paper does not suggest that the US-
Soviet struggle is at an end, or is even likely to be within the
conceivable future. As the world's leading great powers, the US and
the USSR are probably destined to play antagonistic roles for the
remainder of this century. It is hard to see how it could be otherwise,
except in the face of a common enemy. In any case, some degree of
Soviet hostility to the US and to many US interests is almost certain
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to survive, with or without a militant communism to nourish it,
and some degree of US suspicion and vigilance is likely to endure
for at least as long.
3. But surely, in the current debate over the nature of the
cold war, there is a middle ground between the genuine US-Soviet
truce envisaged by some and the permanent and high-pitched Soviet
threat foreseen by others. Indeed, this is what seems to have been
emerging ever since the watershed year of 1962. The major question
is, and may remain for some time to come, of course, just how
transitory this middle ground will prove to be. It is the estimate
here -- made in the full knowledge that tomorrow could bring a
rebuttal of events -- that the forces which are responsible for the
present relatively relaxed state of relations between the US and
the USSR and for the present condition of the international scene as
a whole (Vietnam excluded) are on the whole strong and durable. As
a consequence, it is also the conclusion of this paper that the
cold war, as we have known it, is unlikely to revive.
4. The term cold war needs defining. It is a highly subjective
label, even slogan, and its meaning is obscure. Here, then, for pur-
poses of discussion, is an attempt at definition.
5. The cold war, as it developed and as it came to be known, was
more than great power competition. It was:
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-- essentially a US/Western struggle against what amounted
to a single enemy, the USSR;
-- active and intense political warfare, world-wide and
with virtually no rules or codes of conduct;
-- and a contest which often involved the threat of actual
military hostilities.
6. The cold war was also a state of mind and a series of mis-
conceptions. It was widely feared in this country and Europe in the
1950's, for example, that the USSR wished and intended to use its
massive armies to invade Western Europe. The anxiety was no less
real and no less important simply because it was probably baseless.
Indeed, encouraging Western concern and fostering erroneous Western
convictions played a significant role in Soviet cold war strategy
(e.g. the missile gap).
7. Finally, the cold war, like all wars, came to have a distinct
character which represented more than the mere sum of its parts. It
was people, incidents, and impressions, interacting and in motion. It
was Stalin and Khrushchev; Iran, Turkey, Trieste, Czechoslovakia,
Berlin, Korea, Berlin, the Congo, and Cuba; Sputnik, the rattle of
rockets, Checkpoint Charlie, and more. And on our side too: the
Truman Doctrine containment, McCarthy, NATO, CENTO, and SEATO;
agonizing reappraisals, rollback, "Ich bin ein Berliner", eyeball to
eyeball; and all the rest.
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8. If we accept these definitions, we can see how well they
apply to the present state of affairs.
-- First, the question of a US/Western struggle against
a single enemy, the USSR: The struggle today is vastly
different. One can no longer speak of a common US/Western Front,
nor of a single enemy. Both Blocs have fragmented. In Vietnam,
the US is waging a war without Western help, indeed with con-
siderable Western opposition; the war was not begun by the
Soviets; our primary enemy is a small Asian Communist country
over which Moscow exercises no control and perhaps not even much
influence; and the USSR -- despite its support of Hanoi --
is willing to conduct business with Washington on a normal basis
even while the US is bombing its Communist ally.
-- Second, concerning the proposition that the cold war is
active, intense, and world-wide political warfare: Surely, inso-
-,far as it is directly related to the USSR, the activity has
diminished, the intensity of the struggle has waned, and some
de facto rules of the game have begun to emerge. As a conse-
quence, the conflict is not so warlike, and hostility between
the US and the USSR is no longer so passionate. Europe has
been quite calm for more than five years, and elsewhere, though
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great power competition is omnipresent, the Soviets are as
likely, for their own good reasons, to try to calm down a
violent situation as to provoke further discord (as in India vs.
Pakistan, Indonesia vs. Malaysia, and as in various countries
plagued by internal strife, such as Indonesia and Venezuela).
Moreover, Moscow's tactical interests in some situations have
for a time paralleled those of the US, as they have, for
example, in India, in China, and, potentially, in regard to
a nuclear non-proliferation treaty.
-- Third, concerning the question of actual or potential
military hostilities: This is an element of the old cold war
which has almost completely vanished as a day-to-day kind of
concern. The USSR no longer rattles rockets in the same old
way, positively avoids this approach when dealing with the
Europeans, and mentions it to us only in the context of relative
military strengths (and here their references often seem to be
defensive reactions to their own inferiorities) and only by
implication in its pronouncements about the dangers of US
escalation in Vietnam. The notion that all of us in the West
must live under the Soviet gun -- so carefully cultivated by
both Stalin and Khrushchev -- no longer really exists and is no
longer encouraged by the Soviets.
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-- Fourth, concerning the loose category of characters,
incidents, and impressions: Excluding Vietnam, which should
not be seen as a manifestation of the cold war, at least as we
have defined it, it is impossible to come up with a series
comparable to that suggested in paragraph 7 above. Stalin and
Khrushchev have gone and have been replaced by members of a
committee who, while ruthless and unfriendly, are essentially
cautious, and who, while not always polite, would not be
caught dead pounding their shoes at the UN. In any case, there
have been no Checkpoint Charlies of late, no need for agonizing
reappraisals, and no eyeballs together. Instead of rollbacks,
there are bridges. Instead of COCOM, there is FIAT.
9. The thaw in the cold war has not come about because of any
magic Soviet awakening, any sudden enlightenment, or any conscious
decision by the Soviet leadership to abandon the one true faith.
Indeed, much of the change has come about as the result of pressures
not of the Soviets' own devising and adjustments to these pressures,
some deliberate, some not.
10. Problems at Home. The differences in temperament and style
between Khrushchev and his successors, especially the greater patience
and prudence of the latter, have certainly contributed to the course
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of Soviet conduct. This is perhaps most apparent on the home front,
where serious economic problems have confronted the leadership for
years, and where Brezhnev and Kosygin have introduced a new note of
sober endeavor. They seem to appreciate, as Khrushchev did not, the
need for solid (as opposed to propagandistic) domestic achievement.
They also seem disinclined, as, again, Khrushchev was not, to try
to cover failure at home with glory abroad. More relaxed and
realistic than their predecessor, more aware of the nature of the soft
spots in the Soviet economy, they feel they can and must devote a-.
large share of their energies to problems close at hand. It would
be easy to exagerate the degree of preoccupation with internal
affairs -- the present leadership is by no means tinged with
isolationism -- but emphasis on domestic concerns does encourage them
to avoid international disruptions, and probably accounts for a part
of their discontent over Vietnam as well.
11. Trouble A rro'a&, Khrushchev, in 1964, at the time of his
removal, was himself something less of a zealot than he once had been;
it is hard to be enthusiastic in the face of repeated defeats. The
collapse of the Berlin campaign in 1961, the Soviet back-down in the
Cuban missile crisis in 1962, and the great grain failure of 1963 all
took their toll in terms of the man's stature and morale. His
successors would like to avoid a comparable series of setbacks; one
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way to do this, abroad anyhow, is to refrain from sticking their necks
out in international circumstances which are likely only to end up in
confrontation and retreat. Someone in the Soviet leadership at some
time came to realize that Soviet policies toward the US need not be
permanently frozen into an oscillating pattern of showdown and peace
offensive. And someone also began to recognize, at long last, that
bluster and threat indeed worried the states of the Western alliance
but also served to unite them.
12. The Strategic Balance. Of course, underlying the above is
Moscow's appreciation of the key strategic fact of life: US will
and US strategic superiority. And this appreciation is apparently
coupled with a realization that, the precise strategic equation aside,
the maneuverability of the two great powers is severely limited by
the inflexibility of the nuclear response and the suicidal implications
of general war. The area of conflict between the US and the USSR is
thereby more clearly defined, and both sides now seem to comprehend
the outer limits of the arena. At least, for the past five years or
so, neither has behaved as if the nettle of the other could be tested
beyond those limits.
13. China. China is not a signatory of the unwritten contract
suggested above. It is, nonetheless, very much an interested party.
Indeed, its alienation from both contestants has influenced the behavior
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of each, though in opposite directions. US policy is less constrained
as a consequence of the Sino-Soviet split -- as, for example, in
Vietnam -- while Soviet policy is more so -- as, again, in Vietnam.
The precise effect of Sino-Soviet struggle on Moscowts approach to
world problems is not easy to gauge, and it is tempting perhaps to
overemphasize the degree of threat the Soviets perceive on their
eastern flank. Nevertheless, the disintegration of the communist
camp, the appearance of an openly hostile policy in Peking, and the
emergence of at least a potential threat to Soviet border security
probably do tend to encourage Soviet interest in international
equilibrium. They also tend to sap Moscowts energies and to spoil
its concept of a single prime antagonist, the US; it may be that the
US is still the principal opponent of communism, but China is cer-
tainly beginning to look like the main enemy., of the Soviet Union.
Moreover, no matter how facilely they seek to explain it all away to
the world at large, the Soviets know in their hearts that the Chinese
defection throws doubt on the efficacy of Soviet power and the inexorability
of ultimate communist triumph.
14. Ideological Decline. Communist thought is not immune to
temporal ravage and theological decay, and we have been witness to
both. In fact, dogma in the USSR simply ain't what it used to be,
and, though certainly not down or out, it is beginning to reel in the
ring. This means, at home, a slow and reluctant effort to deal with
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problems in a less ideologically encumbered light; the revival of
private plots on the collectives and the institution of interest
charges on capital are cases in point. Abroad, it means roughly the
same sort of thing, a subtle altering of perceptions, a gradual scaling
down of extravagant expectations, and a slow accumulation of somewhat
more aware and sophisticated concepts of our life and times. This
is not to say that an ideological recovery of sorts is out of the
question. It is to say, however.--- as stated in last year's Soviet
general policy estimate (NIE 11-7-66) -- that there is a tendency in
the USSR for the leaders "to temper their revolutionary outlook in
the world with concerns of national interest and great power status."
15. In addition to the more or less specific kinds of pressures
and adjustments outlined in the preceding paragraphs, a number of
developments of a more general nature have had important effects on
Soviet attitudes and policies. And though few issues between the USSR
and the United States have actually been settled, changes on the
of
international scene have had the effect/modifying, moderating, or
making irrelevant some of the old divisions. This can perhaps best
be seen in terms of what has happened over the past several years in
three principal areas of cold war concern and conflict: Europe, the
Third World, and the Communist World itself.
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16. Europe. Once the scene of intense cold war struggle, Europe
is in today's world an island of serenity. The old hard and fast
divisions between East and West Europe are melting. The USSR's
determination to erect a barrier between the two has diminished,
partly because of the refusal of the Eastern European states to remain
behind it, partly because of Moscow's confidence that serious (i.e.
sudden and violent) threats to stability within Eastern Europe have been
eliminated, and partly because of Moscow's reconsideration of its own
best interests. At the same time, US determination not to admit the
existence of two Europes, East and West, has also faded. Even the US
attitude toward the West European Communist Parties has altered; the
old belief that these parties were simply Soviet-controlled instruments
of the cold war has given way to a new interest in assessing their role
within the context of local politics.
17. In any case, while the USSR 'is perhaps no less interested
than ever in:,reducing or removing the US presence and in isolating
West Germany from the remainder of the continent, .. ' Moscow now plays
an entirely different game. Gone is the sense of urgency, gone are
the threats of violence and military action, and gone are the ultimatums
and moves against West Berlin. Instead, because it has finally learned
that Soviet bludgeoning breeds Allied unity, because NATO has begun to
This seems to have been the case most recently in the case of France,
where Communist victories have been looked at chiefly in terms of their
impact on De Gaulle and French politics as a whole. The USSR's view of
this election, by the way, also illustrates the pervasiveness of the
changes which are sweeping over Europe: The Soviets' attitude toward
Communist progress in France is obviously complicated by their concern
to maintain good relations with their principal "ally" in the West,
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unravel all by itself, and because of its own concerns about the indepen-
dentist movements in Eastern Europe, the Soviet leadership now yearns
for respectability and membership in a "secure" European community.
The Soviets, in fact, have developed a vested interest in not rocking
the boat. And if they have not yet seen the futility of achieving
communism in Western Europe, they have at least recognized that such
achievement must be put down as a matter for the remote future. In
the meantime, the best that Moscow probably can hope for is some kind
of Soviet-West European rapprochement, gained at the expense of Bonn
and Washington, and some kind of general recognition of the status
quo in central Europe. While this design and its means of accomplish-
ment would certainly be inimicable to US interests, they are at least
several steps removed from those typical of the cold war; Europe is
now an area of contention, but not of confrontation.
18. The Third World. As a battleground of the cold war, the non-
aligned world once seemed to the combatants to be very much a thee-
or-me proposition. Thus, for example, as the USSR moved into Africa,
once a Western preserve, it appeared that state after state might move
into the Soviet orbit. This is presumably what the Soviets wanted
and expected, and it is certainly what the West feared. But, of course,
it is not what happened. The Soviets were bested in the Congo,
embarrassed in Guinea, and reduced in Ghana. They have done well in
Algeria (though Ben Bela's ouster was a major setback), and, of course,
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the UAR. But nowhere in Africa have the Soviets succeeded in setting
up a client regime, and nowhere have they found a native movement
willing to subordinate itself to the USSR.* They have discovered, as
indeed have we, that most Africans wish neither the Communist nor the
Western worlds to run things in Africa and that, though happy to
receive assistance from both sides, these people generally dislike
and distrust white outsiders of whatever political persuasion. The
Soviets now know this and appear more or less reconciled to it.
Competition with the West in the Third World arena will almost
certainly remain at high pitch and will often be conducted on a low
level; the Soviets are not about to retire or to give up their wish
to dominate the former colonial areas. But the old attitudes of the
contestants -- thee or me, all mine or all yours -- are no longer
likely in most instances to set the tone and establish the objectives
of the contest.
19. The Communist World. It is, of course, in the Communist
world that the most dramatic changes have taken place since the late
1950's. Stalin conceived of other Communist Parties simply as instru-
ments of Soviet power; Khrushchev knew better, but still thought of
other parties more or less as (sometimes unruly) subordinate divisions
of the Soviet corporate parent; the present leadership only maintains
The same is true in Asia, where old Soviet hopes -- as in Burma and
Indonesia -- have also been crushed, and it is much the same even in
Latin America, where Cuba stands as an eccentric monument to success
of sort' but where progress elsewhere can apparently be made only
very slowly, using conventional means in .-relations with conventional
governments, and in dispute with Castro (who continues to hold out
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the hope, and holds out the goal, of continued Soviet dominance of
the world communist movement, or at least the non-Chinese part of it.
But whatever its attitudes toward other communist states and parties,
the USSR's view is no longer controlling. It would appear -- on the
basis of what the present leadership has not been able to do, despite
its efforts to correct Khrushchev's mistakes and to restore priority
to precisely this area of policy -- that its ability to restore effective
Soviet leadership to the movement is really more likely to decline than
to grow. And inevitably, as Soviet leadership wanes, the policies
of the various parties will diverge and come into conflict with each
other, and this will involve even those policies most closely related
to the competition with the West or, within individual Western
countries, those associated with the struggle for domestic power.*
Marxism-Leninism, as such, is simply not sufficient to bind these
parties together, and the threat of US capitalism and US imperialism --
real as it may be to some of these parties -- is already too spectral
in most areas of the world to serve in its stead.
20. A case can be made (and often is) that the changes in the
cold war are superficial and temporary, that Soviet fundamentals
It is now possible to suggest (as Richard Lowenthal has) that the
new Popular Fronts in Western Europe are likely to so transform the
Communist Parties as to make them indistinguishable from the Social
Democrats. Be that as it may, it is no longer possible simply to
assume that these parties are extensions of Soviet power and would
happily hold to the Soviet lead if they should somehow actually
come to power.
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remain unaltered. In this view, the Soviets are now only engaged
in a cold war holding action against the day when new offensives are
possible . But, even if this is so, the deliberate decisions and
conscious plans of the present Soviet leaders will not, in the end,
be determining, as, indeed, Khrushchev's were not for him. The forces
at work on these leaders -- internal difficulties, US policies, other
problems abroad, the strategic balance, etc. -- will count for more.
21. Serious observers who profess to see no ..real changes in
the nature of the cold war are well aware, of course, that Moscow has
changed its tune in recent years, reappraised the balance of forces
on the world scene, and stretched the time frame of its expectations.
What these observers suggest, however, is that this tack will either
be abandoned someday or will become a true course only after a very
long period of time. But even admitting, for the sake of argument,
the legitimacy of these two propositions, the answer suggests itself.
The factors -- the realities of power, the failures of Soviet policies --
which induced the Soviets to make even the "superficial" changes mentioned
above are still in existence, and there are no responsible estimates
around which suggest their early demise, no matter how much the Soviets
may hope for it.
22. It is precisely the existence and nature of these factors
which argue for more than a temporary suspension in the cold war. The
present leadership will someday be replaced, and its successors could
of course revert. But the problems of the economy and of popular
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discontent will probably be much the same tomorrow as they were a
few years ago and are today. The inability of Soviet policy to score
any remarkable breakthroughs abroad is unlikely to change significantly
in the foreseeable future, and relations with China -- though they
might improve somewhat after Mao -- are probably destined to remain
strained for some time to come. The ideological decline could be
arrested, but the effort would probably be costly and the results
impermanent.
23. Only in the area of the strategic balance will there
probably be a development of sufficient importance to justify, or make
very tempting, the consideration of a real change of course. The
USSR is likely someday to reach a point in its weapons development and
deployment which will seem, at least to Moscow, to represent the
achievement of parity or near parity with the United States. Will it
then conclude that this change in the balance of forces would permit
the assumption of new international risks? Will it come to believe
that, in addition to deterring general war, its strategic power would
doter the US from reacting as before in, say Berlin? No one can be
sure of the answers to these questions. But surely everything in
the Soviet cold war experience should tell Moscow that it cannot use
its power to intimidate the US, and surely everything it has learned
about the balance of forces, modern weapons, and the risks and
uncertainties of threatening their use should tell it that the consequences
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of crisis could be fatal. And even should there be a decline in the
balance-of-terror deterrence, a number of considerations suggest that
"both the US and the USSR will continue on their course of not
undertaking initiatives which might provoke the other to a strategic
initiative."
24-. Finally, one might say in summary that some of the heat
has gone out of the cold war. But this would imply that the war is
getting colder, and the process more nearly resembles that of a warming
up, a thaw. If, in 19+8 and 1950 and 1956 and 1962 the temperature
almost sank to absolute zero, we have since come a long way. It is
still very cold, and there is no law which guarantees us against the
return of glaciers. But surely it is more comfortable than it used
to be, and, from the Soviet side, there has been ample, and perhaps
long lasting, reason for the improvement.
25
ONE Memorandum by Willard Matthias, "Prospects for Change in
the Structure of World Power," 6 March 1967, p. 7.
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 41
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
Sherman Kent
2
3
4
5
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks: On 6 March 1967, sent a 25
1
memorandum to the DCI entitled "Soviet Policy in
the Present Phase." The memo argues persuasively
that the cold war is far from over, and concludes
that "what is taking place is merely a tactical
adjustment of the kind often before seen in Soviet
policy, and that no significant moves towffrd
terminating the cold war are in sight."
The DCI hinself has recently presented
similar conclusions in his testimony to con-
gressional committees.
The position that the cold war continues
without major change forms an important part of the
Agency's rationale for its covert action programs.
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FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
ove Fbi1gW12805
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v p ease
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
1
2
3
4
5
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks :
I realize, as a consequence of all the
above, that the cold war has become a subject of
some delicacy. In the paper which is attached, I
present a case for a contrary view of the cold
war; it is, in part an informal dissent to the
work by I do not seek in this
paper to deal wi the problems associated with
covert action, a matter beyond my competence. But
I would like to mention here fly conviction that the
rationale for such action need not (and probably
should not) rest on a belief in the perpetuation
of the cold war,, as such. US covert action pro-
grams will long be necessary with or without the
cold war.
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DATE
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