NATION IN FERMENT: NATIONAL ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL PERMUTATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A001100030022-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 30, 2006
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: April 19, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

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SECRET ANK 197`
19 April 1967
SUBJECT: Nation in Ferment: National Elections
and Political Permutations in South
Vietnam
Summary
The development of a much-needed
political base for the Vietnamese gov-
ernment is slowly gaining momentum. The
movement toward representative and ef-
fective governmental institutions has
been complicated by divisive political
and social influences and an absence of
unifying traditions or institutions, as
well as by intensified Communist polit-
ical and military efforts. Having sta-
bilized the situation, Vietnam's mili-
t4ry leadership remains largely unified
in its reluctance to relinquish its dom-
inant position, but recognizes the need
to share power with civilian elements
in order to gain the popular support
needed to counter the disciplined Com-
munist political threat.
Since its inception the Ky govern-
ment has been consciously moving toward
a transition to at least ostensible ci-
vilian rule along the Korean pattern.
Because of their dominant position, the
leaders of the military establishment
have considerable assets to assist in
accomplishing their aims, including funds,
patronage, and the only non-Communist
organization reaching down to the grass
roots. To bolster their prospects, the
military are attempting to form a loose
political front composed of representa-
tives of various religious and political
groups which will sponsor GVN-endorsed
candidates in the forthcoming elections.
Op"IfCDE
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If the military establishment can
agree on a single slate and a single
presidential, candidate to support, none
of the potential civilian candidates ap-
pears likely to develop the organization
and broad spectrum of support necessary
to seriously contest the military estab-
lishment's choice. This is particularly
true if, as seems certain to be the
case, the opposition to the military's
choice is divided among two or more
slates. Both the Suu and Huong tickets
seem destined to split the important
southern vote. None of the other can-
didates seems likely to muster more than
nominal regional support.
Major issues in the elections are
likely to stem largely from opposition
to the concept of continued military con-
trol of the government. The opposition
probably will focus on the related is-
sues of corruption, inflation, and inef-
ficiency of the military establishment,
and may label Ky a U.S. puppet. The
themes of peace and neutrality may also
be espoused by the opposition, whose
position would thus take on significant
anti-American undertones. Despite this,
it seems unlikely that the campaign will
get too far off the track, although the
possibility of flashes of violence can-
not be ruled out completely. Other po-
tential pitfalls include the danger
that the military, unduly concerned over
their prospects for victory, may attempt
to repress the opposition or to rig the
results. These also seem unlikely, and
we expect the military, under Ky's
leadership, to make a realistic endeavor
to put the best possible face on its ef-
forts to forge a genuine coalition with
civilian elements.
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On balance, the odds favor the elec-
tion coming out reasonably well for both
the GVN and the U.S., particularly if
the U.S. provides active, discreet advice
and counsel within the context of Viet-
namese political realities. The mili-
tary establishment appears almost certain
to score a smashing electoral victory.
The best hope is that, in doing so, it
will facilitate the development of a
broad political coalition comprising
something approaching a majority of the
electorate. Such a coalition could pro-
vide the basis for ultimate development
of a genuine, cohesive, national party
which would foster stability and provide
a strong popular base for the GVN.
1. Since its independence in 1954, South Viet-'
nam has been in the throes of political evolution,
the course of which has been erratic and often con-
vulsive. In'particular, the pace of political.ac-
tivity quickened following the overthrow of the
Diem regime, although such activity occurred in
extra-legal channels more than in legal ones. Under.
the present military regime, however, politics have
tended to shift from the streets and backrooms to-
ward more conventional political modes and forums.
To have come this far is no mean achievement, given
the country's political history, and represents
more progress than anyone expected when the mili-
tary assumed control in June 1965.
2. But the crucial question is what happens
next? South Vietnam has poor clay with which to
build a national political structure. Endemic
political fragmentation is still the rule, and
politics tend to be dominated by narrow-based,
usually contentious, factions reflecting regional,
religious, or, simply personal loyalties with
little consideration for broader national in-
terests. Not only is there nothing resembling a
national party, but even the political fragments
are badly splintered. Thus, the upcoming pres-
idential and legislative elections will test the
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ability of the Vietnamese to form a government
that is both reasonably effective and relatively
representative; that is, a government that re-
flects, and is cognizant of, the necessity for
balancing personal liberty and national order.
There can be no assurance that this goal will be
realized; the attempt itself might once again
plunge the country into political paroxysms.
3. In any event, the divisive nature of Viet-
namese politics will have to be attenuated, and
eventually subsumed, by a broader political frame-
work if continued political progress is to be
realized. Encouragingly, there are indications
that broader political groupings are in the proc-
ess of developing. The outcome is of great signi-
ficance for Vietnam and for the US because, if
handled well, politics in South Vietnam could
begin to normalize and stability should increase.
The following paragraphs will assess these de-
velopments in greater detail.
II. THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT*
4. Since assuming control, the military es-
tablishment has displayed a remarkable degree of
cohesion. This cohesion derives in large measure
from similar backgrounds--regional, religious,
military, education and experience--and an acute
awareness and understanding of the political realities
in Vietnam. As a result, there is a willingness to
The term military establishment" includes Ky
and Thieu and their immediate military colleagues
and advisors. The key political figures in the
military establishment are Generals Ky (Premier),
Thieu (Chief of State), Loan (National Police
Director and Chief of the Military Security Serv-
ices), Chieu (*Secretary-General of the Directorate),
Tri (Information and Chieu Hoi Minister and Head
of the Armed Forces Political Directorate)', Thane
(Revolutionary Development Minister), Khang (III
Corps and Capital Military District Commander), and,
to a lesser extent, Vien (Minister of Defense).
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subordinate personal ambitions to the collective
interests of the military and an apparent consensus
among the military hierarchy concerning the major
policy issues facing Vietnam. Considering the dis-
mal performance of the civilians in the past, the
military has no confidence in the ability of the
civilian politicians to administer effectively, to
maintain national cohesion, to pursue the war vig-
orously, or to refrain from interference in profes-
sional military matters. Specifically, the military
leaders share a common aspiration for political
stability, which they interpret as requiring mili-
tary dominance in any'government in the near future.
5. At the same 'time, however, the military
leaders appear willing to accept a wider civilian
role in the government. This is in part because
of US urging and in part because of the military's
own desire to obtain a popular and legal mandate
for its continued exercise of authority. While
not willing to surrender its control of the levers
of real political power, the military establish-
ment has made concessions and adjustments to ac-
commodate the civilian elements. And it has re-
sponded to popular aspirations for an elected gov-
ernment.
B. Political Strategy and'Assets
6. For over a year, the military establish-
ment has been quietly exploring means to create a
political apparatus with which to insure continued
military domination within a counstitutional and
representative system. To this end, the GVN has
sought and received advice from the South Koreans,
and, to a lesser extent from the Chinese Nation-
alists (who have advisers in the GVN's political
warfare department). The ROK CIA has sponsored
trips to Korea by Chieu, Loan, and Vien; Nguyen
Van Kieu (General Thieu's brother and an assistant
of General Chieu) had a "special assignment" to
Seoul to study how the ROK military formed its
political party. We do not know how much direct
assistance the Koreans are providing to the GVN's
political efforts, but we are reasonably confident
that the ROK CIA is in contact with Loan and Chieu
and probably with Ky as well. In any event, the
manner in which the Korean military has succeeded
in legitimizing its control of political power is
an obvious model for the Vietnamese' military.
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7. The military establishment has substantial
political assets at its disposal. It controls the
financial coffers of the country; it is the dispenser
of governmental favors, jobs and sinecures; it has
the organization, manpower, and trucks to see that
the voters get to the polls. In short, the military
is the only (non-Communist) body whose power and
sway extends throughout the country, and this gives
it tremendous advantages in organizing grass roots
support. In particular, the revolutionary develop-
ment program and cadre provide the regime with a
formidable political instrument with which to get
to the people. The RD teams were used for political
purposes to get out the vote for the Constituent
Assembly elections last September, and they will
undoubtedly be even more active for the presidential
and legislative contests this fall.
8. In addition to the RD cadre, the military
hierarchy can count on the support of most of the
armed forces, the civil administrative apparatus,
and provincial and district officials (most of whom
are military). These groups not only have a vested
interest in the present system, but they are sus-
ceptible to persuasion and pressure from the gov-
ernment. Thus as election day approaches, it can
be assumed that considerable emphasis will be placed
on these groups delivering the vote; officials.
whose response appears less than enthusiastic will
run the risk of being replaced.* It is probable
that the hamlet and village elections will con-
stitute a dry run for testing the ability of the
regime's political organization. Loan is appar-
ently taking steps to keep close tabs on the local
candidates as well as the actions of provincial and
district officials during the elections. The elec-
tion of hamlet and village officials who are sym-
pathetic or beholden to the GVN would further enhance
the position of the military's candidate; in many
instances, the local villagers rather.dociley vote
the way the village headman instructs them.
In the very important Saigon area, for example,
Loan and the Mayor of Saigon, Loan's brother-in-
law, are increasing the number of wards and
selecting new ward chiefs who would be expected
to get out a large vote for the military's can-
didate.
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C. Civilian Support
9. In addition to the substantial assets the
military has from its own resources, the establish-
ment leaders will probably be at least moderately
successful in garnering support for its presidential
candidate from a number of the traditional civilian
political factions. This development will probably
take the form of a political front. It is generally
accepted in Vietnam that military support is es-
sential for the survival of any government, and
many believe that at this time the only way to in-
sure military support is to have a military man in
the top executive post. Moreover, the military's
support of a faction's legislative ticket could be
decisive. Such considerations, plus the fact that
most Vietnamese observers believe that the military
will win anyway, tend to provide considerable in-
centive to cooperate with the military and thereby
get on the bandwagon and share the rewards and spoils
of victory.
10. The military's efforts to forge a political
base with civilian support have been handled pri-
marily by Generals Loan, Chieu, and Tri, although
others, including Ky and Thieu, have also been active.
For example, over a year ago Chieu was given the
responsibility for developing a political base for
the Directorate. He has been involved in the ROK
CIA effort in South Vietnam (as has Loan). Loan,
Chieu and Tri have also been active in the GVN's
dealings with the Constituent Assembly. Loan, who
has increasingly assumed a major role in the GVN's
political activities, financed the election campaigns
of an unknown (but presumably substantial) number
of candidates for the Assembly and will probably
play a similar role in the legislative contests later
this year. Tri, a protegee of General Thieu, was
instrumental in the formation of the Greater People's
Bloc in the Assembly, and when the Revolutionary
Dai Viet leadership of the bloc proved recalcitrant,
Tri brought about the bloc's disintegration. Chieu's
role is less clear, but he has been the GVN's spokes-
man in several confrontations with the Assembly.
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11. The general outline of a possible GVN
front can be described. It would probably include
following groups.
a. The Hoa Hao Sect. In the delta, the
Hoa Hao religious organization, which
carries more political weight than the
sect's small political parties, appears
to favor backing the military's candidate.
Such clerical'le'aders,as Van Phu and Le
Phuoc Sang, once a special assistant to
Ky and now the leader of the Democratic-
Alliance Bloc in the CA, probably see
more to gain in aligning the sect with
the military than in following southern
regionalist sentiments and backing a can=
didate such as Tran Van Huong or Phan
Khac Suu. In fact,; the sect's strength
as a southern faction gives it particular
appeal to the GVN, which is weakest in
this area.
b. The Cao Dai Sect. No longer much of
a political force; outside of, certain en-
claves such as Tay Ninh Province, the Cao
Dai Sect has been amenable to GVN persua-
sion in the past. The presidential can-
didacy of Phan Khac Suu (a Cao Dad member)
notwithstanding, we believe the odds are
slightly better than even that most of
the Cao Dai leaders will fallow the GVN',s
lead.
c. The VNQDD Party. Truly a many splintered
thing, some of the VNQDD factions, whose
strength is primarily in I Corps area of
central Vietnam,. will back. the
military; to do otherwise would risk hav-
ing the military opt to work exclusively
with the Dai Viets, the VNQDD's arch rivals
in I Corps. 'During,thIe "struggle" move-
ment last year, the VNQDD leaders appar-
ently cooperated with the GVN. Ky, has
been infrequent contact with VNQDD leaders
and other military leaders have probably'
had similar contacts.
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d. Northern Catholics. Plunged into dis-
array following Diem's ouster, the large
(almost one million) northern Catholic ele-
ment has steadily re-asserted itself as a
strong and cohesive political force that
must be reckoned with in the nation's po-
litical future. Sharing very similar goals
with the military, many of whom are north-
ern Catholics, the northern Catholics have
had cordial relations with the military re-
gime. In particular, the northern Catholics
favor the military's policy of a vigorous
prosecution of the war. The candidacy of
Tran Van Huong, however, might draw some
support from the northern Catholics because
of his anti-Buddhist background, but the
southern regionalism that Huong also per-
sonifies would work against him. Moreover,
the northern Catholics were undoubtedly
more impressed by the military's forthright
squashing of the militant Buddhists last
year than they were by Huong's overthrow
by the Buddhists. In any event, we believe
that'the bulk of northern Catholic support
will go to the military establishment's
candidate, and the odds are about even that
their political organization, the Greater
Solidarity Forces, will formally endorse
the military's ticket.
e. Northern Buddhists. The northern ref-
ugee Buddhists are led by Thich Tam Chau
and are strongest in and near Saigon. Fol-
lowing the open break between Chau and
militant Buddhist Thich Tri Quang in the
wake of the "struggle movement" last year,
Chau has been cooperating with the military
government, with General Loan serving as
the regime's principal contact. The regime
has been aiding Chau in his efforts, as yet
unsuccessful, to create a national Buddhist
organization free from the influence of Tri
Quang. In return, Chau will probably be
expected to back the military's presidential
candidate, and although he might, not formally
endorse the candidate, we believe that he
will deliver the vote. Indeed, if Tran Van
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Huong is the main civilian candidate, or
if Tri Quang takes an active role in the
election, we believe the odds are fairly
good that Chau will openly back the mili-
tary's choice.
f, Labor. Tran Quoc Buu, prominent
leader of Vietnam's major labor organiza-
tion, appears to have switched his al-
legiance from Tran Van Huong to Premier
Ky. The labor vote in Vietnam is not
large but in the Saigon area it is of
some consequence. Buu, who aspires to
be a political force, has apparently con-
cluded that no civilian candidate can
hope to win and that it is smart politics
to back a winner. Buu claims to be work-
ing with Dang Van Sung, an old-line Dai
Viet, and Hoa Hao leader Le Phuoc Sang
in forming a front to back Ky.*
g. The Veterans' League. Under the lead-
ership of General Chieu, the Veterans'
League, which has limited political po-
tential, should be solidly in the mili-
tary's camp. The League plans to run
about 30 candidates for-the legislature
and will probably receive governmental
support for this endeavor. Apart from the
general value of organized support, the
League gives the military establishment
some organized support in the south--the
weakest link in the military's chain of
Although we have only the sketchiest,of infor-
mation 'on the subject, it may, also be ithat for-
mer premier Phan Huy Quat and former deputy
premier Tran Van Tuyen are involved in,this ef-
fort. There had been earlier indications that
Quat, Tuyen, and Buu were planning to create a
political front, and Tuyen has intimated that
it would be quite possible that the front would
favor a military candidate.
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support, and the area from which the ma-
jor opposition to the GVN will come.
12. It should be stressed that endorsement of
a candidate by a political faction does not mean
that the candidate will receive full support from
the faction's adherents. There is such a mishmash
of conflicting interests within the many political
groups that some seepage is inevitable. Indeed,
some groups will attempt to be involved to some ex-
tent in each of the contending camps so as to insure
their interests no matter how the election comes out.
Furthermore, the political give and take over the
next few months and the specific civilian candidates
and their vice-presidential choices who finally con-
test the election will affect the final composition
of a pro-establishment front. For example, there is
a fair chance that the Revolutionary Dai Viet Party*
may eventually align itself with the GVN's candidate.
13. Phan Khac Suu. Chairman of the Constituent
Assembly and former chief of state (October 1964 -
June 1965), Phan Khac Suu apparently has decided to
stand for the presidency with Phan Quang Dan, CA mem-
ber and president of the Gia Dinh Provincial Council,
as his vice-presidential running mate. Suu has had
a long, if not particularly distinguished, political
career in South Vietnam. And although his age (62)
and lack of dynamism are considered liabilities by
some, he is known nationally and may even be some-
thing of a "father image" in a country where venera-
tion of the elderly is a common and strong emotion.
In any event, Suu, who is a southerner, would run
strongest in the delta area and might also get some
support from VNQDD elements in central Vietnam. The
presence of Dan on the slate would draw votes in the
populous Saigon area. The Suu-Dan ticket makes some
attempt at a regional balance, but unless a centrist
is added as the prime ministerial choice, it does
not seem likely to obtain significant support outside
* See paragraph 19.
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of southern region. Unless it does obtain such sup-
port, its chances of seriously challenging the mili-
tary's candidate are very small.
14. Dan, and perhaps Suu as well, recognize
the odds against their ticket. Indeed, Dan has in-
dicated that he believes the military will win the
election, and there were indications that he was
trying to persuade Suu not to run for the presidency
but to head up a legislative slate. We do not know
what lies behind Suu's decision. He may feel that
his time is running out to play an important role
in Vietnamese politics, and he would prefer to play
it in the main arena not in a legislative sideshow.
Or he may feel that, whatever his chances are, he
has something to contribute to a presidential cam-
paign and the country's political future. In any
event, Suu's presence in the race will have the ef-
fect of splitting southern strength, and there is
a possibility that the GVN had a surreptitious hand
in persuading Suu to run.
15. Tran Van Huong. The strongest civilian
candidate is TTran Van Huong, who, despite not having
yet openly declared his candidacy, is almost certain
to run. Huong, unlike Suu, is both forceful and de-
termined. He has not forgotten his past difficulties
with the military and the Buddhists who were instru-
mental in his ouster as premier in January 1965. As
a result, he harbors much distrust for both. Thus
while Huong gives lip service to the need for mili-
tary-civilian cooperation, compromise with the mili-
tary would tend to be difficult for him. Huong
believes in a strong executive and is frankly of,the
belief that the majority of the Vietnamese people
are not ready for democracy and do not necessarily
need or want it. US officials have stated that Huong,
who has expressed admiration for Diem's "good qual-
ities," appears to have some of the late'dictator's
characteristics, namely honesty, courage, a sense of
mission, a capacity for stubborness, and a basically
confucian-mandarinale view of government and society.
16. Huong, a southerner, is a staunch champion
of southern regionalist sentiments and would draw
heavy support from this area. Even some southern-
born military officers (e.g., Ranger commander Tran
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Van Hai) have expressed interest in Huong's can-
didacy. Former youth minister Vo Long Trieu, who
was one of the dissident southern ministers that
resigned in last October's "cabinet crisis," is
currently acting as Huong's campaign manager and
is a member of a "brain trust" that is plotting
Huong's political strategy. Trieu is the ac-
knowledged leader of the Movement for the Renais-
sance of the South, a militantly southern separa-
tist group, which is solidly in Huong's camp,
although its strength outside the CA is question-
able. More important, Trieu, leader of the younger
progressive wing of the 1500-member Southern Alumni
Association, is attempting to wrest control away
from the Association's founder, retired General
Tran Van Don.* If Trieu is successful, the Associa-
tion would undoubtedly become more active and mili-
tant in political affairs and would back Huong.
(If Don retains control, the Association would be
less likely to play a meaningful political role
since Don and his more "conservative" wing appear
to be sympathetic to Ky.) Finally, Huong would
probably obtain the bulk of southern Catholic and
Buddhist support since these politically inchoate
groups generally follow the lead of the southern
political organizations; he would also pull some
votes in the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai areas.
17. Huong realizes that if he is to have a
real chance of challenging the military's candidate.
he must broaden his political base outside the
southern region. Initially, Huong appeared to
favor an alignment with the VNQDD. But since the
military (or more specifically, Ky) seems to have
gained a rather secure lock on VNQDD support, Huong
is now exploring the possibility of an alliance
with Revolutionary Dai Viet Party (RDVP) leader'Ha
Thuc Ky, who at the moment claims to be running for
the presidency himself.
Don's hopes of running for the presidency have
been'dashed by the constitution''s disqualifying
anyone holding French citizenship from the pres-
idency.
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18. Huong would probably garner some north-
ern Catholic votes because of his previous strong
stand against the Buddhist Institute. Trieu is
one of the key leaders of the Catholic Liaison Of-
fice in Saigon, which has played an important role
in promoting Catholic cohesion, and can be expected
to lobby for Huong in this group. Trieu has also
said that Tri Quang's militant Buddhist following
in central Vietnam would not oppose Huong's candi-
dacy. Indeed, it is not at all out of the question
that Tri Quang might enter into an open alliance
with the southern regionalists in support of Huong,
especially if Huong should take a strong stand
against the military and a somewhat anti-US tack.
19. Ha Thuc Ky. Although RDVP* leader Ky has
made no secret of his presidential candidacy, we
believe that he is really fishing for a deal in
'which he "withdraws" and throws his support to another candidate in return for the vice-presidential
slot or some other prestigious position in the new
government for himself and his party. It remains
to be seen whether Ky will forge an alliance with
Huong. Indeed, we are inclined to believe that the
odds are as good or slightly better that the mili-
tary establishment can win the RDVP over to its
side. We note that many of the military leaders
have a Dai Viet background, e.g., Thieu, Tri, and
Vien, and that Thieu's brother, Kieu, was an in-
fluential Dai Viet leader, and that two of Ky's
closest advisors, Dinh Trinh Chinh, and Bui Diem,
were connected with the party. Finally, of course,
Ha Thuc Ky may not be able to make a deal with
anyone; if so, he would almost certainly remain in
the race despite his neglible chances.
The plans of the other smaller Dai;Viet off-
shots such as the New Dai Viet Party are un-
known. Generals Thieu and Loan apparently have
some contact with them, and the French may also
be involved with some segments.
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20. Others. There will probably be some
other presidential aspirants. They may run for
the sheer fun of it or, more seriously, they may
calculate that even an unsuccessful race will gain
them national prominence and publicity which may
be useful in the future and which could help their
group's legislative ticket. In any event, we do
not expect many minor candidates to run, and the
major effect of those that do run will probably be
to fuzz slightly the factional line-ups behind the
major contestants.
IV. THE ELECTIONS: ISSUES, PITFALLS, AND PROSPECTS
21. Issues. As electioneering picks up steam,
we anticipate a rising chorus of criticism against
the military establishment and its performance in
office. This could become particularly bitter if
the civilian candidates decide that their only hope
of rallying the people is to pull out all the stops
in attacking the military. The military establish-
ment will be charged with attempting to perpetuate
itself in power and thereby flaunting the people's
"desire" for a civilian government. General Loan,
long a target of southern civilian ire, will almost
certainly be bitterly assailed and accused of in-
timidating and suppressing civilian opposition to
the military regime. And as is usually the case in
politically underdeveloped states, the "outs" will
be predisposed to charge that the "ins" have rigged
the elections.
22. The civilian oppositon will undoubtedly
hammer away consistently at the themes of inef-
ficiency and corruption within the military estab-
lishment. The GVN is vulnerable on the score of
corruption and is itself embarked on anti-corruption
crusade; nonetheless, the opposition will get some
mileage from this issue. The military (and the US)
will also be blamed for the increased cost of living,
inflation, and other deprivations occasioned by the
war. Finally, the military will almost certainly
not escape being labelled as a "US-puppet."
23. Beyond these issues, such potentially ex-
plosive questions as peace and the US role in Viet-
nam are likely to be broached during the election
campaign. We believe that the positions on these
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subjects will not be overly extreme. Nonetheless,
we are somewhat apprehensive that the opposition
groups, feeling themselves in dire need of some
emotionally dramatic issues to offset the military's
advantageous position, may come out for peace and
neutrality and will attack the US presence in Viet-
nam. It is worth noting that the southern groups,
reflecting in part their closer affinity and contact
with the French, have generally taken a more com-
promising attitude toward ending the war and have
tended to be more vocal about the allegedly delete-
rious effects of the US presence on the country's
economic, social, and moral fibre. Moreover,
should Tri Quang align himself with the southern
opposition elements and actively participate in the
election, he would certainly attempt to exploit
anti-US and peace sentiment.* In any event, we ex-
pect that there will at least be significant under-
tones if not blatant overtones, of anti-US and
neutralist sentiments in the campaigning.
24. The military establishment's candidate
will more or less run on the regime's record and ac-
complishments. We would expect a generally moderate
position on most issues with the exception of the
question of negotiations. Here, the military is
on record as being opposed to any talk of a coalition
government and any direct discussions with the NLF
or Viet Cong, though the-GVN's military leaders have
indicated some willingness to talk with their Hanoi
counterparts. The military candidate may also engage
in some anti-US baiting, in part to undercut the
opposition and in'part to assert his independence
The recent militant Buddhist request, later
seconded by Tam Chau, for a cease-fire on
Buddha's birthday may mark the opening round
of an attempt by the militant faction to make
political capital by exploiting the peace
theme. Tri Quang still has the remnants of the
"struggle movement" at his disposal, and it'is
now becoming clear that the militant Buddhists
are attempting to revive the movement. If the
opportunity arose or could be manufactured, it
is likely that Tri Quang would be quite willing
to take to the streets again.
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from the US. Although the military establishment is aware
of the need to avoid exacerbating regional differences and
civilian-military animosities, pressure from the hard-line
"Baby Turk" wing of the military could lead to some unfor-
tunate developments in these areas.
25. Potential Pitfalls. The most obvious pitfall, of
course, is that the electoral process will somehow set off
forces which destroy the substantial, but as yet fragile,
progress made thus far. This could come about in a number
of ways, e.g., a serious split in the military establishment
that resulted in a military coup, or a situation in which
the campaign became so bitter that the security of the coun-
try was so threatened by demonstration, riots, and the like
that the military felt compelled to suspend the elections
and resort to suppressive measures. We consider both of
these possibilities unlikely at the present time, though
this estimate will obviously have to be kept under continu-
ing review.
26. Somewhat more likely, but still considerably less
than even, is the possibility that the military will rig the
elections or at least engage in such flagrant activities as
to destroy their usefulness and integrity. Unlike the CA
election where the main task was merely to get out the vote,
this time the military must get out votes for the right man,
and this calls for more sophisticated tactics. We know,
for example, that the military has considered the possibility
of having to resort to illegal tactics. General Loan, in
his capacity as the eyes and ears of the regime, appears to
be the man who would be in charge of such a move should the
military deem it necessary. We do not believe that the
military will think it necessary to resort to blatant po-
litical chicanery, but there is a possibility that Loan and
others will act unilaterally or else bend their instructions
in such a way as to lend credence to charges of fraud.*
Lest this paragraph give a wrong impression of Loan, it
should be pointed out that on balance he is more of an
asset than a liability--albeit an asset that bears
close scrutiny. Loan's position as the chief security
officer of the country and his very close relationship
with Ky make him a natural choice for running the re-
gime's covert activities. Thus far at least, Loan has
not grossly exceeded his jurisdiction and his role in
support of the government has been considerable, e.g.,
Loan played a major role in the GVN's victory over Tri
Quang and the "struggle movement" last year.
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27. Yet another potential pitfall lies in the
danger that the military, confident of its ability
to win and govern in any case, will not be particu-
larly concerned to make an effort to include a
significant civilian element in the new government.
Some in the military may not sufficiently realize
the need for the new government to look like some-
thing new, or at least to avoid having it look as
if the political process now in train has been de-
signed only to give a constitutional and electoral
veneer to the same old political arrangements.
This is important for both the domestic and inter-
national image of the new government. On balance,
however, we believe that the top leadership in the
military is aware of the importance of. the coupling
of the military and civilian elements in the govern-
ment, and that they will be receptive to US advice
in this direction. Thus, we estimate that the odds
are better than even that the new government, will
contain enough of a civilian aura to give credibility
to its being a real step forward.
28. Summary and Prospects. Considering the
assets that the military establishment already pos-
sesses and the potential support that it may gain
through political deals, it is almost certain that
if the military remains unified, whomever it supports
for the presidency will win handily. This is not be-
cause the elections will necessarily be rigged, but
because no opposition group can rival the nationwide
apparatus and potential Tammany-like influence that
can be utilized by the military establishment.
29. This fact of Vietnamese political life
will affect the campaigns of the opposition candi-
dates and could, perhaps, lead to a particularly
bitter contest in which a number of issues may be
raised which will be particularly abrasive and which
will involve the US. Furthermore, there is a danger
that the military in the heat of. the campaign will
resort to illegal means, even if unnecessary, to
guarantee the victory of the GVN's candidate and
thereby destroy the value of the election. This is
not to say that these potentially disastrous events
will occur or that the country will be torn apart
by the elections, but to point out the dangers that
could arise and to underline the critical importance
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of the election and the pre-election period. Our
estimate is that the odds favor the election coming
out reasonably well for both Vietnam and the US,
particularly if the US assists by roviding active,
but'discreet, advice and counsel within the context
of Vietnamese political realities.
30. Time is too short, the divisive forces
too strong, for true national political parties to
emerge before the elections this year. About the
most that can be realistically expected is loose
coalitions of disparate groups. Nevertheless, if
such coalitions are formed, there is likely to be
a substantial carryover effect in the new government.
Assuming the military's candidate wins, we believe
there is a slightly better than even chance that the
legislature will be organized around a "government
bloc" and one or two "opposition blocs." Initially
at least, such blocs would not be particularly
cohesive, and some re-alignment of individuals and
groups would be likely to occur sooner or later.
31. Politics in the new government would gen-
erally resemble the present situation. Most of the
same problems would still exist, and the government
would still be faced with the same vulnerabilities.
The civilian-military relationship in general, and
regionalism in particular would continue to be the
major stumbling blocks. Regardless of the extent
of civilian participation in the new administration,
there are certain to be strains and stresses in ex-
ecutive-legislative relations. Compromise and po-
litical give and take are not firmly rooted in Viet-
namese political life, and the disparity of power
between the civilians and military tends to result
in the civilians being over-sensitive to real or
imagined faults of the military while some of the
military leaders tend to take a rather cavalier at-
titude toward the civilians and the need to cooperate
with them. Because of the fragile nature of the
system, judgments concerning longer range develop-
ments must be highly tentative. There will be crises,
any of which could prove to be the ultimate undoing
of the whole system.
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32. Thus, although the successful holding
of national elections would be an important and
essential political achievement, it would not
automatically insure that continued progress was
in store for Vietnam. The formation of a large
political coalition that comprised something ap-
proaching a majority of the electorate would be a
promising development and one that should be en-
couraged, though such a coalition would not be a
panacea. Initially, a coalition of this type
would not be very cohesive, but it would promote
political stability, particularly by forcing the
special interest groups to find some common ground
through which they could win a national election.
Furthermore, such a coalition would help to lay
the groundwork for the eventual creation of a
real, cohesive national party.
33. Actually, South Vietnam is slowly, often
agonizingly so in US eyes, moving in this very
direction., And although there will by many a slip
between cup and lip, we are cautiously hopeful that
the trend line will remain on the plus side. The
military establishment is aware of the need to
create a national political base, and within limits
it is receptive to advice on how to go about it.
On its own, it has sought advice from the Koreans,
whose rulers have faced problems similar to those
now faced by the Vietnamese. One obstacle to the
military's effort to create a stable base is its
lack of solid support in the southern region. Ul-
timately, if it is to succeed, it must incorporate
some sizable southern element not now included
among its assets. In any event, it must at all
costs refrain from aggravating the potential for
regional strife.
34. Over the longer run, the government must
of necessity also adopt a revolutionary stance.
Without this, it will probably be unable to motivate
and sustain a viable national base. This means that
insofar as possible, the government must strive to
maintain a maximum of independence from the vested
commercial and landed interests, so that it can
justify the support of the people by satisfying their
needs for social and economic change. To be free
of its ties to the vested interests requires financial
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support from other sources, which in this case
means the US in one way or another.
35. The US is inextricably embroiled in the
political life of South Vietnam and wields con-
siderable political power there. Most Vietnamese
tend to believe that the US calls most of the shots
in South Vietnam, and they identify the US with the
military regime. Indeed, a US policy of non-inter-
ference is not realistic; even if the US attempted
to stay out of the political picture, the Vietnam-
ese would see such restraint only as a clever
strategem to get what the US really wanted. There
are, however, limits to US power. The US, for ex-
ample, can probably influence the GVN in putting
a more civilian cast on the government, its in-
stitutions, and its day-to-day operations. But
the military leaders are not going to turn real and
full power over to the civilians, and it is quite
clear that whatever the government may be, the
influences of the military will be controlling for
some time to come. This is a fact of Vietnamese
political life that no US desire or action is likely
to change.
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