IMPLICATIONS OF THE VIETNAM WAR FOR THE US INTERNATIONAL POSITION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A001100030012-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 21, 2005
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: May 8, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
8 May 1967
DRAFT
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Implications of the Vietnam War for the US
International Position
1. An examination of the implications of the war in Vietnam,
and especially of US policy toward it, upon the US international
position poses difficult analytic problems. There are attitudes
and responses at various levels, ranging from official government
positions to organized opposition sponsored by Communist groups.
There are short-term and long-term effects. There are variations
from place to place, often depending upon local political circumstances
or degree of geographical proximity to Vietnam. Evidence is often
contradictory, and much depends upon the importance one is disposed
to attach to particular manifestations or expressions.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
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2. The US international position with respect to the Vietnam
war is, of course, unique in American experience; we have not before
been heavily engaged with so few active allies and so much strong
criticism, both at home and abroad. Because so much of the world
considers itself affected, or likely to be affected if the war is
prolonged and intensified, developments affecting the war have
become a major concern of many friendly nations. Moreover, because
of the world role of the US as the strongest and leading power of
the non-Conanunist world, the way in which the war is conducted and
terminated is widely felt to involve great significance for the
future of the free world itself.
3. There was indeed bound to be a certain ambivalence in the
attitudes of others toward any policy which the US chose to follow
in Vietnam. In the abstract, there was certain to be support for
the idea of protecting small nations from aggression and on
accompanying fear of this leading to an uncontrolled and dangerous
conflict. In any case of big power intervention there will always
be those who applaud and those who object. If US intervention had
been brief and quickly decisive, much of this ambivalence would
have dissolved. The objectors would have been routed by success
and the fears of the sympathetic dissipated. The US problem has
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arisen largely because the conflict has been prolonged and success
appears dubious, at least by means considered acceptable in many
parts of the world. This has removed much of the world's approach
to the problem from the abstract to the specific. It is no longer
for many foreign observers and governments a question of a principle
but of a specific case to be examined on its merits.
I. CURRENT ATTITUDES AND POLICIES
4.
Western Europe. Generally speaking, those who most dislike
and disapprove the US intervention in Vietnam and the US military
strategy in Vietnam are our European friends and allies. With certain
exceptions (Spain and Portugal and to some extent, West Germany),
the opinion is almost unive=ae,1 that the US has blundered in the
fact and the extent of its involvement. Moreover, among intellectuals,
youth, and the working class there is a strong moral revulsion against
the bombing policy and against what has come to be thought of as the
US objective, namely, to foist a puppet militoristic regime upon a
people trying to establish their oa national identity.
5. These views contrast strongly with what is often the official
policy of the governments, one which might be described as support
for our general objectives and sympathy for the problems and difficulties
we have encountered. But even the governments which quite honestly
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make these pronouncements of support often maintain grave reserve
about the wisdom and content of our policy. This reserve is not
often expressed to US representatives, but it nevertheless exists.
It seems to have deepended during the past several months, in
contrast to most of 1966, when our military progress was noticeable,
our willingness to negotiate accepted at face value, and the,re-
calcitrance of our enemy easy for all to see. But with intensification
of the bombing campaign, a slowdown in military progress on the ground,
and a growing malaise about the actual US willingness to negotiate,
the misgivings of government leaders have intensified.
6. These misgivings have not reached critical proportions,
non do they seem likely to do so in the absence of major intensifi-
cation of the war. But Socialists in the governments of Britain,
Italy, and West Germany would have great difficulties -- and some
cases might fail -- in holding the support of their parliamentary
contingents and local organizations if certain types of military
escalation occurred or if it appeared that the US was refusing what
they considered to be reasonable terms for a political settlement.
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8. Asia. The Far Eastern and South Asia countries constitute
a special case because of the significance and future impact of the
conflict upon power relationships in the area. The Australians
and New Zealanders, of course, would like to block Communist ex-
pansion and believe they are taking out insurance by providing
political and military support to the US. Others of our allies
feel the same way, notably the Thais and South Koreans. Of those
countries not allied with us, they generally put their chips on a
US victory, but have been cautious; they neither wish to offend
nationalists at home who sympathize with the North Vietnamese nor
wish to be in an exposed position in case of a compromise political
settlement. Indian and Pakistani public opinion sympathizes with
the North Vietnamese, but the governments of these two countries
are following a policy based largely upon the complications of their
international associations. Both these countries and the neutrals
would like the war over, and would probably be happy with the status
quo ante. The Japanese have accorded us verbal support on the basis
of the US diplomatic posture and military strategy to date. But
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the government has domestic political problems, including the
future of the security treaty, which would make it chary of
supporting the US if the war were substantiately intensified.
9. Other Areas. In much of the rest of the world, attitudes
depend greatly upon the state of relations with and proximity to
the US. While many feel uncomfortable about according political
support, those with useful bilateral relations with the US would
like to avoid endangering those relations by engaging in criticism.
Radical regimes which are already on bad terms with the US~
Many countries simply do not feel engaged and have problems of
they own. Most would like the war over, since it has preempted
so much of US interest and resources as to reduce the US capability
and disposition to extend them economic assistance.
are of course critical of US policy.
II. EFFECTS UPON US POLICY AND PRESTIGE
10. It was axiomatic that US prestige should have suffered
as a consequence of misapprehensions over the wisdom of US policy
and the morality of our military strategy. It has also declined
over our failure to have won and over the successful defiance of
US might by a small Communist country. In the context of our great-
power status, which many nations disliked but needed and could not
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deny, our failures have encouraged a new wave of anti-Americanism,
especially in Europe. This would be further stimulated by intensi-
fication of the conflict -- especially if it should fail to produce
quick results.
11. But in the more specific sense one cannot detect any way
in which this reduced prestige prompted by the Vietnam war has
frustrated US policy in Europe. The preeminence which the US
enjoyed in Europe was on the decline in any case, for a variety of
reasons. What the US involvement in Vietnam has done is to accelerate
this process and to provide additional talking points to those who
have wished to reduce the US role. Dislike of US intervention has
made it easier for the USSR to appear moderate and peace-seeking.
It has reminded the Europeans, especially the West Germans, that
the US has other problems besides Europe in which it is interested,
and this has encouraged Europeans to take more things into their own
hands. This in turn has made De Gaulle's policies more palatable
and contributed to our difficulties with the Kennedy Round, the NPT.,
and proposals regarding international liquidity.
12. Outside Europe, there has been perhaps a greater loss of
prestige, but less loss of policy effectiveness. Where smaller
and less powerful nations have felt the need for US help and
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protection, they have not been inclined to criticize US actions, at
least openly, or to try to frustrate US policy. Most of the
frustrations we have suffered have come from deep-seated problems
and trends already in existence. In some cases, our role in
Vietnam has probably strengthened our position and advanced our
general goals. In Indonesia, for example, the generals may not
have had the courage to move against Sukarno had it not been for
the US presence in Southeast Asia.
III. LONGER-TERM IMPLICATIONS
13. A great deal of the loss to the US prestige and much
of the legacy of opposition to US policy would probably be dissi-
pated by an early termination of the war on terms in general
consonance with the US objective. There would be general satisfaction
that the conflict was ended; if terminated in a way which appeared
to fulfil.'. our limited objective, there would be a widespread
reaction that the US had been right, after all. As time went on
and the world became interested in other things, even those who
have been especially bitter critics of US policy would find it
difficult to find listeners, and some of these might even join the
applause.
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14. Nevertheless, there would remain certain residues which
could not easily be overcome. These would be of two types. The
first would be in terms of the respect accorded US leadership.
Especially in Europe, something has been lost which will take
much time to recover; because of the widespread belief, even among
those who support us, that the US has blundered and refuses to
recognize its blunder, the US will have greater difficulties in
procuring support for its policies. On European questions US
leadership will particularly suffer, since it is now widely suspected
that the US is not really interested in Europe except in a commercial
sense, that it s aims there are more selfish than altruistic. The
other type of negative response which will be especially long-lasting
will be disillusionment, especially among European intellectuals and
youth, with US morality. Because of the great economic progress
which has been made in Europe, youth is more concerned with morality
and less with personal security than at any time in history. It
has the time and the disposition to worry about the bombing and
about the correctness of the US intervention. Rightly or wrongly,
it has taken a dim view of both US intervention and US strategy,
and this will plague us for many years to come.
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15. All the problems which have been noted viii. be compounded
the longer and more intense the war becomes and will make recovery
more dubious and prolonged. Moreover, particular steps in US
escalation might cause special problems and set in motion political
responses which would not only be difficult to handle but could
result in significant political changes. This is not the place
to catalogue either the various types of escalation which might
occur or the various responses which might ensue, but it is
important to be clear that tolerance is not unlimited, even among
those whose loyalty leads them to support us. There. would be a
point at which domestic political clamor or fear of future electoral
defeat will lead some of our friends to desert us. This may be
prompted by a particular action or an accumulation of actions, a
failure to accept a negotiation or political solution, or a turn
of events on the battlefield or in the political situation in
South Vietnam.
16. It is neither possible nor desirable to postulate or
attempt to predict specific consequences. But there are hazards
which must be noted. Developments in the war which inspired wider
and sharper criticism and dismay abroad will make the Soviet task
much easier and could in time lead to a new structure of power in
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various areas of the world. Developments in the war could, even
if no immediate political changes occurred, lead to a strengthening
of existing political groups who are anti-American or neutralist
and whose increased strength would become manifest in subsequent
elections. Perhaps most important of all, the hazard should be
recognized that certain types of US action could lead some govern-
ments to open disavowal of US policy at a time when international
support of the US was most important.
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