REACTIONS TO CONTINUATION OR TERMINATION OF THE PAUSE IN AIR ATTACKS ON THE DRV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A001100020033-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 1, 2006
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: January 19, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
19 January 1966
SUBJECT: Reactions to Continuation 4* Termination of the Pause
in Air Attacks on the DRV
THE PROEL I
To estimate the reactions of Communist and important non-
Communist nations to:
I. A continuation of the bombing pause;
II. A resumption of bombing in the DRV:
A. On the pre-pause pattern, with LOCS bombed to
within defined limits from the Chinese border and
no strikes within the Hanoi and Haiphong perimeters;
B. Extension of bombing to POL facilities, power
plants, and other military associated targets
including those within the Hanoi and Haiphong
perimeters, where this could be done without
major civilian casualties; ..I1'
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
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C. As in A and B, plus mining of Haiphong harbor
and the two lesser ports to the north.
For all three cases, it is assumed that SAM sites would be
struck as necessary to carry out the program without unacceptable
losses, and that airfields would be struck if, but only if,
hostile air action became a significant impediment to the carrying
out of the program.
We assume that, whether or not bombing is resumed, there will
be a continued buildup of US forces in the South.
1. The great bulk of present evidence indicates that
Hanoi is not prepared to make significant concessions in order
to negotiate a settlement in Vietnam or to gain a prolonged
cessation of US air attacks. This would not rule out private
or public moves by Hanoi to test US terms for a settlement. Such
efforts would, from their point of view, serve both to test US
determination, now possibly under doubt in their minds, and also
to encourage the US to prolong the pause. In our view, however,
Hanoi"s general attitude toward the pause and the US diplomatic
efforts indicates that the DRV leaders intend to continue the
insurrection in the South, even though they expect that if they do
the US will eventually resume bombings, probably on an augmented
scale.
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2. There are a number of possible reasons ..far this attitude,
including Chinese pressures and concern over Viet Cong cohesion
during any possible negotiations. Moreover, behind these tactical
considerations lie basic judgments by the North Vietnamese that
they can absorb a great deal more bombing if necessary, and that
they have political and military advantages which still promise
ultimate success or at least a far more favorable settlement than
the US appears willing to accept at this time. Thus, their hopes
and morale ride almost entirely on the course of events in the
South.
3. The Chinese make similar judgments. In addition,
they believe that larger stakes are involved. They greatly fear
that a negotiating phase in the Vietnam war would reinforce what
they see as a Soviet-US collaboration to isolate China and stifle
the world revolutionary movement. They have almost certainly
urged a hard line on Hanoi during the pause, and have publicly
warned against entering into any dealings with the US.
4. The Soviets probably take a more complicated view.
They have reaffirmed their commitments to Hanoi in the face of
the continued US buildup and the chances of renewed bombing. At
the same time, they have made some effort to bring the US and the
DRV into political contact in hopes of blocking further escalation.
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We doubt that they have put much pressure on Hanoi to enter
negotiations, but they have probably made clear Moscow's preference
for primarily political tactics at this stage of the struggle.
Their efforts have apparently failed, and they probably see no,
choice now but to persevere in supporting Hanoi while awaiting
another opportunity for diplomacy.
5. The Non-Communist Countries. Most opinion, both
governmental and private, is relieved that US air attacks have
been suspended and hopes that negotiations can be arranged. In
the middle ground between staunch US supporters and those
alienated from US purposes, the contrast between US initiatives
and the DRV's inflexibility has shifted onto Hanoi and Peking a
larger share of the blame for an unpopular war. Except for
certain US allies in Asia, most governments hope that escalation
can be prevented, and several states are making or plan to make
mediation efforts which, in their view, would be nullified by
an early renewal of bombing.
II. REACTIONS TO CONTINUATION OF THE PAUSE
6. The DRV. It is possible that Hanoi intends to make
some meaningful approach to the US. If so, the most logical time
would be in the near future, at a point it calculated to be the
last moment before the anticipated resumption of US bombing. Almost
certainly it would not do so after bombing was resumed -- at least
for some time.
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7. Given Hanoi's attitudes as we now estimate them to be,
however, an indefinite continuation of the bombing pause would
almost certainly encourage the DRV to believe that continued
struggle was on the right course. It would probably attribute
prolongation to heavy foreign and domestic pressures on the US
gaverrwent, It might from time to time make minor political
moves designed to encourage the US to extend the pause. But we
do not believe that a prolonged pause would lead the DRV leaders
to reduce their terms for a settlement so long as they still
expected to prevail in the South.
8. Communist China. Peking would be encouraged by a
continued bombing pause. The Chinese leaders would feel that the
continued standdown has greatly reduced the chances of a Sino-US
war and the risks of any call upon their air forces to try to
defend the DRV. They would urge upon Hanoi that the failure to
resume bombing was a sign of US weakness, and would claim that
the policies they have advocated were being justified. They
would still be concerned that the pause was related to diplomatic
probings, and would continue to warn Hanoi against negotiations.
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9. The USSR. The Soviets would not share the view that a
continuation of the pause betrayed a fundamental US irresolution.
They would probably still regard the US as committed to a long
war in SVN, but they would be gratified that the pause limited the
risks of their own involvement and relieved them of pressures to
protect DRV airspace. Soviet policy toward Vietnam probably
would not change much. The USSR would continue to supply mili-
tary ai., but it would probably seek to keep alive the possibility
of negotiations, hoping in this way to ward off future escalation
and achieve a resolution which assured a continued Soviet presence
in the area. If the pause were prolonged, the Soviets would feel
somewhat freer to improve their relations with the US in other
areas as opportunity and interest dictated.
10. Non-Communist World. Asian governments allied with the
US, except Japan, would be distressed by prolongation of the
bombing pause. In the GVN especially, morale would be lowered
and doubts as to US constancy would grow.. However, the continuing
rapid buildup of US forces in the South would do much to relieve
these feelings. In Japan, where the bombing of the North has
been the major element in growing public opposition to the US
course in Vietnam, continuation of the pause would be generally
welcomed. As a result, the Sato government would be strengthened
against leftist attacks on its handling of Southeast Asian policy.
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11. The European allies of the US would in general be glad
to see an indefinite prolongation of the pause in bombing. They
would be relieved that the prospect of a widened war seemed
thereby to be diminished. The uncommitted nations would probably
give the US some credit for good intentions, but on the whole
the effect among these nations would be not to win them to the
US side but to diminish the degree of their opposition to the
general US course in Vietnam.
III. REACTIONS TO RESUMPTION OF BOMBING
12. The DRV. Hanoi almost certainly expects the US to
resume bombing in the absence of any conciliatory moves on their
own part. If anyone in Hanoi seriously thought that the pause
indicated an intention of the US to yield its position, he would
be disabused. Hanoi might be confirmed in its declared view that
the pause was no more than a device to strengthen the US political
standing and justify an intensification of the war. There is a
possibility that Hanoi would have misjudged the pause, miscalculated
the intentions of the US, and be surprised by the resumption of
bombing. In the unlikely event that this was true, a gradual
renewal which began with targets related to the movement of men
and supplies to the South, might cause the DRV to make some
political moves to avert an expansion of the attack. We think
it far more likely that Hanoi has discounted in advance the
renewal of bombing and would be prepared to accept it.
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13. As a general proposition, we believe that variations in the
scope of the bombing would not produce significantly different
responses from the DRV. Courses B and C would present them with
greater physical difficulties than Course A. But in all of these
contingencies we believe that Hanoi would continue to support
the insurgency in the South and to defend its air space as best
it could. At some point it might elaborate on the hint, planted
by General Tolubko's visit, that continued escalation could
bring Soviet surface-to-surface missiles into North Vietnam.
14. Communist China. Renewed bombing, even on the expanded
scale of B and C, would not be likely to diminish the confidence
of the Chinese in eventual victory through the techniques of
"people's war." Indeed, though they would prefer a continued
pause, they would even derive some satisfaction, in the event of
renewal, from the obvious failure of the US and the Soviets to
move the struggle to the negotiating table, from the increasing
political and military costs to the US of the effort, from the
hardening of the DRV attitude which bombing would produce, and
from the continuing heavy dependence of the DRV on China.
15. On the other hand, renewed bombing, especially Courses
B and C, would raise problems for the Chinese. They would feel
that their boasted readiness to aid their small partner was being
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tested in the eyes of the world. A, the same time, they would
be deeply worried that the war might spread to Chinese territory.
It is likely that they would respond to enlarged air attacks on
the DRV with greatly increased logistic support, including large
additional numbers of engineer and supply troops and, possibly,
anti-aircraft units. We think it unlikely that Peking would
intervene in combat with aircraft or infantry. Nevertheless,
the increase of their logistical presence in North Vietnam and
the strengthening of their military position in South China
improves their capabilities for such intervention should they
decide to undertake it.
16. The USSR. The Soviets would belabor the US in public,
would send more military aid to the DRV, and would make other
gestures of support. We continue to believe, however, that the
odds are against their intervening in radical new ways which would
expose them to serious risks -- e.g., by introducing surface-to-
surface ballistic missiles. The chances are somewhat greater that
they would contribute KOMAR boats or cruise missiles. Moscow
would also try to keep up US hopes for a peaceful settlement,
working to achieve another pause in the future as a prelude to
such a settlement.
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17. The Non-Communist World. Resumption of air attacks
would produce popular disappointment, much of which would be
directed against the US. Nevertheless, the contrast between US
efforts to get negotiations started and DRV inflexibility would
cause a large share of the blame to fall on Hanoi and Peking.
We believe that no states that now support the US policy would
cease to do so. However, states which conceive of themselves
as active mediators would feel that their efforts had been
slighted. The most significant effect would probably be in
Japan, where there would be renewed apprehension over Chinese
involvement and pressures on Sato for a more neutral stance on
Vietnam would grow.
18. The timing and manner of resumption would probably
have some effect on initial non-Communist reactions. The tendency
to blame the US would be appreciably strengthened if bombing
were resumed immediately after Tet and if it were renewed on the
scale of Course B or C. Conversely, Hanoi would bear a greater
burden if major post-Tet offensives by VC/PAVN forces preceded
the renewal of air attacks upon the North. Even in these circum-
stances, however, much of world opinion would tend, in time, to
forget the particulars and to urge the US again to make concessions.
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19. Special Considerations of Course B. Destruction of the
main POL facilities and electric power plants would deprive the
modern sector of the North Vietnamese economy of its main sources
of power. However, this modern sector is not essential to the
viability of the DRV. About 85 percent of the people live in
rural areas and depend little if any on the modern sector.
Traditional means of transport could provide the rather limited
necessary circulation of food and clothing. The fundamental
needs of the people would continue to be met. Nevertheless,
many people would undergo great inconvenience; some would suffer
serious hardships and personal losses; and civilian casualties
would be higher than heretofore. These things would arouse
protests in various parts of the wort , especially among those
who already oppose US policies. But we think that this kind of
bombing would not create serious problems of popular morale in
the DRV or weaken the regime's determination to resist.
20. Reactions Peculiar to Course C, Mining the Ports. During
the past six months, calls at North Vietnamese ports by Free World
ships, primarily vessels of British registry chartered by the
Communists, have ranged between 11 and 21 a month. We believe
that mining the main harbors, even with adequate warning to avoid
unintentional damage to shipping, would bring increased attacks on
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US policy throughout the Free World. The Norwegian and British
governments, especially, would be under added domestic pressure
to oppose the US actions. The UK government would indicate
reservations about the mining, but would probably not vigorously
press its case on the US nor oppose the action in public.
21. The Sobtiet Union would be presented with a particular
dilemma. The difficulty of clearing such mine fields and the
ease of resowing would virtually rule out efforts to reopen the
ports. The Soviets would certainly protest vigorously and.might
try for some kind of action in the UN. We do not believe,
however, that the Soviets would risk their ships in mined Vietnamese
harbors. Peking and Hanoi would try to keep the necessary supplies
moving by shallow-draft coastal shipping and overland transport.
Impact on the Military Situation in the South
22. In the preceding paragraphs we have discussed our
conclusion that renewed aerial attacks at A, B. or C levels would
probably not produce a significant change in Communist policy with
respect to Vietnam. We have stressed that Hanoi would be likely
to be discouraged only if Communist forces were taking a consistent
beating in the South. We must, therefore, consider what effect
renewed bombing in the North would be likely to have on Communist
military capabilities in the South.
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23. Resumption of pre-pause levels (Course A) would not
have an appreciably different impact from that of the past few
months, during which the Communists have been able to increase the
level of their military activity in the South.
24. Course B attacks, if prosecuted vigorously enough,
could knock out most of the DRV's modern industrial sector and
substantially reduce its modern transport capability. However,
this modern sector is not essential to the support of the
insurgency in the South. DRV industry provides only a small
part of the weapons and munitions sent South -- grenades, land
mines, and some small-arms munitions -- and these could be
replaced from Chinese sources.
25. Destruction of the major POL facilities would deprive
the DRV of most of its stored POL. About 10,000 tons, or two-thirds
of a normal month's supply, is estimated to be dispersed in drums
and small tanks. Closing of Haiphong by mines would cut off the
means by which most POL has been entering the country. Such
losses would initially disorganize the Communist logistic effort,
but they would probably resort to rail shipment to P'ing-hsiang
on the Sino-Vietnamese border and truck shipment from there on
(zften moving at night), augmented by coastal shipping, to continue
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essential supplies. Carts and wagons drawn by animals and humans
could continue logistic support where POL was lacking. This was
done in Vietnam during the war against the French and in Korea
by the Chinese and North Koreans. Supply of the Communist
troops in South Vietnam would be much more difficult than at
present, but they could not be prevented from moving the relatively
small amounts required even for an expansion of the levels of
conflict in the South. Thus we do not believe that even the
maximum (Course C) level of air attack on the DRV would, in
itself, have a critical impact on the combat ability of the
Communist forces in South Vietnam.
SHERMAN KENT
Chairman
The requirement for outside supply of the Communist forces in
South Vietnam at recent levels of combat is estimated to
average about 12 tons a day. Even with the Communist force
increases projected by MACV for the end of 1966, and at
greatly intensified levels of combat, requirements would
average only about 165 tons a day. The weakest part of the
lines of communication, the Lao corridor is estimated to have
a capacity of about 400 tons a day even under present levels
of bombing.
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