PROBABLE REACTIONS TO CERTAIN US ACTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A001100020030-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 1, 2006
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: January 27, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Re e 2006/11/01 CIA-RDP79R00967A1100020030-5
TS. 185994-a
27 January 1967
DRAFT
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: PROBABLE REACTIONS TO CERTAIN US ACTIONS
To estimate the probable Communist and Free World reactions
to aerial mining of North Vietnamese harbors and to subsequent
air strikes against North Vietnamese airfields.
I. MINING OF HARBORS
A. Free World Reactions
1. Compared with reactions to previous US moves, there
would be somewhat more alarm in the Free World over this course
of action. Mining the harbors, unlike certain other US moves
which have been more or less self-contained (i.e., air strikes
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on new targets) the mining of the harbors could set in train a
series of possible reactions and countermeasures. No one could
be sure for some time whether the US had raised the war to a far
more dangerous level, perhaps involving a confrontation, with
the USSR or China. And should this apprehension die down, there
would be a residual of criticism against the US for blocking
deliveries of non-military supplies to the people of North Vietnam
and for disregarding the principle of "freedom of the seas" in
peacetime. In our view, it would be difficult for the US to
demonstrate in public that a substantial amount of war material
(other than POL and trucks) was deliverd by sea.
2. Nevertheless, we believe that no Free World country
would basically alter its policy toward the US and that the Free
World concern would recede, provided there was no significant
escalation on the Communist side. The US action would complicate
the British Government's policy of semi-support of the US in Viet-
nam.* As with the earlier bombing of the POL storage facilities,
* The preponderance of Free World shipping to North Vietnam
is on British flag ships (50 during 1966).
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the UK would probably publicly disassociate itself from the
US action. Japan would probably also disassociate itself.
Elsewhere, the move would reinforce sentiments that the US
was not really interested in negotiations. It is possible
that some Afro-Asian countries, perhaps supported by France,
would move to have the UN condemn the US action.
3. General. All of the Communist powers would assume
that the US was embarking on a new phase of escalation. And
they would generally conclude that{US interest in negotiations
had substantially declined Of course, in all Communist
countries, there would be a massive barrage of propaganda denouncing
the US move.
4. North Vietnam. Hanoi has already begun to prepare
its citizens for the possibility that its harbors will be mined.
Nevertheless, the actual mining would be a jolt and would increase
fears that the ultimate aim of the US was to destroy the North
Vietnamese regime. There is little that Hanoi can do to counter
the mining: it has no capacity to deal with the mines themselves.
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 Hanoi's main concern would be to improvise alternative means
which to maintain the flow of supplies into the count
5.
against some or all shallow draft shipping, then the rail line 5
vould have to operate at maximum capacities, and would thus be
highly vulnerable to air strikes. Thus, the US action
could considerably increase the problems in prosec the war.
The North Vietnamese leaders would probably estimate
that they and their Communist allies could find ways to continue
the flow of essential military and economic goods, although with
far more difficulty and disruption. If the mining were effective
In the near term, however, we do not believe Hanoi 'would be forced-
t
6. It is possible that at this point, however, Hanoi would
decide a showdown was at hand and that it could not simply absorb
the US moves without responding. In these circumstances, North
Vietnam might attempt some high
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attempting an airstrike against South Vietnam. We believe that
such actions are unlikely since Hanoi would probably calculate
that they would only draw an even greater US reaction in response.
However, it is likely that the VC would
et to mine the channel into Saigon.
7. The USSR and China. The US action would come at a
time when Sino-Soviet relations are particularly tense. But to
offset fully the closing of North Vietnam's ports, a much greater
degree of Sino-Soviet cooperation would be rewired. During 1966,
about 120 Soviet ships delivered abou
North Vietnam.* If compelled to find othr routes, the Soviets
would be forced to obtain Peking's approval for transhipment
across China. A Soviet airlift could be ttempted, but the
quantities of supplies that could be airl fted would be small
unless staging rights could be acquired in China.
8. Though North Vietnam would insis on keeping supplies
moving, the US action would probably not f ice any significant
improvement in Sino-Soviet cooperation. Ch na would argue that
This was comprised of 99 dry-cargo vess is carrying
327,800 tons of supplies and 23 tankers hich delivered
203,000 tons of POL.
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the Soviets should confront the US on the high seas, while the
USSR would counter that Chinese obstanc ;indered joint efforts
to support Hanoi. Thus, to some ent, politics would probably
interfere with Communist efforts to offset the mining of the
ports.
9. China. The present upheaval in China makes it almost
impossible to predict with confidence Peking's reactions. At a
minimum, China would greatly increase the amount of supplies
sent to North Vietnam. There would be a heavy torrent of belligerent
Chinese propaganda against the US. Beyond this, however, we note
that there has been a decline in Chinese attention to all foreign
affairs, including Vietnam, because of the cultural revolution.
Thus, we doubt that the mining would automatically produce any
significant change in Chinese policy toward Vietnam. It could be
that the flow of supplies over the rail lines would be disrupted
by the internal convulsions in China.
a more direct challenge, since the Soviets supply much of North
Vietnam's economic requirement by sea (estimated at $150 million
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last year). The Soviets would be embarrased by their inability
to prevent or counter the US move. Moreover, unless they were
prepared to take new risks they would be immediately vulnerable
to Chinese taunts. And, of course, the new situationwould mean
that all deliveries of supplies, military and civilian, would be
at the sufferance of Peking, (particularly, if the moving made
it too dangerous to offload shipments and small vessels.) To
cover this embarassing situation, the Soviets would resort to
a considerable verbal escalation hoping to force the US to retreat.
U. But from a practical point of view the Soviets would
have little choice, but to accept the situation. We assume that
the Soviet experts would conclude that the mines would be too
ifficult to sweep and, in any case, could be easily replaced.
n such circumstances we believe the USSR would nom willing
with the US by bringing
aircraft that would bably be necessary to
keep sea lanes open to North Vietnam. The Soviets could use
the situation as an excuse to disengage from the Vietnam war by
charging Chinese obstructionism and so forth. But we doubt that
this option is politically feasible. The net result, however would
probably be a loss of Soviet influence in Hanoi.
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12. The Soviet Bloc would be likely to strike back at the
US in their bilateral relations. Any ongoing US efforts to begin
a dialouge on East-West issues would be frozen. In addition,
they might recall the Soviet ambassador S Washington in a public
display of anger. These p ? ss 13i1'i tires would be greatly strengthened
if the mining operations were carried out without warning or with
some serious damage to Soviet ships. How long this freeze in US-
Soviet relations would continue would depend on subsequent events.
13. Longer Term: Over a period of several months, it seems
likely that supplies to North Vietnam would be reduced, particularly
if air attacks on rail lines were increased. Moreover, if the
mining were also effective against shallow draft shipping, then
the decrease in supplies would come sooner. Eventually, Hanoi
would have to sort out its priorities between vital military
items and essential civilian goods. However, in our view it would
probably be many months before this situation began to effect the
military situation in South Vietnam. How the Communists might
react at this point cannot be-foreseen. Much would depend on
intervening events; the status of the war, the situation in the
communist world, and the US.
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(1) The US action resulted from greatly increased
air combat over North Vietnam which affected
US air operations.
(2) Initial and follow-up US strikes would be
generally successful in making the airfields
inoperable.
A. General Reactions
14. Free World reactions to the US bombing of airfields
in North Vietnam would follow similar lines to those discussed
above. If the strikes came hard on the heels of the mining
Y action, they would be viewed by most observers as proof that
the war was rapidly escalating, that the US had largely abandoned
any hope for a negotiated settlement in the near term, and was
intent on pursuing the war to a complete victory. Fear of a
confrontation with Communist China would increase, and many
countries would consider that the Vietnamese war had moved
significantly closer to a Sino-US war. Pressures on the US for
a unilateral suspension of all bombings in North Vietnam would
grow.
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15, North Vietnam would attempt to defend its airfields.
The North Korean pilots now in North Vietnam would enter the
combat, if they had not done so already, and perhaps Soviet and
Chinese pilots as well. Nevertheless, even if a substantial
part of North Vietnam's air force (96 MIG-15s, and 17s, of which
32 are in China, 18 MIG-21s, and 8 IL-28s) survived the initial
strikes, it would have only a limited and short-lived capability
to interfere with the US attacks. Faced with the destruction of
its air facilities, in any case, Hanoi might attempt a spectacular,
last gasp air attack against a US base in South Vietnam or a US
carrier in the Tonkin Gulf. Eventually, however, Hanoi would
have no choice but to send its remaining aircraft and pilots
to bases in Southern China.
16. Apart from providing sanctuary for North Vietnamese
aircraft and supplies to Hanoi (both of which it is already
doing), Communist China might be asked to allow North Vietnamese
aircraft to operate from Chinese bases. We have previously
estimated that China.,-recognizing. the-r_isks iuv,,, lved~j,-wo-qld
prohibit such action. If circumstances were normal in China
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when the assumed situation arose, we would still make such an
estimate. But if the present turmoil or something like it still
exists when Peking had to decide its reaction, we would be far
less certain that the Chinese leaders would calculate the situa-
tion in a careful, prudent and rational manner. Certain political
factions might even see an advantage in a US air attack, which
could be used to rally the armed forces,though we still believe
this unlikely. At the same time, if the situation in China were
still so uncertain, Hanoi might not seek refuge for the remnants
of its air force.
IT. A compromise of sorts might be worked out to minimize
the direct dangers to China. For example, fighter aircraft
might return to North Vietnam if and when the airfields were
repaired, and then begin some limited defensive operations. If
once again forced to deploy to China, they might remain inactive
for a time and return again. In this way the Communists would
create a semi-sanctuary in China. The situation confronting the
US would be highly ambiguous, especially if North Vietnamese
pilots were interspersed with some North Koreans, Chinese, and
Soviets. Though this situation is possible, we think it unlikely
that the Chinese would want to slide into possible confrontation
with the US in this manner.
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18. Hanoi would request and be able to obtain additional
air defense equipment, SAMs and AAA, from the USSR and China.
Furthermore, Hanoi would probably ask for, and China would
almost certainly send, additional logistic and am4i.aircraft
troops to augment the Chinese force already there. This action
and the presence of the Chinese units already in North Vietnam
might be publicly announced to heighten its effect. (We do not
believe, however, that either Hanoi or Peking would see the
desirability of introducing substantial numbers of Chinese ground
combat units into North Vietnam. The Soviet Union, Cuba, and
the Eastern European Communist states might be asked to send
'volunteers" to aid in the defense of North Vietnam. If so,
we believe they would comply with Hanoi's request.
19. The USSR. The Soviets are already heavily committed to
help defend North Vietnam against air attacks, and the US action
would complicate their policy problems. They would realize their
limited ability to protect North Vietnam from US airstrikes,
Nevertheless, they would have scant choice but to attempt to
fulfill Vietnamese requests for more air defense equipment.
The alternative would be to abandon Hanoi to Chinese influence
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an alternative the Soviets have already paid a considerable
price to avoid. At this stage of the air war, the Soviets
would be unlikely to agree to any overt involvement, beyond the
possibility of allowing "volunteers" to go to North Vietnam.
Soviet relations with the US, of course, would suffer.
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