COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO CERTAIN US COURSES OF ACTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A001100020029-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 1, 2006
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: February 2, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

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TB. 135997
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
2 February 1967
DRAFT
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: COMMUNIST REACTINNS TO CERTAIN US COURSES OF ACTION
To estimate the probable reaction of North Vietnam, China
and the USSR to the following air campaigns against North Viet-
nam:
1. A phased course of US actions consisting of:
A. airstrikes against 20 modern industrial targets
in North Vietnam, followed by
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B. mining of North Vietnamese harbors to prevent:
(1) use of deep-draft ocean-going ships only
(2) use of both deep-draft and shallow-draft ships
In both cases, we assume intensive armed reconnais-
sance against LOCs and transport targets, followed by
C. airstrikes against the levees in the Red River Delta,
followed by
GROUP I
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D. intensive airstrikes against the transportation
system, the airfields and certain minor military
targets, and miscellaneous industrial and repair
facilities.
II. A restriction of US bombing to the "logistic funnel,"
i.e., Route Packages 1 and 2 and Laos.
None of the above would call for the use of nuclear
weapons or for air strikes any closer to the border of
Communist China than at present.
1. There are a number of general considerations which would
influence the immediate reactions of the Communist countries
concerned and, more important, influence their judgement of US
intentions. How the US explained its policy and intentions would
the
be taken into account. In addition,/ duration of the campaign,
whether it was a rapid series of air strikes or a more gradual
and prolonged campaign could be quite important in how the Com-
munists would respond. Among the other significant factors
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bearing on Communist reaction would be the general political sit-
uuation at the time the proposed course of action was initiated,
i.e., whether there seemed to be movement toward negotiations of
and
some kind,/ the general state of world opinion and international
reaction to the US moves.
2. We think it also important to emphasize that in estimating
the Communist reactions to an involved series of US moves, there
are likely to be unexpected developments which would affect both
the US and the Communist side. We have tried to point out certain
possible developments such as the intervention of third parties at
the UN. In addition, there is the great uncertainty over internal
developments in China, and the state of Sino-Soviet relations. For
such reasons, the estimated reactions of the Communist3 near the
last stage of the assumed air campaign are highly tenuous. By
that time a number of events could have occured which might per-
suade the Communists to make some quite different responses than
we foresee.
3. We have not tried to judge the affect on Hanoi's will
every
to persist at/ stage of this campaign, mainly because after
the mining of the harbors, the effect on life in North Vietnam
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would be a cumulative process. When and if the regime would judge
that morale and the disruption of public order was a serious
problem cannot be foreseen. Thus, it is not possible to say that
at any given point in the campaign Vietnamese will to persist
will crack. In general, however, we believe that if Hanoi does
not change its policy after the full impact of the mining is
apparent, then the subsequent US actions would probably not prove
decisive.
II. COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO A PHASED STEP-UP IN US ACTIONS
A. Air strikes Against Selected Industrial Targets
:. General. All of the Communist powers would interpret
the US action as an important change of US Policy. They have
apparently been unsure of which direction the US planned to move
in the bombing campaign -- whether to escalate or to keep it
limited. The airstrikes would convince them that the US had
opted for escalation, though they would not be sure of how much
or how soon. In any case, they would probably conclude that the
US interest in a negotiated settlement was waning. As in the case
of the previous strikes against the POL, there woul8 be a barrage
of propaganda denouncing the US move; the civilian nature of the
targets and civilian casualties would be exploited as would the
attacks in the areas of Hanoi and Haiphong.
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5. North Vietnam. North Vietnam has probably already
discounted the effect of an attack on the country's industrial base.
The North Vietnamese reaction would be attenuated by the fact
that its industry is not essential for the country's survival
because of the basically agrarian nature of its economy. More-
over, Hanoi would assume -- almost certainly correctly -- that
much of the effect of the US action could be offset by increased
imports from the USSR and Communist China, and that the supplies
necessary to keep the economy going and to sustain the war effott
could be obtained. At this stage of the war, we believe that
North Vietnam would be willing to accept the destruction of its
industrial facilities in order to continue the war and that the
US action would not have any decisive effect on the North
Vietnamese will to persist.
6. North Vietnam would probably use its (96 MIG-
15s and 17s, and 18 MIG-21s) in attempting to defend its industrial
plants, particularly those targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong area.
This plus the use of already heavy SAM and AAA air defenses in
the area could lead a substantial step up in the air war over
North Vietnam. Thus, it is possible that the stepped up North
Vietnamese air reaction would confront the US with the question
of whether to destroy the airfields.
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7. China. Despite the present turmoil in Communist
China, we are reasonably confident that the US action would
not trigger any significant change in Peking's position
concerning the war in Vietnam. China would step up its economic
aid to North Vietnam as well as providing additional air defense
equipment. Peking would almost certainly be willing to increase
the number of anti-aircraft and logistic troops it has in North
Vietnam; currently estimated at 25,000 to 47,000 men.
8. The USSR. The Soviet Union would be somewhat concerned
that the US action marked the beginning of a new and more dangerous
phase of the war, which, as it unfolded, would confront the USSR
with increasingly difficult problems and decisions. At this
point, the Soviets would be mainly I to meet whatever
new requirement Hanoi levied for economic and military aid.
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B. Mining of the Harbors
9. General. The Communist countries would consider the
mining as a considerably more provocative and dangerous course
of action, particularly if it followed soon after the airstrikes
against industrial targets. They would see the US action as proof
that the war was rapidly escalating, and they would probably assume
that the US was no longer interested in a compromise and was intent
on the war to a complete victory whether by negotiations
or not. US protestations to the contrary would not be believed.
In the hope of increasing world pressure on the US for a unilateral
de-escalation of its activities in the war, Communist propaganda
would stress the dangerous turn of events and the increased
possibility of a confrontation between the major powers. At this
stage the Vietnamese problem would probably be taken to the UN,
either by neutrals or by the USSR and East Europeans.
10. North Vietnam. Hanoi has already begun to prepare its
citizens for the possibility that its harbors will be mined.
Nevertheless, the actual mining would be a jolt and would increase
fears that the ultimate aim of the US vas to destroy the North
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Vietnamese regime. There is little that Hanoi can do to prevent
the mining: it has no capacity to deal with the mines themselves.
It is likely, however, that North Vietnam would commit its aircraft
against the US mining effort. But Hanoi's main concern would be to
improvise alternative means by which to maintain the flow of supplies
into the country.
11, The North Vietnamese leaders would probably estimate that
they and their Communist allies could find ways to continue the
flow of essential military and economic goods, although with far
more difficulty and disruption. If the mining were effective against
some or all shallow draft shipping, then the rail lines would have
to operate at maximum capacities, and would thus be highly vulnerable
to air strikes. Thus, the US action could considerably increase
Hanoi's problems in prosecuting the war. In the near term,'
we do not believe Hanoi would be forced to abandon the war in South
Vietnam.
12. It is possible that at this point,
decide that it could not simply absorb the US moves without a
major response. In these circumstances, North Viethan might attempt
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some highly demonstrative action of its own, e.g., attacking a
US carrier or attempting an airstrike against South Vietnam.
We believe that such actions are unlikely since Hanoi would.
probably calculate that they would only draw an even greater
US reaction in response. , it is likely that the VC would
try to make a sustained attempt to close the channel into Saigon.
13. China. We doubt that the mining would automatically
produce any significant change in Chinese policy toward Vietnam.
There would be a round of propaganda. At a minimum,
China would attempt to increase substantially the amount of
supplies sent to North Vietnam, although the flow of supplies
over the rail lines out of China might be disrupted by the
internal convulsions there. But the present upheaval in China
makes it almost impossible to predict with confidence Peking's
reaction to the mining. There would be some chance that China
would react strongly, perhaps even going so far as to directly
intervene in the air over Vietnam, though we consider this unlikely.
If requested, Peking would augment its forces in North Vietnam.
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14. The USSR. The US action would confront the USSR
with a more direct challenge, since the Soviets supply much
of North Vietnam's economic requirement by sea (estimated at
$150 million last year). The Soviets would be embarrassed by
their inability to prevent or counter the US move. Nbreover,
unless they were prepared to take new risks they would be
immediately vulnerable to Chinese taunts. And, of course, the
new situation would mean that almost all deliveries of supplies,
military and civilian, would be at the sufferance of Peking
(particularly, if the mining made it too dangerous to offload
shipments onto small vessels). To cover this embarrassing situ-
ation, the Soviets would resort to a considerable verbal escala-
tion hoping to force the US to retreat. And they would probably
allow "volunteers" to go to North Vietnam if Hanoi asked for
them.
15. But from a practical point of view the Soviets would
have little choice but to accept the situation. We assume that
the Soviet experts would conclude that the mines would be too
difficult to sweep and, in any case, could be easily replaced.
In such circumstances we believe the USSR would not be willing to
take the risk of bringing down the ships and aircraft that would
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probably be necessary to keep the sea lanes open to North Vietnam.
The Soviets could use the situation as an excuse to disengage
from the Vietnam war by charging Chinese obstructionism and so
forth. But the Soviets almost certainly consider the option
politically infeasible, The net result, however, would be that
as China's role in the delivery of essential supplies increased
there would probably be a loss of Soviet influence in Hanoi,
at least as long as Hanoi was determined to persist in the war.
16. The Soviets would be likely to strike back at the
US in their bilateral relations. Any ongoing US efforts to begin
a dialogue on East-West issues would be frozen. The Soviets
would exploit the US action with the European states by charging
was
that the US/no longer concerned with Europe and was irresponskble
and aggressive in its world relations. For a number of reasons,
including presenting themselves as a reasonable nation, the
Soviets wouldbe unlikely to increase pressures in Berlin. The
USSR would probably move to have the UN condemn the US for the
mining. In addition, they might recall the Soviet ambassador
from Washihgton in a public display of anger. These possibilities
would be greatly strengthened if the alining operations were carried
out without warning or with some serious damage to Soviet ships.
How long this -freeze in US-Soviet relations would continue would
depend on subsequent events.
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17. The USSR and China. The US action could come at a
time when Sino-Soviet relations are particularly tense. But to
offset fully the closing of North Vietnam's ports, a much
greater degree of Sino-Soviet cooperation would be required. If
the shallow draft mining compelled the Soviets to find other
routes, they would be forced to obtain Peking's approval for
transhipment across China.* A Soviet airlift could be attempted,
but the quantities of supplies that could be airlifted would be
small unless staging rights could be acquired in China.
18. Though North Vietnam would insist on keeping supplies
moving, the US action would probably not force any significant
improvement in Sino-Soviet cooperation. China would argue that
the Soviets should confront the US on the high seas, while the
obstinacy
USSR would counter that Chinese/ hindered joint efforts
to support Hanoi. Thus, to some extent, politics would probably
interfere with Communist efforts to offset the mining of the ports.
During 1966, about 120 Soviet ships delivered about
530,000 tons of goods to North Vietnam. This was
comprised of 99 dry-cargo vessels carrying 327,800
tons of supplies and 23 tanners which delivered
203,000 tons of POL.
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19. General. Coming after the two actions discussed
above, the bombing of the levees would be viewed by the
Communists as proof that the US was engaged in a campaign
to destroy North Vietnam in an attempt to end the war. The
Communists would calculate -- almost certainly correctly --
that adverse reaction to the US move would be widespread and
they would exploit such sentiment, emphasizing that the prime
target was the civilian population of North Vietnam. However,
the US willingness to accept expected criticism would probably
be sobering for the Communists. It would tend to convince them
that there was little, if anything, that the US might not
eventually do or risk to impose its will in Vietnam, including
the possibility of direct invasion of the North.
20, North Vietnam. We believe that Hanoi would feel
compelled to respond vigorously to the attack on its dikes. If
Hanoi had not already begun an intensive air war to protect the
LOCs after the mining, at this point they almost certainly would.
Thus, as already noted, the US might have to decide the question
of bombing the air fields. Moreover, the odds would increase at
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This stage that Hanoi would attempt some major retaliation of
its own against the US either in South Vietnam or in the Tonkin
Gulf, They would probably calculate that the US was determined to
widen its air attacks and that there was little to be gained by
restricting
their response. It is also possible that the VC in
South Vietnam would significantly step up their terroristic
activities directed at US personnel in response to the bombing
even though this might cause heavy losses and expenditure of
their assets.
21. The bombing would force North Vietnam to increase
substantially its food imports, especially if the dikes were
hit during the high-water period from mid-July to mid-August
when destruction of cropland would be the greatest. Coupled
with the increased need for imports imposed by the C a mining
program, the food imports would tax the overland routes from China
to North Vietnam to almost their full capacity. This would
inevitably lead to delays, and given the current US bombing
program against these routes, it is highly doubtful that the total
amount of through traffic would fully meet the demands imposed
by both the mining and the bombing. Thus Hanoi would probably
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be forced to establish priorities between the military and economic
goods that it receives from its Communist allies. Nevertheless,
we believe that enough supplies would get through to keep North
Vietnam going and to allow it to continue the war for some time
to come.
22. At about this stage, however, we feel that the North
Vietnamese would have to make some basic choices, either taking
whatever steps seemed necessary to cause the US to stop the
bombing, or accepting the possibility of more damage and
perservering. They might also decide the time had come to
reconsider whether they could continue the war without significant
escalation of their own or had to widen it by calling in the
Chinese and Soviets or by spreading it to Laos.
23. trhich option the North Vietnamese might choose would depend
on how they viewed several factors. Of first importance would be
the general state of North Vietnam, and the regimes judgment as
to whether it could maintain morale anddisc plino despite the US
air attacks. Secondly, would be the advice andassistance they
received from China dnd the USSR. They would certainly want to know
how far these two countries would go if requested to intervene.
Finally, the military and political situation in South Vietnam would
be an important factor.
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24. They might calculate these factors and conclude that
their objectives in South Vietnam were more remote and that the
damage to the North was becoming far too costly. They could
reason that only minimal political concessions could cause the
US to desist. And they might decide that the alternative of
continuing the war would make Hanoi far too dependent on Chinese
assistance and troops, thereby gradually losing control over the
25. On the other hand, they could conclude the opposite.
They could decide that, barring ground invasion, the US had
done its worst and that North Vietnam could sustain further
damage without having to abandon the war. They might also
conclude that the Communist side could escalate in such a way
as to force the US eventually to retreat from the bombing.
26. We cannot be very confident which course the North
Vietnamese would choose, and, of course, they might simply pro-
crastinate. But we think that at this stage they would be
unlikely to reverse their policies and seek a way out of the
war. They would probably decide that they had already suffered
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too great a loss and made too great a commitment to the war
27. If we are correct and Hanoi decides to persist, then
there are a number of steps which they would probably consider
to put the US under political and military pressures, though
still short of massive Chinese ground intervention. These steps
be designed
would / to heighten the impression of a confrontation
between the US and the entire communist bloc.
23. Hanoi would request and be able to obtain additional
air defense equipment, SAMs and AAA, from the USSR and China.
Furthermore, Hanoi would probably ask for, and China would almost
certainly send, additional logistic and anti-aircraft troops to
augment the Chinese force already there. This action and the
presence of the Chinese units already in North Vietnam could be
publicly announced to heighten its effect. Some Chinese ground
combat units might be introduced into North Vietnam. The Soviet
Union, Cuba, North Korea and the Eastern European Communist states
might be asked to send "volunteers" and contingents to aid in the
defense of North Vietnam. If so, we believe they would comply with
Hanoi's request.
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29. There are two other steps that North Vietnam might
take at this time. First, they might decide that c onrnitment
of more North Vietnamese ground troop to Laos and a subsequent
offensive there would put the US and Thailand under pressure.
They might reason that it no longer mattered if the US responded
by occupying southern Laos. We are inclined to believe they would
hold off on this move, mainly because they would fear that the
US would then invade North Vietnam. For the same reason we think
that Hanoi would be reluctant to make a far greater cornitment
of regular troops to South Vietnam, that is by invading with
several divisions across the DII . But there is a fairly good
chance that they would put in some more troops, perhaps in an
effort to score an important victory against a US concentration
or to occupy Hue. In any case, at this stage of the war, the
VC and NVA main force might launch a general offensive against
the US.
30. China. Peking's reaction becomes very difficult to
predict. If circumstances were normal in China when the assumed
action occurred, we would estimate that China would probably
not want to intervene with its fighters from Chinese bases. If
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the current chaos and confusion in the internal scene in China
still prevailed, the Chinese leaders would be to hesitant
to risk-a showdown with the US. But we could not be very confi-
dent that they would calculate the situation in a careful,
prudent, and rational manner. There is also the possibility
that Peking would feel compelled to react strongly in order to
bolster the North Vietnamese will. to persist in the war.
31. A final possibility is that as the US actions
continued, China would come to believe that the collapse of the
regime in Hanoi seemed likely. We have previously estimated
that this is one of the circumstances in which China would
almost certainly intervene in North Vienam.* If the situation
were normal. in China (and the US action might tend to aid
bringing matters back to normal there), we would still make this
estimate. But if China were still wracked by internal ccnvulsiDns
similar to those at present, we would be somewhat less confident
of this judgment, though we think the odds still would be better
than even.
The others are US invasion of North Vietnam and the bombing
of Chinese territory.
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32. The USSR. The Soviet Union would be greatly
alarmed by the US bombing and would view it as an indication
that the US was willing to go to almost any lengths to prevail
in Vietnam. Soviet propaganda would bitterly assail the US
and would be cdesigned to support Free World pressures on the
US to stop its bombing program. If they had not already done so,
the Soviets might sponser a move in the UN to condemn the bombing.
They would expect considerable perhaps a majority, support for
such a move. Finally, the freeze in US-Soviet relations would
become even deeper.
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33. The Soviets are already heavily committed to
help defend North Vietnam against air attacks, and the US
action would complicate their policy problems. They would
realize their limited ability to protect North Vietnam from
airstrikes. Nevertheless, they would have scant choice but
to attempt to fulfill Vietnamese requests for food and for
more air defense equipment. The alternative would be to
abandon Hanoi to Chinese influence -- an alternative the
Soviets have already paid a considerably price to avoid. The
Soviets, however, would be unlikely to agree to any overt in-
volvement, byyond allowing "volunteers" to go to North Vietnam.
D. Intensive Airstrikes Against the Transportation System,
Airfields, and Certain Other Targets
34+. General. Coming after the previous actions, this US
move would initially be generally regarded as more of the same.
Thus, the initial reactions of the Communist countries would also
generally follow the same lines discussed above. There would
be, however, certain specific contingencies that might arise from
the action, and the more sustained nature of it might also lead
eventually to a change in the Communist reactions.
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35. North Vietnam. Assuming a reasonably successful
program of mining the harbors and bombing the levees, the LOCs
from China would be operating at full or almost full capacity.
Even under the present levels of US bombing against those LOCs,
Hanoi would almost certainly be unable to meet all of its import
needs via these routes; under an intensive and sustained bombing
program Hanoi could not meet such needs. 'Moreover, large numbers
diverted
of laborers would have to be/ from other tasks to keep the
routes operating at even partial capacity. In attempting to keep
these routes defended and open, Hanoi might ask for and receive
even more Chinese logistics and AAA troops.
3u. If it had any aircraft left, North Vietnam would use
and
them in an attempt to defend its LOCs/airfields. The North
Korean pilots now in North Vietnam would enter the combat, if
they had not done so already, and perhaps Soviet and Chinese
pilots as well. Nevertheless, even if a substantial part of North
Vietnam's air force survived the initial strikes, it would have
only a limited and short-lived capability to interfere with the
US attacks. Faced with the destruction of its air facilities, in
any case, Hanoi might attempt a spectacular, last gasp air attack
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against a US base in South Vietnam or a US carrier in the Tonkin
Gulf. Eventually, however, Hanoi would have no choice but to
send its remaining aircraft and pilots to bases in South China
or to have them rendered useless. We strongly believe it would
opt for the former, but if the situation in China were highly
uncertain, it might not seek refuge for the remnants of its air
force.
37. China. Apart from providing sanctuary for North
Vietnamese aircraft and supplies to Hanoi (both of which it
is already doing), Communist China might be asked to allow
North Vietnamese aircraft to operate from Chinese bases. We
have previously estinantcd that China, recognizing the risks
involved, would prohibit such action. If circumstances were
normal in China when the assumed situation arose, we would still
make such an estimate. But if Peking had to decide its reaction
in the midst of chaos like that now occurring in China, we would
be less certain how the Chinese leaders would evaluate the situa-
tion.
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38. A compromise of sorts might be worked out to minimize
the direct dangers to China. For example, fighter aircraft
might return to North Vietnam if and when the airfields were
repair d, and then begin some limited defensive operations. If
once main forced to deploy to China, they might. remain inactive
for a time and return again. In this way the Communists would
create a semi-sanctuary in China. The situation confronting
the US would be highly ambiguous, especially if North Vietnamese
pilots were interspersed with some North Koreans, Chinese, and
Soviet. Though this situation is possible, we think it unlikely
that tie Chinese would Want to slide
into possible conftontation
with the US in this manner.
31). The USSR. The Soviets would be faced with about the
same p oblems as discussed above. They would attempt to fulfill
Vietnamese requests for more air defense equipment anf for more
trucks and rolling stock, despite their probable doubts as to the
ultimate usefulness of such materiel. Otherwise, the Soviets
would probably be caught in the crunch of hoping to find some way
to avoid the rapid US escalation of the war, but without loosing
Hanoi o the Chinese in the process. By this stage, the USSR
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would probably have privately beseeched North Vietnam's leaders
to do something to stop the US escalation, but if Hanoi persisted,
we believe the Soviets would abide with the North Vietnamese
decision.
E. The Cumulative Impact of the US Escalation
40. Over time, the cumulative impact, physical and
psychological,of the US escalations would greatly complicate
Hanoi's problems in North Vietnam and would probably have some
deleterious effect on its ability to sustain the war in South
Vietnam. Nonetheless, we believe that North Vietnam would
still be able to carry on for some time both in the North and
the South and that its will to persist would not necessarily be
destroyed.
III. REACTIONS TO A RESTRICTION OF US BOMBING TO SOUTHERN NORTH
VIETHAN AND LAOS
41. General. It might be some time before the Communist
were convinced that the US had changed its bombing policy. Once
it became clear that the US was restricting its air strikes, the
Communists would probably attribute the shift to the pressures
of international opinion and domestiaccriticism. In this respect
they would be enoouraged that their estimate that the US would
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not persist in a long struggle was correct. Nevertheless, they
would remain highly suspicious that the US would resume more
extended attacks at some point.
42. Hanoi would probably not be greatly concerned over the
effects of the new campaign. If the Communist force structure in
South Vietnam is basically fleshed out and the emphasis has now
shifted to guerrilla warfare, then the manpower and supply require-
ments for the Communists in the South that have to be infiltrated
from North Vietnam are likely to drop. Thus the US might find
that it was bombing more and more against less and less.
43. The timing of the US move could be important. Hanoi
might interpret the move as an attempt to probe North Vietnam's
willingness to negotiate, particularly if the move were announced
at a time when Hanoi had hinted at a willingness to talk. North
Vietnam, however, has pegged even the consideration of talks on
a complete stopping of US bombing. We believe it would continue
for some time to hold to this position. But if the US held firm
on its bombing and the war in the south continued to go against
the Communists the chances of some change in Hanoi's strategy would
increase. They might believe this more restricted program of bombing
could be terminated by the US without Hanoi having to make any
substantial concessions.
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44. China. Peking's reaction to a de-escalation of US
bombing would tend to be ambivalent. China's leaders would
be relieved that the pressure on North Vietnam had lessened; and
they would ascribe this to their support of Hanoi. On the other
hand, however, Peking would probably be somewhat concerned that
a
the US move might lead Hanoi to make reciprocal response, perhaps
at Soviet urging. To counter this possibility, Peking would
stress to Hanoi that the US will was flagging and that final
victory was inevitable as long as North Vietnam held firm in
fighting the war. In addition, China would publicly and privately
denounce negotiations as an "evil" plot sponsored by the USSR and
US to frustrate the attainment of North Vietnam's objectives.
45. The USSR. The Soviets would be relieved that the US had
reduced its pressure on North Vietnam. Nonetheless, the Soviet
leaders would probably believe that the US move was mainly because
of internal US political problems and pressure from Communist and
Free World countries against the bombing program. Ibever, the
Soviets would also view the move as a step toward creating an
atmosphere more conducive to negotiations. We doubt that Moscow
would go to any significant lengths to try to persuade Hanoi to
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negotiate in response to the US move -- unless Hanoi first
indicated an interest in doing so. In this latter case, we
feel that the Soviets would become more active in arranging
for talks.
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 Approved For Release 2OTOP1 SEC
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