COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO CERTAIN US COURSES OF ACTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A001100020028-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 1, 2006
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: February 2, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Roase 2006/11/01 : CIA-RDP79R0096741100020028-8
T-O-P TS. 125997
SENSTTIVE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
2 February 1967
DRAFT
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: COMMUNIST REACTIMS TO CERTAIN US COURSES OF ACTION
THE PROBLEM
To estimate the probable reaction of North Vietnam, China
and the USSR to the following air campaigns against North Viet-
nam:
I. A phased course of US actions consisting of:
A. airstrikes against 20 modern industrial targets
in North Vietnam, followed by
1 B. mining of North Vietnamese harbors to prevent:
(1) use of deep-draft ocean-going ships only
--z...-
% (2) use of both deep-draft and shallow-draft ships
\
NI
In both cases, we assume intensive armed reconnais-
sance against LOCs and transport targets, followed by
C. airstrikes against the levees in the Red River Delta,
followed by tviOPI1CDr
T-04) S-E-C-R-E-T
1glIP7Mpr1p
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
Downgrading and
Declassification
7AP/111QrA nni lflflfl2flfl2
Approved For base 2006/11/01 : CIA-RDP79R00967e1100020028-8
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
SENSITIVE
D. intensive airstrikes against the transportation
system, the airfields and certain minor military
targets, and miscellaneous industrial and repair
facilities.
II. A restriction of US bombing to the "logistic funnel,"
I .e., Route Packages 1 and 2 and Laos.
None of the above would call for the use of nuclear
weapons or for air strikes any closer to the border of
Communist China than at present.
DISCUSSION
I. GENERAL
1. There are a number of general considerations which would
influence the immediate reactions of the Communist countries
concerned and, more important, influence their judgement of US
intentions. How the US explained its policy and intentions would
the
be taken into account. In addition,/duration of the campaign,
whether it was a rapid series of air strikes or a more gradual
and prolonged campaign could be quite important in how the Com-
munists would respond. Among the other significant factors
- a -
T-06P S-E-C-R-E-T
SENSITIVE
Annnwpri Ent- RPIPase 7006/11/01 ? CIA-RDP79R00967A0011000211028-8
Approved For ,ase 2006/11/01 : CIA-RDP79R00967401100020028-8
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
SENSITIVE
bearing on Communist reaction would be the general political sit-
uuation at the time the proposed course of action was initiated,
i.e., whether there seemed to be movement toward negotiations of
and
some kind,/ the general state of world opinion and international
reaction to the US moves.
2. We think it also important to emphasize that in estimating
the Communist reactions to an involved series of US moves, there
are likely to be unexpected developments which would affect both
the US and the Communist side. We have tried to point out certain
possible developments such as the intervention of third parties at
the UN. In addition, there is the great uncertainty over internal
developments in China, and the state of Sino-Soviet relations. For
such reasons, the estimated reactions of the Communist3near the
last stage of the assumed air campaign are highly tenuous.
that time a number of events could have occured which might
suade the Communists to make some quite different respons
we toresee.
By
per-
3. We have not tried to judge the affect on Hanoi's will
every
to persist at/ stage of this campaign, mainly because after
the mining of the harbors, the effect on life in North Vietnam
- 3 -
T-04 S-E-C-R-D4
SENSITIVE
Annroved For Re!Rase 7noRt1 tni ? rIA-RnP79R00967A0U1100020028-8
Approved For lipase 2006/11/01 : CIA-RDP79R00967.01100020028-8
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
SENSITIVE
would be a cumulative process. When and if the regime would judge
that morale and the disruption of public order was a serious
problem cannot be foreseen. Thus, it is not possible to say that
at any given point in the campaign Vietnamese will to persist
will crack. In general, however, we believe that if Hanoi does
not change its policy after the full impact of the mining is
apparent then the subsequent US actions would probably not prove
decisive.
II. COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO A PHASED STEP-UP IN US ACTIONS
A. Air strikes Against Selected Industrial Targets
C_Ja4,%14t
L. General. All of the Communist powers would interpret
the US action as an important change of US policy. They have
apparently been unsure of which direction the US planned to move
in the bombing campaign -- whether to escalate or to keep it
limited. The airstrikes would convince them that the US had
opted for escalation, though they would not be sure of how much
or how soon. In any case, they would probably conclude that the
US interest in a negotiated settlement was waning. As in the case
of the previous strikes against the POL, theme would be a barrage
of propaganda denouncing the US move; the civilian nature of the
targets and civilian casualties would be exploited as would the
attacks in the areas of Hanoi and Haiphong.
- 4 -
T-C64?
SENSITIVE
Annrnvar1FrwRPIPACP9nnR/11mi ? riA_Pnp7aRnnaR7Anni -Inciry)nmsz
Approved For Arse 2006/11/01 : CIA-RDP79R00967101100020028-8
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
SENSITIVE
5. North Vietnam. North Vietnam has probably already
discunted the effect of an attack on the country's industrial base.
The North Vietnamese reaction would be attenuated by the fact
that its industry is not essential for the country's survival
because of the basically agrarian nature of its economy. More-
over, Hanoi would assume -- almost certainly correctly -- that
much of the effect of the US action could be offset by increased
imports from the USSR and Communist China, and that the supplies
necessary to keep the economy going and to sustain the war effott
could be obtained. At this stage of the war, we believe that
North Vietnam would be willing to accept the destruction of its
industrial facilities in order to continue the war and that the
US action would not have any decisive effect on the North
x,.?clwar "oe 2",`,
Vietnamese will to persist.
6. North Vietnam would probably use its beN7 (96 MIG-
to defend its industri
15s and 17s, and 18 MIG-21s) in attempting
plants, particularly those
in the Hanoi-Haiphong area.
This plus the use of already heavy SAM and AAA air defenses in
the area coul
a substantial step up in the air war over
North Vietnam. Thus, it is possible that the stepped up North
Vietnamese air reaction would confront the US with the question
of whether to destroy the airfields.
- 5 -
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
SENSITIVE
Aporoved For Release 2006/11/01 ? CIA-RDP79R00967A001100020028-8
Approved For Rare 2006/11/01 : CIA-RDP79R0096711100020028-8
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
SENSITIVE G?
7. China. Despite the present turmoil in Communist
China, we are reasonably confident that the US action would
not trigger any significant change in Peking's position
concerning the war in Vietnam. China would tep up its economic
aid to North Vietnam as well as providing additional air defense
equipment. Peking would almost certainly be willing to increase
the number of anti-aircraft and logistic troops it has in North
Vietnam; currently estimated at 25,000 to 47,000 men.
8. The USSR. The Soviet Union would be somewhat concerned
0111141M?00..1111.11.???????
that the US action marked the beginning of a new and more dangerous
phase of the war, which, as it unfolded, would confront the USSR
with increasingly difficult problems and decisions. At this
point, the Soviets would be mainly is 1 to meet whatever
' 4
new requirement Hanoi levied for economic and military aid.
6
SENSITIVE
norovpd For RPIRase 2006/11/01 CIA-RnP79R00967A001100020028-8
Approved For base 2006/11/01 : CIA-RDP79R0096711100020028-8
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
SENSITIVE
B. Mining of the Harbors
9. General. The Communist countries would consider the
miming as a considerably more provocative and dangerous course
of action, particularly if it followed soon after the airstrikes
against industrial targets. They would see the US action as proof
that the war was rapidly escalating, and they would probably assume
that the US was no longer interested in a compromise and was intent
on . the war to a complete victory whether by negotiations
or not. US protestations to the contrary would not be believed.
In the hope of increastng world pressure on the US for a unilateral
de-escalation of its activities in the war, Communist propaganda
would stress the dangerous turn of events and the increased
possibility of a confrontation between the major powers. At this
stage the Vietnamese problem would probably be taken to the UN,
either by neutrals or by the USSR and East Europeans.
10. North Vietnam. Hanoi has already begun to prepare its
citizens for the possibility that its harbors will be mined.
Nevertheless, the actual mining would be a jolt and would increase
fears that the ultimate aim of the US was to destroy the North
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
SENSITIVE
Annmvpd Fnr RPIPASP 7noRn 1/1)1 ? CIA-RnP79ROOP67A001100020028-8
Approved For Arse 2006/11/01 : CIA-RDP79R00967#1100020028-8
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
SENSITIVE
Vietnamese regime. There is little that Hanoi can do to prevent
the mining: it has no capacity to deal with the mines themselves.
It is likely, however, that North Vietnam would commit its aircraft
against the US mining effort. But Hanoi's main concern would be to
improvise alternative means by which to maintain the flow of supplies
into the country.
(1 (44.44-/ett
11, The North Vietnamese leaders would probably estimate that
they and their Communist allies could find ways to continue the
...-le
flow o essential tary and economic goods, although with far
ag
more di ' ty disruption. If the mining were effective against
some or all shallow draft shipping, then the rail lines would have
to operate at
to air strikes,
Hanoi's problems in prosecuting the war. In the near term;
we do not believe Hanoi would be forced to abandon the war in South
-imum capacities, and would thus be highly:yulnerable
Thus, the US action could considerably increase
Vietnam.
12. It It is possible that at this point,
decide that itlicould not simply absorb the US moves without a
\
major response, In these circumstances, North Viethan might attempt
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
SENSITIVE
Approved For ase 2006/11/01 : CIA-RDP79R00967*1100020028-8
T.-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
SENSITIVE
some highly demonstrative action of its own, e.g., attacking a
US carrier or attempting an airstrike a )st South Vietnam.
We believe that such actions are/461/1:41y ainee Hanoi would
---- '
probably calculate that they wo draw an even greater
US reaction in response. , it is likely that the VC would
try to make a sustained attempt to close the channel into Saigon.
13. China. We doubt that the mining would automatically
produce any significant change in Chinese policy toward Vietnam.
There would be a round of propaganda. At a minimum,
China would attempt to increase substantially the amount of
supplies sent to North Vietnam, although the flow of supplies
over the rail lines out of China might be disrupted by the
internal convulsions there. But the present upheaval in China
makes it almost impossible to predict with onfidene king's
reaction to the mining. There would be some chance that China
would react strongly, perhaps even going so far as to directly
intervene in the air over Vietnam, though we consider this unlikely.
If requested, Peking would augment its forces in North Vietnam.
T-064 S-E-C-R-E-T
SENSITIVE
Annravprl Fnr RPIPACP 7nnRri rni riA_Rnp7qRnnqA7Anni lnnn9nn7R-s
Approved For laa, se 2006/11/01 : CIA-RDP79R00967a1100020028-8
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
SENSITIVE
14. The USSR. The US action would confront the USSR
with a more direct challenge, since the Soviets supply much
of North Vietnam's economic requirement by sea (estimated at
$150 million last year). The Soviets would be embarrassed by
their inability to prevent or counter the US move. Moreover,
unless they were prepared to take new risks they would be
immediately vulnerable to Chinese taunts. And, of course, the
new situation would mean that almost all deliveries of supplies,
military and civilian, would be at the sufferance of Peking
(particularly, if the mining made it too dangerous to offload
shipments onto small vessels). To cover this embarrassing situ-
ation, the Soviets would resort to a considerable verbal escala-
tion hoping to force the US to retreat. And they would probably
allow "volunteers" to go to North Vietnam if Hanoi asked for
them.
15. But from a practical point of view the Soviets would
have little choice but to accept the situation. We assume that
the Soviet experts would conclude that the mines would be too
difficult to sweep and, in any case, could be easily replaced.
In such circumstances we believe the USSR would not be willing to
take the risk of bringing down the ships and aircraft that would
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
SENSITIVE
AnnrnvPrl Fnr RPIPACP nnAii mi ? riA_Rnp74trizg7A-o01 100020028-8
Approved For Ire 2006/11/01 : CIA-RDP79R009641100020028-8
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
SENSITIVE
probably be necessary to keep the sea lanes open to North Vietnam.
The Soviets could use the situation as an excuse to disengage
from the Vietnam war by charging Chinese obstructionism and so
forth. But the Soviets almost certainly consider the option
politically infeasible, The net result, however, would be that
as China's role in the delivery of essential supplies increased
there would probably be a loss of Soviet influence in Hanoi,
at least as long as Hanoi was determined to persist in the war.
16. The Soviets would be likely 4'
strt