COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO CERTAIN US COURSES OF ACTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A001100020024-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2006
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: February 6, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Copies are attached of a memorandum on Communist
reactions to a possible US bombing program. It was
prepared by the Board of National Estimates to
respond to Mr. McNamara's request.
Representatives of ORR, OCI, and SAVA partici-
pated in the preparation of the memorandum. The
usual footnote noting the office of origin and
concurrences within the Agency has been omitted
because the memorandum is from you to McNamara.
We are, of course, making no further distributio
FORM NO. IOI REPLACES FORM 10.101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Robert S. McNamara
In response to your request, I attach a
memorandum prepared by the Office of National
Estimates on Ccm nunist reactions to a possible
US bombing program.
Richard Helms
Director
7 February 1967
(DATE)
FORM GN 54 IVI WHICH REPLACES
MAY F BE M 10-101
I AU
KENT
Director
National Estimates
7 February 1967
(DATE)
MORUCIDIF saes 2-18
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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
6 February 1967
SUBJECT: COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO CERTAIN US COURSES OF ACTION
THE PRONM
To estimate the probable reactions of North Vietnam, China,
and the USSR to the following air campaigns against North Vietnam:
I. A PHASED STEP-UP IN US ACTIONS CONSISTING OF
A. Airstrikes against 20 modern industrial targets
in North Vietnam, followed by
B. Mining of North Vietnamese harbors to prevent:
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(1)
(2)
use of deep-draft ships only
use of both deep-draft and shallow-draft ships.
In both cases, we assume intensive armed
reconnaissance against LOCs and transport
targets, followed by
GROUP 1
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C. Airstrikes against the levees in the Red River
Delta, followed by
D. Unlimited attacks against the transportation
system, the airfields and certain minor military
targets, and miscellaneous industrial and repair
facilities.
II. A PROGRAM OF DE'ESCALATION BY RESTRICTING US BOMBING TO
THE "LOGISTIC FUNNEL." i.e., ROUTE PACKAGES ONE AND T 1O
IN SOUTHERN NORTH VIETNAM, AND LAOS.
None of the above would call for the use of nuclear weapons
or for airstrikes any closer to the border of Communist China
than at present.
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I. REACTIONS TO A PHASED STEP-UP IN US ACTIONS
General Considerations
1. This program would constitute a progressive, vigorous
and clearly apparent escalation of the US bombing of North Vietnam.
The Communists and the world at large would be convinced that it
reflected a basic change of US policy and objectives, especially
if the moves were initiated at a time when there seemed to be
movement toward negotiations or compromise. The Communists would
thus be reacting not only to each specific action, but also to the
general change in US posture. Hence the next four paragraphs dis-
cuss Communist reactions to the program in general; the later
paragraphs deal with specific points involved in each phase of
the program.
2. Throughout the campaign international opinion would be
an important general factor. It may be taken for granted that
there would be an accentuation of Communist propaganda about the
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inhuman nature of the US action. Receptivity to such charges would
be increased in the non-Communist world, the more so as there would
be growing alarm over the possible expansion of the war to China
and even the USSR. We think it certain the Soviets, or some other
country, would bring the matter to the UN, where the US would be
severely and extensively criticized and perhaps formally censured.
3. Communist reactions would be largely influenced by the
condition of China, the state of Sino-Soviet tensions, North
Vietnam's judgment of its own capabilities, and the military and
political situation in South Vietnam. To some extent, the
Communists, especially Hanoi, might also be influenced by the
manner in which the US conducted the campaign, its duration, and
any political moves by the US that would accompany it.
4. The physical as well as the political effects of the
campaign would be cumulative. As the impact of each successive
stage became fully apparent, Moscow, Peiping, and Hanoi would be
continually reviewing their own situation, international reactions,
and US intentions. We cannot say at which point, if any, each of
them might feel compelled to reconsider basic policies and options,
and they might reach different estimates at different stages.
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5. The major questions are these:
a. Would the program constrain North Vietnam to negotiate
or otherwise to end the fighting? Obviously it would make it
increasingly difficult for North Vietnam simply to persist in its
present course. The North Vietnamese leaders would be concerned
over the increasing destruction of their country and the effect of
this on their people, and they would be increasingly apprehensive
that the US would invade the North. More immediate factors in
their decision would be the course of military and political
developments in South Vietnam, and their estimate of the condition
and policies of China: on the one hand, whether the Peiping regime
appeared stable enough to rely on for long-term assistance., including
the transit of Soviet aid; on the other, whether Hanoi was becoming
dependent on China to the point of political subservience. We
cannot say with much confidence what conclusion Hanoi would draw
from these factors. Hanoi might decide to take whatever political
steps it deemed necessary to halt the bombing. But in the near
term we think it more likely that the North Vietnamese would decide
to continue the war.
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b. Would this program bring Communist China or the USSR
or both into open military conflict with the US? We think not;
we are fairly confident with respect to the USSR, but not so con-
fident with respect to China. Reasons of geography and logistics
virtually rule out the intervention of significant Soviet armed
forces in Southeast Asia. As for China, that country is currently
in such a state of disorder that its reactions are largely unpre-
dictable. Yet we do not believe that China would enter the war
with ground forces in Southeast Asia, or even with its air force
acting from Chinese bases. A major exception to this estimate,
however, is a situation in which China believed the North Vietnamese
state was disintegrating or that an invasion of North Vietnam was
imminent.
c. Would the need to cooperate in further support of
North Vietnam draw the USSR and China closer together? We do not
expect that the movement of the Vietnam war into a new phase would
operate to improve relations between Moscow and Peiping. The
stepped-up US effort may impel the Chinese to somewhat greater
cooperation than heretofore in seeing that Soviet supplies move
forward to North Vietnam, since neither of them wishes to appear
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responsible for impeding that flow. But Sino-Soviet differences
are so deep and relations so abrasive that at best serious delays
in shipments will probably occur.
d. Would it cause the Sovi ets to pressure North Vietnam
into some sort of approach to the US which would end the fighting?
The embarrassment the Soviets would feel over their inability to
protect North Vietnam, and the increased risks involved in providing
effective aid, would probably dispose them to a more active search
for peace than they have been willing to undertake so far. At
some stage, they might urge Hanoi to seek a political settlement.
Yet, the Soviets would probably also be unwilling to run the political
risk of putting serious pressure on Hanoi, say by making their con-
tinued aid conditional on moves toward negotiations.
e. Would it cause the North Vietnamese to react with
hitherto untried enterprises -- attacks on US carriers, or air
attacks on airfields or other targets in South Vietnam? We doubt
it, because the chances of substantial success would be small,
especially in attacking a US carrier, and the effect of such attacks
would probably not be thought worth the cost which might be expected
from US retaliation. Yet the possibility exists, and the odds
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would rise in the later stages of the US air campaign. At some
point the North Vietnamese might feel they had little left to
lose.
f. Would North Vietnam retaliate by a major invasion of
Laos or South Vietnam? Probably not, mainly because the fear of
an invasion of North Vietnam would still be a potent deterrent.
But this attitude might change if Hanoi came to believe that a
US invasion was the inevitable climax of the bombing campaign.
g. Would it cause the Soviets to react by vigorous pres-
sures against US interests elsewhere in the world? Of course Soviet
policy toward the US would harden. However, there are in fact
few places where the Soviets could exert such pressures. They
would be unlikely to do so in Berlin; this would undercut the
general policy they have been pursuing in Europe, especially toward
France. Moreover, they would see considerable advantages to be
gained in Europe and elsewhere by exploiting antipathy to the US
actions and emphasizing that the US was reckless and aggressive.
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COURSE A: Air Strikes Against Major Industrial Targets
6. General. The Communists have apparently been unsure
whether the US planned to intensify the bombing campaign or to
keep it limited. The airstrikes would convince them that the US
had opted for escalation, though they would still not be sure of
how much or how soon. Since many of these targets are in heavily
populated areas, the attacks would probably involve greater
destruction of civilian life and property. Hence, in anticipation
that such themes would be echoed by most of the Free World, the
Communists would denounce the US move by stressing the civilian
nature of the targets and the civilian casualties.
7. North Vietnam. North Vietnam has probably already
discounted the effect of an attack on the country's industrial
base, in large part because industry is not essential for the country's
survival. Moreover, Hanoi would assume -- almost certainly cor-
rectly -- that increased imports from the USSR and Communist China
could provide the supplies to sustain the war effort. North
Vietnam, nonetheless, would probably make a maximum air defense
effort, and this could substantially increase the air war over
North Vietnam.
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8. China and the USSR. This particular action by the US
would not cause any sicnificant change in Moscow's or Peiping's
policies. Peiping would be willing to add to its logistic and
antiaircraft troops already in North Vietnam. Both China and the
USSR would try to compensate for the losses suffered by North
Vietnam by providing military and economic aid. But how much
assistance could be provided would depend on how soon the US began
the mining, as well as on the political and physical problems of
shipping across China.
COURSE B: Mining of the Harbors
9. General. The three Communist countries concerned would
view the mining as a major escalation of the war; this might be
the stage at which they concluded that the US had abandoned hope
of an early negotiation and was intent on increasing military
pressures even at substantial political cost to itself. They
would see this course of action as particularly alarming to much
of the Free World and would make a special effort to exploit adverse
reactions. It is probably at this point that a UN condemnation of
the US would be sought, either by neutrals or by the USSR and East
Europeans.
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10. North Vietnam. The mining would be a jolt to Hanoi,
even though it has already anticipated such a possibility. It has
little capacity to deal with the mines themselves. But the main
concern of the North Vietnamese leaders would be to maintain the
flow of essential military and economic goods; they would probably
estimate that they could do so, although with far more difficulty
and disruption. If the mining were effective against some or all
shallow-draft as well as deep-draft shipping, then the greatly
increased burden placed on the rail lines would make them highly
vulnerable to airstrikes.
11. It is possible that at this point, Hanoi would decide
that it simply could not absorb the US moves without a major re-
taliation. It might try to mine the Tonkin Gulf. And the VC
would probably make a sustained effort to close the channel into
Saigon.
12. China. To help maintain the flow of supplies, China
would probably add to its troops in North Vietnam and perhaps
announce their presence. But the Chinese leaders would seek to
shift to the USSR the chief responsibility for coping with the
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specific issue of mining. Peiping might also undertake some
demonstrative military movements in South China or along the. Taiwan
Strait, or offer to send ground troops to North Vietnam.
13. The USSR. The mining would be particularly galling to
the Soviets, who last year moved some 530,000 tons of goods to
North Vietnam by sea. They would be embarrassed by their inability
to prevent or counter the US move, but we believe they would be
unwilling to take the risks involved in committing their own ships
and aircraft to an ef"fort to reopen the ports. They could attempt
an airlift, but the quantities of supplies that could be airlifted
would be small. Thus, almost all deliveries, military and civilian,
would be at the sufferance of Peiping, particularly if the mining
made it infeasible to land seaborne cargoes by lighters and small
vessels.
14+. In these circumstances, the Soviets would be at pains
to blame the Chinese for any obstruction of shipments across China.
They would probably send a token number of "volunteers" to North
Vietnam if Hanoi asked for them, and they might be willing to pro-
vide Hanoi with new forms of military assistance, e.g., floating
mines and cruise missiles (land-based or _o
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could appear as a direct response to the US mining. By these
means, they would seek to limit their loss of influence in
Hanoi.
15. The Soviets would be likely to strike back at the US in
their bilateral relations, severely reducing what remains of normal
contacts on other issues. They would focus their propaganda and
diplomatic campaign to get US allies in Europe to repudiate the
US action. They migat also make other tension promoting gestures.
The vigor of the Soviet reaction would be strengthened if the
mining operations resulted in some serious damage to Soviet ships.
However violently they reacted diplomatically, we think there is
some chance that the new situation produced by the mining would
lead the Soviets to a more active search for ways to limit the
risks of confrontation.
COURSE C: Attacks on the Red River Delta Levees
16. The Communists would estimate that world opinion would
be peculiarly sensitive to US attacks on this target, and they
would maize an intense effort to exploit this sentiment vigorously
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in every sort of forum, claiming that the civilian population was
the prime victim of the US action. They would also probably esti-
mate that the US would be unable to inflict and maintain a
destruction of the levee system so extensive as to place insupport-
able burdens on the North Vietnamese economy. Unless and until
this estimate was proved to be wrong, the likely effect of attacking
the levees would be to stiffen the Communist will to resist.
COURSE D: Unlimited Attacks Against the Transportation System,
Airfields, and Certain Other Targets.
17. North Vietnam. A principal object of the preceding
actions would have been to increase North Vietnam`s need for
supplies from outside the country, and to concentrate the flow
of these supplies to the land routes from China. Hence the chief
importance of the Course D attacks would rest on how successfully
they interdicted these routes. In consequence, North Vietnam
would have to devote a major effort (including its remaining air-
craft, if any) to defending them. However, successful and sustained
US attacks on the airfields would almost certainly soon force the
remnants of the North Vietnamese air force to seek refuge in South
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China, though it is possible that they would be expended in a
desperation attack against US carriers or US bases in South Vietnam.
Civilian air operations in Saigon might be subjected to VC attack.
18. China. Apart from providing sanctuary for North Vietnamese
aircraft and supplies to Hanoi, China might be asked to allow North
Vietnamese aircraft to operate from Chinese bases. We have pre-
viously estimated that China, recognizing the risks involved,
would prohibit such action. If circumstances were normal in China
when the assumed situation arose, we would still make such an
estimate. But a variant of this could minimize the direct dangers
to China. For example, fighter aircraft might return to North
Vietnam if and when the airfields were repaired, and then begin
some limited defensive operations. By repeating this process, the
Communists could create a semisanctuary in China.
19. China would be greatly concerned over the ability of
the North Vietnamese Government to survive. We have previously
estimated that if the collapse of North Vietnam seemed certain,
China would almost certainly intervene in the war, though this
might only mean a substantial occupation of North Vietnam. And this
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still seems likely, assuming that China still has a government
capable of taking such an action.
20. The USSR. By this time, the USSR would already have
been caught in the crunch of hoping to find some way to end the
war without losing Hanoi to the Chinese in the process. With
increasing vigor, the USSR would probably urge North Vietnam's
leaders to seek peace, but if Hanoi persisted, we believe the
Soviets would abide with the North Vietnamese decision.
21. North Korea. North Korea is one area where the Communists
could try to relieve the military pressure on Hanoi. North Korea
would be concerned that the lack of a vigorous military response
in Southeast Asia could affect its own future security. Nevertheless,
we think it unlikely that North Korea would be willing to reopen
the Korean war either of its own accord or at Moscow's or Peiping's
urging.
II. REACTIONS TO AN ALTERNATIVE PROGRAM OF DEESCALATION BY
RESTRICTING US BO1:TBING TO SOUTHERN NORTH VIETNAM AND LAOS
22. North Vietnam. The timing of the US actions and the
circumstances in which they took place could be of considerable
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importance. Hanoi and Peiping might attribute the shift to inter-
national opinion and to domestic US criticism and see it as confirming
their view that the US would not persist in a long struggle. On
the other hand, if the moves occurred at a time when Hanoi had
hinted at a willingness to talk, Hanoi might interpret the move as
a US response and an attempt to move toward negotiations.
23. The USSR. The Soviets would probably be more disposed
than Hanoi to view the US move as an effort to bring about a
settlement, and far less likely to consider it a mark of failing
US resolve. Accordingly, they would probably advise Hanoi to
probe the US position, looking toward possible negotiations.
However, the USSR would not be likely to put much pressure on
Hanoi to respond.
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