NORTH VIETNAMESE INTENTIONS IN REGARD TO THE WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A001100010021-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 13, 2006
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: May 15, 1967
• Content Type: IM

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
15 May 1967
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
North Vietnamese Intentions in Regard to the War
Summary
The Vietnamese Communist leadership clearly
retains its high level of motivation and displays
every intention of continuing the war.. Ho Chi Minh
and his lieutenants are convinced that they can
outlast the US in Vietnam and they have programmed
their tactics to fit that theory.
Tt is unlikely that the Communists will attempt
to launch a direct, conventional ground .attack across
the l~emi~litarized Zone or that they will commit their
assets in South Vietnam to one large campaign at any
time in the near future. They are more likely to con-
tinue along basically the same lines as at present,
Note: This memorandum wad produced solely by CTA.
It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence
and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates.
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attempting to wage a grinding war of attrition, which,
they believe, sooner or later will force major con-
cessions on the part of the US. To this end, they
will probably continue to infiltrate sufficient re-
placement personnel to keep existing units at com-
bat level and they will also move additional units
to South Vietnam as needed to counter the introduc-
tion of more allied units.
There seems little chance in the foreseeable fu-
ture that Hanoi will seek the commitment of large num-
hers of foreign combat troops for South Vietnam. It
is always possible that for propaganda purposes, an
"international brigade" will be formed and sent South
but only the Chinese Communists are readily available
in sufficient Strength to pose an actual threat. Hanoi
probably does not believe that foreign volunteers will
be needed in South Vietnam and apparently does not
expect the Chinese Communists would make troops avail-
able to fight in South Vietnam even if they were needed.
Judging from Hanoi's military plans for the next
few months as revealed by a North Vietnamese officer
who recently defected in South Vietnam, the North Viet-
namese believe that they can go on the offensive in
the r}orthern half of South Vietnam. Their experience
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over the past several years has undoubtedly confirmed
their belief that the allied forces, with the men now
in South Vietnam or with ..even a considerably expanded
force, will not be able to drive the Communists from
the field. They seem to believe that they can con-
tinue to fight as they have over the past several
years, taking heavy casualties but inflicting increas-
ing casualties on the US in return. Captured docu-
ments reveal that the North Vietnamese have concluded
that a military stalemate will eventually result in
a political victory for them because they believe
the US will not be able to tolerate such a stalemate
as long as they can.
In North Vietnam, Hanoi has already called in
substantial foreign personnel to aid in t}~e air de-
fense system. Chinese Communist antiaircraft artil-
lery units, North Korean jet ,fighter pilots, and So-
viet surface--to-air missile operators have all been
active thus far against US aircraft. In addition,
on several occasions since late April Chinese Com-
munist jet fighters have attempted to engage US air-
craft operating over northeast North Vietnam. It
is probable that. Hanoi will call for further help in .
this field as the bombings do more and, more damage
and as North Vietnamese defense efforts prove inade-.
quate.
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The North Vietnamese, however, are unlikely to
call for foreign ground troops unless a US invasion
should threaten the heartland of the DRV, the Red
River Delta. There is a possibility that Hanoi would
ask for Chinese troops to man defensive positions in
the strategic delta area if the bulk of the North Viet-
namese Army had to be committed in the southern area
of the DRV, On balance, however, it is more likely
that Hanoi would not deplete its own forces in the
delta for operations farther south. In numerous ar-
ticles over the past several years, North Vietnamese
military leaders have discussed the possibility of a
US invasion and have laid out the general outlines of
the DRV response. The plan calls for the North Viet-
namese to wage almost the same type of war that is
being fought in the South, a mixture of conventional
and guerrilla warfare. They belive that such tactics,
together, with the war in the South, would force the
US to commit more men to the war than it would consider
acceptable.
Should such tactics fail, the North Vietnamese
leaders would undoubtedly call'for the Chinese Com-
munists to come to their aid. Despite the age-old
antipathy o~ the Vietnamese for the Chinese, Hanoi's
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actions thus far in the war indicate that the present
leaders would much prefer to see the Chinese enter
North Vietnam iri force than to suffer defeat by the
US. When faced in early 1965 with the problem of
whether to call for Chinese Communist help to off-
set US air strikes or to negotiate an end to the war
as the US requested, Hanoi decided to invite the
Chinese to send logistic and antiaircraft troops to
North Vietnam to meet the attacks. Faced with the
reality of an invasion by the US, there is little
doubt that the North Vietnamese would appeal to the
Chinese again.
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North Vietnam: Motivation and Intentions
1. The decision as to whether pr not the Viet-
namese Communists will persist in the war in South
Vietnam rests with the~11 men who form the politburo
of the Vietnam Workers Party. The determination shown
by~this small group in pursuing ,a war~that has brought
great destruction to North Vietnam as well as heavy
losses to the ranks of Communists and their supporters
in South Vietnam stems largely from two factors.
2. One~is their complete and militant dedication
1
to the precepts of Communism, including the most doc-
trinaire revolutionary aspects of Communist theory.
In numerous public statements, the official party
journals and leading party spokesmen have made it
clear that the Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) rejects
the Khrushchevian notion of "peaceful coexistence"
as far as South Vietnam is concerned and that it op-
poses the "modern revisionist" advice that political
methods are preferable to violent means in "wars of
liberation." In the area of Communist ideology, the
VWP has left no room for doubt that it is far closer
in viewpoint to the philosophy of the Chinese Commu-
nists than to that of the USSR.
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3. Ho Chi Minh and his top lieutenants are bat-
tle--hardened revolutionaries who fought and defeated
the French. They are convinced that their success
was due in large measure to the fact that they cor-
rectly interpreted and properly applied Communist
ideology to the situation in Vietnam. These men
genuinely believe that the "immutable" laws of his-
tort', as interpreted by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Mao,
have assigned them the duty--and the glory--of leading
the Vietnamese people in a struggle for independence.
They also see themselves as the battle front command-
ers in the world-wide struggle against the "number
one imperialist," the US.
4. The second chief factor influencing Hanoi's
determination is a strong spirit of nationalism,
which finds its expression in bitter anti-Americanism.
Ho and his aides are thoroughly convinced that the US
deliberately set out to undermine the 1954 Geneva
agreements and the provision therein for national
elections in Vietnam in July 1956. The VWP hierarchy
remains convinced that had those elections been held,
Vietnam today would be united under a government
headed by Ho Chi Minh and the Vietnam Workers Party.
They lay at the feet of the US the entire blame for
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the situation which developed after 1954, including
'the success of Ngo Dinh Diem in creating a viable
government aid particularly his increasingly effec-
tive campaign to roll up the Communist cadre left
behind in the South after 1954.
~5. The Vietnamese Communist leaders believe
deeply that they were the victims of'US duplicity in
the years after 1954. They believe that they were
fully justified in turning to the use of force in
order to overthrow Diem and unify the country after
the repeated refusal between 1954 and 1956, and even
later, of Diem to respond to North Vietnamese offers
to hold meetings preparatory to national elections.
In their eyes, they had little choice but to take, up
arms once again against what they termed "My/Diem,"
roughly translated as "US-Diem." They do not see
themselves as aggressors attempting to seize control
of a neighbor nation but rather as the legitimate
authorities of a national government denied control
over half their country by a foreign invader. The
initiation of US air strikes against North Vietnam
in February 1965 and the introduction of US combat
forces into South Vietnam in 1965 further inflamed
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 the Hanoi leaders' feelings and reinforced their
view that the US was bent on denying them their
rightful place at the head of a unified Vietnam.
Current Evidence
6. That the North Vietnamese leaders are still
fanatically devoted to their goal is indicated by
all the current evidence on the subject. Recently
captured North Vietnamese soldiers from the fighting
near Khe Sanh in western Quang Tri Province, for
example, state that three additional regiments from
the 325th Division have moved across the Demilitar-
ized Zone since,March. The continued dispatch by
North Vietnam of combat units to South Vietnam in-
dicates that, at least over the next few months,
Hanoi intends to stay in the fight. Moreover, the
increased use in northern Quang Tri and the DMZ of
Communist mortars and artillery, coupled with plaus-
ible reports that the Soviet Union has agreed to pro-
vide more artillery, adds further evidence of an in-
tention to continue the fight.
7. Other similar indications include the early
April trip to Moscow by DRV Premier Pham Van Dong
during which he reportedly discussed additional Soviet
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military aid. The appearance of Chinese Communist jet
fighters over northeast North Vietnam on several oc-
casions beginning on 24 April and their efforts to
engage US aircraft in that area--the first such actions
since September 1966--suggests a North Vietnamese will-
ingness to continue to rely heavily on Peking rather
than agree to negotiate.
8, The negative results of US efforts to ar-
range peace talks with Hanoi further indicates Hanoi's
intention to keep the war going. The North Vietnam-
ese have consistently stuck to their refusal to offer
some quid pro quo in return for a cessation of the
bombings. Hanoi's release on 21 March of the ex-
change of letters between President Johnson and Ho
No rorei n Dissem
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Chi Minh was the act of a nation which dad decided,
at least for tYie time being, toy reject the role of
secret diplomacy iri regard to a negotiated settle-
ment of the War. Captured enemy documents. giving
details of Hanoi'S attitude toward negotiations dis-
close that the North Vietnamese regard them pri-
marily as a tactic to be .used in conjunction with
continued warfare in order to extract maximum con-
cessions from the US. There is nothing in the docu-
~nents to suggest that the North Vietnamese enterta2n
any notion of withdrawing from South Vietnam as a
result of negotiations.
9. Tt is, perhaps, inherent in the. very fanati-
cism of the Vietnamese Communist leadership that they
should prefer to make the war a test of wills. They
are convinced that their motivation is ,stronger than
that of the Americans. Thus, they have programmed
-their effo,rt:to take over South Vietnam to be a
tart' stalemate in South Vietnam will suffice for their
grinding war of attrition}. They believe that a mili-
purpose, whereas, in Hanoi's
either win quickly or settle
the Communists .
assessment, the U~
on terms favorable
must
to
10. Gven.~this long'r.ange strategy, it appears
unlikely that the North Vietnamese intend to make
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any dramatic military move such as an overt invasion
across the DMZ in the near future. They are more
likely to continue the same basic approach as in the
past, infiltrating sufficient replacement personnel
to keep existing units at combat level and intro-
ducing additional combat units to the South as
needed to maintain or perhaps gradually exceed a
relative balance with US and allied forces.
recently defected, claims that Communist plans for
the upcoming year include a major military campaign
in the western highlands of Kontum and Pleiku. This
is to be coordinated with two other moves in the
northern half of the country. One will be a thrust
in northern Quang Tri and Thua Thien and the other
will be in the coastal areas of Binh Dinh and Phu
Yen. The North Vietnamese must realize that their
successes, if any, in these campaigns will be rela-
tively modest. They will probably be satisfied if
these campaigns result in heavy US casualties, even
at the cost of heavier Communist losses.
12. Captured documents, as well as articles in
the press by North Vietnamese military leaders, dis-
close that there has been considerable concern among
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Vietnamese Communist leaders over the way the war
in South Vietnam has been going. This concern has
been manifested in a lengthy debate among the Commu-
nist military leaders over the proper military tac-
tics to be used against US forces in South Vietnam.
One group advocated a policy emphasizing large unit
offensive actions directly against US units. Another
group believed that the role of guerrilla warfare was
being underplayed in the South.
13. For the present, judging both from Communist
action in the field and from recent articles in the
DRV press, a compromise solution has been reached--
although some aspects of the debate appear to be
continuing--with heavier emphasis being given to the
guerrillas than in the past two years but primary
weight is still being given to large unit actions.
14. One of the major points of dispute within
the Vietnamese Communist military establishment has
been the relative number of casualties the Communists
believe they can afford to take in comparison with
the losses of the allies. For example, Nguyen Chi
Thanh, chief military and political officer for Com-
munist forces in the South, in July 1966 criticized
those who claimed that the Communists needed a two
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to one troop superiority in order to defeat an ARVN
unit and at seven or even nine to one to defeat a
US unit.
15. Complicating this problem for Hanoi is
the difficulty in getting accurate details of the
battlefield situation in the South. Captured docu-
ments indicate that local Communist commanders report
their own losses accurately. There are some indi-
cations, however, that local commanders grossly exag-
gerate the number of casualties their units have in-
flicted on US units. Hanoi has several means at
hand to overcome this problem. One is the fact that
in recent months the Hanoi High Command has been
greatly expanding its direct radio communications
contacts with North Vietnamese units in South Viet-
nam. Hanoi has also been sending an increasing num-
ber of top level North Vietnamese general officers to
command positions in the South. Moreover, total US
strength figures are available to Hanoi not only
through battlefield commands but also through an
extensive and very competent intelligence network
which seems to have penetrated all levels of the
South Vietnamese Army. At present, therefore, it
seems likely that Hanoi has a fairly good appreciation
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of_ the actual si_i_uati_on in the South,
Foreign Volunteers for South Vietnam
16. It is unlikely that Hanoi or its National
Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV)
will at any point seek substantial help from Commu-
nist China, the Soviet Union, or the rest of the Com-
munist bloc in the form of combat personnel for the
war in South Vietnam. In part this is because the
Vietnamese Communist leadership appears confident
that the manpower available to them in North and
South Vietnam is sufficient to carry on the war. A
recently captured notebook contained what appears to
be notes from a lecture to Communist cadre in the
South on Hanoi's "12th Central Committee resolution"
on war policy. According to these notes, the Commu-
nist High Command anticipates that the US may raise
its force level in South Vietnam to one or one-and-
a-half million men. The Communists are confident
that they can defeat even that large a force, accord-
ing to the notebook, and no mention was made of for-
eign volunteers.
17. In part, Hanoi's attitude probably stems
from a realization that no significant foreign ground
combat force is likely to be made available for fight-
ing in South Vietnam. Although there is always a
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possibility that at some point an international bri-
gade type of volunteer unit will appear in South
Vietnam at the behest of the NFLSV, such a unit would
be primarily for propaganda rather than combat pur-
poses.
18. Certainly Hanoi is under no illusions that
the Soviet Union or any Eastern European country is
going to send substantial ground forces to South Viet-~
nam. The North Vietnamese also appear to believe
that .there is little prospect of significant Chinese
Communist intervention in South Vietnam. A captured
document containing an analysis of the war by party
first secretary Le Duan pointed out that "South Viet-
nam's resources in manpower and material is in the
north." Le Duan went on to state that it is possible
the US will attempt to move into Laos in order to cut
off the supply lines from the north to the south.
asserted that in such an event "the US troops would
have to clash with the North Vietnamese main force."
In neither case did Le Duan suggest that foreign
troops would enter the fight.
19. Le Duan also stated his belief that the US
had been encouraged in sending troops to South Viet-
nam by the fact that a situation existed in which
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"our camp's unity was seriously impaired," and there-
fore the US would not become "involved in a major
war" encompassing the entire socialist bloc.
20. Another captured notebook, containing ex-
cexpts from a lecture by a Communist official named
Vinh, asserted that the Chinese would enter the com-
bat "if the war is expanded to North Vietnam," im-
plying that China will not enter as long as the war
is confined to the South. Thus, it is clear the
leadership did not want to raise any hopes that the
Chinese would step in to save the day for the Viet--
namese in South Vietnam.
21. Hanoi's handling of the subject of foreign
volunteers in its propaganda also suggests that it
does not intend to raise any hopes among Viet Cong
supporters in the South of massive Chinese inter-
vention on their behalf. On 22 March 1965, the
Central Committee of the NFLSV issued a statement
containing a warning that it would call for foreign
volunteers if the US and its allies continued to
send troops to South Vietnam and continued "to
expand the war to the North and Laos." When Hanoi
rebroadcast this NFLSV statement, however, it added
the caveat, "when needed." From then on, both the
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NFLSV and Hanoi inserted that or a similar caveat
whenever referring to'the possibility of foreign
volunteers.
22. Moreover, after the summer of 1965, Hanoi
appears to have attempted to lump the threat of for-
eign volunteers for South Vietnam together with the
possibility of volunteers for the North. Hanoi spokes-
,
men and news media now use such terms as "the Viet-
namese people" will call for foreign volunteers
"when needed," thus blurring the issue as to Which
half of ,Vietnam these volunteers would be sent. At
no time have Vietnamese Communist spokesmen specified
any point at which foreign combat personnel would be
requested, and all available evidence suggests that
Hanoi does not expect that point ever to be reached.
23. Even in the event that Communist main forces
in Sot}th Vietnam were defeated and the guerrillas
and political infrastructure destroyed, it is un-
likely that Hanoi would call for Chinese Communist
assistance ~.n the form of combat personnel for the
South. This is due, if for no other reason, to
the fact that Hanoi undoubtedly understands that Pe-
king would not respond favorably to such a request.
Lin Piao's famous September 1965 treatise, "Long
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Live the Victory of the People's War," stated in
unmistakable terms the Chinese position that op-
pressed peoples must wage wars of liberation--and
Vietnam was held up as the prime example of such a
war--largely with their own resources. Le Duan's
letter, mentioned earlier, stated that one of the
chief requirements facing the Communists is to "per-
suade the socialist bloc to be also resolute like
us to foil the U5 aggression in the South," suggest-
ing that Le Duan thought the rest of the bloc was.
not providing ~s much assistance as it might.
Foreign Combat Personnel for North Vietnam
24. North Vietnam has already accepted foreign
air defense personnel and probably will ask for
and receive. additional help of this kind as the de-
mands on its aid defense system are increased. For-
eign air defense personnel known to be in North
Vietnam at present consist of Soviet surface-to-
air missile operators, a few Soviet jet pilot train-
ers, North Korean combat jet pilots, and Chinese
Communist antiaircraft artillery batteries. In
addition, sine late April, Chinese Communist MTGs
have been engaging US aircraft over northeast North
Vietnam.
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26. Hanoi was probably motivated to seek for-
eign personnel to aid in its air defense because of
its realization that its own efforts in this area
were, totally inadequate. When the first SAMs ap-
peared in North Vietnam, there was abundant testi-
that the Vietnamese preferred to man the missiles
themselves rather .than to allow the Soviets to do so.
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Ln part, L-his was due to Flanoi's desire not L-o p.ro-
coke the Chinese, who did not and still do not want
to see substantial numbers of Soviets in North
Vietnam.
27. When it became clear by June 1966, however,
that North Vietnamese - fired missiles were not doing
the job expected of them, the Soviets took over
control of several operational sites. The Soviets
claimed in private that their missiles were good
and that the poor showing was due to the inability
of the North Vietnamese to fire them properly. The
Soviet missilemen, however, failed to score any
better record of shootdowns. By September 1966 it
appeared that North Vietnamese had resumed control
over all the firing sites.
28. In the case of the Chinese, it is likely
that Reking insisted on providing its own antiair-
craft defenses for its engineers working in North
Vietnam. It is also likely that Hanoi was glad to
have some help in this area, thus freeing its own
antiaircraft artillery resources for duty in other
areas of the country.
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30. If US air strikes continue to hit key
targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong area, the North Viet-
namese can be expected to request an additional
commitment from their allies for air defense. This
could include an appeal for Soviet and East Euro-
pean "volunteer" pilots., regular Soviet SAM units,
a Cuban jet pilot contingent and Chinese Communist
jet interceptor units, as well as additional Chinese
31. There is little likelihood that US air
strikes will bring the Hanoi regime to such straits
that it will request the introduction of Chinese
Communist ground combat forces into the war. The
North Vietnamese have made extensive preparations
for the evacuation of their government offices from
Hanoi and have already begun to disperse some offices
to the countryside, even under. the heaviest bombing
attack, the regime could probably continue to func-
tion well enough to continue to support and direct
the war in South Vietnam. After more than two years
of intensive bombing, the North Vietnamese are still
capable of moving substantial quantities of goods
and men to South Vietnam and there is little reason
to believe that this capability will diminish enough
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as the result of air strikes to end the war. More-
over, captured documents such as tYie notebooks)
mentioned above, state Hanoi's .intention to confine
the war to South Vietnam.' Le Duan particularly
dwelt on this aspect, calling it a duty of the Viet-
namese Communists to contain the conflict within
that area.
32. North Vietnam probably would not rule out
a call for foreign ground force help (in-practice
this would: have to be primarily Chinese) in-the
I .
event of an invasion of its territory by US ground
forces. The lecture by Vinh to Communist cadre in
South Vietnam stated flatly that the Chinese Commu-
nists will enter the war if it is extended to North
Vietnam. It should also be recalled that in 1965
~.
Hanoi was faced with the decision of whether to
ask for Chinese help, including the presence of
large numbers of Chinese personnel., to cope with
the effects of US air strikes. At that time, despite
its ingrained antipathy to having large numbers of
Chinese in their country, the North Vietnamese de-
cided to invite in the Chinese. Faced with the even
greater threat posed by a US invasion, it is likely
that Hanoi wi7,l take the necessary step of inviting
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further Chinese presence. It is possible that Hanoi
would call for Chinese troops to replace North Viet-
namese forces sent to counter a US invasion of the
southern DRV but it is more likely that I-Ianoi would
wait until it determined whether the US forces
intended to remain near the DMZ or whether they
intended to move farther north. Hanoi would also
wait until it .made certain its own forces could not
contain the US .troops before calling in the Chinese.
33. I-Ianoi might also call for volunteers .from
other countries but only the Chinese could offer an
effective ground combat force. Any Communist ground
force operating in North Vietnam would be almost
totally dependent on supplies coming through China.
34. In the event of a US invasion of North
Vietnam, Hanoi could decide to opt for negotiations
as proposed by the US. It is more likely, however,
as long as Hanoi is convinced it can rely on the
Chinese for support, ultimately including the com-
mitment of ground troops, that the North Vietnamese
would continue to fight. A number of articles
written over the past several years by top-level
North Vietnamese military leaders have addressed the
question of how North Vietnam would handle an invasion
T
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by the US. They all indicate an intention to
fight rather than negotiate in such an event. Ac-
cording to these articles, the North Vietnamese
intend to use tactics similar to those used in South
35. Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap in an
article published on 22 December 1964 stated that
"if the enemy wages an aggressive war against North
Vietnam... .standardized warfare and guerrilla warfare
will be simultaneously used in the war launched by
our people to'protect the fatherland." The deputy
chief of the North Vietnamese Army's General Staff,
Hoang Van Thai, wrote in December 1964 that "in
case of war in North Vietnam," both "conventional
and guerrilla; warfare will be used." These and
other such articles also stress the fact that Hanoi
I
will wage a "protracted war" in its own defense,
just as in South Vietnam. Other more recent articles
by leading North Vietnamese echo this theme. They
all reflect a determination'on the part of the North
Vietnamese leadership to fight such an invasion and
the tactics they say will be used suggest that they
believe, in,combination with the war in South Viet-
nam, they can effectively, wear down the US as they
did the French.
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