COMMENTS ON THE VIETNAMESE CABINET CRISIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A001000040018-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 7, 2005
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: October 19, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2005/06/ Y I P79R00967A001000040018-8
19 October 1966
3tEMO2iANDUM
CT: Comments on the Vietnamese Cabinet Crisis
I . It is doubtful that any action which KY may take will
resolve the current political crisis before the Manila conference.
Although some or all all of the threatened cabinet resignations may be
affected, the hiatus will be publicized and almost certainly Will lead
to further turbulence both within and outside the Constitutional
Assembly. Any punitive action against the dissidents that the GVN
may take will add fuel to this fire.
Z. Premier KY will be very reluctant to remove General
LOAN, despite any Misgivings KY may have about LOAN's heavy-
handedness. KY has confidence in LOAN, whose firmness and
determination played a major role in upholding the GVN during the
recent struggle movement. Y may feel his government cannot
survive against its current opposition without the stiffening provided
by LOAN in his capacity as director of the two principal internal
security services.
3. Any concession by KY in the form of removing LOAN or
reducing his powers will only temporarily appease the opposition
elements . LOAN is probably only an interim target of the opposition,
whose ultimate aim is the replacement of the current northern-
dominated military government. The opposition -- a loose amalgam
of southern civilians - - is probably counting on KY's inability to find
a roan with LOAN's loyalty to 'Y and and his determination and ability to
support the government.
4. The current crisis is not a new development, but merely
the first significant, post-election i-aanifestation of fundamental
maladies infecting the Vietna-aera body politic. It is a now demonstration
that basic divisive factors -- regionalism and military versus civilian
control -- still pre -dominate over the few unifying factors. (To these
may be added a third divisive element -- religion -- which is not yet
openly involved in this crisis, but which may soon come again into
play.) Regionalism is evident in the southern resentment over the
fact that northern "carpet-buggers" dominate the KY government.
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The question of civilian versus military control is involved in the
fear of continued military control borde>dag on dictatorship.
5. KY has sought in recent months to ameliorate these latent
criticism, by broadening the directorate to include civilian a lumbers,
by holding elections for the constitutional assembly, and by adding a
number of southerners (mostly civilians) to his cabinet. These moves
have not assuaged the opposition; it claims that civilians have not
been consulted on vital decisions; it accuses the GVN of using police-
state methods to suppress its opponents; and it suspects the
military of plotting to renege on the promised transition to civilian
4overnment.
6. At the moment, KY appears determined to retain LOAN
and to accept the resignations of the dissident cabinet members. He
has planned to replace these with other southern civilians. He has
shown some skill and adroitness in resolving confrontations with
other opposition groups in the past, and may somehow temporarily
patch over this crisis. Nevertheless. he probably will not soon be
able to find a formula for resolving the fundamental divisive factors
contributing to political instability. The principal hope for long-terra
development of stability would appear to be the evolution of so -ne
political mochanis 'a which insures predominant military influence.
but which also provides some means of civilian participation. The
GVN is working in this direction, basing its approach in part on the
Korean pattern. Whether the GVN succeeds in finding this fortula
will depend on a large part on the sympathy and/or support he
receives from the U. S.
GEORGE W. ALLEN
Vietnamese Affairs Staff
cc - D/OCI
DONE
C/rE
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 Approved FVIIe~,e?0jk# 6/04,-1f9R009 7A001 18-8
DATE:19 Oct. 66
TO: D/ONE
FROM:
George W. Allen
The attached was prepared to provide
our initial reaction to the current crisis
to the Director. He asked that these
comments be passed to the addressees.
cc - D/OCI
C/FE
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