CURRENT MOSCOW MEETING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A001000040011-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 7, 2005
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: October 21, 1966
• Content Type: NOTES

Approved For Release 2005/(16/0 9 ? P79R0096 01000040011-5
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21 October 1966
SUBJECT: Current Moscow Meeting
The attached staff note by as prepared in haste
this morning just before his departure on TDY. Its substance was
to have been presented orally at the Board and Staff meeting this
morning but scheduling problems interfered.
Please note that paragraph 44w suggests that an important
statement on volunteers for North Vietnam may be issued by the
Moscow conferees.
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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1. Since Monday, a meeting of party chiefs and defense
ministers from Eastern Europe, Cuba, and Mongolia has been going
on in Moscow. This meeting was unscheduled and there has been
no announced agenda. Some facts suggest some urgency in convening
it. Gomulka, who has been visiting the USSR, rescheduled his
departure. Polish Defense Minister Spychalski arrived after the
Gomulka delegation. And a more convenient and appropriate occa-
sion for such a gathering would seem to be the 7 November cele-
brations. Most speculation, informed and otherwise, has the
meeting focusing on China and Vietnam.
2. Also under discussion is a shift by Hanoi in the direc-
tion of negotiations, or new efforts by the Soviets and East
Europeans to persuade the DRV to moderate its present line. The
Czechs, Rumanians, and Bulgarians have all recently returned from
trips to Hanoi, Gromyko recently took the line with the President
that Moscow's influence in Hanoi should not be underestimated,
but offered no clue as to what would happen if the US did stop
bombing. On the other hand, there has been no sign from Hanoi
that it intends to moderate its position. In addition, the Soviet
October Anniversary slogan on Vietnam is much harsher than last
year's.
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3. The Moscow conclave follows Brezhnev's trip last month
to Bulgaria, Hungary, and Yugoslavia where the Soviets put new
fire in their campaign to muster support for their view of devel-
opments in China. Moscow seems intent on making the most of
China's difficulties to enhance its own position in the Communist
world. It obviously sees a tide of opinion running against Peking.
Recent speeches by Brezhnev and Kosygin are the hardest hitting
against China's present leadership since the days of Khrushchev.
4. Vietnam remains the touchstone. Moscow's accusation
for some time now has been that China has failed in its inter-
national duty to participate in joint action in defense of North
Vietnam. Kosygin went so far as to say that the Chinese have pro-
longed the war by their actions. The Russians probably feel that
the mere fact of the meeting highlights the solidarity of the
USSR and its allies in support of Hanoi. The likely outcome is
some sort of joint statement on Vietnam, with very definite anti-
Chinese overtones, similar to the Warsaw Pact declaration last
July. No multilateral party condemnation of Peking is likely.
Moscow and its allies will look at the present scene in China
more in sorrow than in anger. The USSR's goal remains fixed on
the isolation of the present Chinese regime. The opposition to
any "conference" on China by such parties as the Rumanians and
the Poles circumscribes Moscow's actions.
S-E-C-R-E-T
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5. However, one good possibility is that the meeting will
produce some new and more forthright statement on the question
of volunteers for the DRV. All of the recent Eastern European
visits to Hanoi have concluded in communiques which bring this
subject up. On 15 and 16 October in the USSR, young Communist
organizations held mass rallys stating a readiness to go to
Vietnam if it became necessary. In this situation, the presence
in Moscow of the Cubans is quite relevant. They have been out-
spoken on the question of volunteers. Foreign Minister Roa on
18 October at the United Nations spoke out on the issue. There
is also some indication that .the question of volunteers was a
topic of discussion on Brezhnev's trip to Eastern Europe last
month. Any such statement could say that additional contingency
plans have been made with the DRV on the question. It might even
declare the presence in North Vietnam of some Soviet, East European,
and Cuban citizens. The statement would probably still make the
question of volunteers contingent on the DRV's request. And the
statement 'ould have the value of contrasting the joint commit-
ment of Moscow and its allies to support Hanoi with the obstruc-
tionist tactics of Peking -- noticeably silent on the question
of "volunteers" for the DRV.
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