THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: BALAGUER BALLING THE CAT (ONE DISTRIBUTION ONLY)

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79R00967A001000030017-0
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
4
Document Creation Date: 
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date: 
November 1, 2006
Sequence Number: 
17
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
August 12, 1966
Content Type: 
MEMO
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79R00967A001000030017-0.pdf145.12 KB
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Approved For Release 2006/11/01: CIA-RDP79R00967AO01000030017-0 'woe *Wo S-E-C R-E-T CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE A G E N C Y OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES 12 August 1966 STAFF NOTE SUBJECT: The Dominican Republic: Balaguer Belling the Cat (ONE Distribution Only) NOTE TO THE BOARD I has suggested that the attached would be useful subject matter for a Board discussion. We deal here only with the aspect of the Dominican situation which we regard as most worrisome for the shorteun future. A good general wrap-ups produced by OCI on 5 August,, is available in the Reading Room. GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic S-E-C -R-E-T downgrading and declassification - Approved For Release 2006/11/01: CIA-RDP79R00967AO01000030017-0 Approved For Release 2006/11/01: CIA-RDP79R00967AO01000030017-0 iqaw~ S-E-C-R-E-T CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE A G E N C Y OPTICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES 12 August 1966 STAFF NOTE SUBJECT: The Dominican Republic: Balaguer Belling the Cat 1. The first six weeks of President Balaguer's term of office have passed calmly. The next six weeks will probably be less calm,, and the period after late September -- when the last of the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) is scheduled to leave -- may become very tense indeed. 2. Balagzer has now made clear by his actions that he meant what he said about u dertaking a transformation of the military establishment. In changes aimed at reducing the power of ultra-conservatives in the officer corps? he has ordered the transfer into the army of some air force ground combat troops and has directed that the tank force be shifted from one command to another. He has replaced the chief of police with a trusted associate. He has also chosen as his own military aide an am- bitious officer who is generally considered a Trujilloist and is S-E-C-R-E-T Approved For Release 2006/11/01 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01000030017-0 Approved For Release 2006/11/01: CIA-RDP79R00967A001000030017-0 regarded with suspicion by the defense minister and the service chiefs -- all appointees of Provisional President Garcia Godoy. These moves by Baleguer seem to be only preliminary to more ex- tensive -- and more delicate -- changes. 3. The Dominican military establi tment* is certainly not the throw-back,, gorilla outfit it was in Trujillo's time; neither has it suddenly became a collection of honest, dutiful, imaginative, cleancut, loyal professionals. The persistence of the old ways has been illustrated by tough Tony Imbert's recent cycle of visits (clcarlf for no goad purpose) to various mili- tary establishments. It has also been shown by the behavior of an air force major in the town of Barehona vi-Lo last weekend arrested the secretary-general and several other medbers of Juan Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party; the major evidently figured that if these folk weren't the same as Communists, they were just as dangerous. 4. Balaguer obviously realizes that there is some risk in the course he has embarked upon; he has not committed himself to his is a big establishment in a small country. Total number of military persoflnel is nearly 19,000. In addition, 'there is the National Police with about. B.,500. Approved For Release 2006/11/01 : CIA-RDP79R00967AO01000030017-0 Approved For Release 2006/11/01: CIA-RDP79R00967A001000030017-0 S-E-C R-E-T any specific blueprint or time-table. He has , however, indicated his hope of accomplishing far-reaching changes in the military before the IAPF departs. We see two points of concern here: one is that he may be over-optimistic about how far and fast he can go without provoking a dangerous reaction; the other is that im- plementing some changes of the sort he seems to have in mind would likely require more than five or six weeks. 5. Elements in the military are bound to become restive as they see not only their numbers, but also their privileges and prerogatives, cut back. Moreover, with the departure of the IAPF, the extreme left is likely to renew activity, including the per- petration of violent incidents, and certain of the military leaders may want to move more forcefully than Balaguer deems appropriate against leftist groups. In sum, we think there will inevitably be some danger of a military coup attempt and that this danger might abruptly increase if, for instance, Wessin y Wessin or certain of the rebel military officers who have been sent abroad suddenly reappeared on the Dominican scene. -3- S-E-C R-E-T Approved For Release 2006/11/01 : CIA-RDP79R00967A001000030017-0