BRIEFING OF THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES ON: THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM BY, MR. PHILIP C. HABIB, POLITICAL COUNSELLOR OF THE US EMBASSY IN SAIGON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A001000020022-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 2006
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: May 17, 1966
• Content Type: MFR

Approved or. Release 2007/03/06: CIA-RDP79R0Q,7A001000020022-5
17 May 1966
SUBJECT: Briefing of the BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES on:
The Political Situation in South Vietnam by,
Mr. Philip C. Habib, Political Counsellor of the
US Embassy in Saigon
DATE : 13 May 1966, at Headquarters
1. Background. Mr. Habib, who had returned to Washington
to participate in the Washington discussions with Ambassador
Lodge, gave the Board a one hour briefing on the political out-
look in South Vietnam, concentrating primarily on preparations
for elections, and possible developments thereafter. Mr. Habib'a
briefing was prior to recent developments in Danang and Hue.
2. Approximate schedule of events concerning elections in
South Vietnam:
a. Preparations for elections, if things go legally
and logically, will continue over the next 3 or 4 months.
The actual deadline is 15 September, although Mr. Habib
feels that if the elections take place a week or so either
side of that date, everyone should be reasonably satisfied,
b. The elections, to be held about mid-September,
will elect delegates to a Constitutional Assembly.
c. The Constitutional Assembly will probably not
actually convene until about one month after the elections.
Assembly deliberations to draft a constitution will probably
last from 2 to 4 months or longer. Mr. Habib thinks a
3-month guess would not be far off the mark.
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
Downgrading and
Declassification
State Dept. review completed
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d. Events thereafter. These developments should
run at least into January 1967. What happens thereafter
depends in considerable measure upon decisions made by
the Constitutional Assembly. They may decide to perpetu-
ate themselves as the legislature of the new government,
in which case further legislative elections will not be
necessary inanediately. Or they may decide instead to set
up procedures for a general election which would establish
a national legislature. This of course, would take events
into the spring or summer of 1967, before a new government
was fully established.
3. Disruptive possibilities. The Buddhists and Struggle
Forces could demonstrate in favor of an immediate change of
government once the constitutional assembly has been elected.
This is the one Buddhist demand the government has not met in
its concessions to the Buddhists to date. The Buddhists could
demonstrate for this now. The fact that they have not done so
in the face of Ky's recent remarks and those of others in the
last two weeks which indicated clearly the government intends
to remain in power beyond this date, probably means that the
Buddhists are reluctant to get into a tight squeeze again,
possibly because they fear that such moves on their part would
trigger a coup within a coup in the military by the so-called
"Baby Turk" element, for example.
4+. Pre-election political maneuvers.
a. A non-Buddhist "alliance" appears to be shaping
up, including the VNQDD, Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, Catholics,
veterans groups, etc. However, so far this alliance has been
talked about more than it has been explored, and it is not
a movement of any strength yet.
b. The Buddhist Institute is trying to broaden its
base, from I Corps south into the II Corps area, and also
in Saigon. They are succeeding to some extent in the II
Corps area.
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5. What overnmen t do? Mr. Habib believes the
government is unfortunately inadequate to handle the needs. There
are now divisions in the directorate which have grown under the
stresses of the past two months. Mr. Habib expects that the
regular government programs now in existence will continue over
the next few months, but the "intellectual" aspect of the govern-
ment management will suffer, because the government will be pre-
occupied with the problems created by the forthcoming elections.
The military wants to stay on in the interim between the convening
of the constitutional assembly and whatever government follows.
Whetherthey can or not depends to some extent on whether Ky can
reunify the directorate and pull it off. To some extent it also
depends on whether or not the constitutional assembly decides
further elections are necessary, or whether they decide that they
themselves will become the legislature. If they do, they could
than appoint a new executive. If the decision is to go for further
elections, and the directorate has behaved reasonably well between
now and then, the chances are they would stay on in power until
the results of the general elections brought in a new government.
6. Inflation is the number one problem in South Vietnam,
according o~'f~Jr. Habib. Whereas the US now has enough troops in
South Vietnam to actually deal with the Communists independently
should the GVN falter somewhat, the same condition does not hold
in confronting inflation. We are completely dependent on working
through the GVN in dealing with the problems of the GVI1 economy.
The IMF team, now in Saigon, should finish their work there
in a week and make their recommendations. The Embassy has been
high on drastic surgery as a solution to inflation -- namely
devaluation. Washington has had reservations on this, being
skeptical about the GVN's ability to carry devaluation out.
Mr. Habib expects the US position on this to be thrashed out
during Ambassador Lodge's visit here.
The difficulty lies in rallying the disparate elements in
South Vietnam to recognize and deal with the problem. Ky for
example, doesn't really understand the inflation problem or how
to cope with it. Because the leadership is not there for dealing
with the problem, we will have to rely instead on institutions
to take care of it.
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7, Politics and Power. The above remarks led to some
questions on the eteristics of Vietnamese when they organize
politically, and to the use of power in Vietnam.
a. Characteristics of the Vietnamese in organizing
politically are regionalism, religion, social groups,
traditional leadership, and the military. All of these are
really divisive rather than unifying, and this is why the
political scene is so splintered.
b, Mr. Habib feels that with the exception of Diem
from 1955 to 1959, none of the South Vietnamese leaders has
really understood the use of power they way we think of it.
Ky does not understand the use of power. Thieu does, but
he doesn't have any power base, Tri Quang does understand
the use of power and has the base and the will to use it.
8. Buddhist aspects.
a. The Cha lains are subject to the Buddhist Institute.
They are cadre o the militant Buddhists, for the most part.
They are not well organized but follow the ch:in of command.
Thich Tam Giac, the Chief of chaplains, is a moderate. Thich
Ho Giac, the deputy, is independent, but not as influential
as he thinks he is,
b. The Anti-American element in demonstrations. This
was a deli era to a fort B-y-TH uang to put pressure on the
US, so that we would limit out support of Ky and the Direc-
torate.
c. Thich Tri Juana is unable to dominate the present
advisory assembly. Nevertheless his power is growing and he
will probably be a continually growing force to be reckoned
with. Ky is trying to cut Tri Quang down to size and has made
a number of statements about him to the effect that he, Ky,
will take care of Tri Quang before long. Part of this vendetta
stems from the fact that Tri Quang double-crossed Ky., because
Ky had obtained Buddhist assurance that they would not object
to General Thi's removal before Ky actually went ahead with it.
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Tri Quang, in the end,may be a Makarios-type figure.
He is a politician. He is naive towards the Communists -
and also naive toward the military in that he probably
doesn't understand the capacity for violence among the
younger GVN military officers. Tri Quang is obviously
not popular with opposing political groups, and is for
example, high on the V1QDD's assassination list (they
have one). Tri Quang's power is largely in lay Buddhists
whereas Tam Chau's is clerical. Tam Chau has no lay fol-
lowing. Tri Quang is more of a political organizer than
Tam Chau, For example Tri Quang began criticizing the PAT'S
9 months ago. He has always been interested in their organi-
zation and use. Tri Quang's own movement is a political move-
ment, not a protest movement. There are some signs that he
has wider horizons than just South Vietnam. There is common
Buddhist force potential in Southeast Asia and we should
watch for any South Vietnamese Buddhist overtures to the
Buddhists in Cambodia and elsewhere.
d. Buddhist objectives, are primarily, control of the
Assembly. If they cannot aceve this then they want to
achieve a balance of power so that they can at least block
programs they don't like. In achieving their ends however,
it is easier for the Buddhists to create division, particularly
among the military, than it is for them to create alliances.
Mr. Habib thinks perhaps their ultimate objective is to end
the war -- not at any price but they probably think they
can alter the Viet Cong to such an extent that Hanoi would not
control the South. They are naive in this but one of the ele-
ments they will be able to play on if they ever begin this
theme, is the increasing war-weariness among the Vietnamese
people. Also, the US military shield allows the GVN -- and
for that matter the South Vietnamese people -- the luxury of
not being as aggressive as they should be. We must take this
war weariness into account in our own plans without exaggerating
it. As a balancing factor there is the often demonstrated Viet-
namese resilience, which has enabled them to bounce back from
adverse positions before. However, although this resiliency
has enabled the South Vietnamese to survive other government
changes in the past few years we should not automatically bank
on this to save the present political situation, should it get
worse this fall.
0IE/FE 25X1
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