JCS BRIEFING OF BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES ON US PLANS FOR AIR ATTACKS IN NORTH VIETNAM LAOS AND SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A001000010024-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 24, 2008
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: February 23, 1966
• Content Type: MFR

Approved For Release 2008/04/24: CIA-RDP79R00967AO01000010024-4 /L t
ST FT
23 February 1966
JCS review completed
SUBJECT : JCS Briefing of BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES on
US Plans for Air Attacks in North Vietnam, Laos, and
South Vietnam
DATE : 10:00 - 12:30 21 February 1966
BRIEFERS: Vice Admiral Lloyd M. Mustin, US Navy (J-3, JCS)
Major General John B. McPherson, US Air Force, (JCS)
Captain John R. McKee, US Navy, (JCS)
Major General Robert P. Taylor, US Air Force, (DIA)
1. Background. This briefing was originally prepared by
Brigadier General Grover Brown, J-2, CINCPAC, for Secretary McNamara
in Honolulu, 8 February 1966. Admiral Mustin gave a slightly
edited version. Supplementary material was left behind for
interested Board members.
2. Purpose. The purpose of the original briefing was to
tell Secretary McNamara what CINCPAC was going to do with projected
US deployments, and what CINCPAC expected to achieve with them.
The portion of the briefing given here considered the role of
air power. It was, in essence, CINCPAC`s overall concept of the
Air War against the North Vietnamese, including the programs in
South Vietnam and Laos.
3. Objectives. Probably the most important thing to come
out of the briefing was evidence that JCS has accepted community
estimates that the bombing campaign has not affected North
Vietnamese willingness to continue the war and has not to date
reduced significantly their ability to do so. In the light of
clear evidence that North Vietnam intends to continue direction
and support of the insurgency, the objectives of the bombing
program have been slightly revised. As defined tit .the briefing
they are:
a. Reduce to the maximum extent North Vietnamese
capability to support the insurgency.
b. Progressively raise the price to North Vietnam of
that support.
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4. Tasks. The briefing defined the tasks under these
objectives as:
b. Destruction in depth of its most important
contributory resources.
C. Disruption of troop movements.
d. Destruction of other high value targets.
5. Targets include:
a. Ports. About 67% of all North Vietnamese imports
arrive by sea. Nearly all of this comes through the
3 key deepwater ports of Haiphong, Hon Gai, and Cam Pha.
b. Northern LOCS. Objectives are to restrict --
as nearly as possible to deny -- assistance from China; to
impede movement between Haiphong and Hanoi, and to harass
other LOCS.
c. High value targets: These include POL, power, and
military support facilities.
6. Counter measures taken by the North Vietnamese to
combat the effects of the bombing have been similar to those
encountered in Korea: route by-passes, pontoon bridges, dispersal,
etc. In the first part of 1965, the bombing program disrupted
the North Vietnamese considerably, but by September the PAVN was
completely dispersed, re-organized and functioning smoothly.
In sum, for the period up through the end of the bombing pause,
the "pressure" we were exerting on North Vietnam through the air
war was declining rather than increasing, because of their
successful adaptation measures. Nevertheless, an assessment of
the damage in financial terms indicates Rolling Thunder cost
North Vietnam on the order of $28 million directly and an
additional $10 million indirectly.
7. Supply requirements and potential. There was some
discussion of the support requirements of VC/PAVN troops in South
Vietnam and of the tonnage per day potential of North Vietnamese
supply routes through Laos. Admiral Mustin himself and other
ranking officers with the JCS staff feel the going intelligence
figure of 12 tons per day* required to supply VC/PAVN troops.
*This figure was a rough approximation of the average for 1965.
It is generally recognized that the daily rate was considerably
higher by the end of the year.
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in South Vietnam is too low, although it may be an accurate
estimate of their needs at the beginning of 1965. JCS believes
that nearer a 100 tons per day is needed to maintain their
present level of activity and that by the end of the year it will
be on the order of 150 tons per day.
8. Armed Reconnaissance. Since the resumption of the
bombing, all missions to date have been Armed Reconnaissance.
A maximum of 300 sorties per day has been authorized, but because
of adverse weather, actual sorties have averaged less than half
of this number. Armed Reconnaissance has also been restricted
to an area considerably smaller than that permitted in the period
immediately preceding the bombing pause. These restrictions
essentially exempt the Northwestern part of North Vietnam.
Interdiction strikes against targets in the Northeast are permitted
only about once every two weeks. JCS is proposing less restrictive
limits on Armed Reconnaissance to be fixed by a 10-mile radius
around Hanoi and a 10-mile radius around Phuc Yen Airfield.
Everything west of a line 10 miles west of Phuc Yen would be open
to bombing as would everything south of a line 10 miles south of
Hanoi. Although this would still exempt the Northeast from general
Armed Reconnaissance, it would open up Northwestern North Vietnam,
and would in fact expand the target area beyond its greatest
previous limits by some 5,000 square miles.
9. Projected US sorties against North Vietnam for the
remainder of 1966 are set at 7,1i-07 per month. Approximately
3,000 additional sorties per month are to be flown in Laos; and
from 16,000 to 24,000 sorties per month will be flown in South
Vietnam. By mid-1966, the grand total of sorties per month in
the air war will be 34,000. These figures are determined
primarily by ordnance availability. The bomb shortage, more than
any other factor, sets the limits on potential number of sorties
which can be mounted. This shortage has begun to ease, however,
and should not be a restricting factor by autumn, 1966.
10. Summary. JCS does not expect significant results from
the bombing program during the first half of 1966. North Vietnamese
counter measures should enable them to supply their forces in the
South adequately despite hardships. During the latter half of
1966, however, JCS expects the bombing to hurt. They expect that
the buildup of North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam (from a
total of about 110 battalions of VC/PAVN now to about 172 by
December 1966) will require more supplies than North Vietnam
will be able to deliver in the face of the bombing program. JCS
believes that in 1967, because of US bombing, North Vietnam will
not be able to meet the support requirements generated by the
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level of operations carried on in the South by augmented US
forces. JCS believes that North Vietnam's managerial and
reconstruction problems will have become increasingly serious,
which in turn will have a serious effect on morale.
ONE /FE
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