BRIEFING OF THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES BY: BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAMSON, U.S. ARMY ON: THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A001000010010-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 19, 2006
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: March 14, 1966
• Content Type: MFR

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14 March 1966
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Briefing of the BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
BY: Brigadier General Williamson, U.S. Army
On: The War in South Vietnam
DATE : 7 March 1966
1. General Williamson emphasized that he was speaking from
the "limited viewpoint " of a combat unit commander. For the past
ten months he has been in South Vietnam as the commander of a
force consisting of the 173rd Airborne Brigade, Australian forces,
New Zealand forces, and ARVN liaison groups. It was a balanced
force (e.g., USAF aviation, infantry, artillery, tanks, medical,
supply, etc.). Operations were carried out primarily in the Saigon
area, except for August and September 1965, when the Pleiku and
Kontum areas were involved.
2. The Viet Cong and Their Tactics. The VC are "set-piece-
type operators, depending on careful planning, tedious reconnaisM
sane, and specific instructions. Their troops are inflexible and
incapable of adequate action when plans have been upset. Allied
forces have been successful in exploiting this weakness by setting
up several strong outposts around our bases, manning different
outposts at various times-and thereby thwarting VC planning efforts.
From these outposts, mounted and foot patrols are carried out.
Information gleaned by these patrols, plus aerial reconnaissance,
form the basis for offensive operations, which have been quite
successfv ..
3. When our operations began, we did not know the precise
locations of the VC who could, as a result, lash out and destroy at
a time and place of their own choosing, disappearing before govern-
ment forces could reach the area attacked. Now, improved combat
intelligence enables us to mount offensive operations which keep
him off balance and largely on the defensive. Our reaction is
much quicker; our airborne troops can support an attacked area
swiftly.
ARMY review(s) completed.
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
Downgrading and
Declassification
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4. The VC has lost its ability to attack with large forces
in the 173rd's area of operation. Since November 1965, they have
had to abandon such tactics as being too costly. They are com-
pletely outgunned by our M-16 ("a wonderful little weapon"). Its
rapid rate of fire (automatic or semi-automatic with 20 rounds to
the clip), high velocity, light weight, and the light weight of
its ammunition make it ideal for our purposes.
5. The VC can, of course, cause considerable difficulty
with harrassing tactics. Its Claymore-type mines (of Chinese
manufacture) give us a lot of trouble. Two of its Chinese-produced
weapons, the AK-l7 7.12um assault rifle and the 12.8 mm machine-
guu, are very good; the rest are not. A further difficulty is
created in that the VC can move their forces very quickly, even
though they move by foot. But they are being kept moving so often
that, according to captured diaries, many are getting tired.
Their morale is also suffering from the B-52 raids and our artillery:
barrages.
6. The ARVN. The ARVN are learning "at least as fast as
any troops in the world." They have a low experience level by our
standards, but are working very hard to get the job done. While
frightened when by themselves, they are fearless, ehthusiastic,
and effective when employed near a larger force, particularly an
American force. Unfortunately, the ARVN company or battalion
commander is deterred from taking personal initiative in combat;
if he suffers heavy casualties in an operation which was not orderer..
from above, he is in serious trouble.
7. Combat Intelligence. The picture here has improved con-
siderably. Interrogation of VC has been accellerated since trained
U.S. intelligence units have become involved. ARVN participation
is, of course, still vital because of their language skills and
local association. AWN ability to capitalize on captured documents
is questionable; our own intelligence people provide good and fast
feedback to combat units.
8. Sophisticated intelligence methods have been extremely
valuable. The best source of intelligence for the combat commander
remains the five-man patrol. It is sent out by foot, helicopter,
or armored personnel carrier, normally for 72 hours. Each has a
radio, contacting headquarters by aircraft relay.
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9. Our Real Combat Goals, Body count is the wrong way to
judge the degree of our success. We must liberate areas and not by
excessive brutality or destruction. We must fight the battles
so that the local civilians feel that we won properly, that we
are their friends, and that we will protect them. When we do so,
the civilians organize police and security forces. On virtually
all such occasions, the VC have been unable to regain control.
10. To carry out this policy, General Williamson has directed
his command to carry out no unnecessary killing. Firing on villages
is meticulously avoided. If a village must be burned, the policy
is to have local Vietnamese police or the ARVN carry it out. These
efforts have been eminently successful; liberated civilians who
have long been tinder VC control have come strongly to our side,
even assisting in persuading VC conscripts to defect.
11. "How we treat civilians is as important as the guns that
we shoot." Our Civic Action Program is doing very well. Our forces,
are helping them by instructing them in construction. of buildings
and wells, providing medical assistance, caring for refugees, and
in many other ways. Distribution of captured foodstuffs has had
noteworthy success,. not the least important factor being that the
population gets the idea that the government is winning and the
VC are losing. In all of these civic action efforts it is vital
to involve the local officials and give them full credit.
12. In Spry. General Williamson made three succinct
points. First, there is a real sense of direction In our efforts;
our military leaders are following a plan toward specific attain-
ments. Second, this generation of young fighting men "is doing a
whale of a good job," demonstrating good training, tactics,
technical skills, and sense of humor. Third, "I firmly think that
things are going better over there than people think."
ONE FE
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