THE CHANCES OF A CHINESE COMMUNIST MILITARY MOVE INTO SOUTHEAST ASIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A000800050028-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 17, 2006
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: May 11, 1961
• Content Type: MF

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SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
MEMORANDUM FOR THE VD/I
SUBJECT: The Chances of a Chinese Communist Military Move
into Southeast Asia
THE PROBLEM
To examine Communist China's present food situation, and
to estimate the chances that the Chinese might in desperation
e the rice, growing areas of Southeast Asia.
CONCLUSIONS
A. Food and health conditions in Communist China are at
their worst since the Chinese Communist regime consolidated its
d0P1?CDF Pp 1-11j
This r kemorandum has been produced with the assistance of members of
the Board and Staff of C/NE, and of representatives of O/RR, O/CI,
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SECRET
control of the mainland in 1949/1930. To combat this sits:
Peiping has been relaxing certain of its radical economic pressures,
apparently facing up realistically to the acute problems at
Its mood is sober, but not desperate.
B. A Chinese Communist push into Southeast Asia is highly
unlikely, either now or in the foreseeable future.
C. Assuming that the mission, strength, and disposition
of any US troops positioned in Thailand and South Vietnam constituted
no apparent threat to the Communist positions in Laos or the DRY.
it is unlikely that their presence would provoke a Chinese Communist
invasion; of the area.
A. The Situation in China
1. The Chinese Communist regime I. beset by the worst food
and health conditions it has faced since the dislocations attending its
conquest of the mainland. Food appears to be in extremely short
T
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ply in six provinces in particular: Shantung. Hopei, Ronan, and
Shansi (all in North China); K
g (Southeast China); and Liaoning
(Northeast China). * Reports of travelers and refugees concerning
food rations and health conditions in these areas suggest that much
of the rural population is on a slow starvation diet and is suffering
from severe malnutrition and nutritional diseases. Within these
disaster areas the peasants appear to he far worse off than the city
people. There are scattered reports of starvation rations or conditions
s
existing also in Chekiang, Kwangsi, Kiangu, Hunan. and Tsinghai.
A
These difficulties have contributed to an absolute decline in industrial
construction, as well as in production in important sectors of industry.
The USSR has neither alleviated China's famine nor returned the
Soviet technicians which it withdrew in mid -1960.
2. The Communist regime appears to be realistically facing
up to the acute problems at band. It is taking a number of steps
in the form of a relaxation of radical pressures -- designed to alleviate
the critical situation China will face for the next few months. For
example, the proportion of national production allocated to investment
The total population of these provinces in late i957 (official Chinese
Communist figures) was 230 million.
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appears to be decrreasing. to the benefit of personal consumption;
agriculture and light industry are apparently to receive
1961. Although this quantity (designed for domestic consumption
priorities in relation to heavy industry; some of the forced-draft
aspects of industrialisation are being dropped; and work pressure
is being reduced. Peiping has also contracted for imports of about
4million tons of Australian, Canadian, and Burmes.* grains during
small compared to China's total food re
consumption by about 20 kilograms percapita if distributed among
the people in North China, the area most severely affected by drought
and would figure even more importantly is increases if distributed
only in important urban centers or in food-deficit areas in coastal
regions.
. China is probably still sufficiently solvent to pay cash
for current imports, but its international financial position is
tight. Reserves of gold and convertible currencies were probably
about US $225.350 million at the beginning of 1961, and China
to buy about $200 million worth of grain in the first six
Most of
s is designed for re-export by Communist China.
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one. It is making strong efforts to sustain
a high level of exports of nonfo,
purchases of Indus
a, and has sharply reduced its
Western Europe. The Canadian
to give China a g78-day credit for three-fourths of the large
purchases planned in the last half of 1961 will provide the Chinese
a short breathing spell. Although. some drawdown of foreign exchange
reserves probably will be unavoidable, they are not in danger of total
depletion. Reports that the USSR has loaned convertible currency to
help China buy grain are unconfirmed.
4. Prospects for this year's first major harvest (June-July)
are not good. The crucial weather months are probably April and May,
especially as concerns rains in the wheat growing areas of the north
northwest. April was apparently fairly dry in these latter
b some rains have fallen there in the latter part of the
month and in early May. There has been an overabundance of rain
in many areas of south and south central China, but it is not certain
as yet that the resulting floods have
his year's rice crop.
A fairly good total 1961 food crop may yet result if weather conditions
improve. However, if 1961 proves to be a third poor crop year in
succession, the resulting economic and political effects will be grave.
In such a situation, the regime's energies would probably be so
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Lk- s%L i
completely engaged with combatting major proble
and public disaffection that Peiping would have little inclination to
amsumo the additiont burdens and risks of a military adventure.
B. The Chances of a Chinese Conuumaist Push into Southeast Asia
. A neanber
The moat persuasive reason for believing that the Chinese
ttee t a military
st Asia Is that they
would almost certainty estimate that such action would result in
with the US on a major scale. Apart from their
ri
pressure on them to prevear much a develop nt,
bring strong
ecause of
the risks and partly because of the, unfavorable effects for toc polic
Even if the Chines. believed that war with the US could be
avoidea4, however, there are other reasons which would argue against
the move.
b. There are, in fact, no great too
Asia. Rice exports from the mainland Southeast Asia countries are
smelter than pre-war. The total 1960 rice exports from Burma,
Tbaila , Cambodia
Vietnam were about
0 Unvailt d, equivalent to about 3. 8 million tons milled. See also table
of tiero exports at annex,
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This surplus is small in relation to China's basic grain no
about ZOO million tons* at present), moreover, the
population of China is increasing at an annual rate of 15?ZO million
people, for whom an additional 5-6 million tons of grain must be
found each year. The Chinese could drastically cut present consumption
levels and attempt to rate* agricultural production in these countries,
by force, but only at great cost and difficulty attempting to maintain
controls over the hostile populations. Furthermore, the devastation
wrought by a Chinese invasion -- war, conquest, and economic
dislocation -- would require time before present crop production Levels could
again be neared. And the Chinese would have no guarantee that rice
from these areas could be readily shipped, t
Communist naval blockade, to China.
7. An overt invasion would be out of character both with
Communist China's preoccupation to date with internal problems, and
with the foreign and military policies it has pursued. The Chinese
intervened in Korea only in the last instance, in a situation in which,
from their point of view, strong US forces threatened their border.
They have exercised caution in thei
island probes, and have
e Unmilled grain, including tubers. 1960 grain production in China,
including tubers, was probably about 180-190 million tons.
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SC&
backed off from face-to-face encounters with US forces. Their
course has been cautious in Laos. Furthermore, except principally
for the agresaive attitudes they displayed to
and Indonesia
in 1959, the Chinese have shown considerable concern for "correct"
relations with their neighbors to the south. One of Peiping's basic
tactics has been to project the image of its "reasonableness" in South-
east Asia, and it is probable that the Chinese leaders would consider that
overt aggression there wool
s image, greatly lessen Asian
an support for Peiping's world status aims, and perhaps drive
India fully into the Western camp.
There are other means open to the Chinese Communists to
gain more food at less cost than a l)rang each Suden would entail.
Opportunities exist to achieve increases in agricultural production
through such means as improving cultivation, developing new seeds,
increasing the application of chemical fertilisers
gradually extending cultivated acreage.
Lgatton.
opportunities
are vigorously exploited, Communist China can probably obtain enough
increase in food production to keep up with population growth over the
next decade. If there are poor crop years in the
me, the regime
can reduce the rate of economic growth, export more industrial products,
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*r
aad tuts,
1 Asta's r c.
to That
it.
a as s" tbs ct c
r T#
Us*rs a
pr ss y almost T
as terse sasses
restraints 4
parobtb1. Soviet p"as .st & galas
The abssna. a to
!fretted sLses
s t .s That sat Yit.tswrim.sa 4sti
Pr
give the chi"** >*
3'ss Coitt#s.
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would almost certainly be confide
y threat
US forces of this Oise could offer to the Communist cause in the
area, and would almost certainly not wish the Chinese to establish
Y. the USSR, CarawA dst him, and the DRV would
h in North and South Vietnam or elsewhere in
probably be fairly confident that the introductio;
South Vietnam woutd not tbreatsn the Viet C*ng, at least initially,
and that US-Vietnamer, resistance to continued Communist irregular
of the preach.
prove no more availing thaea did the earlier efforts
10. The Chinese Communist response would nevertheless be
There would be plenty of propaganda play and dire threats,
especially with respect to the presence of US forcer in South Vietaa>:n.
The Chinese would charge that the US had contravened the 1954 Geneva
Accords by introducing its forces into Vietname, and would seek UN
and international condemnation of this "lawlessness." The Chinese
it certainly heighten their support of the UR V and its
t certainly be accelerated. Viet Cong forces would
t Coaaag operations in South Vietnam. Such operations
raps and their comaa-icatto-ns and supply
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goo chaoc
would be deflected from their
other missions to direct action against the Viet Gong.
U. If the scale and tWM
Vietnam at if U5 forces took up positions of strength immediately
south of the OW. at the 17th Parallel, the cbanc
action would increase.
cos did intervene in strength
atn in this circumstance, DRV troops
the invradi
probably do
do not believe that Chinese Gomm 1st forces would
be committed in Strength until or unless the Communist stake in the
area appeared tbreat*n*4,
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Rice Exports From Selected Southeast Asia Countries
(in tbeusaaid metric tons of mille !
COW-try
1959
1957
1958
1959
1985 1959
Pro-war)
Average
1939
Burma
1698
1948
1500
1810
Thailand
1230
WO
1390
1140
.108
1270
1288
1885
Cambod
70
231
234
242
South Vietnam
5
t$9
116
246
1
--~
Total (milled)
3345
Total NamUlod, on
5100
$&a*
basis
b/ Indochina figure, but comparable,
Vietnam were exporters.
y those areas now comprising
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