THE DREARY PROSPECTS FOR INDIA'S COMMUNIST PARTIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A000800020003-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 2, 2006
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 18, 1968
• Content Type: MEMO

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Secret
BOARD OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
SPECIAL
MEMORANDUM
The Dreary Prospects for India's Communist Parties
OPI,;C.a 'ages. 1 thrLI 114.
Secret
18 November 1968
No. 22-68
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP i
EXMVDRD FROM AUTOMATIC
T)OW'Ni1NAD AND
DECI.ANSIFICA CATION
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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
SPECIAL MEMORANDUM NO. 22-68
18 November 1968
SUBJECT: The Dreary Prospects for India's Communist Parties*
The Indian Communists, now split into two parties, have
little prospect for acquiring much influence on the national
scene despite their earlier hopes that they would do so.
The Communists have acquired control of the state of
Kerala for the second time. They have failed to improve
conditions there, however, and this has brought about wide-
spread dissatisfaction.
In 1967, a left communist dominated government in West
Bengal fomented serious labor unrest and for a time tolerated a
small peasant revolt. That government has since fallen; New
Delhi will probably not allow the Communists to return to
power even if elected. The more activist Communists will
probably turn to revolutionary methods. Indian police and
security services would be likely to contain such efforts,
however.
This memorandum was prepared by the Office of National
Estimates. It was discussed with representatives of the
Office of Current Intelligence and of the Clandestine
Services, who are in general agreement with its judgments.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
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1. In the mid and late 1950's, the future of the Communist
Party of India (CPI) appeared fairly promising. Alone of all
the opposition parties in India it seemed to offer a viable
alternative to the ruling Congress Party. In the 1957 election,
it doubled its nationwide vote and actually came to power in the
state of Kerala. Many felt that if India in the post-Nehru era
ran into serious economic or political difficulties, the CPI
would become a major force and could even come to power.
2. Few are likely to feel this today. India has gone
through some agonizing crises and the ruling Congress Party
has often stumbled badly. But the CPI has suffered even more.
Party factionalism has played a major role in bringing on its
decline; even in the 1950's, there was considerable infighting
among the party leaders. Though many issues were disputed,
the principal one was the party's relations with the USSR.
About half of their principal leaders criticized the party's
slavish adherence to Soviet doctrine, which defined the Nehru
regime as progressive and enjoined the support of many of its
foreign and domestic policies. With some justice, the dissidents
claimed that the Congress Party, aside from a few mavericks
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like V. K. Krishna Menon, was a highly conservative, bourgeois
organization. Such disputes were reinforced by bitter personal
animosities.
3. This intra-party wrangle coincided with the growing
dispute between the USSR and China. Some of the dissidents
sided openly with the Chinese, but a larger number probably
had no desire to be dominated by either Peking or Moscow. Their
enemies succeeded in tarring them with the Chinese brush, however.
When China attacked India in late 1962, virtually all anti-Soviet
Communist leaders were summarily imprisoned. Many believed
their arrests were made possible by the assistance of pro-Soviet
Communist leaders. A formal party split became inevitable;
in 1964, the dissidents seceded and formed the left Communist
Party (CPI/L); the loyalists became known as the right
Communists (CPI/R).
4. Both Communist parties participated in the 1967
elections, sometimes opposing one another, sometimes in
electoral alliances. Neither made any striking national gains;
indeed, the two together got about the same percentage of the
national vote (10 percent) as the united CPI got in 1962.
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The Communists scored successes in two states, however. They
again won control of Kerala and have since ruled that state
in a CPI/L dominated coalition of other non-Congress parties.
Their experience has not been a happy one. CPI/R and CPI/L
leaders remain suspicious of and sometimes openly hostile
towards one another. Economic conditions in the state continue
to deteriorate, as they have for years. The state government
has been unable to offer any remedies. This is hardly its
fault because Kerala has an enormous surplus population, a
near-total absence of industry, turbulent social conditions,
and is generally unable to pressure the central government into
providing any significant measure of relief. But the Communist
government and particularly the CPI/L leaders are now getting
blamed for Kerala's accumulating woes, and a malaise has set
in in both Communist parties. Corruption, indiscipline, and
disillusionment are apparently becoming more widespread among
leaders and rank and file alike.
5. The left and right Communist also won enough votes
in the state of West Bengal to enable them -- in conjunction
with numerous other anti-Congress parties -- to form a
coalition government there. Unlike their Kerala brethern,
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the Bengali Communists managed to make themselves objects of
alarm to the Indian government. The new West Bengal regime,
dominated by the left Communists, brought on several months
of turmoil and disruption before it fell in late 1967. In
India's most industralized state, it tolerated and even
encouraged something verging on chaos in labor - management
relations. Permitting extremist labor leaders to pursue such
tactics as locking factory owners in their offices until union
demands were met, encouraging strikes for political reasons, the
Communist dominated regime brought on a marked slow down
economic activity, a flight of capital, and a virtual end to
new investiment in West Bengal.
6. Of even more serious concern to New Delhi, some
Bengali Communist leaders tacitly tolerated a rural uprising
which superficially had some of the aspects of a Maoist type
peasant revolt. A group of primitive tribesmen armed with
bows, arrows and spears, seized some tea estates on which
they were working in the Naxalbari region in the northern
part of the state. Some landlords and their agents were
killed, others were driven out, and the properties were
parceled out to the landless. The West Bengal government,
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which had the police responsibility to suppress such activity,
was notably dilatory in doing so. After heavy pressure from
New Delhi, action was eventually and reluctantly taken against
the Naxalbari rebels and the uprising was ended. Even so,
these disruptive activities deeply alarmed the federal government;
eventually, through some political maneuvering, it helped bring
about the dismissal of the Bengali government. New elections
are scheduled to be held in early 1969.
7. The "Naxalbari uprising" made a strong impact on a
number of Indian Communists, particularly those in the activist,
left wing party. Many were disillusioned with tactics calling
for participating in elections only to have their goals
compromised in feckless, short lived coalition governments.
Using Naxalbari as their inspiration, they favor organizing
peasant insurrections. They also look to the Chinese Communists
as an example and hopefully as a source of advice and material
support. These "Naxalites" now compromise perhaps as much as
10 to 20 percent of the entire left Communist movement in India.
They are attempting to set up their own organization, but their
efforts are impeded by personal animosities, factional rivalries,
and doctrinal disputes on when and how to launch insurrections.
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8. We have received reports that some Bengalis plan to
renew the uprising in the Naxalbari area. They hope that the
nature of the mountainous, ill traveled terrain; the establishment
of operating bases in neighboring Nepal and Sikkim; and the use
of more modern and deadly weapons; will enable the uprising
this time to succeed. If the next West Bengal government is,
like the last, Communist dominated, they would probably expect
to profit by its tolerance -- or even cooperation -- and perhaps
to spread their movement to neighboring parts of India,
9. The Indian government is aware of such schemes and
is determined to permit no such activity. Its fear of Chinese
influenced or sponsored subversion is acute. This concern is
fueled by the fact that the Naxalbari region is in the strategic
Siliguri corridor, the narrow neck of land between Sikkim and
East Pakistan that joins Eastern India with the main body of
the country.* In these circumstances, the central government
Eastern India itself is the scene of several long standing
insurgencies. A number of fairly primitive tribal groups,
notably the Nagas and the Mizos, have mounted sporadic revolts
against the Indians for years. They have received some
material assistance from the Pakistanis and more recently
the Chinese. The Indian army has been able, with some
difficulty, to contain these insurgencies, but not to suppress
them.
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will act with severity if any insurgency does again break out
in the Naxalbari area. New Delhi will use strong military
and police force if such becomes necessary to suppress any
trouble. However, it is questionable if the Naxalites, many
of whom are Calcutta intellectuals, long on big talk, with no
roots in the Naxalbari area, and no particular military or
guerrilla skills, will in fact be able to pose a threat to
anyone. At present, the central government appears to have
the military and political muscle to contain any such effort
if it is made.
10. Even if a Communist-dominated Bengali government is
chosen in forthcoming elections, and if it comes under suspicion
of aiding the Naxalites or fosters labor unrest, it will probably
again be dismissed by the central government. This action
will be taken whatever the political implications of a move
denying the right of a freely elected government to rule. Given
a choice between democratic niceties on the one hand and security
and economic needs on the other, New Delhi will probably opt for
what it considers its vital interests.
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11. This course will also be taken in other parts of
the country in the unlikely event it appears necessary. In
these circumstances, the malaise and frustrations of Indian
Communism are likely to be compounded. Those in power, as
in Kerala, will become more disillusioned as their public image
declines. Those in opposition will be equally frustrated by
their lack of popular support and -- in the case of the Bengalis by continued official repression. In these circumstances, we
believe a substantial number of left Communists, and those of a
like mind but unaffiliated with either party, will abandon their
interest in participating in India's democratic, parliamentary
procedures.
12. In particular, they are likely to regard open, legal
Communist Party activity as a waste of time. Over the next
several years they are likely to see Naxalbari and previous
Indian peasants revolts* as the models for their future efforts.
The principal rural uprising to date in India was the 1948
Telengana revolt, which occurred in large areas of the
present state of Andhra Pradesh. This extensive, Communist-
led effort was crushed, with heavy casualties, by the
Indian army.
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NwoXW
It is too early to tell if these would-be revolutionaries will
have the dedication, perserverance, and ability to prepare for
such activity, if they can find a sympathetic response in any
part of the country, and if the authorities will continue to
be able to counter them. Despite India's many difficulties,
no Communist inspired insurrectionary attempt appears to have
much prospect of success in the next few years. The police
and the army remain strong and dedicated, the bulk of the
people apathetic. If over time, economic and social conditions
remain tolerable, and if the central government remains hostile
and strong, the left Communists' prospects are bleak indeed.
On the other hand, steadily worsening living standards and
weakened official authority could give the Naxalites or
likeminded dissidents hope of eventual successes.
13. The right wing Communists face a less turbulent, but
scarcely less promising future. Its principal source of support,
one of India's trade union federation, has been seriously
weakened by large scale defections to new groups appealing to
regional or linguistic loyalites. It has not been able to
recruit new members to make up for the departure of the left
Communists, and it is much weaker than the latter in both West
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Bengal and Kerala. And, despite some expressions of concern
in the party over recent events in Eastern Europe, its aging
leaders are generally regarded as Soviet stooges. While not
likely to fade away, the CPI/R will probably continue as a
party on the fringe of political life, with little hope of
achieving more than occasional and minor participation in
coalition governments in various states, and -- much less
likely -- at the center.
14. On the national scene, the best the Indian Communists
have been able to achieve has been about 10 percent of the
vote; thus the erosion of their strength is unlikely to make
much of a nationwide impact, or to signify any new trends
in Indian political life. In particular, we do not believe
that sagging Communist prospects are part of any national
general trend away from extremist or radical movements. There
are plenty of the latter in India. But these movements, unlike
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the Communists, generally appeal to communal, sectarian,
linguistic, or regional sentiments. They now appear to be
growing stronger, and could present a greater threat to
Indian democracy than the Communists.
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