THE SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP ALONG THE CHINESE BORDER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A000800010012-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2006
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: March 25, 1968
• Content Type: MEMO

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Ton Secret
BOARD OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
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SPECIAL
MEMORANDUM
The Soviet Military Buildup
Along the Chinese Border
ARCHIVAL RECORD
PLEASE RETIML-TD--1_
ANDICY ARCHIVES
MORI/CDF
Top Secret
25 March 1968
No. 7-68
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
25 March 1968
SPECIAL MEMORANDUM NO. 7-68
SUBJECT: The Soviet Military Buildup Along the Chinese Border
SUMMARY
A. The past two and a half years have witnessed a sig-
nificant quantitative as well as qualitative improvement of
the Soviet military posture near China. There has been a steady
increase in the strength of regular combat units along the Sino-
Soviet border. For the first time in two decades, a signifi-
cant Soviet combat force is taking shape in Mongolia. Certain
units of the Strategic Rocket Forces have almost certainly been
earmarked for potential missile strikes against Chinese targets.
the types of Soviet units involved in
the reinforcement
* This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was
prepared by the Office of National Estimates and coordinated
with the Office of Strategic Research.
1 tztt P I
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indicate that the Soviets are preparing their forces not just
for containing local outbreak's of fighting, but even for the
eventual possibility of major military operations -. either
conventional or nuclear -. against the Chinese.
B. The basic decisions behind this far-reaching shift
in the Soviet military posture appear to have been made during
the summer or early fall of 1965. The time factor suggests
that these decisions were influenced primarily by the failure
of efforts by the Brezhnev4Cosygin regime from October 1964
to about mid.1965 to moderate the Sino-Soviet dispute, and
also by the evident continued progress of the Chinese nuclear
and strategic weapons development program during the same period.
In addition, the Cultural Revolution in China and all its
attendent uncertainties must have reinforced the USSR's deter-
mination to press ahead with their own military contingency
measures.
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C. The Soviets probably have several goals in mind.
At a minimum, they apparently wish to dissuade the Chinese
from undertaking organized military actions against the USSR
or Mongolia. Beyond this, the Soviets may believe it desir-
able to develop the capability for conducting limited military
operations across the Chinese border. In any case, it appears
that the Soviet military buildup near China will continue,
for the near term at least, at roughly the pace set in late
19650 and Moscow is evidently beginning to ponder the long-
term implications for the entire Soviet defense establishment.
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DISCUSSION
There is no longer any float now that behind the slogan
proclaimed in Peking that "the wind is blowing from the East"
is a concrete plan that apparently arose in the heads of Mho
Tse-tung and his associates back in the 1950s and has of late
been officially termed in China "The Great Strategic Plan of
Mho Tse-tung"... In a number of respects the "Mao Plan"
strikingly resembles the once notorious "Tanaka Plan" a
plan devised by the Japanese military for the conqrst of Asia
by gradual stages. The Maoists' plans, and even more their
actions, make it possible to say the following. Mho proposes
to include in his Reich in addition to China itself --
Korea, the Mongolian People's Republic, Vietnam, Cambodia,
Laos, Indonesia, Malaysia, Burma and several other countries
in the area. In the second stage of 'the storm from the East'
expansion is planned in the direction of the Indian subcontinent,
Soviet Central Asia, the Soviet Far East and the Near East.
What is anticipated on paper for the third stage is not yet
entirely clear. But the plan is not restricted to the "Maoization"
of Asia. "We shall gaze proudly upon five continents", one of
Mao Tse-tung's myrmidons declares. "China's today is the whole
world's tomorrow"
The Peking military autocracy is clearly dreaming of a
new celestial empire, acting formally under the red flag of
socialism but in fact copying the militarist policy of the
Chinese emperors -- the conquerors and mandarins of long
-
forgotten centuries...
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Literaturnaya Gazetta, Moscow,
27 September and 4 October 1967
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The Early Bul idup
1. Rather than being a single, gradual process, the
Soviet buildup of military forces near China has passed through
two fairly distinct phases. The first phase, under Khrushchev,
extended from about the beginning of 1962 through the fall
of 1964. During that period the Soviets were primarily con-
cerned with providing security against border incidents. The
main military development involved the reorganization and
redeployment of the 150,000 man KGB Border Guard force. The
number of Border Guard Districts on the Chinese border was
increased from 3 to 4, and some Border Guard detachments
were apparantly shifted to the border region.
by mi41-1964 an undetermined number of Border Guards
were assisting the Mongolians in patrols along the Sino.
Mongolian border. By the fall of 1964, about half the total
150,000 man Border Guard force was estimated to be stationed
near China.
2. By contrast to the Border Guard reshuffling, there
was very little change from 1962-1964 in the status of the
regular Soviet armed forces (i.e. those under the Defense
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Ministry) in the area. For several years prior to 1962 the
Soviets maintained 14 ground force divisions in areas within
300 miles of the Chinese and Mongolian borders, of which 11
were positioned near strategic and vulnerable railroad lines
east of Lake Baykal, essentially as a railroad security force.
In addition, the Soviets had available the Far East Long Range
Air Army, the Pacific Fleet, and a number of medium range and
intermediate range ballistic missile sites, plus air defenses;
according to the consensus of the intelligence community at the
time, however, the vast bulk of these forces was deployed
against US power in the Pacific and US allies in Asia and the
Middle East. To this portion located near China, the Soviets
added a single motorized rifle regiment in 1963 and a low-
strength motorized rifle division in 1964. Both units were
in all likelihood intended principally to backstop the Border
Guards.
3. Although the keynote of Soviet military preparations
vis-a-vis the Chinese from 1962-1964 was border security,
there are some indications that Soviet military officers then..
selves were beginning to ponder more serious contingencies.
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Nal
Another indicator was a strongly anti-
Peking article which appeared in the October 1963 issue of the
restricted Ministry of Defense journal, Voyennaya (21mThought). The author described Peking's military and political
strategy as "anti-Soviet", and claimed that the top leadership
of the Chinese Communist Party had "broken with Iftrxism-Leninism",
was pursuing "great power aims", and was hoping to establish
"the epoch of world domination by people of the yellow race".
4. The logic of the indicators cited above would have
dictated a considerably greater Soviet military reinforcement
than actually occurred during the period. Either the Ministry
of Defense failed to argue the case before the political
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leadership, or Khrushchev refused to be convinced by the argu-
ments. Moreover, for about a year after the fall of Khrushchev,
it seemed that military reinforcements were about to be terminated.
NO more than two Border Guard detachments, of 1000-2000 men
each, were added from late 1964 to late 1965, and these additions
were made probably as a result of decisions taken under Khrush-
chev.
It appears that Moscow was at least as anxious to prevent over-
reactions to minor Chinese provocations as to receive timely
Information regarding the incidents themselves.
Re-Appraisal Under the New Soviet Leadership
5. This period of Soviet armed quiescence along the
Chinese border coincided with the private efforts of the new
Soviet regime both to moderate the Sino-Soviet dispute and to
work out some type of coordinated strategy with Peking and Hanoi
toward the Vietnam war. By approximately mid-1965 the Soviets
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must have realized that their relations with the Chinese were
likely to worsen. The Chinese had rebuffed Moscow's overtures
for united action, and they had given evidence of pushing
ahead with their nuclear weapons development program; the
second Chinese nuclear devide was detonated in May 1965. On
25 February, the New China News Agency had warned that there
are groups "even here in China, who believe in Khrushchev
revisionism", a statement which suggested the imminence of a
purge and a more hostile attitude toward the USSR. A demon-
stration outside the Soviet Embassy in Peking in March 1965
must have increased Soviet apprehensions even more.
6. By 1965 the Soviets had become concerned about the
potential Chinese threat to the underpopulated (1.1 million)
buffer ,state of Mongolia. The Mongolian armed forces numbered
no more than 40,000 men, including border guards. (In contrast
to most Communist countries, Mongolia has no significant man-
power reserve.) There were about 20,000 Chinese in Mongolia
at the time, most of them men of combat age, plus numerous
Mongolian opponents of the Tsedenbal (pro-Soviet) wing of the
Mongolian Communist Party. Mongolia was thus vulnerable, not
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Nito,
just to a Chinese Communist invasion, but to a Peking inspired
coup. Clearly, Moscow would have to help. The whole matter
was probably discussed during Shelepin's visit to Mongolia in
January 1965 and during Tsedenbal's visit to Moscow in April
of the same year.
The Second Phase
7. The evidence indicates that during the late summer
or early fall of 1965, the Brezhnev6.Kosygin leadership, doubt-
less after extensive consultation with the Soviet General Staff
and the KGB, approved the initiation of major deployments of
regular Soviet military units to the border area. in November
1965, an army corps headquarters was transferred from the Afghan
to the Sinkiang border. This was qualitatively different from
previous Soviet military moves; it presaged the creation of a
multidivision force, with various combat support units. Such
a level of forces would presumably acquire tactical nuclear
weapons support within its organization. And in fact, two
ground force divisions and a half dozen airfields have since
been added to the corps' present area of responsibility. The
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airfields facilitate supply of the existing Soviet forces, and
allow for rapid reinforcement, if necessary.
8. Secondly, the Soviets decided, prior to the signing
of the Soviet-Mongolian Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and
Mutual Assistance in Janaury 1966 (with Brezhnev and the Soviet
Defense Minister present in Ulan Bator for the ceremonies),
not only to upgrade the capabilities of the Mongolian forces,
but also to station a sizeable contingent of ground forces and
combat support units in Mongolia. This decision logically
required a complementary augmentation of the rear area to the
north and east of Mongolia -- the Transbaykal Military District.
The accretion to the Ttansbaykal-Mongolia area has been both
quantitative -. as maw as six more divisions, plus tactical air
and air defense support, six new graded earth airfields in
Mongolia and qualitative; for example, Moscow placed the former
1st Deputy Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany in
command there.
9. Also the Soviets apparently decided that the training
patterns of the Soviet divisions along the northern and eastern
Manchurian border should focus more on the potential threat
from China.
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Nwe No,
As
a complementary measure, the Soviets began at about the same
time to flesh out the eight ground force divisions in the
vicinity with equipment and apparently manpower; indeed evidence
acquired since mid-1967 indicates that the Soviets are in the
process of establishing as many as three more ground force
divisions along the Manchurian border.
10. In order to enhance the nuclear capability of Soviet
combat forces near China, Moscow decided to station Scaleboard
missile units in at least three of the four Soviet military
districts along the Chinese border. Themissilesznay be the
450 mile range 88-12, or missiles of longer range. These units
are manned by personnel of the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF),
but it is not clear whether they will remain under control of
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SRF Headquarters in Moscow, be transferred to the local military
district cOmmander, or be assigned to some intermediate authority.
So far, four Scaldboard complexes have been discovered
in 1967, but in view of the complexity of the weapons
and support, Moscow probably made the basic decision a year or
more in advance of the actual deployment. The fact that the
Scaleboard has not yet been identified elsewhere in the Soviet
armed forces underscores the increased military priority which
the Soviets now accord to the areas near China.
11. Since late 1965 more KGB Border Guards have arrived
in Asian frontier areas and a new Border Guard district has
been created near the junction of the Soviet-Mbngolim-Manchurian
borders. The Soviets claim that because incidents continue
to occur, it has become necessary to "hermetically seal" the
Soviet-Sinkiang and Soviet-Manchurian borders. But Moscow's
main concern since late 1965 has been the potential threat
posed by regular Chinese military forces, rather than by an
occasional foray of Red Guards waving little red books at a
border station, or "mooning" by the banks of the Amur. From
1962 to 1964 the regular Soviet military forces along the Chinese
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mhigo
'wise
border were essentially auxiliaries to the KGB Border Guards.
Now the Border Guard units are essentially forward outposts
of the regular military forces. Indeed there
tive indications, from a Western journalists'
a Soviet official,
have been tents.-
interview with
that since 1966, serious
border incidents with the Chinese have been handled on the
authority of the local Soviet military district commander rather
than through KGB Border Guard Headquarters in Moscow.
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Long-Term Effects
18. The major improvement of the USSR's military strength
near China appears to be continuing at the rate set in late 1965.
The Chinese are in all likelihood aware of most of the Soviet
efforts; although they have not tried to match the Soviet rein-
forcement they are undoubtedly concerned.
Their own propaganda notwithstanding,
the Chinese probably do not expect a Soviet attack. But they
probably suspect with some reason -- that Moscow intends to
intimidate them in general and to inhibit them specifically
from intervening more actively in South and Southeast Asia.
19. The number of Soviet ground force divisions now deployed
near China almost equals the number of Soviet ground force
divisions in Eastern Europe (26). As many as 12 divisions have
been added to the border area since mid..19640 all but one of
these since late 1965. Major elements of at least five of these
divisions are known to have been sent from the western USSR.
The origin of the other six has not yet been determined (see
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Annex). Given the present manpower shortage in Siberia, and
the potential for Chinese subversion in Central Asia, it is
likely that Moscow has chosen to draw units primarily from
European, Slavic areas. Viewed as a whole, the Soviet ground
forces near China are in all likelihood presently inferior in
manpower and equipment to the Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe.
Nevertheless the former are known to be receiving some equipment
equivalent in quality to those provided Soviet forces in Western
USSR.
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25X1 21. One measure
was
in connection with the reinstitution in 1967 of the post of
OomMander-in-Chief of Soviet Ground Forces (or at least the
filling of a post which had been vacant since 1964). Instead
of choosing a commander from one of the more important military
districts in the western USSR, or from the Group of Soviet
Forces in Germany, the Soviets selected the commander of the
Far East Military District, the most important district border-
ing China. Another development, referred to in a Soviet military
journal in early 1967, is the apparently recent establishment
of the "Far East Theater of Military Operations". This is a
term which implicitly covers all regular military and border
guard units near China, plus Mongolian armed forces and the
Soviet units now in Mongolia. At present the "Far East Theater"
is more a concept than an actual military echelon. It illus-
trates, however, that military planners in Moscow have come to
view the strategic requirements of the region as sul generis.
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23. In the meantime, Moscow must prepare for a number of
military contingencies vis-a-vis China, most of them distasteful.
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The Soviets must allow for the possibility, however remote, that
Mao and "the stinking cultural revolution group" could order the
Chinese armed forces to attack the USSR. Although it is also a
remote possibility at this point, the Chinese could opt for a
massive intervention in Southeast Asia, with a resultant Sino-
US confrontation leading to Soviet involvement. Or, if the
Cultural Revolution continues, the political order in China
could collapse entirely, posing for Moscow the question of
whether or not to intervene in some manner. Of course the
Soviet leaders are entitled to express the hope -- as they
do -- that Mho will soon leave the scene, thus allowing a new
Chinese leadership, rational of mind and socialist of heart,
to reverse the course of Sino-Soviet relations. But for the
near term, at least, the Soviet General Staff can hardly base
its military planning on such hopes.
FCR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
ABBOT SMITH
Chairman
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