URBANIZATION, UNEMPLOYMENT, AND UNREST IN THE POOR COUNTRIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A000500030006-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 11, 2006
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: November 14, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved or-Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79ROOWA000500030006-1
For Official Use Only
Jiwljl~-
MEMORANDUM
OFFICE OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
Urbanization, Unemployment, and Unrest in the Poor Countries
For Official Use Only
14 November 1972
Copy -1
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000500030009-1
 ? Approved For RejWse 2007/OaLO7 - FAt-RSE ONLY 967AW00030006-1
F'FIC
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
14 November 1972
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Urbanization, Unemployment, and Unrest in the Poor Countries*
SUMMARY
Cities are growing at unprecedented rates through-
out the Third World. This process is fueled by twin
phenomena: rapid population growth and strong rural-
urban migration. The number of city dwellers is in-
creasing much faster than the number of jobs available
in the modern sector of city economies, hence unemploy-
ment (however it may be defined) is also rising. The
most vocal, visible, and potentially destabilizing
group of unemployed is the educated or semi-educated
youth, whose expectations ',`far outrun''rear opportunities.
For a variety of reasons, urban growth cannot be
stopped or even much slowed. Agriculture (whether tra-
ditional, modern, or a mixture of both) cannot hope to
absorb the growing number of people born to that sector;
indeed there is mounting evidence that agricultural
mechanization will greatly add to the numbers displaced
from the land.
This memorandum was prepared in the Office discussed with appropriate offices in CIA, which are in agree-
ment with its principal judgments.
Approved For Release 2O T/IVIAI : IE4-WFj,79ROO967A000500030006-1
 Approved For Reh a 2007/0 L07 - FAA-RSE ONLY 967AO ii600030006-1
What this inexorable urbanization will mean
for governments, policies, and the socio-political
balance in the poor countries is less certain.*
It is likely to give rise to sporadic violence and
to radical movements led by young, educated, and
dissident revolutionaries. While such outbursts
will be troublesome, and will absorb attention
and resources, we think they will generally re-
main manageable at least through this decade.
The speed and extent of urban growth, however,
will probably unsettle social and political
conditions more drastically over the longer term.
We don't know whether there is a breaking point
beyond which chaos ensues. If there is, the
critical precipitating factors are more likely
to be changes in attitudes and expectations
than physical conditions of poverty and crowding.
For the purposes of this paper the terms LDC's (less developed
countries), poor countries, and Third World are used interchange-
ably to mean the non-Communist nations of Latin America, Africa,
Asia, and the Near East. We recognize that there are exceptions
to every generalization made about such a large and heterogenous
group. Unless such exceptions are deemed particularly significant,
however, they are omitted for the sake of brevity. We also realize
that many of the generalizations about the impact of rapid urbaniza-
tion may apply to the developed countries too, but that is beyond
the scope of this paper.
Approved For Release 20 -I aj : R1 -URP~9R00967A000500030006-1
 Approved For Rete 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79R00967A0i600030006-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
1. INTRODUCTION
1. Cities have long been considered one of man's finest crea-
tions and one of the most unsettling and disturbing elements of the
body politic. They have exerted considerable fascination for politi-
cians and social scientists as the clearest expression of the personality
and culture of a people, the nexus of political forces, and, since the
industrial revolution at least, a mainspring of economic growth and
development. In the past few years, the cities of the Third World
have attracted the special attention of observers and planners concerned
with the less-developed countries because they are not following the
patterns accepted as "normal" in the now-developed countries.
2. For the past several decades cities of the Third World have
been growing much faster than did most of the cities of the now-developed
countries -- even in the heyday of their expansion. Partly because the
number of people involved is so great and partly because of the poverty
of resources available to support.them, this unprecedented growth is
worrisome. Some observers and planners concentrate on the extra burdens
on social and physical services posed by the urban explosion; others on
the problem of providing jobs for the growing number of city-dwellers;
still others on the latent threat to social and political order raised
Approved For Release 0JJ03/07SE CIIA-RDP79R00967A000500030006-1 ONLY
 ? Approved For Reloyse 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79R00967A0600030006-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
by vast and expanding slums or shanty-towns filled with jobless
and unhappy people.
3. The fact and causes of urbanization in the Third World are
relatively clear, although statistics are notoriously unreliable. 1/
Practically everywhere in the Third World, cities are growing 2 to 4
times as fast as the total population, even where a good part of the
total population is already urbanized. City growth is fastest in
Black Africa, the least urban of major areas, where annual increases
over 10 percent are not uncommon. Most Latin American cities are
growing 5-8 percent a year, despite the fact that Latin America is
already the most urbanized part of the Third World; less than half its
people live in rural areas. Rates are similar in East Asia and North
Africa; slightly lower in South Asia, especially in the very large
cities. But overall, city populations are doubling every 10-15 years
in the great majority of LDC's.
4. Such sustained and extraordinary growth rates are due to
two interconnected factors: the population explosion in the poor
1/
2/
Even the best of censuses should be considered only highly educated
guesses, and good censuses are the exception. Most population and
urbanization figures are based on spotty censuses, surveys, and
estimates. The definition of city or urban area also varies widely.
Nevertheless, the trend and general magnitude of urban growth are not
in dispute.
Estimated annual growth in the 1960's was over 11% for Kinshasa,
Abidjan, and Niamey, for example, and over 17% for Lusaka.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000500030006-1
 Approved For Re1Be 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000030006-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
countries which began after World War II (see Table I) and widespread,
apparently increasing, rural-urban migration. The natural growth of
cities (i.e., excess of births over deaths) is not far from that of
the total population: in some cases a bit higher because of the
preponderance of young adults in the population and/or better health
conditions; in other cases a bit lower because the sex ratio in some
newer cities is skewed by large numbers of migrant males. In general,
however, natural growth is 2-3 percent. Some small part of urban
growth is accounted for by changes of city boundaries, e.g., a large
suburb is suddenly included in the metropolitan count. But most of
the remainder -- i.e., 2-7 percent is caused by in-migration.
TABLE I
ESTIMATED ANNUAL POPULATION GROWTH RATES
(per 1,000 per year)
1920-1930
1930-1940
1940-1950
1950-1960
1960-1970
World
11
11
10
17
20
North America
14
8
14
18
14
Europe
9
8
0
Africa
10
10
15
23
24
Latin America
18
19
21
28
29
Asia
10
12
13
--
--
S. Asia
19
24
E. Asia
Near East
30
29
Approved For Release 20F07/Q3/L 7 : CI -RDP79R00967A000500030006-1 USE ONLY
 Approved For Ruse 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00967k000500030006-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
II. MIGRATION TO THE CITIES
5. Historically, the developed countries also experienced
prolonged and sizable movements of peasants to the cities, but
the present Third World migration differs from earlier experience
in several ways: the rates are faster; the numbers are much larger;
and the economic transformation that helped absorb European migrants
is not keeping pace. For example, population growth in Europe in
the 19th century was under 1.5 percent a year, compared to 2-3 per-
cent in the LDC's today. Thus growth of the labor force was slower*
in practically all the developed countries at the time of their in-
dustrial revolutions, and the overall portion of the population in
the labor force was considerably higher -- on the order of 40-55
percent of the total population -- partly because of the age structure
Estimated annual growth in labor force:
France
1820-1870
0.4%
0
4%
Germany
y
1860-1890
1.4%
.
1890-1913
1.6%
Great Bri
tain 1870-1890
1.4%
US
1890-1915
1
2%
1850-1883
3. 0%
.
1883-1914
2.3%
Japan
1913-1937
1.0%
Source:
C. Clark Conditions of Economic Progress
Approved For Releas%pp?0 /I 03/0U : C N RDP79R00967A000500030006-1
 Approved For Rise 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79R00967A 00500030006-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
of the population (which is heavily influenced by its rate of growth).
That is, with relatively fewer children, there are proportionately
more adults who can work, and the number dependent on each adult is
less.
6. Still another, and perhaps the most significant, difference
between the experience of the developed countries and the situation
that now prevails in most LDC's is that, in the former, jobs for people
in cities (especially in industry) pretty well kept pace with the inflow
and increase in job-seekers. Where they did not, there were considerable
opportunities for migration to the US and other lightly populated areas
(Australia and Canada) where jobs and/or land were in better supply.
These opportunities are not open to most of the people of today's poor
countries.
7. Perhaps to oversimplify a bit -- today, in many LDC's, popula-
tion growth is so rapid that (in comparison with 19th century experience)
each worker must support more dependents, but has less of a chance at
remunerative work. This situation prevails both in the cities and in
the rural areas. The difference between the two, however, is such that
vast and apparently increasing streams of people are moving from rural to
urban areas.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000500030006-1
 Approved For R tse 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00967A O 500030006-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
8. Why do they migrate to cities which, to Western eyes, offer
appalling conditions of life? Because, in their eyes, the alternatives
seem worse. The city, even if it be a Calcutta, exerts a strong "pull"
on the migrant. To this, in many cases, is added a strong "push" from
rural areas where family plots grow smaller, landless laborers outnumber
jobs available, or tenants are ousted in favor of consolidation of farms.
The "Pull" of Cities
9. A complex of factors constitutes the pull or attraction of
urban areas for migrants. Perhaps the most obvious and one of the
most important is income. Despite the rapidity of urban growth, there
is nearly everywhere a considerable income differential in favor of the
towns. Such data as are available indicate that the typical urban laborer
probably receives an income two or three times as high as his cousin in
traditional agriculture.* Scattered evidence plus widespread informed
Clearly, direct comparisons are difficult to make and should be
treated with caution. The number of dependents in each group is
rarely known; the valuation of subsistence output raises difficult
problems; the comparison of real incomes where life-styles differ
considerably is open to objection. Nevertheless, the estimate of
2-3 times greater income for urban workers may be conservative;
given the much higher differentials paid to skilled workers and
professionals. Some country estimates are shown below: Rural per
capita income in East Pakistan in 1963-1964 was estimated at 37% of
urban per capita income; for Egypt in 1960, average income in urban
areas was estimated at 4 times that of rural areas; estimates for
India, Ceylon, Brazil, the Philippines, and Venezuela suggest it was
2-3 times as great in the early 1960's. One of the biggest dispari-
ties is found in French-speaking West Africa where in the mid-1960's,
average wage earnings were around 10 times as high as average earn-
ings in traditional agriculture.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000500030006-1
 Approved For Ruse 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00967AU(O 500030006-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
opinion suggest that it is even widening in a number of LDC's. This
income differential is widely sensed in rural areas. The migrant may
be attracted to the town by it, even if he suspects he won't be able
to get full employment, because even part time work can probably net
him a higher real income than he had in the village.
10. Attractions, other than the hope of considerably higher in-
come, play an important though still more difficult to measure role
in the decision to migrate. They may be characterized as "bright lights
and other amenities". They range from the general appeal of the bustle
and movement of city streets, to greater (even though very low by Western
standards) access to medical care and schools. Housing and water supplies
in slums, though obviously dreadful, are often no worse and sometimes a
great deal better than what the migrant left. Moreover, the very move-
ment and change characteristic of the city sustains hope that conditions
or opportunities will get better.
11. Finally, and of particular importance to a growing and in-
creasingly volatile segment of rural-urban migrants, is the matter of
status. Sample surveys of migrants in a wide variety of LDC's almost
unanimously stress the low esteem accorded work on the land. This is
multiplied many-fold in the case of those who have had some education.
Approved For Release 7I/O$M7 UtlA9RdDP79R00967A000500030006-1
 Approved For lease 28Q I C I07 :USE 0 D Y79R0096-W00500030006-1
Thus, almost everywhere in the poor world, people who have been
through school expect, and are expected by their friends and
families, to find non-agricultural work. All too often, in view of
the jobs available, they expect white-collar work and are resistant
to settling for anything else. But even among the illiterate and
semi-schooled, farm work is usually considered (and quite accurately,
too) hard and dirty work, with uncertain or precarious returns for
much effort.
The "PUB/-i" .from the
12. It should be emphasized that land hunger is not every-
where acute in the Third World. Where it is not, as in much of
Africa and parts of Latin America, other factors, which are essen-
tially the opposites of the "pull" factor outlined above, seem to
constitute the push or repulsiveness of rural life, viz. income-
differentials, the boredom and sameness of-village'life,the"low-
status and laboriousness of farming, the lack of modern amenities
such as medical care, schools, entertainment, etc. These operate
with particular force on the young and educated or semi-educated
people of the villages whose schooling even if scanty has introduced
them to city-oriented ideas. The focus of the schools is rarely or
never on the joys of traditional farming or the simple bucolic
Approved For Release 9 5 i b7Y iAO-KVP79R00967A000500030006-1
 Approved ForTease 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00967AAQ00500030006-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
pleasures which prevail (if at all) only in the urban imagination.
Thus, a huge proportion of boys and to an increasing extent of
girls who have completed rural schools head for the city at their
first opportunity.
13. Shortage of adequate land to support the growing popula-
tion is probably one of the strongest (in some countries clearly
the dominant) push factor in rural-urban migration. Despite the
past and present exodus from agriculture of millions of people,
in most of the Third World the number of people in rural areas
continues to grow rapidly. Where little or no new land is available,
the size of farms or the number of acres per head is falling and the
number of landless peasants rising. This is particularly true for
much of India, Bangladesh, an'd''-P'akiStan, which together account for
a goodly share of Third World population, but is also true in Mexico,
Egypt, and a number of other countries.
14. There is mounting evidence that the "Green Revolution" --
i.e., the modernizing of agriculture by using improved seeds, which
require fertilizer, pesticides, herbicides, and often additional
water -- will, where accompanied by large-scale mechanization, con-
stitute a strong additional push-factor in large parts of the Third
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000500030006-1
 Approved Fq elease 2007/0 A07USL A0j P79R009 A000500030006-1
OFFICIL
World. This is not surprising -- much the same thing happened in the
developed countries -- but it could threaten the livelihood of millions
who have no other skills and little hope of other work.
15. The overall ?impact of the Green Revolution is too complex
a subject to explore here; suffice it to say that to the extent it
stresses mechanization or labor-saving techniques at the same time
that it promotes consolidation and enlargement of individual holdings,
it will inevitably drive tenant-farmers and small-holders off the
land. So far, the pattern is such that modernization of agriculture
in the LDCBs comes increasingly to resemble that of the labor-saving
western model, even though in many cases labor is not scarce but over-
abundant. The western-model works in the West, because it is shaped
by notions of efficiency based on the implicit assumption that displaced
labor can always find work elsewhere, and probably be more productive
at it. Thus, to the extent that agricultural modernization adopts
labor-saving methods, it will tend to push increasing numbers out of
2/
the rural areas in search of non-farm work.
1/ One of the outstanding exceptions'is'Taiwan, whose agricultural
modernization did not rest on mechanization but has neverthe-
less been very successful.
2/ On the other hand, if agricultural modernization is explicitly
designed to avoid over-mechanization, it could increase the
number of jobs and level of income in rural areas.
Approved For Release 2d7F6SM : C:Tip-IQ 9R00967A000500030006-1
 Approved Frelease -,.nf1 1GIAL7 69If p79RO0 000500030006-1
Outlook for Migration
16. Given the above -- rapid population growth, the enduring
pull of the cities, and the likelihood of a much greater push from the
countryside as and if the Green Revolution takes hold -- isn't the
current wave of migration and resulting strain on the cities only a
relatively temporary thing? Won't the rural areas soon be de-populated
enough so that those remaining can be productively and happily absorbed
by modernized farming? Unfortunately, no; at least not for several
decades or more and not unless or until the growth of population slows
markedly. The exodus is indeed likely to abate sooner in regions of
considerable urbanization -- such as parts of Latin America. But
where the proportion of urbanites-is 'low, as in South Asia and Africa, and
population is still growing rapidly, the number of job seekers outside
the modern urban sector will continue to increase for a long time.*
Projections for Pakistan represent perhaps an extreme case: Pakistan
(west) achieved a high rate of non-agricultural investment and out-
put over the decade of the 1950's which allowed non-farm employment
to grow more than 4% a year. If we assume it could continue to
increase these jobs at this rate, and assume that population is
growing at 3% a year (which is probably about right) even then the
agricultural labor force would expand about as follows:
1961 7.5 million
1975 10. 1 million
1985 1109 million
2000 13.7 million
Source: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics Research
Report # 78, Karachi, 1969.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000500030006-1
 Approved Fo elease 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79RO09 000500030006-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Put another way, for a fairly large sample of LDC's which had small
industrial sectors, in the decade 1950-1960 industrial employment
increased from 8 to 9.5 percent of those at work. If agriculture's
share of employment continues to decrease at the same rate as it
did between 1950-1960 in these countries, about two-thirds of the
labor force would still be in agriculture in 50 years. Even in a
country such as Mexico where less than half the population is
classed as rural, even if one assumes fertility will decrease by
20 percent between 1970 and 1985, the rural population will still
be growing in 1985 despite massive rural-urban migration.
17. Thus, continued rapid growth of most of the cities of
the Third World seems inevitable for a long time. In theory, at
least, the only things that could stop it (apart from one or more
of the Four Horsemen) would be reduction of average income levels
in the cities to rural standards; a rise in rural income and well-
being sufficient to reduce or eliminate the attractions of the
city; or possibly development of authoritarian rule sufficiently
strong to prevent such movement. The first would imply serious
deterioration in real income for most urbanites and, while possi-
ble, is likely to be resisted with every means the state can command.
The second presumes an overall rate of economic development and
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000500030006-1
 Approved For,Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00981000500030006-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
structural change far beyond what seems possible for most LDC's
in this century. (In the developed countries, people are still
being attracted to urban areas by considerably higher incomes
there.) Even authoritarian governments like those of the USSR
and South Africa have tried and failed to prevent rural-urban
movement. Communist China may have succeeded more than others,
if so, it is likely to attract much attention and emulation in
this respect on the part of many LDC's in the next decades.
III. THE PROBLEM OF JOBS
18. Barring a major rise in the death rate, the labor force not
only of the 1970's but also of the 80's is already born -- nothing
that happens to birth rates in the 1970's will have a significant
effect on the size of the labor force for 15 years or so.* A compre-
hensive projection of future growth of the labor force is shown below.
These projections are if anything conservative, since estimated
current participation rates were somewhat reduced to allow for more
The only variable is the rate of participation -- which varies
widely according to censuses but probably would vary much less
if the same definition of economically active person or members
of the labor force were employed by all census takers.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000500030006-1
 Approved Fot elease 2007/P? C I : C l RpL 9R0096 000500030006-1
ESTIMATES OF GROWTH OF THE LABOR FORCE IN
LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: 1950-1980
(percentage rates)
Rates of Growth
Rates of Growth
Rates of Growth
1950-1965
1965-1980
1970-1980
Total
Annual
Total
Annual
Total
Annual
Developed countries
17.6
1.1
15.8
1.0
10.0
1.0
Less developed countries
28.1
1.7
39.0
2.2
25.2
203
REGIONS:
East Asia
30.7
1.8
56.5
3.0
35.3
3.1
South Asia b/
23.2
1.4
33.1
1.9
21.6
2.0
South East Asia
32.3
1.9
43.0
2.4
28.0
2.5
Middle East
31.8
1.9
50.4
2.8
31.3
2.8
West Africa
38.9
2.2
40.2
2.3
25.8
2.3
East Africa
21.1
1.3
30.8
1.8
19.8
1.8
Central Africa
16.0
1.0
19.4
1.2
12.9
1.2
North Africa
17.5
1.1
45.7
2.5
29.0
2.6
Tropical South America
48.3 2.7
55.6
3.0
34.7
3.0
Central America
52.0 2.8
62.7
3.3
39.1
3.4
Temperate South America
25.7 1.5
25.0
1.5
16.0
1.5
Caribbean
31.1 1.8
40.6
2.3
25.8
2.3
a/ Includes Ceylon, India, Iran, and Pakistan.
T/ Includes Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and
Thailand.
NOTE: Excludes Sino-Soviet countries.
- 14 -
Approved For Release 2009V#4 TALC I ERUR"R00967A000500030006-1
 Approved Fo lease @99T(Q7Ug;l REfP79RO096ZA000500030006-1
education and earlier retirement. But they illustrate forcefully the
problem facing most LDC's. Their labor force will grow more than twice
as fast as that of the developed countries, an overall increase of about
25 percent per decade. With the exception of temperate South America,
the labor force in all regions will be growing considerably faster in
the next decade than it has in the past two.
19. Where will this army of would-be workers find jobs to support
themselves and their dependents? Clearly not in the modern, usually
urban, sector of their economies. In most of the LDC's, this sector
is so small that even if it achieved unprecedented growth rates it could
not possibly absorb the additions to the labor force outlined above.*
What is almost certain is a continuing and rapid growth of the under-
employed and of workers in the traditional sectors -- farming, petty
trade and services, for example -- where productivity and earnings are
comparatively low. Income inequalities will widen, as in the past, and
in each country the "rich" will get richer -- the poor in many cases
will become even poorer.
By simple arithmetic, a modern sector (including industry and public
utilities for example) employing 20% of the labor force would need
to increase employment 10-15% a year to absorb the increase of a
labor force growing at 3%; this sector would have to grow an addi-
tional 3% a year if productivity gains are taken into account.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000500030006-1
 Approved For lease 2007/061=IAUA6RDF J 0096W0500030006-1
20. Urban unemployment is already worrisome to national leaders
of the LDC's. Published estimates range up to 20-30 percent of the
urban labor force in a few countries; 10-20 percent in many, but these
figures are, at best, good guesses.* The relatively few surveys or cen-
suses where unemployment in urban areas is fairly consistently defined
are unanimous in finding a remarkable difference between unemployment
in the young and in the total labor force as illustrated below:
Percent
Total labor
Total labor
Age
force 15
Age
force 15
15-24
and over
15-24
-
and over
Algeria - 1966
39.3
24.7
Venezuela - '1969
1 8
7.9
Ghana - 1960
21.9
11.6
Thailand - 1966
7.7
3.4
Colombia - 1968
23.1
13.6
Ceylon - 1968
39.0
15.0
Argentina - 1965
6.3
4.2
India - 1961/1962
8.0
3.2
Chile - 1968
12.0
6.0
Korea - 1966a/
16.3
8.9
Guyana - 1965
40.4
21.0
Malaya - 1965
21.0
9.8
Panama - 1963/1964
17.9
10.4
Philippines - 1965
20.6
11.6
Trinidad-Tobago - 1968
26.0
14.0
Singapore- 1966
15.7
9.2
Uruguay - 1963
18.5
11.8
Iran - 1966
9.4
4.6
a/ Non-farm households.
Problems of measuring, defining, and checking unemployment figures
are much greater than census taking. Definitions of "unemployed"
may in extreme cases exclude any who have worked one hour the
previous week, and usually exclude the discouraged who have given
up Looking for work. They would also exclude self-defined "students"
or the idle, who may be numerous. In Puerto Rico, for example, a
1966 manpower survey found that the idle -- young men not at work,
not in school, and not declaring themselves unemployed -- were
numerous; i.e., of males 16-24, 106,000 were employed; 34,000 un-
employed and 22,000 "idle". A sample survey in India found
"students" accounted for 55% of males aged 16-17 and 26% of males
aged 18-21, rates much higher than for Western Europe.
Approved For Release 2007/OSiiCI,MABDF MO967A000500030006-1
 Approved Fo lease 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R0096'7 000500030006-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
The young, in effect, can afford to be unemployed far better than
can the older workers with dependents. In addition, in the few
surveys where work experience was included, the proportion of
"inexperienced" workers among the young unemployed was high -- in
many cases over 50 percent.
21. Relative to the whole urban labor force, the unemployed
tend to be better educated, especially where young and inexperienced
people figure heavily in the total. The rate of unemployment seems
particularly low among the illiterate urban workers -- only 1-2 per-
cent in Asian surveys and rarely more than 4 and 5 percent elsewhere --
and among the highly educated. It is the middle group -- primary and
secondary school leavers* -- whose unemployment rates seem to be
highest. Similarly, the fragmentary evidence available indicates
that this group tends to go the longest time before finding a job.
22. Only the young or the dependent can long be totally un-
employed; those who have dependents must find something to do with-
in a short time. It has generally been true that in the traditional
sector some work is always available, if one is healthy enough to find
it, either through job sharing or by accepting a lower income for a
Including both graduates and drop-outs who have had too much
schooling to be content with low-status work.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000500030006-1
 Approved ForZplease 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R0096 00500030006-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
given effort. The armies of vendors, car guards, errand-runners,
and beggars are earning something. They may work more than 60 hours
a week for a pittance, but they are "at work". This helps explain
the otherwise puzzling finding of some surveys that the migrants,
including the young migrants, often have lower rates of unemployment
than the city-born.
23. Thus, it would seem that the combination of a high-wage,
high-status, modern sector in the towns which is the mecca of the
young job seeker, with a level of family income high enough to maintain
him in a prolonged search for suitable work, largely explains why open
urban unemployment is so high. Further, such unemployment is likely
to grow if these income differentials persist and if the number of
school-leavers increases. Both seem likely.
24. Income differentials, especially in cities, are attributable
more to government policy than to economic imperatives.* Governments
everywhere in the Third World play a major role in determining
in this discussion, it must be remembered that with the exception
of a few relatively rich Latin American countries, the number of
wage earners in the modern sector is usually well below 25% of
the total population. Thus, high wages have less of an overall
impact on employment than on aspiration and popular perceptions
of income disparities. To an economist, wage levels are "too
high" where substantial open unemployment exists.
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000500030006-1
 Approved Fa Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79RO04WA000500030006-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
wages, as major employers of labor and in setting minimum wages for
the modern sector. Their policies, whether or not prompted by
organized labor, are usually guided by some concept of "fair" or
"living" wage high enough to meet minimum human need, much as the
"poverty level" might be determined in a developed country as a
guide to setting welfare or social security policy. Therefore, as
prices rise minimum wages are usually increased. And since other
wage rates in the modern sector are heavily influenced by minimum
rates, they tend to rise too. Thus, the income differential between
the modern sector jobs and those in the traditional sector is likely
-to persist, despite open unemployment.
25. It is almost certain that the number of school leavers will
continue to increase rapidly in most LDC's. Nearly everywhere, great
value is set on education; school enrollments are rising rapidly;
adult literacy campaigns are also stressed. The number of educated
people will thus outstrip the increase in white collar or other high-
status jobs to which the school leaver aspires. Then, either the
number of openly-unemployed will grow, especially in the cities, or a
rising number of disappointed youth will be forced to take jobs they
consider most unsuitable.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000500030006-1
 Approved FLr Release 209H65AL CJ-RWROOA000500030006-1
IV. THE EXPLODING CITIES
26. The rapid growth of cities can have far-reaching reper-
cussions on the city dwellers themselves and eventually on govern-
ment policies and organization. A large and growing portion of the
urban population are relative newcomers, most of them young and more
ambitious than their country cousins. Many, probably most, live
in squatter settlements -- slums or shanty towns that can spring up
2/
over night, Pressure on urban services, schools, roads, transporta-
tion, utilities, etc., becomes intense.
27. The strongest concern about rapid urban growth and urban
poverty is political rather than economic -- perhaps because raising
the level of living of such masses of people is such an intractable
1 3/
problem. In any event, a number of observers predict that chaos or
violent revolution lurk in the streets of Calcutta, the favelas of
Rio or the bidonvilles of North Africa. Some of these prophets stress
1/ Throughout the Third World, rural-urban migrants are overwhelm-
ingly young -- few seem to consider moving when they are over 40.
2/ For example in recent years, about 20-30% of the inhabitants of
Mexico City, Lima, and Caracas lived in these shanty towns,
Estimated rates are higher in cities growing even faster than
these.
3/ Ranging from Franz Fanon to Barbara Ward and Robert McNamara.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000500030006-1
 Approved F 2elease 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79RO09MA000500030006-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
the role of the migrants. Uprooted, frustrated, and hungry, they
are seen as dry tinder for the sparks of rebellion and violence.
Others see the newcomers to the cities as politically passive but
expect that the longer-term urban dwellers or the second generation
migrants will become so miserable and frustrated that they will even-
tually erupt and destroy their societies.
28. On the evidence of history and of present knowledge of
cities -- these theories appear to be myths. In the first place,
there is practically no evidence that migrants are especially
1/
violence-prone or politically radical. More importantly, surveys
of migrants as a group show they tend to be relatively satisfied.
For one thing, their new life is usually more attractive than the one
they left. This is particularly true.for African migrants who, in most
cases, could easily go back if dissatisfied. City life is usually not
a shock to migrants; most have either visited the town or known someone
who had. Most new arrivals are not isolated. Instead, very high propor-
tions of migrants get help from family, friends, or employers in finding
work or a place to live and in settling down.
Indeed, what evidence there is seems to point in the opposite direc-
tion. In Calcutta, voting patterns in the migrant-dominated districts
showed preference for Congress Party adherents in 1957 and 1962;
similar "conservative" preferences appeared in Chilean elections.
Studies of recent urban violence in the US showed migrants under-
represented among the rioters.
2/ From 70 to 90% of surveyed migrants in Latin America; probably
about as many in Africa, perhaps somewhat fewer in Asia,
Approved For Release 20b th - dAER R00967A000500030006-1
 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79R00A000500030006-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
29. Even more startling, perhaps, is the fact that most
migrants seem to find work quite quickly. A sample of recent
migrants in Santiago, for example, showed that 40 percent got
jobs within 2 days; 47 percent of squatters within the first
week. Of course job finding is much more difficult for the
educated young newcomer, as discussed above. But they tend to
be supported, at least after a fashion, by family. In general,
there seem to be lower rates of open unemployment among migrants,
although they tend to get more of the lowest-level jobs and
figure heavily in the marginal occupations like vending and
domestic service.
30. As to migrants' reactions to housing, services, and the
crowding and general/squalor of the slums, most seem to find them
at least tolerable. Thus far, at least, there is little or no
evidence of profound disillusionment or discontent among typical
migrants to cities -- always excepting2the well-educated young
people in search of white-collar jobs.
2/
From the burgeoning cities of Black Africa, to Buenos Aires and
Baghdad, overwhelming percentages of migrants surveyed say condi-
tions and opportunities in the cities are better.
The often.drama tic trials of this group tend to be well reported
in the literature and this probably colors the general impression
conveyed by many authors.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000500030006-1
 Approved For ease 20070E 07I CI -USE RDP79Y 00961"8000500030006-1
31. If migrants as a group show little tendency towards
political radicalism or violent protest, what of the vast mass
of longer-term city dwellers who eke out a highly tenuous existence
in the traditional sector? If the migrant comes with low levels
of political interest, considerable peasant conservatism or respect
for authority, doesn't this fade after a long period in the city?
There is little evidence one way or the other. Studies of voting
patterns, urban violence, and the like do not yet include such de-
tail. There are, however, a few studies which suggest that it is
not the very poor or unskilled that are attracted to radical measures
but groups a bit farther up the scale. Demonstrations in Calcutta are
said to be much more likely to involve violence if they are based on
the middle class rather than on the lower order of workers. A study
of Parisian police records in the 19th century found that those involved
in repeated incidents were mostly from the ranks of skilled workers.*
32. These findings, inconclusive as they are, tend to reinforce the
general theory that trouble doesn't usually come from the very poor but
Studies cited by Joan Nelson in "The Urban Poor" from which much
of this information is drawn.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000500030006-1
 Approved For'fWease 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79R0096 00500030006-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
from those whose conditions are improving, albeit more slowly than
their expectations. After all, the energies of the very poor tend
to be fully absorbed with daily survival. Those at the bottom of
the urban heap are so malnourished and sickly that they probably
could not protest anything very strongly anyway. Moreover, existing
studies of the urban poor indicate that most remain optimistic --
this seems to be true both for recent migrants and longer-term urban
residents. Perhaps if conditions got steadily worse and the slum-
dwellers finally lost hope of improvement, then their passivity would
disappear. Within this decade there are likely to be a few cities
in which such a deterioration of living conditions and loss of hope
takes place.
33. Even then, it would require a demagogue of extraordinary
skill to focus urban discontent on the government itself, The urban
masses, like their rural cousins, tend to focus their anger and
violence on local or immediate targets -- the bus conductor, the
nearest policeman, etc. Rarely do they seem to connect national
government policies with the misery they experience.*
For example, an Indian survey of urban opinion about a food
shortage found that the poorest and most illiterate were
'least likely to blame the government. The best educated and
best paid were the most likely to,,
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000500030006-1
 Approved For%ease 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00967%000500030006-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
V. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF URBANIZATION
34. But can we lean so heavily on past history and present
evidence to predict that the burgeoning cities will not greatly
affect political and social order in most of the poor countries?
Probably yes, for the next few years. For the longer run, perhaps
not.
35. On balance, we think that while Third World cities will
continue to experience rapid growth -- in population, in unemploy-
ment, in misery and poverty -- they will not, at least through the
remainder of this decade, give rise to revolutionary upheavals in
political affairs. There will, however, almost certainly be sporadic
riots and a number of reasonably well-organized radical movements
designed to undo the existing order.
36. For example, numbers of discontented and educated young
people will, at least at times, coalesce into political action.
The Tupamaros of Uruguay and the rebels of Ceylon both tried to
bring about social and political revolution although they got little
or no support from the poor. While they failed, they had considerable
impact on their governments and on their societies. Similar groups
elsewhere are highly likely to emerge; some may be more successful.
Approved For Release 2007/QF31F0W "d1ADP79R00967A000500030006-1
 Approved Forge ease 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R009674VO0500030006-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
37. It is the educated young, especially, who are apt to be
most aware of income differentials in their society. They have the
worst luck in finding acceptable work; their aspirations and expecta-
tions are far higher than their fathers' were. And if mass movements
evolve to press for a bigger share of power and income, they are likely
to be led by, or have a considerable infusion of, young activists.
38. The extra pressure on urban services that city growth will im-
pose will raise problems for governments and induce many to focus on urban
matters more than they have in the past. A few fortunate LDC's are
likely to be able to improve the economic and social conditions of
the bulk of their inhabitants, and achieve an agricultural/industrial
revolution that gets them on the road to real development. Unless
output and income grow far faster than expected, however, there is
little indeed that most governments of poor countries can hope to do
towards improving the lot of the inhabitants in the traditional
sector of the cities.
39. Indeed, in a number of Third World cities, the condition
of the urban poor is likely to deteriorate as ever more people seek
to sustain themselves in odd jobs and marginal occupations. The
result will be more crime and localized violence like that already
present in Calcutta and a number of other cities. But such explosions
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000500030006-1
 Approved Forge ease 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00967,,A 00500030006-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
of misery and frustration tend to be turned inward, and to have
the greatest impact on the slum-dwellers themselves.
40. The most likely government response both to unrest directed
at political change and to the sporadic violence that spills out of
the slums would be a marked improvement in existing means of repres-
sion. Police forces will be enlarged and made more efficient; ruth-
less measures will seem increasingly justified to the supporters of
the existing order. In general, governments in the Third World will
tend to become more authoritarian.
41. Such efforts as LDC governments make either to improve
conditions in their cities or to suppress violent groups in them will
of necessity divert funds, which may hinder constructive change in
the direction of modernization. Yet, by and large, these measures are
likely to keep the situation manageable and have relatively little
impact on other government policies -- except perhaps to intensify the
search for economic and technical aid.
42. But what of the longer run? Can we expect the Third World's
cities to remain generally manageable? Or are the prophets of chaos,
disintegration, and violent.revolution on the right track? We simply
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000500030006-1
 Approved For Jease 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00967AW0500030006-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
don't know if -- or when -- there is a breaking point. If there is,
if at some level of misery things fall apart, the elements most likely
to play a precipitating role are attitudes and expectations not
physical conditions and poverty.
43. The most significant differences between the past-and-
present urban situation, and that which is likely to evolve over the
longer run, appear to be (1) the wider and more rapid spread of informa-
tion -- only a small segment of the urban poor is entirely unreached
by radio, for example -- which can unify opinion, raise aspirations,
and induce politically oriented emotions; (2) the existence of an
extraordinary number of educated and semi-educated young people who
are finding a very wide gap between their aspirations and their real
opportunities for status; and (3) the sheer weight of numbers them-
selves. When the size of cities and the number of the poor crowded
into them passes some critical level, social reactions may change and change in unpredictable ways.
44. Evidence that any one of these differences between past and
future developments is likely to bear out the prophets of chaos is
scanty. We know very little, for example, about the impact of modern
communications on urban masses (but authoritarian governments tend to
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000500030006-1
 Approved For4&ease 2007/OFFICIAL RDPz~~096 p00500030006-1
try to restrict and control the flow of information). Perhaps it
serves entirely for entertainment and diversion, but it seems more
likely that the level of awareness and sophistication about polit-
ical events and governmental policies is higher in the city slums
of today than it was in the 19th and early 20th centuries. More-
over, the notion that government is responsible for the welfare
of the people is certainly more widespread now, even in the LDC's.
45. The spread of education which arouses expectations of
change and improvement is already having an impact on the poor
countries, especially on their city population, far greater than
anything previously experienced. It seems unlikely that the in-
creasing horde of frustrated, educated young people will remain
amenable to tradition and customary authority. As and if they
reject the social norms which have so far ensured a modicum of
order and predictability even in the poorest and most crowded
areas, the stability of the city could change drastically.
46. If the sheer increase in population leads to a considera-
ble drop in individual income among the poorer segments of society,
as it might, then the level of acceptance and optimism which has
heretofore helped to preserve social and political stability could
change. Where hope has gone, the unthinkable could follow. There
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000500030006-1
 Approved Forjfease 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R0096W0500030006-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
are a few intriguing studies of human and animal populations that
have been subjected to great stress -- either from overcrowding or
a radical change in their social environment -- which rapidly be-
came asocial and whose whole way of acting changed, These popula-
tions generally disintegrated either into violent aggression or
total inability to cooperate even within the family unit.* Such
possible patterns of change may merit serious attention with re-
gard to the longer run; it seems unlikely, however, that similar
levels of stress will arise in Third World cities any time soon.
See the recent study of the Ik in Uganda, The Mountain People
by Colin M. Turnbull, 19720
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000500030006-1
 Approved F?gRelease 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00S7A000500030006-1
For Official Use Only
For Official Use Only
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000500030006-1