POLITICS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE LAST DAYS OF FRANCO SPAIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A000500030002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 19, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 16, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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Secret
OFFICE OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
MEMORANDUM
Politics and Social Change in the Last Days of Franco Spain
Secret
Copy No. 1/3
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
16 November 1972
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Politics and Social Change in the Last Days of
Franco Spain*
Franco will be 80 next month, and some of his
associates do not expect him to Last another year.
Franco's regime has Lasted three and a half decades,
and he has tried hard to ensure that the political
institutions he established and defended will be pre-
served after he has gone. Much has transpired in the
interim. Important economic and social changes have
occurred in Spain and its international relations, and
even the character of Spanish politics has altered.
Adherents of political liberalization no longer are
confined to outright opponents of the regime, but in-
creasingly include members of groups upon which his
power has been based. Thus, the pressures for politi-
cal change will be very strong after his demise, and
it appears Likely that some steps will be taken to
liberalize the system from within. But the question
is still open whether the proponents of reform will
succeed or whether conservative forces, fearing that
the process would get out of hand, would move to sup-
press both such changes and their advocates.
' This memorandum was prepared b' the Office of National Estimates.
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I. THE MAINSTAYS OF FRANCOIST POWER
1. Thirty-six years have passed since Franco seized power
in Spain. Although the harshness of his authoritarianism has
been eased from time to time, Franco and his diminishing retinue
of former comrades-in-arms continue to behave as if any real con-
cessions to the political opposition would cause the fruits of
victory in the Civil War to be lost to Communism or chaos. But
Franco's comrades have been gradually dying out, and in the in-
tervening years a new generation of Spaniards has emerged -- now
comprising more than half of the population -- which has had no
direct experience of the SpanishCivil War. Like its counter-
parts in other European countries, this generation feels no
responsibility for the disputes of its elders and is anxious for
Spain to shed outdated habits and to adjust to changes in the
world's political and economic environment. Although Franco has
struggled bravely to preserve the traditional trappings of his
cause, this struggle is becoming more and more difficult, even
for him, as the years go by.
2. The very basis of Franco's political power has changed.
When he assumed power in Spai-n, his main pillars of support were
the Church, the Falange, the monarchists, the industrialists, and
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the army. But the Church can no longer be considered a faithful
supporter. Indeed, some of its leaders now challenge Franco on
such key issues as human rights and the relationship between
Church and State. The Falange, which was long ago stripped of
any independent basis of power, has gradually fused into the
broader regime bureaucracy known as the "National Movement" and
has lost most of its political influence. Those of its leaders
who are still alive are no longer politically important and a
number of them have become disgruntled critics of Franco. Even
some monarchists no longer support the caudiZZo, blaming him not
only for tolerating liberal economic practices in Spain, but
also for choosing a successor as Head of State, Prince Juan
Carlos, who does not, so far as they are concerned, even repre-
sent continuity with Spain's monarchial past. For their part,
Spain's present industrial and business leaders have little in
common with their pre-war counterparts.
3. Today, apart from the devout but pragmatic elitist group
of Catholic lay leaders connected with the "Opus Dei" organiza-
tion, who wield great influence in governing, economic, and in-
tellectual circles, Franco's main bulwark of support is the
military. No other organization or group has comparable power,
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and most military leaders still regard. themselves. as guardians
of the political system..which.Franco..has.established. Yet.even
the military can-.no longer , betaken. for.granted..as an unques-
tioning supporter..of.the.Franco-regime -.- some. of its top lead-
ers are known to favor some political change when Franco departs.
II. SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE
4. One reason-for the changes noted above is the passage.
of time; another. is that.the.Spanish.economy-has .been.profoundly
transformed during.the-past..two.decades..-The. key turning point
was in 1959,.when..the.decision..was_made..to.. abandon autarchic
economic policies.a.nd.to welcome.-foreign.investment. As.a re-
sult, the development..ofdomestic industry. boomed during the
sixties, and-Spain.changeditself.froma.rel?atively. backward
country into an.-industrialpower..of.growing.consequence.* The
foreign investment boom..was. accompanied. by.substantialin
creases in imports,. financed.to..a large extent. by a mushroom-
ing tourist trade-and.by..remittances.from.. Spanish migrant
workers abroad.. Tourism has continued to grow -- last year
The industries showing the greatest development included ship-
building, steel, automobiles, electrical appliances, oil re-
fineries and petrochemicals.
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it earned Spain about $2 billion in foreign exchange, while re-
mittances from workers abroad netted an additional billion. As
a result of this "economic miracle", the importance of the agri-
cultural sector has declined. Between 1960 and 1971 agriculture's
share of GDP declined from 24 to 15 percent and the agricultural
labor force declined from 4.9 million to about 3.8 million.
5. Spain's growing industrial development resulted in an
expansion of foreign trade, much of it with Western Europe, en-
couraged by the conclusion in 1970 of a preferential trade agree-
ment with the EC. Last year 42.1 percent of Spain's total imports
and 47.3 percent of its total exports were with the countries of
the enlarged EC. In addition, about 60 percent of all foreign
investment in Spain now comes from the same area. Thus, although
still blackballed for political reasons from official membership
in EC, the Spanish economy is deeply affected by economic trends
in Western Europe.
6. The economic changes in Spain have had some effect on
the social structure. A substantial portion of the agricultural
labor force has moved from the countryside, half of it abroad
and half to the growing urban industrial centers. Many Spanish
workers who migrated to Western Europe have gradually found
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their way back to Spain, having acquired new skills and experi-
ence. They have brought with them somewhat different political
notions as a result of their exposure to Western Europe. Also,
during the past decade or so, educational standards have been
raised, and all sectors of Spanish society have been subjected
to new political and cultural currents from outside the country,
partly because of government encouragement of economic and tech-
nological aid from abroad, and partly as a result of the constant
flow of tourists.
7. Spain's growing prosperity has also had social effects.
Average per capita income. grew.between 1960 and 1972 from $290
to over $1,000 (equivalent to Italy's. per capita income in l964),*
although the growth of real. income has been slower because of
inflation. Rising incomes have brought some former workers into
the ranks of the middle classes, or at least have caused them to
become more and more concerned with maintaining their material
benefits and less and less. with sustaining old class conflicts.
Moreover, the expanding middle-class and business community have
acquired a stake of their own in maintaining Spain's rising
The number of care per 1,000 people grew from 9 to 70 between
1960 and 1970.
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living standards. As a result of all these developments, xeno-
phobic tendencies in Spain and some of the political and regional
antagonisms stemming from the Civil War period have diminished
somewhat, and even some of the. traditional social divisions in
Spain have lost their sharpness.
8. In this environment the character of politics has changed.
Politics are no longer simply black or red; it is no longer a
simple question of being for Franco or against him. Out-and-out
oppositionists remain, but within the system there are many who
want changes in the way in which the system functions or who want
to alter the system itself. More. and more Spaniards, leaders and
followers from all sectors of the. society, are waiting quietly
but anxiously for the old man to die.
A. Pressures within the System
9. This attitude is apparent even among those sectors of
society which formerly. were among the strongest supporters of
Franco. Many members of.the.government bureaucracy, for example,
now seem to believe that Spain's future will require political
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change, but thatsuch change. is out of the question as long as
Franco lives. Even "Opus Dei" Cabinet ministers, despite the
conservatism of their political and spiritual views, have come
around to this view. Largely through their experience as archi-
tects of Spain's economic. transformation, they have become con-
vinced that the further economic and technical development of
Spain will necessitate some relaxation of the political atmos-
phere, not only to make the. system work in a modern environment,
but also to alleviate foreign hostility toward Spain's political
institutions.
10. Spain's, business. and. professional classes are equally
impatient for change. Much of.. the new Spanish business commun-
ity, in contrast to its counterpart of Civil War days, has ac-
quired a pro-European and.. relatively progressive outlook. Thus,
most businessmen believe. that.Spain.'s economic ties with the
outside world, not to mention.. Spain's economic power in Europe,
will be greatly enhanced. by a. loosening of. the domestic politi-
cal reins. As technocrats. they. are essentially pragmatic, as
shown, for example, by their tendency to bypass the system to
deal directly with the illegal workers.' commissions, Some
Spanish lawyers are chafing for legal reform. A small but
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influential group of Madrid lawyers, for example, has been press-
ing for some time for the. reform of government legal codes which
it feels threaten the independence of the legal profession.
Spanish teachers have long. been-.at odds. with the Franco regime
over needed changes in the educational system, but have been es-
pecially outraged by recent, government measures to impose greater.
discipline on the academic-community. Artists, writers and
journalists are also deeply discontented, especially because of
the regime's imposition.of.harsh..censorship policies after the
unrest in December 1970. A. particular. sore point was the sus-
pension from publication last. year of the mildly liberal daily
newspaper, Madrid.
11. The Church. Long a stronghold of conservatism and a
strong supporter of Franco, the Catholic Church in Spain has
gradually evolved into-an. irritant for the regime and a constant
source of pressure for political liberalization. A key factor
in this transformation was the. influence of Vatican II, as a re-
sult of which liberal inclinations among the lower clergy found
growing sympathy amongChurch. leaders. Indeed, the power of the
liberal bishops has. steadily increased to the point that they
were able to achieve majority control of the Spanish Episcopate
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at its meeting last March. WithVatican support, the liberal
bishops have been pressing Franco for a revision of the 1955
Concordat to achieve full separation. of Church and State. They
have gone even further. and.. have, expressed the view that the
human rights provisions of the Papal encyclical, Paeem in Terris,
should prevail in Spain.
12. Franca, with the. support. of the conservative minority
of bishops, has tried to prevent Vatican appointments of liberal
auxiliary bishops, has resisted Vatican pressure to revise the
Concordat, and has denounced. the. Episcopate's attempts to inter-
vene in political matters. Moreover, despite the predominance
of liberal influence,in.the.Spanish_.Churchhierarchy, conserva-
tive bishops still participate-in parliament (the cortex) and
one, the Archbishop of.Zaragoza.,.is even a member of Spain's top
governmental body, the Council of the Realm. Although relations
between Church and State are continually tense, neither the
Episcopate nor the Government desires to allow this relationship
to develop into a showdown -- the latter because of the great in-
fluence of the Church in Spain,. and the former because of the
Church's heavy financial dependence on-the annual subsidy (ap-
proximately $93 million) received from the State.
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13. The Military, Rightist influence remains strong in the
Spanish military establishment., even among the younger officers,
who seem firmly committed, to the. preservation of law and order.
.It is especially strong, of course, among those of Franco's former
comrades from Civil War and. "Blue. Division" days -- now in their
seventies or older --who are. still onactive duty. Indeed, most,
of the Spanish officer.cor.ps,.though trained to remain aloof.from
politics, is afraid that.even..limited political change might lead
to serious disorders, and.wouid..favo.r military intervention at an
early stage to suppress.domestic.disturbances, or even to stop,the,
process of reform. Nevertheless.,.the changes in Spain's political.
and economic environment. have. also produced some new types among
Spain's military professionals... A number of officers have become
convinced, as-a. result. of...thei.r.contacts.with their US and Euro-
pean couterparts, that_technical.progress is vital for a modern
military establishment.. Further,,some have become infected by
the."European" virus and. believe. that not only Spain's economic
future, but its military.future..as well. is tied to Europe. One
such "European" is the.. present,Chie:f of Staff, General Diez-
Alegria, who believes in the. firm. enforcement of law and order
but at the same time is. convinced.,that.Spain'.s future.relation-
ship with Europe will require some liberalization of political life.
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B. Pressures from outside the System
14. Labor Groups. Clandestine labor groups today are prob-
ably the primary form of political . opposition. in Spain. The for-
mation of illegal groups, often. on. an ad hoc basis, was stimulated
in part by the short-sighted. policy of the government in permit-
ting legal labor activity only within the government-controlled.
"Spanish Syndical Organization" (SSO). The ineffectiveness of
this organization. led.to..the,formation of clandestine "workers'
commissions" in which representatives of. illegal political groups,
both Communist and non-Communist, participate. Although Commu-
nists and fellow-Marxists.are..only a. small minority,. operating
in an illegal situation. has. enabled. them in a. number. of cases to
dominate the commissions. and.to..infiltrate the official syndical
organization. (In.1971,.between..iO.and 20 percent of those
elected as factory shop , stewards. were.. considered."undesirables"
by the government, and.about.half of these "undesirables" were
said to be Communists.)
15. Despite their illegality, these-commissions have become
the only really effective labor. organizations in Spain. In plants
where they are strong, management prefers to deal with them on
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most issues rather than with the official syndical organization.
The commissions also have played.an.active organizing role in
labor disturbances, and although strikes are illegal.in Spain,
were active in major.strikes.during 1971 in Madrid, Barcelona
and Asturias. The.fact-that .the.regime..is well aware of the
existence and'activity of. the, commissions and yet is reluctant
or unable to suppress them outright suggests that it may to some.
degree have accepted them. It may feel that the commissions
serve a needed function or that. it can monitor them more effec-
tively if they are allowed, to. function openly. In any case,
wholesale suppression would probably cause large-scale labor
unrest.
. 16. students. Even more than most other traditional "es-
tablishments" in Europe, the Franco regime has difficulty com-
municating with the student.generation. Student unrest seems to
cause the Franco regime special concern.. Alarmed at the least
sign of student dissidence, the government tends to react harshly.
For example, in January 1969,, in response to a series of student
demonstrations for university reforms after the student disrup-
tions in France of the previous. year, the universities in Madrid
and: Barcelona were closed, over a thousand arrests were made, and
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a three-month state of.emergency was declared. Even after the
universities were. reopened,. the.. government stationed uniformed
and plain-clothes police.on-the. campuses., thus. antagonizing the.
students further. In response.. to. student demonstrations during
the 1971-72 academic year,. severe measures. were taken to estab-
lish control over the-universities. These.measures.were aimed
not only at excluding. student..agitators,.but also faculty mem-
bers considered.responsibl.e..for stimulating disorder by "sub-
versive teaching". But these...actions.only provoked the rectors
and top faculty administrators,of universities in Madrid,
Salamanca and Valencia into. resigning in September. The univer-
sities have opened.. under.. new. management and the police have been
withdrawn, but the regime.. clearly.is.determined to.take.whatever
measures are necessary.to_.preserve.order on. the. campuses., and. the.
resentments of both.students.and.faculty against the Franco re-
gime are stronger than ever.
17. The Traditional Opposition. Most of the political
groups which defended. the. Second. Spanish. Republic. against Franco
still exist within and outside. the country, but their political
importance has greatly. declined.. In. addition to groups. operating
in exile, some leaders of the old political parties -- e.g.,
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Christian Democrats and Socialists -- are tolerated in Spain
itself, but they are watched. carefully and are enjoined from
any "public" political activity. Thus, they have little oppor-
tunity to build upa.popular following, and, it is difficult to
judge which, if any, of the.parties.would be.likely to have
significant support. if allowed , to, function openly. At the same.
time, three.decades.of.sustained.propaganda.by Franco. on. the .
theme that to restore the..political parties would only mean to
repeat the chaos. of the,pre,Civil War period has made an impact
on the populace.
18. The two left-extremist political opponents of Franco
-- the Anarchists and the..Communists are legally banned. but.
continue to engage.. in clandestine.. activity. Anarchism -- before
World War II one of the.most,powerful.political movements in
Spain -- has lost most.of.its.popular.appeal, even in Catalonia.
Small Anarchist groups..st.ill attempt. occasional, acts of.violence,_
but neither their tactics nor their ideas inspire..any significant
support in contemporary.Spain.. The. Communist Party. of Spain.
(PCE), however, continues..to.maintain.the only. nationwide clan-
destine organization of.any consequence its hard-core member"
ship is estimated at about 5,000, most of them outside Spain.
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Despite continual harassment by Franco's security forces, it has.
had some success. in infiltrating. the. labor syndicates, as well
as youth and intellectual.groups... Nevertheless, the.party's .ef-
forts to improve its image.. are.. hindered. by. the strong popular
fear of Communism, and..its estrangement: in recent.years from
Moscow (which has transferred.. . its. support. to a. rival splinter
group) has made it. more. difficult. for.. the. party leaders to di-
rect effective political activity from abroad.
19. The ancient traditions-of..separatism.per.sist in.Cata-
lonia and the Basque.prov.inces,.and. small. extremist.. clandestine
groups continue to. operate.i.n..both. areas,. despite.Franco's con-
stant efforts to. suppress,,them....In Catalonia, Catalan separa-
tists have been .able.. to. hold.. clandestine. meetings in Barcelona
under the noses of the..security services. The Basque. extremist.
organization, the. ETA (Basque. Nation.. and.. Freedom), is the.. most
ardent exponent of violence.,.but ithas.been...wea.kened by splits,
and its cross-border..activities..have. been-.made more difficult.
recently by the.. outlawing.. of.. the.organ.ization.by the French gov-
ernment. The violent.tactics_of..the.extremists.do.tend,to.keep...
the traditionsof these.movements.alive, but. violence. is. not. a
popular political. method.in.post.-Civil .War Spain, even in these
traditionally rebellious areas.
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IV. POLITICS IN POST-FRANCO SPAIN
20. Spain's changing domestic and. international environ-
ment, together with the.altered. attitudes. of the political forces.
in Spain, will make it difficult. for.Franco's.successors to re-
sist pressures for liberalization., of.. the political system. At
the same time, thirty years-of authoritarian .rule .and the wide-
spread fear among Spaniards-of-the dangers of restoring Westerr-
styl.e parliamentary democracy.ar.gue.strongly that liberalization
will be achieved,.not..by.throwing.. out., the. political system set.
up by Franco, but by.modifying.it. The. military will continue
to occupy a key position. but,..espec,ially after the powerful.in-.
fluence of Franco's personality has. been removed,.. even the mili-
tary may consider it.more.prudent.to-concede.to liberal pressures.
than to hold out.against.them,.judging that to take the latter
course might well cause another general political convulsion in
Spain.
21. Because of the.. careful preparations already made by
General Franco, the. immediate. succession process is likely to be.
orderly. Juan.Carlos..will become-Chief of State, and Franco's
powers will be divided between him and the designated President
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of the Government (Prime.Minister), Admiral Carrero Blanco.* In
the past, Prince Juan.. Carlos. has. been. regarded.as.a political.
lightweight, but he is now:taken..more.seriously within leadership
circles in Spain.. He.. has. made.. it. clear., more: than once that he.
favors liberal political.. change. but feels that. sufficient leeway
for such change already..exists..in.Spain.'s present. political sys-
tem. Admiral Carrero.Blanco..appears.to.have. extremely conserva-
tive political views..and.bel.ieves.that noconcessions should be.
made to the. political left. He appearsto,have been responsible.
for the severe. repressive.measures.. taken.this..year.against the..
universities, and.. for. incr.easing. secret.. police.. powers. against
"subversives". Whether..his.views..would.rema.in conservative.
without Franco there to support him remains to be seen.
22. If the views of those. favoring controlled. liberal
change should prevail, it is. possible. that sufficient changes
could be made within the. present political system to disarm the
chief critics of the Franco regime.. in.. Spain. and. abroad. For.
example, the labor syndicates could be made more representative
Juan Carlos apparently will inherit Franco's post as Commander
in Chief of the Armed Forces, but the Premier will control the
"National Movement" and probably the police forces.
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and more responsive to.workers' needs. Eventually the workers'
commissions could.be..legally?.recognized..and.allowed.to operate
openly within the. system. Parliament (the Cortes) could be
made more representative than it now is, and freer parliamentary
debates could be.permitted.....In general, a more relaxed politi-
cal atmosphere .permitting.-greater. freedom. of. assembly, worship
and the press, could.be,toleratedv. Indeed, much of the latter
could be achieved.simply-by.a.more..iiberal-interpretation than
in the past of the fundamental liberties already constitution-
ally guaranteed by the Code of the Spaniards decreed by Franco
in 1945.*
23. Although moderate-change., seems the more..likely course,
violence on a major scale.is..still .possible.if liberalization
should release ..long..pent-up...popular..emotions. and. if certain
long-repressed groups.. should be..encouraged.to press. hard and.
fast for radical change. In such circumstances, conservative
During the sixties, Franco actuaZZy considered certain liberal
poZiticaZ changes which included a draft Zaw permitting "po-
liticaZ associations" in lieu of poZiticaZ parties, within a
framework of Franco-style "organic democracy". Such plans
were gradually abandoned after the Burgos Trials of Basque
separatists in December 1970, but it may well indicate one
avenue political reform could take in post-Franco Spain.
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forces, particularly those in the. military establishment, prob-
ably would become sufficiently. concerned. about.. the.implicati.ons.
of liberal change to try to suppress it. Clearly, much continues
to depend on how. the.military..responds to .such .a situation, and.
whether Juan Carl os.as.the..new.Chief of. State.. will.be strong
enough to exert at least.a-mediating.role. Meanwhile, the more
Spain's economy continues.to be.developed,and modernized, and
the more Spain's ties.are.developed..w th.the outside world, the
more difficult it. will.become. for. conservative. forces. in Spain
to turn the clock backward and... reimpose.. an isolationist, tradi-
tionalist, and xenophobic course.
24. The. course.of..political.developments.after.Franco.will,
of course, have.animportant..bearing..on..the.:US-r..elationship_with.:.
Spain. Spanish ruling-circles. seem generally in favor of a.con-
tinued cordial and,even_intimate_.relationship.with the.United..
States, especially. in.the...military and..economic..spher.es4.. This.
support is unlikely to be.affected.significantly..by.attempts to
liberalize the..political.system, although in a.more.permissi.ve.
political atmosphere. the radical.left may attempt to demonstrate
against the US military presence.
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25. But as Spain develops closer ties with Western Europe,.
and alternative sourcesof.military and-economic support thereby
become available, US-.economic-and military relations with Spain
could come under.attack. Some..would..favor.moving away from a
close military relationship-.with the.US.and.toward closer rela-
tions with West.European...countries. Indeed, some steps are al-
ready underway to improve.-military cooperation with some of these.
countries,. especially ..Fr.ance.- As Spain becomes more ..deeply .in-
volved with Western..Europe,,Spain's national. interests -- like
those of other West..European.,countri"es -- probably.will conflict
more frequently than in the..past.with those of the US. This
would be particularly true, for-example, if progress were to be.
made on schemes. for...a. closer relationship among Mediterranean
riparian powers.
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Secret
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