BANGKOK AND PEKING: THAILAND ENTERS THE PING-PONG SWEEPSTAKES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A000500020002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 31, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 14, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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Secret
MEMORANDUM
OFFICE OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
Bangkok and Peking: Thailand Enters the Ping-Pong Sweepstakes
Secret
14 September 1972
Copy No.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
14 September 1972
MEMORANDUM*
SUBJECT: Bangkok and Peking: Thailand Enters the
Ping-Fong Sweepstakes
Thailand has now joined the ranks of those countries
in East Asia seeking to work out some sort of better
relationship with China. No basic shift in Thailand's
pro-US orientation, however, is likely in the near term -~
certainly not while Thailand is deeply embroiled in the
Indochina war and there is a massive US military presence
in Thailand. The opening to China, nonetheless, is im-
portant and suggests some possible changes in Thailand's
longer term outlook. This Memorandum discusses the opening
of the Sino-Thai dialogue and its possible significance.
This Memorandum was prepared by the Office of National
Estimates and discussed within CIA.
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I. THE SETTING
1. Thailand and Indonesia have been two notable excep-
tions to the recent drift in East Asia toward closer contact
with China. Their reluctance to deal with Peking has been
sustained by strong anti-Chinese and anti-communist sentiment,
and a fear of local Chinese subversion. Though they made an
exploratory move toward Peking last year and are likely to
do so again, the Indonesian generals sense no particular
requirement for speedy action: Indonesia's remote location
affords relative immunity from any immediate or direct pres-
sure from Peking.
2. The Thai leaders, however, are faced with a less
comfortable situation geographically. They are quite con-
cerned about Chinese intentions toward Thailand. They view
Chinese support to the Thai communist insurgents as a major
threat to Thailand's security. They also are much alarmed
over the Chinese road construction in northwestern Laos; to
the Thai, the primary, if not sole, purpose of the road to
Pak Beng is to facilitate increased Chinese support to the
insurgents in northern Thailand.
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3. With these concerns in mind, some Thai figures
had long advocated opening some sort of dialogue with
Peking. Former Foreign Minister Thanat led in pushing
this line, and even General Praphat, the regime's major
policy maker and certainly no soft-liner, was at least
willing to consider the possibility. But as is often
the case in Thai politics, personal rivalries and sus-
picions intruded. Thanat wanted to move quickly and
publicly, and to use his supporters in the effort, while
Praphat favored a restrained private approach utilizing,
of course, his minions. Pulling and hauling on this issue
was a factor behind the "auto-coup" in Bangkok last November;
Thanat was removed from office and effectively silenced.
4. With Thanat out of the picture, the question of
Bangkok dealing with Peking largely disappeared from public
view. Praphat and other Thai leaders, however, continued
to consider just how to approach the Chinese. The evidence
about what exactly went on and who advocated what is exceed-
ingly fragmentary -- the Thai make such important policy
decisions in private and keep the results to themselves.
But behind the scenes Praphat apparently was moving ahead
with his own deliberate game plan. For example, the Thai
Vq_I
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toned down their public statements against China -- a gesture
reciprocated by Peking in its pronouncements against Bangkok.
Secret contacts were made with the Chinese, and once Praphat
was satisfied that Peking was willing to engage in discussions,
the stage was set for a demarche.
5. Thus, in August, Thailand followed up Peking's ini-
tiative and agreed to send a ping-pong team to China. And
it is clear that the Thai have more in mind than table tennis.
The "adviser" to the team, Prasit Kanchanawat, is a close
confidant of Praphat and an economic specialist. Prasit is
well chosen for his task.* In addition to being close to
Praphat -- they are business associates -- he is also quite
acceptable to the Chinese, who agreed to treat him as an
"honored guest." He met with ranking Chinese officials and
twice with Chou En-tai. Throughout his stay, Prasit was
treated cordially and with ceremonial attention: a clear
indication of the political nature of his trip as well as of
the importance the Chinese placed on the discussions. He has
now left China.
Prasit, a Thai of Chinese ethnic background, has like
many overseas Chinese maintained contacts in China for
many years.
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6. Despite the Thai opening to China, we do not
expect rapid forward motion on key bilateral issues be-
tween the two countries. What Thailand would like most
from China -- assurance that Peking will cease supporting
the Thai insurgency -- it almost certainly is not going
to get. China does not acknowledge that it is giving aid
and sustenance to the insurgents and will not agree to
any statement that suggests that it is. Nor is Peking
likely to offer any concrete assurances to the Thai con-
cerning the use of the Chinese road in Laos.
7. The Thai seem to realize that their basic objec-
tives will not be satisfied by Peking. China might be
willing to make a general statement about its "peaceful
intentions" in an attempt to assuage Thai fears about
Chinese objectives in Southeast Asia. The Chinese might
also reassure Bangkok that they have no plans to foment
trouble within the large Chinese community in Thailand;
they have done so in several other countries in East Asia.
This would give the Thai something to show for their efforts
and would cost Peking nothing. Beyond this, however, the
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Thai probably view the talks largely as a way to probe
Chinese intentions toward. Thailand.
8. From Peking's point of view,'there are two major
obstacles in the path to improved relations with Thailand --
Bangkok's relations with the Nationalist Chinese and the
heavy Thai involvement in the war in Indochina. On the
latter issue, the Thai might be willing to concede something,
probably in private, to Peking in the way of some vague for-
mulation which appeared to promise a reduction of the US
role in Thailand at some unspecified date. It is doubtful
that Peking would push very hard for more than this. The
Chinese leaders take a long range view of their interests
and objectives in Southeast Asia, and their prime concern
at this time is to enhance their status in the region. As
a result, they see value simply in having leading figures
from other countries make a pilgrimage to Peking. In this
sense, the fact of the Thai visit is probably as important
to Peking as its substance.
9. On the Taiwan issue, Bangkok, once convinced of
Peking's interest in substantive discussions, appears willing
to.go at least part way in meeting Peking's position on the
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Taiwan Question. Although there have been few public hints
that Thailand has changed its stand on the Taiwan issue,
Thai
leaders are ready to acknowledge that Taiwan is part of
China and that Peking is the sole legitimate government of
China. Though perhaps de rigueur for any country wanting
to deal with Peking, such a shift in Bangkok's position
would be a marked departure from its previous stance as
one of Taipei's staunchest friends. But Thai relations
with the ROC stemmed as much from hostility toward Peking
as from affinity to Taipei. (Financial considerations were
also involved to some extent.) With the US opening to China
and the rush of other nations to follow suit, the Thai
leaders, who are known for their ability to "bend with the
wind," probably have reasoned that it behooved them not to
be last past the gate. Any decision to move away from the ROC
was probably made easier by the realization that Taipei's
status and value as an ally was rapidly diminishing.
10. Even if the Thai decide to let their ties with
Taiwan lapse, they still would probably attempt to do so in
a gradual and seemly fashion. Initially, this might include
a reduction in number and rank of Thai personnel assigned to
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Taipei, concurrent with a similar reduction of Nationalist
Chinese officials stationed in Bangkok. Peking is not
likely to press for more than this at the moment; it has
not demanded more from other countries. But if the Thai
start in this direction, it would strongly suggest that in
time Bangkok would be prepared to abandon Taipei entirely.
11. In any event, the Sino-Thai dialogue represents
an important development in the two countries' relationship.
Although diplomatic relations do not appear to be in the
cards any time soon, there is a possibility of a trade
protocol being arranged between Thailand and China.*
Moreover, no matter how limited, the discussions represent
the first overt, high level contact between the countries
in many years. The talks may serve to stimulate more open
discussion in Bangkok about Thailand's longer term policy
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toward China. More important, the talks provide the basis
for more meaningful exchanges when and if the situation in
Indochina quiets down.
12. Implications for the US. Over the near term,
Bangkok's dialogue with Peking is unlikely to have much
effect on US-Thai relations. Praphat and the present Thai
leadership prefer to stick with the US so long as there
remains a communist threat near Thailand's borders. Re-
liance on US commitments (e.g., the Rusk-Thanat under-
standings of 1962) has been the linchpin of Thai foreign
policy, and they are not presently contemplating any shift
from this position. So long as Washington remains willing
to stand by Laos and Cambodia and to assist Thailand itself
against the threat of insurgency, the present Thai leader-
ship will more or less continue to hew to a pro-US course.
The course may be rough at times, but for the moment at
least, the Thai consider that they have no other viable
alternative.
13. The Thai leaders, however, have begun to weigh
the possible long term consequences of their close identi-
fication with the US. The prospect of an end to US military
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involvement in Indochina coupled with the nagging fear
that the US might withdraw from all of Southeast Asia
causes concern in Bangkok. The Thai are apprehensive that
in time Thailand could find itself over-exposed and under-
supported in facing China in the area. As a result, the
Thai are concerned to chart a course whereby they can stay
close to the US, while at the same time leaving room for
a shift in direction should future events so dictate. In
sum, the Thai initiative probably represents an attempt
to begin hedging its bets against the time when the Indo-
china struggle is not paramount and when the US role
throughout Southeast Asia may be greatly reduced.
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