PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL CHANGE IN MOROCCO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A000400030003-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 26, 2006
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 28, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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Secret
MEMORANDUM
OFFICE OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
Prospects for Political Change in Morocco
Secret
28 February 1972
Copy No.
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SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
28 February 1972
SUBJECT: Prospects for Political Change in Morocco*
King Hassan survived a spectacular and nearly
successful coup attempt in July 1971. While Hassan
quickly reestablished control and executed the
alleged ringleaders after summary trial, the up-
rising at Skhirat palace clearly shook the regime
and exposed the vulnerability of narrowly based royal
rule. The King has now promulgated a new Consti-
tution which is to go to referendum on 1 March.
It is scheduled to be followed by general elections
for a new parliament. The process promises a polit-
icaZZy important and tense period. This memo-
randum addresses what has changed and is likely to
change in Morocco as a result of the attempt to
overthrow the King, and treats the implications
for the US.
This memorandum was prepared by the Office of National Estimates
and discussed with other components of the CIA1, who are in
general agreement with its judgments.
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KING HASSAN II
ry,
ulti qi ii
3i
ul
GENERAL MOHAMED OUFKIR
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1. Monarchy has long roots in Morocco. But in the past
the royal family rarely held effective sway over large sections
of the present realm. The monarchy itself was dislocated dur-
ing the era of the French Protectorate (1912-1956); King Mohamed,
Hassan's father, was ousted by the French and spent the last
two years of French rule in exile. Capitalizing on his own
record of opposition to the French and his traditional appeal
as a religious and dynastic leader, the King restored the
monarchy's paramountcy after Morocco gained independence. His
success was facilitated by the rivalries which frustrated
unity among the civilian politicians and by the absence of
any popular military challenger. By the time Hassan inherited
the throne in 1961, the monarchy was unquestionably the central
political institution in the country.
2. Following in his father's footsteps, Hassan made it
his mission to keep power concentrated in his own hands. He
has worked to bolster the loyalty of the military establishment
to the throne and has greatly reduced the influence of civilian
politicians. Essentially a manipulator, he has on the one hand
attempted to prevent the formation of groups powerful enough to
threaten his position. On the other, he has made skillful use
of patronage and the desire for office that animates Moroccan
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politicians in general. Office has become the gateway to riches,
not political power. And Hassan's pandering to the acquisitiveness
of the elite has aggravated one of the regime's most stubborn
problems -- corruption. So has the monarch's example of lavish
entertainment and extravagant expeditions abroad.
3. Where he has encountered opposition, Hassan has character-
istically reacted by firmness or, when faced with broader pressures,
by a facade of concession. Thus, he prorogued parliament and
virtually suspended political activity after the bloody riots in
Casablanca in 1965. But after five years of a "state of exception",
he felt it expedient to regularize his regime. He convened a
carefully selected assembly in 1970. Under the Constitution
issued at that time, this tame parliament has no authority to
challenge the King. It provides the illusion, rather than the
substance, of popular participation in government.
4. The King's regime had been running into difficulties
well before the July uprising. Hassan's style had alienated in-
creasing numbers of the Moroccan people. His conceit, arrogance,
and pursuit of pleasure, the latter symbolized for many by his
mania for golf, were foci of irritation. The stagnant economy
and the heavy hand of his security forces also contributed to
cumulative resentment. Discontent among students and intellectuals
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`'+ SECRET MP;
has proved a continuing problem for the regime. Student
demonstrations periodically disrupted the functioning of the
universities and lycees. Student groups cheered when they
thought that the King had been overthrown during the July
attempted coup.
The Political Parties
5. Yet the political parties have not effectively reflected
this dissatisfaction. They never effectively controlled the
Cabinet, even during the first few years after independence
when they were nominally part of the governmental coalition. In
recent years their freedom of action has been severely restricted
by the crown. This has weakened, demoralized, and disrupted
their organizations which have been out of the political
mainstream for almost a decade.
6. Despite the recent effort to patch together a so-called
National Front, the rival formations that contest the political
arena have found it difficult to concert action. The present
alignment of the right of center Istiqlal Party and the leftist
National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP) is an alliance from weak-
ness to oppose the King. Of the two parties, the Istiqlal, under
its leader Allal al-Fassi, is the more rigid and insistent on its
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rights to dominate the political scene. The UNFP leaders are
more flexible; though they view the monarchy as a medieval
institution which eventually should be uprooted, they are willing
to' proceed by stages, aiming first merely to get greater freedom
for parliamentary action. The UNFP derives some support from
the Moroccan Federation of Labor, an independent body which has
considerable popular. strength of its own. The other party
organizations have demonstrated little popular appeal and are
generally ignored by the major actors.
The Military
7. The 60,000-man military establishment holds the
key to political power in Morocco.
Broadly speaking, the top officers were French trained
and most of them appear to be conservative monarchists. On
the other hand, during the attempted coup of last July it be-
came evident that there was concern throughout the military
about the rampant corruption in the regime. While details.
about the planners of the coup remain murky, it appears that
middle grade officers took the initiative in planning the up-
rising in July. A number of generals joined them toward the
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end.* Though King Hassan has since purged elements suspected
of disloyalty, this punitive action itself may have fed
resentment among the junior officers.
8. The Moroccan military is distinguished from the other
key institutions in the country by the high percentage of Berbers
among its senior members. The marriage of Berber and Arab
elements in Morocco has never been complete; the French consciously
encouraged Berbers to enter the military profession as a counter-
weight to the Arab majority which dominated the political scene.
Since independence there have been no visible signs of significant
ethnic rivalries within the military. But in Moroccan society at
large many Berbers resent the favored position of the Arabs from
Fez in the civilian power structure. The army leaders continue
to favor Berber officers, and Berber clannishness thus may
become increasingly important in influencing the attitudes of
the officer corps.
9. The present leader of the military establishment,
General Mohamed Oufkir, has emerged as unquestionably the most
Four of Morocco's 16 general officers were killed in the coup
attempt and five were executed by the King on charges of
complicity.
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important personage in the country after King Hassan. Oufkir
is a Berber whose power is based not only on his closeness to
the King, but on his long-time control of the internal security,
police, and intelligence networks. An outstanding administrator,
he is also widely feared for his tough and frequently brutal
treatment of his political opponents.
Long relied on by the King, Oufkir further strengthened his
position after the July 1971 uprising when he was given un-
limited powers to restore public order. He now serves as Chief
of Staff of the Royal Armed Forces and Minister of National
Defense.
10. Despite his years in the public eye, Oufkir has remained
a figure of some mystery. He apparently has little respect for
the civilian politicians. In the past, he has shown sympathy for
Hassan's efforts to strengthen the authority of the monarchy.
But since July 1971 his attitudes toward the regime seem less
clear.
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Impact of the JuZy Coup Attempt
11. The July uprising apparently convinced Hassan of the
need for some kind of action. He immediately promised basic
reforms, installed a new Cabinet of technicians, and then under-
took negotiations with the major political, social, and economic
leaders of the country. He took steps to raise wages, revise
the tax structures, and lower living costs. At the same time,
he indicated that he would pursue charges of corruption against
senior officials. In this connection, five former ministers
are now under arrest for involvement in financial scandals --
though the King does not seem inclined to push the investigation
beyond those most obviously implicated. Hassan has also down-
graded his personal royal cabinet, a body that had served
prominently as anintermediary in the governing process and a
check on the national ministers. And finally in February 1972
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Hassan announced that on 1 March a referendum would be held
on a new Constitution limiting royal power somewhat.
12. Although these acts go further than Hassan has been
willing to go in recent years, it remains to be seen how much
political participation he is prepared to grant. The King has
not altered much of his own personal style of pleasure seek-
ing; he still does not work hard at the business of ruling.
The political changes which the King is now offering seem
essentially an effort to avoid basic transformation by per-
mitting some minor, mostly cosmetic, alterations. Under the
new regime, the King will remain the dominant power. Through
his right to name the Cabinet and dissolve parliament, he has
retained ultimate control over the operation of the political
system. His assumption of the role of "national arbiter"
between parliament and the Cabinet clearly indicates a deter-
mination to intervene actively in the process of government,
He obviously has no intention of becoming a mere figurehead.
Nor is it likely that Hassan contemplates permitting the new
government to take action against groups, such as the army or
his household, on which he has been accustomed to lean. There
are even some signs that he might encourage the formation of a
new royalist party to increase his weight on the political scene.
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And Hassan may hope that the limited boost in the stature of the
civilian parties will serve as something of a counterweight to
General Oufkir.
13. The new Constitution clearly represents less than
the politicians had hoped to achieve. In an effort to press
the King for further concessions, the National Front leaders
have announced a boycott of the referendum. This is less
extreme than their stand against the 1970 Constitution, and
once the Constitution is adopted they may decide to take
part in the political process, particularly if they will be
able to campaign as a party. For the new arrangement does
offer the parties a significant opportunity to increase their
political power. Under the new regime, two-thirds of the
parliament will be elected directly by the people. The deputies
will have some supervisory power over the government as well as
a role in any future amendments of the Constitution. The
party leaders are also tempted by.hopes of being included in
the Cabinet, though they fear that their chances of getting
significant posts are slim.
14. Changes of the scope outlined by the King will probably
not do much to solve the underlying problems that trouble Morocco.
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The new cabinet is not likely to have sufficient independent
authority to take bold initiatives in the economic and social
realms. Moreover, there is a good chance that the Istiglal
Party and the UNFP would fall out in the process of pressing
the palace to agree to basic reform. Even under the best of
circumstances, it would be difficult to carry out radical land
reform, which is urgently needed to correct the injustice of
antiquated land tenure arrangements. A coalition government
might attempt some educational reform. But it would not be
easy to transform this rooted structure, nor does the regime
have much wealth to invest in this area.
15. Indeed, the limited fiscal resources of the state
are a major obstacle to reform. Morocco faces the normal
quotient of economic problems common to underdeveloped coun-
tries: serious unemployment and underemployment, burgeoning
slums resulting from the influx of the poor from the land to
the cities, rising prices and inflation that exacerbate social
unrest, and a wide gulf in wealth between the few rich and the
many near the subsistence level. In addition, overpopulation
and a high birthrate also serve to frustrate the government's
efforts at development. Morocco lacks oil or other readily
exploitable natural resources. Suffering from these severe
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structural difficulties, the country has made only faltering
economic progress. since the French left and has been in an
economic slump for the past few years. The regime now has
little chance of obtaining the funds needed to stimulate the
economy, unless the government should become willing to take
painful steps to redistribute the wealth of the Moroccan elite.
16. Failure to deal with these basic problems may not,
of course, pose an immediate threat to the survival of the
regime. The show of action underway since last July seems
likely to abosrb the attention of the politically aware for
the near term. Much as they will continue to grumble and express
dissatisfaction with the King's initiatives, the political
party leaders are apparently not yet ready to mount all-out
opposition to the proposed liberalization. They realize that
they are not in position to insist on a much faster pace or
more extensive change. General Oufkir and his associates
also seem ready to accept this political charade, especially
as long as the government maintains public order. The King
apparently recognizes this danger and has warned that he will
move decisively to prevent a descent into anarchy.
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17. Although an explosion does not appear likely in
the immediate future, continuing discontent poses a long-
term threat to the regime. To avoid eventual forceful over-
throw, Hassan must be willing to change the system far more
fundamentally than he has so far been willing to do. Already
the younger militants within the political parties are
criticizing the established leaders for negotiating with the
King on the latter's terms. Particularly if the present leaders
cannot obtain an adequate measure of authority from the King
to provide far more effective government than Morocco has enjoyed
up to now, they will face a rising challenge from the younger
generation. In this event, the chances for the emergence of a
strong leftist radical movement would be high. And Moroccan
politics might no longer be characterized by a measured ap-
proach. Indeed, if the new government to be formed after the
referendum does not accord the parties a significant role,
this radicalization may come sooner rather than later.
Implications for the United States
18. The US has been closely associated with the Moroccan
monarchy over the years. US military and economic aid have
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in the Moroccan context been relatively large (about $860
million since independence: of which some $783 million is
military and about $77 million economic). Moreover, inside
Morocco the US is widely regarded as a staunch supporter of
the royal regime. Despite domestic criticism, Hassan, for
his part, has permitted the US to operate the important Kenitra
communications complex. The Moroccans have served as some-
thing of a moderating influence in Arab councils.
19. But forces that threaten cooperation with the US are
rising. As elsewhere in Africa and Asia, nationalist feeling
is growing in Morocco. This process may be speeded as a
result of the reemphasis on party politics that may result
from the new Constitutional arrangement. Both the UNFP and
more especially the Istiglal Party stand for US withdrawal
from the Kenitra facilities. In its quest for popular sup-
port, the Istiqlal may raise this issue as an early order of
business. While Hassan still sees some value in retaining
this link to the US, he recognizes that in terms of an induce-
ment for additional aid and as a source of foreign exchange
these facilities are a waning asset. These calculations may
weaken his resolve to resist pressures if the American pres-
ence should emerge as a popular issue. Moreover, in this
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situation present US intentions to reduce the complement
associated with Kenitra might lead Hassan to believe that
the US itself would not be seriously troubled by the closing
of these installations.
20. Of course, the close relationship between the US
and Morocco would be far more seriously disrupted if. the.
monarchy were to be overthrown.
Hence any successors to the monarchy would probably
move soon to terminate US access to the Kenitra facilities.
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2 March 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
D
John Huizenga
SUBJECT : Additional Distribution for MEMORANDUM:
"Prospects for Political Change in Morocco"
Subject to your approval, we would like the following to
receive this Memorandum:
White House
Mr. Harold Saunders (2 copies)
National Security Council
Room 372A
Executive Office Building
State Department
Ray Cline
INR/OD
Room 6531
Robert H. Pelletreau (Copy sent 28 February 1972)
AF/N
Room 4511
James J. Blake (Copy sent 28 February 1972)
AF/N
Room 4513
C. Robert Moore (Copy sent 28 February 1972)
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Room 6234A
David D. Newsom //
Room 6234A
S-E-C-R-E-T
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Pentagon
James H. Noyes
Deputy Assistant Secretary NESA/-LSA
Room 4E840
George W. Bader
Regional Director, Africa/- -1-5.4
Room 4B880
ie ear Last staff
Office of National Estimates
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E
xe
Cutxvu
23 March 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR : Director of National Estimates
SUBJE~gT Prospects for Political Change in Morocco
,.i!- ~ Trends in Ceylon
On reading your excellent memorandum on Morocco,. I thought
it might have been a fine candidate for an experiment in presenting
possible alternative developments and the factors which might bring
them about. I think this might sharpen up the value of an Estimate
paper and prove a certain incentive toward decision-making to which
factors to activate so that a preferred alternative could be sought.
The defense will exist that this might get near to policy advocacy but
I think the alternatives could be stated in objective enough terms so
that it need not be.
In this case, the alternatives might be ' along the lines of:'
a. King Hassan's performance on about the same lines
as at present, resulting in continued unhappiness with the
regime, the possible growth of a real opposition underground
and a substantial swing in policy as a result of his disappearance
or overthrow.
b. A "King's revolution" along the lines of Iran, accom-
panied by some unhappiness among some of the settled powers
of the country but the gradual awakening of a political base in
the country.
c. Assumption of power by General Oufkir as an authori-
tarian boss replacing or under the figurehead of King Hassan.
The Ceylon estimate might also be given somewhat the same
treatment although the alternatives are by no means as clear as the
Moroccan.
Since I know very little, if anything, about Morocco or Ceylon,
these are obviously just suggestions as to form rather than substance.
They do stem from an interest in making Estimate papers a really
vital part of U. S. policy formulation, however, and I think a change in
form might encourage this.
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Exectut4v CIrector-Comptroller
.1. 1
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MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI
Morocco is one of the places we carry on our
list of potential unpleasant surprises. This paper
reviews the scene on the occasion of a constitutional
referendum this week, and is a dry run for an NIE
some months hence.
JOH f~I tDTZENGA
D' e for
National Estimates
Attachment:
Memorandum, dtd 28 Feb 72
"Prospects for Political Change in
Morocco"
FORM 101 ~ELACES FORM 10-101
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Colby
Morocco is on our watch list of potential
unpleasant surprises.
John Huizenga
(DATE)
(DATE)
FORM tot RELACES FORM 10-101
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Morocco is one of the places we arry on our
list of potential unpleasa t surpr' es. This paper
reviews the scene on the occa ' n of a constitutional
referendum this week, a ' a dry run for an NIE
Attachm&it:
Memorandum, dtd 28 Feb 72
"Prospects for Political Change in
Morocco"
FORM I NO 101 RELACES FORM 10-101
MLMORANEP FOR: Mr. Cline
This is a dry run for a forthcoming estimate on
Morocco intended to acquaint the community with
our current thinking. It has gone to the following
policy people in the Department: Assistant Secretary
Newsom, Deputy Assistant Secretary Moore,
James J. Blake AF/N, and Robert Pelletreau AF/N.
Jo nh'F ga
ui~
Director
National Estimates
NO '
54 1 0 1 WHICH RELACES FORM
USED.
(DATE)
2 March 72
(DATE)
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