EGYPT AND THE USSR: FRIENDSHIP FOREVER (OR FOR FIFTEEN YEARS)?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A000400010018-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 14, 2006
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: July 6, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

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Secret
OFFICE OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
MEMORANDUM
Egypt and the USSR: Friendship Forever (or for Fifteen Years?
Secret
6 July 1971
Copy No.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
6 July 1971
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Egypt and the USSR: Friendship Forever (or for
Fifteen years)?
Appraisals of the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation have diverged widely. Some have said that it repre-
sents a major turning point in Middle Eastern affairs -- a new
reality which will affect events significantly for years to come.
Others have argued that it is simply a formalization on paper of
present realities, suiting the tactical convenience of each party,
and so subject to interpretation in light of expendiency as to be
a matter of very limited importance. This memorandum assesses the
factors bearing on these divergent interpretations of the treaty
and considers the course of the overall Soviet-Egyptian relationship.
Not all who participated in the discussion of the paper are in full
accord with its conclusions. These latter appear in summary form
in paragraphs 23 and 24.
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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1. When Nikolay Podgorny and Anwar Sadat met in Cairo
in late May, both leaders had reason to be concerned about
aspects of their relationship. From Moscow's point of view,
the events of the previous few weeks had been extremely dis-
turbing. All the prominent Egyptians publicly associated
with the USSR had been unceremoniously dumped in a major purge.
A widely publicized visit to Cairo by Secretary Rogers had
signaled an apparent improvement in US-Egyptian relations.
The USSR had been excluded from negotiations over a possible
interim agreement along the Suez Canal. Sadat was apprehen-
sive about the Soviet response. He feared that it might compli-
cate his uneasy political situation at home. He was anxious
to reassure his military that weapons would continue to arrive.
2. Podgorny's hastily arranged trip to Cairo resulted in
a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (text at Annex). Pre-
viously, the Soviets had not entered into bilateral treaties
incorporating political engagements with non-communist devel-
oping countries, aside from two of their immediate neighbors.
The Egyptians had not signed a bilateral treaty with a great
power since 1954, when the British agreed to leave the Suez Canal
Zone, and all the Arab countries had avoided treaty commitments
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to the great powers since the establishment of Israel, barring
Iraq's participation in the Baghdad Pact.' So in a formal sense,
at least, the treaty was a considerable departure from past
practice.
3. The Egyptian-Soviet treaty can be taken as a further
step in a long process of increasing intimacy between the USSR
and'Egypt. Since the 1967 war, Moscow has strengthened its
influence in Cairo and expanded its military presence in Egypt.
The Egyptians, under the pressures of a disastrous defeat and
continuing Israeli occupation of Sinai, have become almost totally
dependent on the USSR for military assistance and for diplomatic
support. Each side might have seen advantage in formalizing the
relationship, and the idea of a treaty appears to have been ger-
minating for some time, though the circumstances in which it was
worked out suggest that the specific initiative came from the
Soviet side.
The Evian Accords between Algeria and France were similar to
a treaty in many respects, but they were signed prior to --
and in exchange for -- full Algerian independence.
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4. Both Moscow and Cairo claim that a formal accord was
first suggested by the Egyptians, but the language and format
of the document signed in May mark it as a Soviet text. We
have reports that Nasser proposed in July 1970 that Soviet-
Egyptian relations be formalized in a document and that Sadat
repeated the idea during his visit to Moscow in March 1971. It
seems likely that the Soviets had prepared a draft, on a contin-
gency basis, in response to such suggestions. But the Rogers
visit to the Middle East and the purge of the Egyptian government
probably seemed to Moscow to call for dramatic counterbalancing
action, thus providing the immediate stimulus for the treaty.
Whether or not Sadat had second thoughts when the Soviets pre-
sented their draft, he had taken steps that jeopardized a relation-
ship he needed and could hardly refuse to make a placatory gesture.
5. The treaty itself contains only one specific, concrete
obligation -- continued training of the Egyptian armed forces by
the USSR (Article 8). The Soviet obligation to continue providing
weapons is implicit but clear. The mutual pledges include an
undertaking not to interfere in one another's internal affairs,
efforts to achieve peace in the area, consultation on all important
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matters, and avoidance of other obligations that would conflict
with the treaty. On policy matters, the only contingency that
requires the parties to "concert their positions" rather than
simply to "consult" is the development of a situation that both
judge to be a danger to peace (Article 7). In addition, there
are provisions dealing with technical cooperation and trade ex-
changes, as well as rhetorical flourishes invoking friendship
and fidelity to the anti-imperialist cause.
6. Several omissions and nuances are notable. The treaty
clearly places Egypt in a category of special importance, close-
ness, and concern to the USSR. Egypt is ponderously described
not as a socialist state but as a state having "set itself the
aim of reconstructing society along socialist lines" (Article 2).
This formula gives the USSR ideological justification for close
involvement with Egypt but stops short of invoking the Brezhnev
Doctrine -- the right of the Soviet Union to interfere in the
internal affairs of socialist states. Provisions relating to
mutual assistance against aggression are entirely absent.
7. From our fragmentary information on the negotiations
in Cairo, it appears that Sadat introduced some changes in the
text proposed by the USSR which were intended to make the treaty
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as palatable as possible to him and his Egyptian and Arab con-
stituents. He reportedly insisted on including Cooperation,
rather than solely Friendship, in the title, shortened the
term from 35 to 15 years, and inserted a statement that existing
international commitments are not affected.
the Egyptians wanted a
Soviet commitment to defend Egypt against attack; if so, Sadat
failed on that point.
8. The treaty already has been useful to its signatories
in appealing to some elements of their separate constituencies.
For Russian ears, Moscow can point to it as a tangible return
on the huge Soviet investment in Egypt. During the ratification
procedure, it was hailed as a triumph of Soviet foreign policy.
It has greatly cheered pro-Moscow leftists in the Middle East,
who had been badly shaken by indications that Sadat was moving
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away from Moscow. The Kremlin also is billing it as evidence
of growing cohesion between the socialist countries and world
liberation movements. Most importantly, it is a signal that
the US has not driven a wedge between the USSR and Egypt or
excluded the Soviets from the peace making process.
9. For Sadat, the treaty is implicit Soviet endorsement
of his leadership and his policies. It serves to protect him
from political adversaries who might contemplate moving against
him in the hope or expectation of Soviet help. He has under-
scored the message to Egyptian leftists by appointing at least
two known members of the now-dissolved Egyptian Communist Party
to government posts. For his military, the treaty is assurance
that further arms and training will be forthcoming. Both for
Egyptians and for other militant Arabs, Sadat has been stressing
the role that Soviet aid will play in preparing Egypt to move
militarily against Israel when settlement efforts founder.
10. In the wake of the treaty, there has been a hiatus in
efforts toward a settlement or an interim arrangement between
Egypt and Israel. This suspension of action on the negotiating
front may not have been intended by either of the signatories.
Both the Soviets and the Egyptians have insisted in public and
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in private that the treaty has no effect on Egyptian terms for
either partial or total settlement, and the words of the treaty
do not, in fact, pose any new obstacles. But the very signing
of the treaty has raised serious questions in Washington and in
Tel Aviv. At the moment, Moscow probably is enjoying US dis-
comfiture and expecting a larger role in further efforts at settle-
ment. And the harsh tone of Egyptian comments on peace prospects
that have followed the signing of the treaty does nothing to
expedite the settlement process.
11. Israeli reactions have been contradictory. On the one
hand, Tel Aviv dismisses the treaty as an inconsequential codifi-
cation of an existing relationship. On the other hand, the Israelis
insist that the treaty augurs a new flow of arms to Egypt and requires
immediate US approval of additional advanced aircraft for Israel.
Concurrently, the Israeli government assures the Israeli people
that Egypt has no capability to launch a successful attack against
Israeli forces and cannot attain such a capability anytime in the
foreseeable future.
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Some Longer Run Possibilities
12. With the signing of the Soviet-Egyptian treaty, some-
thing new clearly has been injected into the Middle East situation.
The treaty does not, of course, stand alone; it is only one mani-
festation of an evolving bilateral relationship which is affected
by the actions, words, and policies of many parties. In large
measure, the new element it signifies is a matter of atmosphere
and expectations rather than specific change spelled out in the
treaty itself. The official and semi-official pronouncements on
the treaty from Moscow and Cairo give some indication of the motives
and intentions of the two signatories.
13. The Soviets, in their commentary, are making it clear
that they are in the Middle East to stay, in spite of any moves
the US might make to undermine their position. In their public-
ity on the treaty, the stress has been on the permanence of
Soviet-Arab friendship, a legal foundation for joint Soviet-
9
Egyptian actions of unspecified nature, and -- repeatedly --
peace on terms acceptable to the Arabs. The Soviets have seized
on renewed Israeli statements of arms requirements as further
evidence of Israeli aggressive intentions and hence of Arab need
for defensive assistance. In reference to military cooperation,
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Moscow has hit hard on the importance of Soviet assistance to
the Arabs in repelling aggression, although it has carefully
avoided any suggestion that the USSR might assist the Arabs
directly in liberating the occupied territories.
14. Sadat clearly looks on the treaty as a short term
expedient, despite his statement that it is "for eternity".
He has downplayed its non-military aspects, claiming that it
has only two important facets: the article on military assist-
ance and the rebuff that the treaty itself presents to those
who hoped to weaken Egypt by undermining Soviet-Egyptian friend-
ship. In short: Now we are strong enough to make peace and
someday we will be strong enough to make war -- both thanks to
Moscow.
- Regarding ,Settlement Efforts
15. By reemphasizing the solidarity of the USSR and Egypt,
Moscow probably hopes to impress upon Tel Aviv that the Israeli
military option has become very risky and that a settlement by
negotiation has become the only prudent course. Both the Soviets
and Egyptians may calculate that the Israelis, in the face of the
power realities which now prevail, will finally see no choice but
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to work out an agreement -- and an agreement on terms acceptable
to Egypt. Whether in fact Israel will come to feel such concern
over its security as to become amenable to effective negotiation
and compromise seems doubtful. US policies and actions would,
of course, be highly important in this regard.
16. The immediate impact on Israel of the Soviet-Egyptian
treaty has been to reinforce existing irritations and suspicions.
When the Egyptians and Soviets cooperated to violate the stand-
still provisions of the cease-fire in 1970, Cairo was attempting
to attain a military position strong enough to permit it to
negotiate. What the Egyptians either did not realize or did not
take seriously was the effect that this move would have on Israeli
willingness to entertain notions of compromise. For Israel,
Egyptian cheating was one more clear evidence of the unreli-
ability of any Egyptian pledge; the effect was all the worse
because of the collusion of the detested Soviets. Given the
depth of Israeli antipathy for the Soviet regime, the treaty --
signifying Egyptian approval of a formally entrenched long term
Soviet presence is one more reason for Israel to remain adamant
on all issues.
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- Regarding Military Relationships
17. The Soviets, having by the treaty implicitly increased
their commitment to Egypt, are likely to be led to increase their
military role there. They might want to curtail military activities
that principally serve Egyptian interests and involve risks for
the USSR, such as direct participation in the defense of Egypt.
But Sadat will continue to seek this kind of help and such activ-
ities do have the advantage to the Soviets of improving their ability
to affect the likelihood and/or outcome of future hostilities. Sadat
probably hopes to limit the size and scope of Soviet activities
designed principally to serve Soviet interests, such as recon-
naissance and fleet support. But the more dependent he becomes
upon Moscow, the harder it will be for him to refuse requests for
new concessions -- expanded use of Mersa Matruh, for example. He
probably will calculate that the Egyptian army will tolerate an
increased Soviet impingement on Egyptian sovereignty in exchange
for increased Soviet equipment. Over time, therefore, the extent
of. the Soviet military presence in Egypt is likely to depend
increasingly on what the Soviets consider desirable in military
terms and acceptable in terms of the risk of involvement in a
renewed Egyptian-Israeli conflagration.
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18. There is no reason to believe that Moscow wants to
see Sadat renew war with Israel. The Soviets undoubtedly
hope that the treaty's requirement for concerting policy in the
face of a threat to peace will help to prevent the Egyptians from
doing anything rash. However, the presence of Soviet personnel
with Egyptian military units and Soviet control over key military
equipment such as surface-to-air missiles and advanced aircraft
are more dependable restraints on the Egyptians than any treaty
commitment.
- Regarding Egyptian and Arab Affairs
19. Similarly, Sadat probably depends more on the inherent
limitations on Soviet ability to interfere in his domestic affairs
than on their promise not to. There have been two major political
crises in Egypt in the past year -- Nasser's death and Sadat's
purge of the government. In both cases, the Egyptian authorities
acted rapidly and the Soviets remained properly aloof, although
no doubt deeply concerned about the outcome.
20. Moscow's forbearance may simply have resulted from
recognition that there was little they could do to affect the
outcome. Unsuccessful interferencf' would be embarrassing to
Soviet international prestige and?ght, moreover, produce
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domestic political recriminations. Geography and logistics
severely limit the military force that the Soviets can bring
to bear in Egypt. Political manipulation alone is an uncertain
tool at best. Hence, though the extent of their commitment
probably will cause the Soviets to want a higher degree of
control over the Egyptian political process, they will probably
remain careful about direct interference. Nevertheless, Sadat
will be aware of their desires and preferences and probably
will temper his actions somewhat in order to avoid strong Soviet
displeasure.
21. Arab reactions to the treaty are ambivalent. The
Arab world is simultaneously disturbed by Sadat's action in
signing and understanding of the pressures that brought it about.
Egyptian adherence to the treaty has been endorsed, officially or
semi-officially, by the governments of Libya, Syria, Lebanon, and
South Yemen. Nevertheless, at least the first three are aghast
at this breach of neutralism. Colonel Qadhafi of Libya has
recently gone out of his way to excoriate the Soviets in a public
speech (along with the imperialist US, the atheistic Chinese,
the Egyptians, and almost all other foreigners). In these cir-
cumstances, the prospects for any meaningful federation of Egypt,
Libya, and Syria seem dimmer than ever.
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22. With foreign military bases on its soil and a bilateral
treaty with a great power, Egypt has further diluted its claim
to non-alignment. In so doing, it has lost one of its major
appeals to progressive non-Communist Arabs throughout the Arab
world. In time, Cairo may find itself the new target for the
kind of inter-Arab attack it used so generously in the past
against Arab regimes that harbored US and British bases. At
this juncture, however, Sadat's relations with the conservatives
are relatively good. King Feisal, normally so sensitive about
Soviet intrusion in the Middle East,saw fit to visit Cairo and
exhibit Arab solidarity in the immediate wake of the treaty. We
have no satisfactory explanation, but the visit suggests that
Feisal feels he has less to fear from Sadat than from Nasser in
terms of his own political position at home and accepts Sadat's
explanation that the treaty was a necessary step in the over-
riding Arab cause -- standing up to Israel.
23. The Soviet-Egyptian treaty itself will not determine
the future course and development of Soviet-Egyptian relations,
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but it does cast the relationship in a more solid and solemn
framework. The Soviets, uneasy over Sadat's independent dealings
with the US, have made him promise to consult them in the future
and undoubtedly expect this promise to be kept. On their own
side, the Soviets have assumed a more formal obligation to Egypt
that is likely to affect their behavior in future risk contin-
gencies; they will feel that their prestige and honor are more
deeply committed. Individual Soviet leaders have associated them-
selves with an Egyptian policy involving high costs; its failure
would entail political risks for them. In Moscow and in Cairo,
the treaty is likely to give birth to bureaucratic interests which
will identify with the relationship in its new form and which will
be determined to have it succeed. Thus, the long-standing trend
toward growing Soviet involvement in Egyptian affairs has been
institutionalized and made even more difficult to reverse.
24. Sadat appears to have assumed some increased degree of
long run risk to Egyptian sovereignty and his own freedom of
maneuver, in order to preserve the immediate benefits of the
Soviet alliance. Of course some major change --'e.g., Israeli
agreement to total withdrawal from Sinai as part of a settle-
ment package -- could deprive the Soviet-Egyptian treaty of
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much of its meaning. In the Arab-Israeli atmosphere that now
prevails, however, it appears more likely that the total Soviet-
Egyptian relationship formalized by the treaty will develop to
the advantage of the Soviets and to the detriment of those
Egyptians who remain committed to policies of independence and
non-al i gnment.
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