INDO-PAKISTANI TENSIONS, PRESENT AND FUTURE*

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A000300020006-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 6, 2008
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: March 1, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

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S] URE"l'
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
SUBJECT: Indo-Pakistani Tensions, Present and Future*
Varying degrees of fear and distrust have usually char-
acterized relations between the governments of India and
Pakistan. Religious rivalries and unresolved territorial
disputes, notably over Kashmir, militate against any lasting
reconciliation. Islamabad fears that its larger neighbor
will some day seek to destroy it. New Delhi has become
increasingly concerned with Pakistani intentions, particularly
since the latter now receives support from India's much
feared enemy, Communist China. Internal political develop-
ments in both India and Pakistan are likely in the immediate
future to add to the tensions between them. Neither country
desires or intends to start a war, but each exaggerates the
other's hostile intentions. The odds are still against hos-
tilities, but the two could stumble inadvertently into a
serious conflict, as they have in the past. This Memorandum
examines relations between India and Pakistan, considers
the contingency of new hostilities in both the short and
longer term, assesses the general military capabilities of
each, and discusses the likely outcome and some implications
for the US.
PFIAB review completed
This Memorandum was prepared by the Office of National
Estimates and coordinated within CIA.
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1. As a result of several unforeseen and unconnected
developments relations between India and Pakistan are now
more strained than at any time since the 1965 Indo-Pakistani
war. India will go to the polls during the first 10 days of
March. The electoral campaign has brought forth much anti-
Pakistani oratory. Pakistan for its part is in the midst of
serious domesticcrisis. Its martial law regime has relaxed
its former strict controls over the people. It permitted a
free election in December 1970. After a campaign which featured
vociferous expressions of anti-India sentiment in West Pakistan,
the voters chose an assembly charged with writing a new con-
stitution. The assembly was scheduled to begin its work in
early March, but its opening has been indefinitely postponed by
President Yahya because of the intense disagreement betweenthe
East and West Pakistani factions.
2. Pakistan's domestic political situation has implications
for the Indo-Pakistani dispute. The country has, since Ayub's
takeover in 1958, been dominated by West Pakistan; its army
has been overwhelmingly from the west wing; the national
government's policies have reflected anti-Indian biases
which are much stronger in West Pakistan than in the east.
Even so, since 1958, Pakistan's governments have been auto-
cratic in nature, not responsive to popular pressures and
able (though not always inclined) to play down or ignore anti-
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3. The December elections have changed this. The West
Pakistanis* overwhelmingly voted for the Pakistan Peoples
Party of Z.A. Bhutto, a virulent anti-Indian xenophobe.
The East Pakistanis, on the other hand, chose almost the
full slate of candidates of the Awami League (AL) led by
Mujibur Rahman (usually referred to as Mujib). The East
Pakistanis have far less fear and hatred of India than do
those in the west wing, are little concerned about India's
occupation of Kashmir, and in fact want a rapprochement with
their large Hindu neighbor. The AL would have an absolute
majority in the constitutent assembly -- if that body is
allowed to convene -- and Mujib is determined to assure well-
nigh, complete autonomy for East Pakistan, including freedom
to determine its own international relationships. But he has
run into opposition, both from Bhutto and at least some elements
of the ruling martial law regime.
4. The denouement of the present situation is anything
but clear. Negotiations between Mujib and Bhutto have broken
down. The attitudes of President Yahya and his government
West Pakistan has recently been broken into four separate
provinces. These nonetheless have much in common and will
probably continue to work closely together; for the pur-
poses of this paper West Pakistan will be considered as a
single unit.
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continue to be uncertain. Yahya, when he ordered the elec-
tions held, stated that he would veto any constitution which
destroyed the "integrity" of Pakistan. Privately, he has dis-
approved of Mujib's demands for autonomy, and as a West Pakistani
military leader he almost certainly dislikes the AL's softness
towards India. It is too early to say whether Yahya's post-
ponement of the constituent assembly will bring on a showdown
or temporarily postpone it. The former appears more likely at
the moment.
5. East Pakistan's 75 million people resent -- with
considerable justification -- what they consider discriminatory
and repressive rule by the westerners. A growing number now
demand full independence. Whether the 20,000 or so predominantly
West Pakistani troops there could suppress a Bengali uprising,
much less retain control over any extended period, is open to
serious question. But this judgment may not be shared by hard
line military leaders; at least some are probably disposed to
hold the Bengalis down by force, and confident they can do so.*
6. As the Indian election campaign has drawn to a close,
domestic tensions have risen there as well. Among those
contesting for office is at least one fairly large political
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party, Jan Sangh, which is bitterly anti-Muslim and anti-
Pakistani. Its candidates' oratory has inevitably roused
emotions in those areas of India where anti-Muslim prejudices
are strong. This in turn has put pressure on those relatively
moderate leaders, including Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, to
prove their patriotism and display their anti-Pakistani cre-
dentials. Initially this was achieved by jailing prominent
Kashmiris who urged separation from India and by banning their
political movement from participation in the election -- acts
in themselves provocative to the Pakistanis. All this has
tended to reinforce a climate in which the government would
have difficulty in not reacting strongly to Pakistani moves
considered hostile.
7. With such edgy situations in both countries, a specific
event has triggered off what could be the beginnings of a new
Indo-Pakistani crisis. On 30 January 1971, an Indian airliner
flying between Jammu and Srinagar was hijacked and forced to
land at Lahore in West Pakistan. The hijackers were Kashmiris
out to publicize the plight of that predominantly Muslim area
occupied by India since .19+8. They initially demanded the
release of those Kashm.iri leaders recently jailed by the Indians,
but they eventually let the passengers and crew go and then
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blew up the plane. The Pakistanis, ignoring official Indian
demands for compensation, apologies, and extradition, granted
asylum to the hijackers. India has since responded to the
hijacking by banning overflights over India between East
and West Pakistan -- posing a financial burden on that country.
8. Both governments have permitted if not encouraged
large and sometimes violent demonstrations outside each other's
diplomatic installations. Bhutto, attempting to consolidate
his position in the west wing and to cast doubts on Mujib's
patriotism (the latter had been critical of the whole hijacking
affair), has lavished praise on the hijackers and made a point
of going to the airport to congratulate them. Mrs. Gandhi too
has gotten into the act and has revived a long standing demand
of Hindu extremists that Pakistan be forced to give up that
part of the old princely state of Kashmir which it occupies --
something which India could try to accomplish only by major
armed action.
9. Reports of movements of armored units, of troops put
on ready alert, and the like have been circulated. There
apparently have been some troop movements, the extent of
which we do not know, but they appear defensive. Completion
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of the Indian elections and forward movement on Pakistan's
constitutional problems could in themselves lead to a
quieting of the situation. There are already signs that
governmental leaders on both sides are making a more sober
assessment of the current problems between them, and are working
towards a lesser level of tension.
10. But this is not to say that the basic hostilities
and underlying strains between the two countries are likely
to be overcome. They have already led to three wars, one of
major dimensions, and the potential for strife will still be
there. The specific political conditions in both nations offer
ample opportunity for extremists and demagogues to heat up the
atmosphere. It does not seem likely that either government
will deliberately plan toinitiate hostilities against the
other. The real danger, as before, is that inflammatory events
now unforeseeable will put further strains on their relations,
produce exaggerated reactions, and escalate to military conflict.
Military Capabilities
11. The Indian armed forces have something over a
million men; the Pakistani roughly a third that number.
Both have been greatly expanded in size in the past decade
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and have received very substantial amounts of new and sophis-
ticated equipment. Military budgets are now, in real terms,
up to double what they were in 1960. Both countries must
still rely on major arms producing countries for such complex
weapons as jet aircraft, helicopters, most of their tanks,
electronic equipment, naval craft, etc. They have so far
been relatively successful in acquiring them, and the armed
forces of the two countries are well equipped. Until 1965,
Pakistan's armed forces were supplied almost completely.by the
US, which had provided nearly
700 million in military aid
since the mid-1950s. Since the cut-off of US arms supplies
at the time of the 1965 war, Islamabad has greatly diversified
its sources. Its principal new arms provider has been China
which has sent over a hundred jet fighters, several hundred
tanks, and enough materiel to equip at least two new infantry
divisions. The Pakistanis have also purchased substantial
amounts of arms in Western Europe and have gotten some modest
numbers of tanks and other ground equipment from the USSR.
12. Unlike Pakistan, India has a substantial defense
industry of its own, and now manufactures enough ammunition,
small arms, machine guns, mortars, light artillery pieces
and the like to equip its ground forces. While India still
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gets some sophisticated items from the UK and France (US
military aid has been terminated), the USSR is its principal
source of such equipment. Since 1962, the Soviets have de-
livered over $700 million worth of jet fighters and fighter bombers,
surface-to-air missiles, tanks, frigates, submarines and other
materiel.
13. The splitting of Pakistan into two separate nations
-- if such does indeed, occur -- would have little impact on
the balance of conventional military forces in the subcon-
tinent. Those comparatively few West Pakistani troops in
the east wing are essentially an occupation force, with obso-
lescent equipment and little military capability with respect
to the Indians. In any Indo-Pakistani war, India could of
course move forces into East Pakistan with little or no
resistance, but this would not affect the main theater of
fighting. It would take an independent Bengali regime many
years to develop a military arm of any consequence, even if
it decided to do so.
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Communist China -- A Possible Factor
14. India, with 10 times the population of West Pakistan
and three times the number of troops, is not threatened by
that country alone. But this is not India's real fear; India
must take Communist China into account. The two countries
have serious territorial disputes; their relations, initially
cordial, began deteriorating in the late 1950s. In a border
war in the autumn of 1962, China inflicted a humiliating defeat
on India. It has developed close ties with the government of
Pakistan; since 1965 it has been the chief source of arms
supplies for the Pakistani military. During the 1965 Indo-
Pakistani war the Chinese made a number of threatening noises,
but did not actually intervene.
15. How far India's fear of China is justified is
debatable. Certainly in any Indo-Pakistani conflict China's
sympathy and interests would lie on Pakistan's side; at a
minimum, it would make some gestures of support. But China's
future policies are no more a known quantity to India than to
us, and India feels it must be prepared for the contingency
of another round of fighting with the Chinese.
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16. In any event, India military planners have prepared
for a two-front war against West Pakistani and Chinese con-
ventional military forces.* About 200,000 of its million-man
army are positioned against West Pakistan, which has a force
of roughly equal size, equipment, and leadership on its side
of the frontier. Most of these units are deployed in the flat,
open Punjabi plain. Another 200,000 Indian soldiers are posted
in the high Himalayan areas and passes of Ladakh, eastern India,
and Sikkim. These are specially trained and equipped mountain
troops. Behind these two concentrations of forces are strategic
reserve units of up to 200,000 men in north and central India,
ready to come to the assistance of either force were the Chinese
or the Pakistanis to break through on their respective fronts.
17. The Indians, since their military humiliation in
1962, have persistently exaggerated the strength of the
conventional military forces that China could bring to bear
against them. Because of long distances from supply centers
The Indians are deeply concerned about China's nuclear
arsenal, but have as yet not sought to develop a nuclear
deterrent of their own. They could explode a low yield
nuclear device within a year of a decision to do so, and
could then manufacture several more. They will be unable
to produce thermonuclear weapons in at least this decade,
however. Pakistan's nuclear capabilities will remain
virtually nil in this period.
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and severely inhospitable terrain, no more than 150,000
Chinese could be used in an attack on India from bases
in Tibet and Sinkiang. Formidable Himalayan winters would
permit major military operations in this region only between
August and December. Such factors as very high altitudes
and distance from available air bases would greatly reduce
the amount of air support the Chinese could give their ground
forces. Indian defenses in these areas have been very greatly
improved since 1962.
18, On the other hand, there are some factors which
could benefit the Chinese in an attack on India. They would
start from a relatively favorable strategic position. Based
on the high points of the large Himalayan plateau, the Chinese,
if initially successful, would quickly come down through mountain
valleys to the large Gangetic plain in the subcontinent. Their
principal area of attack would probably be through the North
East Frontier Agency and particularly through Sikkim which is
only some 60 miles from the East Pakistani border. Were
Chinese forces to reach the latter point, they would isolate
eastern India -- including Assam and the North East Frontier
Agency -- from the rest of the country. Further, the Chinese
could attack eastern India with another 150,000 troops if they
chose to move their forces through Burma.
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Military Prospects
19. In a war which saw no outside intervention in the
subcontinent, India would almost certainly defeat Pakistan.
Its forces are so much larger, its inventory of armaments
and sources of supplies so much greater than the Pakistanis'
that the latter would eventually be overwhelmed by sheer
weight of numbers. This estimate is probably shared by the
top authorities of both India and Pakistan. (In 1965, the
Pakistanis overestimated their strength against India and
now know that they did.) Accordingly we believe the Pakistanis
would, in the present situation at least, go to considerable
lengths to avoid provoking open combat unless they can get
major outside, i.e. Chinese,support.
20. A number of factors bear on the possibility of
Chinese involvement in an Indo-Pakistani war. Some, noted
above, are physical and even seasonably predictable. For
example, weather conditions in the Himalayas would severely
limit Chinese military moves against India from January
through July of each year. Other current impediments to
Chinese intervention are political or more subject to change.
These include the situation along the Sino-Soviet border,
circumstances in Indochina and the state of internal politics
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in China. The outcome of a two-front conventional war fought
by India against Pakistan and China is much less predictable
than an Indo-Pakistani conflict. The Indians are far better
prepared -- in strategic planning, training, equipment, and
number of forces -- to meet the Chinese than they were in 1962.
On paper they have the strength, without any outside aid, to
wage a successful defense against a Pakistani-Chinese assault.
But such intangible and unpredictable factors as morale, ability
to handle sophisticated equipment -- and luck -- could possibly
change this picture.
Implications for the USSR and the US
21. The past five or six years have seen an increasing
political interest and involvement by the USSR in the affairs
of South Asia. The Soviets have expanded their already sub-
stantial military aid program to India and have begun a much more
modest -- and perhaps temporary -- one to Pakistan. Soviet
economic assistance programs have shown no significant in-
crease, but neither have they precipitately declined.
US associations with Pakistan
in CENTO and SEATO have been, in effect, terminated; US military
supply programs to India and Pakistan have all but.ended; US
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economic assistance programs for both countries -- though
still larger than those of the USSR in absolute terms --
have been cut considerably.
22. While active in promoting closer bilateral polit-
ical ties with both India and Pakistan, Moscow has also gone
to some lengths to bring about an improved climate of relations
between the two antagonists themselves. This was conspicuously
the case in the Tashkent Conference of January 1966, wherein
Kosygin persuaded the then leaders of India and Pakistan to
pull their troops back from areas occupied during the 1965
war, to restore diplomatic relations, and to begin dialogues
leading to resolution of outstanding disputes. Such dialogues
have, of course, failed, but the Soviets still seek to enhance
their leverage and to promote stability in the area.
23. To a very considerable extent their policies have
been the outgrowth of a rising concern with Communist China.
Moscow has sought to increase its leverage in Pakistan in
order to reduce Chinese influence there. It has given con-
siderable backing and support to India as the latter has
sought to strengthen itself militarily with respect to the
Chinese. And Russian efforts to reduce Zndo-Pakistani tensions
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w SJ(JKt1' NOW
appear motivated chiefly to prevent crises which Peking
could exploit. Accordingly, the outbreak of a war even
between India and Pakistan alone would be a matter of major
concern to the USSR; the possibility of an entry of Communist
China into the fighting would pose a most serious challenge.
24. If fighting broke out between India and Pakistan,
Moscow would probably seek, as it did in 1965, to get the
fighting stopped as soon as possible. It would likely again
cooperate with the US and other Western Powers in the UN to
this end, and would also exercise strong bilateral pressures
upon India and Pakistan themselves. Moscow would also prob-
ably try to deter the Chinese from any military intervention;
to this end Soviet forces along the Soviet-Chinese frontier
might undertake seemingly threatening moves. Whether or not
Moscow would choose to go farther to keep the Chinese out,
or what actions it would take if Peking did become militarily
involved in South Asia would depend on factors and circum-
stances which cannot now be foreseen. The nature of Soviet-
Chinese relations at the time; the apparent involvement
or non-involvement of the US; and immediate military develop-
ments with respect to Pakistan, India, and China would probably
all play important roles.
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25. In any event; Moscow will continue to play an
important political role in the subcontinent. Its efforts
to acquire more extensive political leverage seem likely to
increase. The continued existence of tensions between India
and Pakistan, and between India and China, will provide the
USSR the opportunities, and at times the hazards, of increased
involvement in South Asia -- probably to a greater extent than
the US. At the same time, both India and Pakistan will prob-
ably continue to want to balance their ties by seeking rea-
sonably good relations with Washington. In the event of
rising Indo-Pakistan tensions, and particularly if fighting
broke out, both would seek at least some form of diplomatic
support from the US. India in particular would press the US
for some kind of backing, support, or guarantees in the event
of possible Chinese intervention.
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MEMORANDUM FOR: The L rector
This is the memorandum I mentioned this
morning which was sent to Admiral Anderson.
ABBOT SMITH
Director
National Estimates
Attachment:
Memorandum, dated 1 March 71
"Indo-Pakistani Tensions, Present
and Future" I March 71
FORM lvl RELACES
BEMUSED.
(DATE)
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l' P?33004-71
PRESIDENT t S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY l3UA.1W
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