LETTER FOR HONORABLE RICHARD HELMS DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FROM HENRY A. KISSINGER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A000200030007-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2006
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: October 23, 1970
• Content Type: LETTER

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Fxerutive Rr?}stay
October 23, 1970
I jest. Wanted yon to know that I found the
ONE memorandum "Some Implications
of Population Trends in Poor Countries"
thoughtful and thought- provoking. Please
tell the people who drafted the memo that
I have react it and think it is a first-rate
job. As a result of the memo, I have
several follow-on questions which I will
be sending to you separately.
Warm regards,
Henry A. /Kis singer
Honorable Richard Helms
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
4 September 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SUBJECT: ATTACHED MEMORANDUM: SOME IMPLICATIONS OF
POPULATION TRENDS IN POOR COUNTRIES
1. After consultation with the Chairman of the United States
Intelligence Board and discussion with appropriate USIB representatives,
the Board of National Estimates concluded that subject paper would be
put in final form and disseminated as a memorandum, rather than as a
National Intelligence Estimate. This is clearly not the usual material
of Estimates, yet we regard the subject matter as important and urge
you to give the paper wide distribution.
2. The entry, NIE 6-70, which appears on the Program of National
Intelligence Estimates for the Third Quarter of 1970 (USIB-D-14.1/48,
dated 1 July 1970) should now be deleted.
ABBOT SMITH
Director
National Estimates
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L declassification
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Confidential
MEMORANDUM
OFFICE OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
Some Implications of Population Trends in Poor Countries
Confidential
1 September 1970
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
1 September 1970
SUBJECT: SOME IMPLICATIONS OF POPULATION TRENDS IN POOR COUNTRIES
This memorandum deals with problems that are increasingly
important in all our analyses of the prospects for poor countries
of the world, and in our judgments on their relations with the
rich countries as well. Though not based on intelligence data
in the narrower sense, the conclusions we draw here are relevant
to many intelligence estimates likely to be undertaken in the
future. We have, therefore, discussed the paper with the appropriate
representatives of the other USIB agencies; they are in general
agreement with its findings.
GROUP 1
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downgra ing an
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Page
SUMMARY ....................................................
I. THE POPULATION PROBLEM ................................
2
II. THE FOOD PROBLEM........... I ...........................
6
III. IMPLICATIONS OF RAPID POPULATION GROWTH ...............
10
A.
Urbanization and Unemployment .....................
10
B.
Effects on Economic Development.. .............
14
C.
Some'International Economic Implications ..........
17
D.
Some Broader Implications .........................
21
E.
Implications for the East-West Struggle ...........
27
TABLE I:
ESTIMATED ANNUAL RATES OF POPULATION GROWTH --
PER 1,000 ........................................
30
TABLE II: ESTIMATED RECENT ANNUAL RATES OF POPULATION
GROWTH -- PER 1,000 ..............................
31
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrad,i ng and
declassification
CONFIDENTIAL
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The unprecedented growth of world population is almost
certain to continue over the next decade and beyond. Most
of it will occur in the poor countries* because their death
rates are falling rapidly under the impact of cheap and
popular public health measures while the birth rates remain
very high, and are unlikely soon to diminish.
Thanks to the "green revolution," the food problem
appears less intractable than it did even a few years ago.
In most parts of the world, food production seems likely
to keep pace with population growth over the next decade.
But even if the growing population is fed, its sheer size
will bring about increases in urbanization and unemployment
so rapid as to pose grave challenges to the governments of
poor nations and, in many cases, lead to profound social and
political instability.
Economic development in these countries, a slow process
at best, will be further impeded. Hence the existing gap in
income, values and goals between the rich nations and the poor
is certain to widen. While there is little chance of direct
physical confrontation between the rich and the poor countries,
the rich (including the US) will find their interests involved
in the numerous local wars, ethnic conflicts, and other strife
that will almost certainly occur in the Third World as a conse-
quence, in part, of population pressures.
In this estimate the term "poor countries" includes all the
countries of Latin America, Africa (except South Africa), and
Asia (except for Japan and that part of Asia included in the
USSR). "Rich countries" are taken as the US, Canada, all of
Europe including the USSR, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and
South Africa.
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1. The population of the world is rising at an unprecedented
rate, and this is creating or intensifying a host of other fundamental
social, political, and economic problems. The most obvious problem is
that of food, but rapid population growth also means an aggravated
demand for education, health, and other services. Population growth
has stimulated urbanization and added to the mounting unemployment
problem in much of the world. And in various ways population pressures
are exacerbating international tensions, sharpening tribal and racial
hostilities, and complicating relations between the rich and poor
nations of the world.
2. The current burgeoning of population is primarily a phenomenon
of the poor countries of the world -- those in Africa, Asia, and Latin
America. In northern Europe, for example, population is growing about
0.6 percent a year while in Central America the rate is about 3.4 per-
cent.* Until very recently the poor countries were lands of high
birth rates and high death rates. Since World War II, and particularly
in the past decade, the widespread application of cheap and effective
public health measures has dramatically lowered death rates. Yet for
* See Tables I and II.
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a variety of reasons, mainly cultural, birth rates remain high in
most of the poor world.*
3. Clearly there is scant hope for a reversal or even a slowing
of the population growth in the poor countries until the birth rate
drops (or the death rises). The development of improved methods of
contraception in the past few decades would seem to offer a chance
for rapid reduction of the birth rate, and there are a few encouraging
indications in this direction. Sample surveys from some of the poor
countries of the world indicate that many women who already have
four or more living children are not anxious for more, though few of
them are likely to practice contraception. The estimated high rate
of abortion in much of Latin America indicates a willingness to take
drastic measures to limit family size. Some national governments
already are making efforts to promote family planning -- Taiwan,
Mauritius, and India among the most notable. Yet, even those govern-
ments which recognize rapid population growth as a national problem
find it very difficult to organize effective family planing programs.
The chart on the following page and the chart which follows
page Z5 are from Finance and Development, Quarterly No. 4,
published by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank
Group. The data resented. eiozld. be considered illustrative.
Population statistics for Third World countries are of uneven
quality.
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TRENDS OF BIRTHS, DEATH AND NATURAL
INCREASE RATES IN SELECTED COUNTRIES
(Per thousand)
60 0 UNITED STATES - UNITED KINGDOM
5
40
30 -
SWEDEN
20 dommmmm_
10 J .............. I...... I.........r-
0 I I I I 1 I I I I I
'40 '45 '50 '55 '60 '65 '70 '40 '45 '50 '55 '60 '65 '70
60 FRANCE
50
40
30
20^?~
10 '?? ..........................
0 1 1 1 I 1 I I 1 I
'40 '45 '50 '55 '60 '65 '70 '40 '45 '50 '55 '60 '65 '70
60 INDIA
30
20 ""??.. 1 -1.
MALAYSIA
0 1 1 1 I I I I 1 I
'40 '45 '50 '55 '60 '65 '70 '40 '45 '50 '55 '60 '65 '70
60
50
40
30
20
10
TUNISIA MEXICO
0 I I I I I I I I I
. . . . . . . . . . ....... . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . -10
I I I 1 I
'40 '45 '50 '55 '60 '65 '70
CHINA, REPUBLIC OF
/,,,?.,.
I I I I 1
'40 '45 '50 '55 '60 '65
UNITED ARAB REP.
'70
- 60
- 50
40
30
20
10
I I I I 1 0
'40 '45 '50 '55 '60 '65 '70
COSTA RICA 60
50
40
30
20
?8,..,,,, 10
Birth Rate "\\...\.. Death Rate
78557 6-70
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4. Many other governments, including most in Africa and Latin
America, appear unconcerned about the rapid increase in their popu-
lations. Indeed, some welcome it. The notion that large means
"great" in terms of prestige among nations still has a considerable
hold on the minds of rulers. Many of them view population growth in
terms of larger markets or labor forces, ignoring considerations of
effective demand or manpower efficiency. Hence, they frequently
resent the preaching of foreigners about birth control. Some increas-
ingly nationalistic spokesmen in the poor countries see these projects
as a form of biological imperialism.* Thus, despite the strenuous
efforts of the World Bank and others concerned by the population
explosion, it is likely to be many years before most governments in
Africa, Latin America, and Asia actively promote birth control.
5. Even where governments espouse family planning and offer
inducements to keep families small, the sheer number of individuals
who must be reached and convinced presents enormous organizational,
financial, and manpower problems. Coercion, in the form of sterility
additives to food or water supplies, has already been seriously
suggested by some in the US and Europe, but is most unlikely to be
The following are examples of this point of view:
"To tell you my blunt opinion, birth control propaganda is part
of an insidious plan to cut down the black population of the
world." New Nigerian, 5 November Z969.
"No one, no nation is going to tell Brazil what is best for
Brazilians. That's up to us to decide. And this whole question
of birth control that you Americans talk so much about is simply
an effort to exert your influence on us." Reported by The
Christian Science Monitor,'27 December 2969.
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adopted soon. To the extent that the decision is left up to
individuals, tradition, culture, and social attitudes which largely
govern family size can be expected to change only slowly. In much
of Latin America, for example, there are strong cultural barriers
to the concept of population limitations. Many Latins, Arabs, and
others feel that men are really men only if they have a large number
of offspring. Moreover, in many agrarian cultures, a goodly number
of sons is considered necessary to ensure a labor supply and security
in one's old age.
6. For all these reasons, it is highly unlikely that the rate
of population growth in the poor countries will be slowed during
the next decade or so, and it may even rise. The total world popu-
lation in 1970 is about 3.6 billion, of which around 2.6 billion
live in the poor countries. According to UN projections, which
assume a continuing decline of death rates and continuing high
fertility, there will be some 3.4 billion in the poor countries by
1980 and about 3.9 billion by 1985.
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II. THE FOOD PROBLEM
7. The virtual certainty of continued rapid population growth
in Africa, Latin America, and Asia raises questions about feeding
the additional multitudes. Thus far, food production in these lands
has about kept pace -- except for natural disasters such as the
failure of the monsoon in South Asia for two successive years, localized
droughts, and politically caused famines such as the one in Biafra. By
and large, sales or gifts from the stocks of the rich countries have
made up the shortfalls. But, in the years ahead, the quantities of
additional food required will be so large that the rich countries will
almost certainly not be both willing and able to supply them.
8. Clearly it will be up to the poor countries to provide most
of the food themselves. Will they be able to do so? According to
most expert opinion, it is technically possible not only to feed the
world's multitudes but also to improve the general level of nutrition
within the next decade or so. This is the "green revolution", i.e.,
the rapid adoption of high-yielding seeds, fertilizers, herbicides
and pesticides, water control, and other measures in the poor countries.*
Methods for increasing production of protein from the sea, by
such means as fish farming, seaweed cultivation, etc., are
also part of,the new technology. If concerted and well-funded
scientific.and technological programs are instigated, food from
the sea could be considerably increased, but this is unlikely
to provide a panacea for the populations of the poor countries.
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9. Technical feasibility is, however, only one aspect of a
very complex set of problems which the "green revolution" poses.
The application of advanced agricultural techniques requires revolu-
tionary changes in national priorities and vast improvements in
administrative performance. Most of the poor countries probably
could finance the essential investments in irrigation, land reclama-
tion, fertilizer and chemical plants. But this would call for mobiliza-
tion of resources at an unprecedented level and a drastic shift in
public spending in the direction of agriculture. Aid from the rich
countries would of course ease the burden, but the bulk of the effort
would have to come from within the poor countries themselves.
10. Political and social obstacles are formidable. Hard decisions
between economic and social objectives are already confronting many of
the poor countries, and new agricultural programs which are economically
efficient may have high social or political cost. In India, for
example, where the new, high-yielding seeds and technology contributed
to bumper crops in the past few years, most of the gains have been
made by the relatively rich farmers who had more land and better
credit. For tenants and sharecroppers this "green revolution" has
sometimes meant higher rents, or expulsion, as the owners have
extended the more efficient new methods to more of their land.
Moreover, economic disparities between regions have widened -- those
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with natural advantages have forged ahead, while depressed regions
stagnated. Mexico has experienced similar difficulties in intro-
ducing high-yielding seeds. Its agricultural output has risen
impressively, but the tenant farmers and laborers have not benefited.
11. The increased disparities in living standards which the
agricultural revolution creates in the countryside is contributing
to rural unrest and may hasten migration to the cities. Further, in
countries such as India where votes matter, competing demands from
city-dwellers and proponents of industry tend to reduce the attention
and funds that are devoted to agriculture. Moreover, once a food
crisis passes; attention and funds may be diverted from agriculture,
creating a stop-go pattern inimical to sustained progress.
12. In a few countries or areas where favorable climatic,
organizational, and financial conditions exist, agricultural produc-
tion may increase drastically as it did in Taiwan. Some countries,
now in deficit, will produce surplus food. Others will fall behind
and need external aid to maintain even current nutritional levels.
In the more sparsely populated countries -- including most of Africa,
much of Latin America, and parts of Asia -- gradual, less expensive
and less technologically demanding changes in agriculture are likely
to suffice to maintain roughly current levels of nutrition for some
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years. In some of these countries, more land can be brought under
cultivation relatively easily, fa i ow periods may be shortened,
new crops may be introduced to maintain soil fertility, and so on.
13. But the amount of land suitable for permanent agriculture
is limited, particularly in the tropics. The danger here, especially
where the soil is thin or exposed to extremes of temperature and
rainfall, is that if population pressure on the land rises faster
than agricultural techniques change, large areas may be destroyed.
This has already happened or begun in parts of Africa, in Mexico,
in Brazil and in Pakistan. The deserts are growing and erosion has
ruined thousands, perhaps millions, of acres for crops or even
pastures.
14. The prospects for the densely populated areas, especially
in the longer run, must be considered doubtful. There, most arable
land is already under cultivation and raising output will require
complex new technology -- bringing more land under irrigation, or
extending the growing period by supplemental water storage, for
example. Not only do such changes cost more per acre, they also
require a higher level of social and political organization to
carry out. Nevertheless, the "green revolution" began in these
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countries; they are more conscious of a food problem, and they
are likely to get most of whatever outside aid is available. If
they bring themselves to give their highest priority to agricultural
development, and then sustain that priority, they may manage to
maintain current levels of nutrition over the next decade.
15. In effect, then, the "green revolution" appears capable
of buying time in the race between population growth and food
production. But the very process of achieving this goal will generate
or exacerbate other problems. For one thing, the effect on the world
environment of greatly increased use of fertilizers and insecticides
required by the new technology is likely to be considerable. For
another, if food is available world population will go on increasing
for a long time, even though family size may begin to decline. This,
in turn, will intensify further problems associated with population
growth such as unemployment and rapid urbanization.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF RAPID POPULATION GROWTH
A. Urbanization and Unemployment
16. The implications of rapid population growth in terms of
urbanization and unemployment are more pressing than the food prob-
lem in many of the poor countries. A major impetus to urbanization
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is the sheer increase in the numbers of the population which
causes many to leave traditional villages insearch of food or work
in the cities. The process is facilitated by the contemporary
revolution in communications, i.e., the spread in recent years of
transistor radios, newspapers, advertising, and better roads, which
lure the countryman to the bright lights of the city. The "green
revolution" itself may drive some people off the land and into the
cities. The urban-oriented policies of some governments, e.g.,
subsidization of urban food prices, tend to add to the urban flow.
17. The rise of cities in the poor countries of the world today
is a vastly different phenomenon from the process of urbanization
in Western Europe, the US, and Japan. There the cities grew largely
as a response to industrial, commercial or administrative demands,
and fulfilled specific economic requirements. The typical city in
a poor country in 1970 has a core of such activity, but is also a
vast collecting pool of unemployed, partially unemployed, and many
whose vague hopes of employment are dimming, but who have no other
place to go. Hence, the vast shanty-towns in and around the cities
are spreading. Though sanitary conditions are generally miserable,
the birth rate in the cities of the poor countries is probably at
least as high as in the hinterland, and the death rate appears lower.
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The urban population in these countries has grown five-fold since
1920, and in the coming decade the cities will probably grow at
about twice the rate of total population.
18. A number of governments are already attempting to slow
migration to the cities but few have had even short term success.
Even in the Soviet Union and South Africa, where governments have
far more effective control over the movement of the populace than
the poor countries can aspire to for many years, cities continue
to outgrow official plans. There seems scant prospect, then, for
the reversal of the trend towards urbanization.
19. The urban multitudes already pose serious problems for
their governments. For one thing, they expect more goods and
services -- housing, schools, clinics, water supplies and the like
-- than rural people and have a greater potential for backing up
these demands with demonstrations and riots. Most governments of
the poor countries have espoused some of the welfare standards
of the rich states, and many are attempting to meet them. To the
extent that they.do, even more people are likely to head for the
cities. Moreover, unless productive jobs (as opposed to the
multitude of errand boys, servants, beggars and thieves) can be
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found for the city dwellers, they will constitute a large potential
drain on government budgets- a drain which would reduce funds
available for investment in agriculture, industry, and services.
Thus, what has until recently seemed primarily a food-population
problem is likely to.have even greater impact as an employment-
population problem.
20. To the extent that governments are unable to cope with
the expectations, however unrealistic, of the urban masses, the
spectre rises of mobs swarming out of slums and shanty-towns to
show their discontent. Though apathy normally prevails among the
bulk of the suffering urbanites,.the flash point of violence in
many of the world's cities seems to be getting lower, and the
danger seems to be growing that minor incidents can quickly turn
into revolutionary challenges to authority. Unemployed school-
leavers and graduates tend to flock to the cities and this group
is likely to have far more potential for fomenting unrest and un-
seating governments than their illiterate and less ambitious country
cousins. The current great fascination with education in much of
the poor world will almost certainly continue and will produce
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hordes of self-styled intellectuals, many of them either
unemployed or unsuitably employed, who will be harder and harder
to manage.
21. It seems likely, therefore, that the most striking
political ramifications of the population explosion in the poor
countries will be exhibited in the cities. It is difficult at
this stage to foresee what kind of urban agitations will arise,
how widespread they will be, or what effect they will have upon
the political institutions of the nations of Latin America, Africa,
or Asia. Some states may simply be overwhelmed by an outpouring
of urban discontent, and pass through periods of anarchy. In
some cases popular pressures may force established rulers out of
office, and install demagogues who in turn are unable to satisfy
popular demands. In some cases, perhaps many cases, the end-
products will be tough authoritarian regimes, maintaining order
by repression.
B. Effects on Economic Development
22. The fact of rapid population growth does not, in and of
itself, constitute an obstacle to economic development; there are
a number of examples from the past -- some of them in US experience
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-- where trends in population and in economic growth have moved
smartly upward together. But for this to happen the additions
made to the labor force must prove to be large enough and
productive enough to outweigh the additional demands on the
consumption side. And in the circumstances now prevailing in almost
all of the poor countries, the opposite will be the case: new incre-
ments of population will generate consumption increases markedly
larger than the production increases. This will occur partly be-
cause of the patterns of population growth which are characteristic
there, and partly because of the fundamental political-economic
conditions upon which these patterns will impinge.
23. In Africa, in Latin America, and in South Asia, at least
40 percent of the population is less than 15 years old. (The
comparable figure for Europe is 26 percent.) With each new year,
moreover, there are many more new mouths waiting to be fed and
many more new hands waiting to be trained before the many more
new bodies are able to labor productively. Efforts in these back-
ward countries simply to maintain the existing low standards in
schools, housing, health and social services absorb constantly
increasing funds from national budgets. And these governments,
like the governments of richer nations, are under heavy pressures
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AGE STRUCTURE OF POPULATION IN SELECTED REGIONS
AGE
GROUP
Latin America Inl 3%
41%
North America r1q 6%
M
63%
31%
80 plus
75-79
70-74
65-69
60-64
55-59
50-54
45-49
40-44
35-39
30-34
25-29
20-24
15-19
10-14
5-9
0-4
80 plus
7579
70-74
65-69
60-64
55-59
50-54
45-49
40-44
35-39
3034
25-29
20-24
15-19
10-14
5-9
0-4
80 plus
75-79
70 74
65-69
60-64
55-59
50-54
45-49
40-44
35-39
30-34
25-29
20-24
15-19
10-14
5-9
0-4
Africa A 4%
Europe F--; 11%
U.S.S.R.
26%
5%
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from their citizenry to improve, rather than simply maintain,
24. The need which most of these governments see to emphasize
social investment sharply limits the public investment they can
make in industry and economic infrastructure. In few cases, more-
over, are either private investment from internal sources, or invest-
ment funds from abroad, likely to take up the slack. The general
tendency to increasing political unrest (discussed above in
paragraphs 19-21)can only discourage new private investment, whether
from domestic or foreign sources. Strongly nationalistic attitudes
and the proliferation of laws regulating the activities of foreign
firms are a further deterrent to private investment from outside.
Certainly foreign governments and international banking institutions
will continue to provide some economic and technical aid, but all
indications are that the magnitude of such assistance is likely to
diminish in the years ahead.
25. In short, the economic outlook for much of the poor wrold
appears dismal indeed. Of course, there will be exceptions. In
some countries progress has been comparatively rapid over the
past few decades and chances are it will continue. A few, such
as Taiwan, Iran, possibly Turkey, seem to have broken out of poverty
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and stagnation. More will probably do so in the next decade or
so, particularly those that have rich mineral deposits, or are
successful in attracting large amounts of foreign investment.
C. Some International Economic Implications
26. Even so, the income gap between the rich countries,
which will have a diminishing proportion of the world's population,
and the great majority of the poor countries is almost certain to
widen over the next decade and beyond. In a few of the very poor
countries, where expectations of development have never been great,
the widening gap may not cause much discontent. But elsewhere in
the poor world, where hopes have been raised but where conditions
will not improve fast enough to satisfy important groups of the
populace, resentments are likely to build and to be directed both
toward the national rulers and toward the rich countries.
27. Over the years the poverty, deprivation and general
misery of the increasing billions in the poor countries will continue
to have an impact on the consciences of many in the rich countries.
The rich countries, however, are limited in what they can do to
end or substantially ease the misery in the great bulk of the poor
world within the next decade or so. Unless local attitudes and
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institutions are geared. to population control and to changes
conducive to economic development, loans and grants seem to have
less than the desired effect, although they may buy time.
28. How then are the resentments of the poor countries toward
the rich likely to find expression? Some have suggested that the
poor might band together to deny their products and thus force
the rich countries to be more forthcoming. This seems most unlikely
on several counts. The poor need markets in the rich countries far
more than vice versa and, by and large, they know it. Most of the
remarkable increase in world trade over the past several decades
has taken place among the rich countries. The share of the poor
countries in international trade has generally declined, and they
are pressing for greater access to markets in rich countries, not
less. Few indeed are the agricultural products of the poor coun-
tries that are indispensable to the rich. And for those few, there
are so many producers that united, sustained action seems most
unlikely.
29. The case could be different for certain minerals, notably
oil. Here, a small number of the poor countries could be in a
position to disrupt the economies of certain rich countries by
withholding the needed supply. Combined action to withhold oil by
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the Arab states of the Middle East and North Africa could, for
example, have severe impact on the rich countries of Western
Europe, though only relatively minor effect on the US. Disruptive
action of this kind will be a possibility, rather than a probability,
in the foreseeable future. The countries which would have to be
involved are strongly dependent on the income produced by maintaining
a high level of exports of the particular commodity. Most Arab oil
producers participated in an oil embargo immediately after the
June 1967 war, but this proved to be short-lived because oil revenues
were needed to help rebuild Arab military establishments as well as
for the customary uses,
30. If indeed the rich countries are subjected to a denial
or interruption of supply of a key commodity, this is more likely
to result from moves by the governments of poor countries against
the foreign companies extracting the minerals. The ownership of
the copper mines in Chile has already been "Chileanized"; before
many more years have passed, most of the mines will almost certainly
be entirely nationalized. The government of Libya has been putting
heavy new pressure on US oil companies operating there and has been
seeking to expand the role of its own small national oil company;
a sudden move to nationalize one or another of the US companies
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would not come as a surprise. These are but two of many straws
in the wind. While the governments of most of the poor countries
continue to acknowledge the usefulness of foreign private invest-
ment, they are becoming increasingly antagonistic toward the big
foreign firms -- especially toward those in the extractive indus-
tries. Accusations that foreign companies are exploiting irreplaceable
national resources have become more and more common. Rising nation-
alistic sentiments and frustrations over the slow course of develop-
ment add to the hostility against the big international corporations.
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D. Some Broader Implications
31. The population surge in the poor countries of the world
is not only widening the gap in income between them and the rich
countries, but is perpetuating or intensifying other gaps in values
and goals. This is not to say that the world is tending toward a
complete cleavage between rich and poor. Obviously, the fundamental
power rivalry between the US and the USSR will take its course
regardless of the plight of the poor countries. The US and South
Africa, though both considered as rich countries in this estimate,
will continue to differ drastically in their views on human rights.
Sharp differences of economic policy and national interests will
probably cause rifts between the US and Japan, or between the US
and the Western European Common Market.
32. The growing disparities between the rich countries and
the poor are likely to cause problems of a different type. The
US will find some of them serious, others merely annoying. For
example, the poor, collectively and individually, are likely
increasingly to ignore or flout hard-won international conventions
which are valued by the US and other rich countries. In this
category are difficulties with Mexico over illegal border-crossers
seeking work in the US, the concerted effort to expel South Africa
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from the Universal Postal Union last year, and claims to territorial
waters or air space far grander than international law has heretofore
accepted. The upcoming conference on maritime law is likely to
become another of these examples. Unconstitutional or otherwise
disruptive behavior in the UN and other international organizations
is likely to increase and could disrupt their work. Diplomatic
incidents -- attacks on, or kidnappings of, travelers or officials
-- are also likely to increase and national leaders more often to
be subjected to physical attack. Such aggressive behavior will
probably stem as much from rising nationalism as from frustration
of the poor countries over their own poverty or over what they
would regard as inadequate help from the rich. Population pressures
in the poor countries will be only one of the ingredients in this
developing scenario but it may be a powerful contributor.
33. All this will pose new and complicated challenges to US
foreign policy. In particular, the time-honored goals of expanding
the number of friends of the US and of promoting the prestige of
the US abroad will be very difficult to maintain. At least in
part as a result of their inabilities to cope with problems flowing
from over-population, many poor countries are virtually certain
to take more nationalistic and xenophobic measures, aimed particularly
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against the US. These are likely to be ill-conceived, emotionally
based and sporadic harassments, rather than planned or orchestrated
programs of anti-Americanism.
34. The US will, moreover, be playing a lead role in yet
another emerging conflict of interest between rich and poor.
Concern about pollution of air, water, and soil is mounting rapidly
in the rich countries, and some aspects -- oceanic and atmospheric
pollution in particular -- are viewed as global problems. The
next decade is likely to see efforts by-the rich countries to
curtail such identifiable pollutants as came from fossil fuels
and insecticides. Few in the poor countries share these concerns,
and it will be difficult to persuade them to abandon practices
they regard as essential. The poor countries, for example, are
coming to consider insecticides and fertilizer vital to agricultural
growth. Nations which have just begun to appreciate their impact
on yields are unlikely to give them up no matter what the benefits
may be to lower links in the food chain. Some Africans, Asians,
and Latin Americans will see the antipollution drive as but another
devious imperialist trick to keep the poor world poor.
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35. Most of the poor world is just beginning to exploit
advanced technology and is far from being concerned with con-
servation or pollution. In the more developed areas of Mexico,
for example, air and water pollution are increasing while little
thought is given to erosion or environmental deterioration.
To the extent that poor countries succeed in adopting modern
technology, this sort of side-effect is certain to become
more serious. Yet, to governments struggling with massive
internal problems caused by population growth and economic
backwardness, the lure of the "green revolution" and of
industrialization are strong indeed. They are following the
ways of the developed world, a world which discovered pollu-
tion to be a serious menace only after decades of thoughtless
polluting. Now that they are embarked on what they see as the
only escape route from poverty, they will find it intolerable
to be told not to follow that route.
36. As the richest of the rich nations, the US is likely to
be the most visible target of the wrath the poor come to feel over
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their many plights, as well as the recipient of the most urgent
requests for help. But most other rich countries will also encounter
fallout from the problems caused or exacerbated by the population
explosion. To many observers, the widening gap between the rich
and the poor poses grave threats to international order. This
stark division between haves and have-nots cannot, in their view,
be neglected without tragic consequences for the world.
37. For some, at least, this implies a physical confrontation
between the rich minority and the poor majority. But is this
realistic? Is the security of the US or any other rich country
likely to be threatened by an assault of one or more of the over-
populated nations? The problem of physical distance is a decisive
deterrent in most cases; they simply couldn't get at us. In others,
the military capabilities of the richer country are likely to
restrain the multitudes from poorer nearby states. In short, there
have always been richer and poorer countries. Rich minorities
have always been surrounded by an ocean of human poverty. There
are few ways by which the poor can by their own efforts directly
hurt the physical security of the rich. A cataclysmic Armaggeddon
is almost inconceivable.
38. Antogonisms and conflicts between states in the poor
world will almost certainly be a cause of greater concern for
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the US. Population pressures upon land will in some areas of the
poor world become intolerable, and the migration to cities cannot
entirely alleviate such pressures. If some countries appear to
have surplus land, this may tempt overpopulated neighbors to move
in, either as migrants or as invaders. There are already few
desirable habitable areas of the world not now occupied, and there
will be even fewer in the decades ahead. There may be considerable
contention over the remaining thinly inhabited lands, particularly
if historic claims can be invoked, or deep-seated religious or
ethnic antagonisms are involved. Burgeoning population and
unemployment appear to have played some role in the recent clash
between Salvador and Honduras and certainly were a factor in the
Nigerian Civil War. In the next several decades there will likely
be a proliferation of border disputes, ethnic conflicts, and
nationalistic adventures, partly caused by pent-up frustrations
of overpopulated societies.
39. The protagonists in these minor wars will often seek
to involve the rich countries by appeals to humanitarian concerns
or attempts to entangle rival great powers in the conflict. The
continuing dispute between India and Pakistan illustrates the
type of diplomatic problem such poor nation quarrels can cause.
And the outlook is for many more. The task of policy-makers in
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the rich countries will be further complicated in some cases by
emotional appeals from the contending poor countries on issues of
race, religion, and language.
40. Racial antagonisms are likely to persist and may intensify
in the next decade regardless of population pressures. The coin-
cidence that most of the nations beset by rapid population increase
are colored -- black, brown, or yellow -- and the rich world is
conspicuously white will add racial overtones to many of the issues
and conflicts between the poor and the rich countries.
E. Implications for the East-West Struggle
41. Certain of the poor countries are likely, at some stage
of their irritation with the US, to turn for help to the Soviet
Union. This will mean additional Soviet opportunities to displace
Western interests and influence, but it almost certainly will not
lead to any meaningful and militant new alliances directed against
the US. The fears of a decade ago that the USSR might use aid and
trade inducements to throw Western interests out of the under-
developed world and then deny us its resources now seem less valid.
The Soviets appear highly reluctant to reduce trade barriers at the
request of poor countries or to expand economic aid very much --
yet both are measures which seem prerequisite to a major Soviet
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effort to gain significant influence in the poor and population
burdened world. Moreover, the rising nationalism and self-assertiveness
of some of the poor countries are likely to make their relations with
the Soviets nearly as difficult as with us. It is fairly common in
the poor countries today to lump the USSR with the "rich and selfish
West" and to subject it to similar criticism.
42. The Soviets will probably be far more successful in
helping to diminish the influence of the US in a number of the
poor countries than they will be in replacing it with their own
influence. In responding to requests for handouts, Moscow will
probably continue to be quite selective. The future Soviet policy
is much more likely to be one of taking advantage of individual
openings to enhance their standing in particular countries than
one of undertaking a crusade throughout the underdeveloped world.
The price tag on a major aid program to countries deeply caught
up in the population explosion would be extremely high, and the
rewards for the USSR uncertain at best.
43. There is, however, another possible combination of
circumstances involving the poor countries which could, over time,
pose a danger to US national security interests. This possibility
would involve Communist China rather than the USSR. It is at least
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conceivable that China, if it regains power and internal cohesion,
might one day seek to become the champion of the world's poor.
The concept of an alliance among the non-white, poor, and burgeoning
nations against the imperialistic, domineering, rich, and largely
white community may again appeal to some. Its earlier brief
manifestations as the Bandung spirit, and as other constellations
of Afro-Asian-Latin American groupings, went by the board as China
turned inward.
44. But if, in the next decade or two, the US appears less
disposed to play a major role in the poor countries, if China
formulates a more coherent foreign policy, and if such a policy
attracts poor non-white nations, then a collaboration of the kind
envisaged at Bandung could indeed significantly alter the world
power structure. For example, a cohesive and determined China,
possessed of a nuclear arsenal and supporting the demands of the
poor for more aid and trade concessions, might force the rich to
modify their policies. Such an arrangement would be in accord with
the Maoist doctrine of pitting the "rural" world against the rich
"urban" world. While such a development now seems unlikely, it
cannot be entirely ruled out because, in many ways, China is the
great unknown of the coming decades.
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ESTIMATED ANNUAL RATES OF POPULATION
GROWTH -- PER 1,000)
1800-1850
1850-1900
1900-1920
1920-1930
1930-1940
1940-1950
WORLD
3-5
6-7
6-7
11
11
10
Africa
0-1
5-7
0-8
10
10
15
North America
30
23
19
14
8
14
Latin America
7-11
13
19
18
19
21
Asia
2-4
4-5
3-6
10
12
13
Europe and
USSR
7
8
7
9
8
0
Rounded
SOURCE: Cambridge Economic History, Volume III, page 58
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ESTIMATED RECENT ANNUAL RATES OF POPULATION
GROWTH -- PER 1,000
1950-1960
1960-1967
Industrialized Countries
12
12
North America
18
14
Western Europe
7
11
Poor Countries
22
25
Africa
23
24
South Asia
19
24
East Asia
25
27
Latin America
28
29
Middle East
30
29
17
20
SOURCE: World Bank, Annual Report 1969
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