GMAIC CONTRIBUTION TO NIE 4 - 3 - 61

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00961A001100120011-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 24, 2000
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: July 20, 1961
• Content Type: NIE

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20 July 1961
GMAIC CONTRIBUTION TO NIE 4 ? 3 v 61
Scope Note
This contribution is concerned only with the capabilities of "Nth"
countries, singly or in combination to develop and produce guided missiles
systems capable of delivering nuclear weapons. In most instances the
capability in question is that of delivering a nuclear warhead on key
targets within the USSR. However, in certain countries 25X6
he potential enemy is nearer at hand and missiles of shorter range than
:hose required to reach the USSR would be significant.
It is assumed for the purpose of this estimate that a nuclear warhead
for a missile developed by an "Nth" country would weigh 3000 to 5000 lbs.
The development of a missile system could precede the development of
a nuclear weapon by an "Nth" country and would not necessarily be
contingent upon the development of the nuclear component.
Of the countries considered by JAEIC to have a potential nuclear
-,,weapons capability, only the following countries are believed to have a
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GUIDED MISSILE AND ASTRONAUTICS INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
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sufficient potential for guided missile production to warrant treatment
in any detail in this contribution:
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With the exception of France and to a lesser degree.
Communist China, none of the countries considered is believed to have
taken more than preliminary steps toward the development of an offensive
missile capability of any significance. The quality of the evidence
available to make missile delivery capability estimates varies considerably
among the countries considered. In general, we believe that the more
advanced countries under consideration could develop a 200- 500 nautical
mile missile in five years from the time of its inception if the program
were given a very high priority. About 8-9 years after decision would
be required by these countries to develop longer range ballistic missiles.
Less developed countries would require somewhat longer periods to
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develop ballistic missiles of these types.
The development of a submarine launched missile capability by
any of the more advanced countries will in large measure be dictated
by the status of submarine technology in that country. Compatible
cruise missiles will be relatively easier to develop than ballistic
missiles if there is already available an adequate background in
aircraft development.
The quantity production of missiles would require an additional
year or so after an initial capability had been achieved. We believe
that economic limitations would hamper any missile program undertaken
by individual "Nth" countries, but we have made no forecast of the
manner in which these countries are Likely to allocate their resources
in the 1961-1971 period.
The general effect of assistance from the U. S. or USSR would
be to shorten the time required for "Nth" countries to acquire an
operational capability. We cannot be more precise than that because
the nature of the aid would be crucial in determining the speed with
which an operational capability could be acquired by individual countries.
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FRANCE
The French have indicated that they are engaged in the early
phases of development of a nuclear powered ballistic missile submarine.
The current status and success of the missile aspects of this project
is unknown. We estimate that this weapon system could be operational
n
by 1970. There is no evidence that a sub-launched cruise missile is
being developed.
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SWEDEN
Sweden today has the scientific, technical and industrial capacity
to develop the missiles under discussion before the end of the period of
this estimate if she were willing to engage in an all-out effort. To date
Sweden's efforts have been directed toward the development of defensive
capabilities, she has developed a number of air defense. and short range
surface-to-surface tactical missiles up to a 150 n. m. missile operational
since 1958. However, the government decided last year to suspend
development of newer types of air defense missiles and to rely on purchases
abroad to fulfill Swedish requirements. If Sweden were to embark on a
development program for long range missiles, she would have considerable
difficulty in locating and establishing a test range for these missiles.
Although there is no evidence of such development, a cruise type
:urace-to-surface missile system with a range of a few hundred miles,
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capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. could be developed and installed
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COMMUNIST CHINA
We believe that Communist China will go forward with the
development of ballistic missiles. probably concentrating initially on
a i-missile with a range of 200-500 miles capable of carrying a fission
warhead. We believe they could have such missiles after 1963,; or with
,'4siderable Soviet assistance somewhat earlier. We do not believe
way could, by themselves, produce a 6500 n. m. missile necessary to
, ,- ve them a capability against the U. S. within the period of this estimate.
:UROPEAN COMBINATION
F or the foreseeable future European cooperative ventures
~rvolving rocketry are likely to be limited to the field of space exploration.
aA zeserves on this date.
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However, the fringe benefits to individual members in economic and
missile delivery capabilities may well have far reaching implications
in the near future.
The January 1961 Strassbourg Proposals sponsored by Great
Britain and France for the development of a European space program
has now acquired the official support of West Germany and plans for a
European Space Research Organization (ESRO) are moving ahead.
Original plans, not yet finally accepted by the group, envision
the investment of about $200, 000, 000 over a 5 year period for the
construction of a three stage vehicle and other initial expenses. A
proposal has been made that the first stage be based on the British
'Inlue Streak", the second stage on an improved version of the French
"'Veronique" and the third stage of a new design. The costs of this
project estimated by the group is as follows:
Millions of dollars
First Stage
109. 5
Second Stage
35.8
Third Stage
17.9
Experimental Rockets
19.9
Sundry Expenses
15. 9
199.0
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The initial planned contribution of individual states for a five
year program are as follows:
Million of dollars
Great Britain 66.5
France - 41.0
West Germany 37.7
Italy 19.5
Spain 5.9
Sweden 5.8
Belgium 5.6
Netherlands 5.2
Switzerland 4. 5
Denmark 2.7
Austria 2.6
Norway 2.0
TOTAL 199.0
At a meeting of the ESRO at The Hague in May 1961, the principal
features of this program were set forth as follows:
First year - ZO probes into the outer atmosphere
Second year 50 atmospheric probes
Third year - orbiting of a small satellite
Sixth year - orbiting of a large satellite
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No manned space experiments were envisioned in the program. It was
proposed that ranges be located (a) at Kiruna, Sweden and possibly in
Greenland for auroral studies (b) in the Canary Islands for polar and
equatorial orbits and (c) at Colomb-Bechar in the Sahara for small
satellite launchings.
We estimate that initial launching of a vertical probe under the
auspices of the ESRO could occur in late 1962 or early 1963.
The time and economic burden involved in a space program would
be substantially reduced by this cooperative venture. The important
question is how much could the knowledge gained by the participating
members aid them in acquiring independent missile delivery capabilities.
The use of the "Blue Streak" as a booster for a European space launcher
would contribute to the knowledge of the participating nations concerning
the technology of large rockets. However, it is unlikely that this knowledge
d
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could or would be put to military use by the individual nation in the
Although France has an active missile development program underway,
she seems to be heavily committed to solid propellants for military
missiles. The other smaller nations, with the possible exception of
Sweden, are not now capable of exploiting the information they might
acquire from "Blue Streak".
There is little question that the general state-of-the-art in
rocketry among the European nations will be given a boost by their
participation in a cooperative program of space exploration. Moreover,
it reduces the major political and technical obstacles which would face
an independent effort.
OTHER COUNTRIES
Italy has some capability to develop and produce the smaller
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types of guided missiles under construction, but her resources would
be severely strained if she were to undertake an independent program
for the development of large missiles. Italy could, however. make
a significant contribution to a joint project with other European
countries as a supplier of small components,
The Netherlands would also be able to make a significant
contribution to a joint European missile effort, especially in electronics.
India has no native potential for missile development within the
period of this estimate.
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